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ABSTRACT
Environmental regulations are typically portrayed as an outside force stimulating development of
environmental technologies in regulated industries. In reality, firms influence regulation by
communicating their technological progress, which helps form a basis for future standards. Because of
differences in each firm's technological capability and environmental performance, regulations affect the
competitive position of firms. Firms with advanced technologies stand to gain competitive benefit from
more stringent environmental regulations, and may therefore choose to introduce a more costly but
cleaner technology ahead of regulation. Such a competitive regulatory strategy has the potential to bring
competitive benefits to the lead firm(s) and environmental benefits to the public.
This research explains the conditions under which competitive regulatory strategies are pursued in the
diesel vehicle and fuel industry. Growing public concern about the health effects of diesel exhaust has led
countries to implement several cycles of increasingly stringent emission and fuel regulations over the past
two decades. Taking a comparative case study approach, this work studies multiple regulatory cycles for
light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty engines, and diesel fuel sulfur in the European Union, Japan, and the
United States. For each region's regulatory cycles, cases of corporate behavior, including early adoption,
first-mover behavior, and noncompliance, are identified and analyzed for their context, motivation,
influence on regulatory policy, and public and private effects. Source material consists of documentary
sources, descriptive statistics, and semi-structured interviews with experts. This methodology generates
multiple cases for comparison across countries, cycles, sectors, and firms.
While early- and first-mover behavior was observed in the regulatory cycles, firms do not aggressively
pursue competitive regulatory strategies. They are guided by other motivations, such as fiscal incentives,
diesel market share protection, and technology development/testing. A weak business case, risk aversion,
industry pressure, and lack of supporting infrastructure pose strong disincentives. The final
recommendations address issues pertinent to regulators, firms, and environmental groups: fiscal
incentives as an effective means to encourage rapid technology adoption; environmental NGOs as a
vehicle for communicating technological progress; use of technology demonstrations by lead firms to
show regulatory readiness; and combination of short-term and long-term targets with mechanisms to
encourage technology-based competition.
Thesis Committee:
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction
1.1 Research motivation
The environmental regulatory process is often characterized as a struggle between the
regulators and the regulated. Regulatory stringency may offer greater health and environmental
protection while imposing higher costs on industry. As a result, industry will often press for
more lenient standards or extended compliance time. The international regulatory community
and industry have searched for a more cooperative standard-setting process, where both sides can
agree on mutually acceptable targets. Negotiations and cooperative agreements have become
popular, but resulting standards have often been criticized as not challenging enough. Interaction
between regulators and firms is plagued by information asymmetry, because firms have more
information about their ability to meet regulations than regulators do. In an effort to reach a
collective decision, such standards may also cater to the "lowest common denominator" in
industry, which gives firms little incentive to innovate or invest in cleaner technologies and
practices. Some business experts use anecdotal evidence to claim that companies should
voluntarily pursue environmental performance to cut costs and improve efficiency. Some firms
in a niche market do find customers willing to pay more for higher environmental quality, but
widespread adoption is often necessary to gain meaningful environmental benefits. In many
cases, regulations are very costly for the entire industry across the board, so without regulatory
pressure or customer demand, firms lack incentive to invest in higher environmental
performance.
This research focuses on an alternative way of looking at the interaction between
regulators and regulated firms. It conceives of the regulatory process as inherently competitive,
where one company or a group of companies might support greater regulatory stringency
because it provides them with a competitive advantage or a larger market. This advantage may
arise from superior technology, superior management, or lower compliance costs relative to
competitors. The idea of firms supporting proposed regulations or meeting upcoming
regulations ahead of the deadline is appealing from the standpoint of both public and private
benefits. Cleaner technologies can be adopted earlier or spread more rapidly, resulting in greater
15
health and environmental benefits. Regulators have an easier time passing regulations if they
have one or more industry supporters rather than solid opposition from the entire industry.
Instead of designing regulations for "the least common denominator," regulators may be more
inclined to base their standard-setting on the leading-edge technology. The regulations may give
the first movers an advantage over their competitors, or offer fiscal incentives to promote early
compliance.
Companies' support of regulation does not necessarily come in the form of political
lobbying. Because technology assessments preface all regulatory decision-making, regulators
have a keen interest in obtaining information about technological progress. Most research on
environmental regulations still treat regulations as exogenously handed down from regulators,
with companies as passive "regulation-takers." In reality, firms provide substantial input into the
regulatory process. Through their communication of technology development, they can
influence regulatory stringency and shape the terms of competition.
This type of corporate strategy, called "competitive regulatory strategy," can offer
financial and reputation benefits to the lead firm. It is type of nonmarket strategy that deals with
forces outside a company's markets, such as governments, interest groups, and the public. An
individual firm or subset of firms may advance environmental standards beyond the rest of the
industry's capabilities, or even beyond regulators' expectations. This may lead to regulatory
competition, where firms compete based on their ability to anticipate and/or influence
regulations through technology development.
1.2 Problem statement and research questions
Extensive research has been done on corporate environmental strategies and industrial
competition. However, few researchers have addressed how environmental regulations shape the
competitive positioning of firms, and in turn, how firms shape regulations. This research seeks
to enhance understanding of these forces, and their impact on regulatory competition. Before
turning to the research questions, it is necessary to give further explanation of the corporate
responses to regulation and competitive regulatory strategies, which are central to this research.
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Companies respond to regulation in a variety of ways. Compliant firms are those whose
products or processes meet regulations by the established deadline. This is true of the vast
majority of firms, especially those whose products must be certified as compliant before they can
be sold. Non-compliant firms, those that do not meet regulations, are usually only discovered
through enforcement action taken by regulators. Then there are firms that go beyond existing
requirements. A first mover is a firm that has a technology or product with environmental
performance that surpasses any known existing or future regulations. This means that the firm
has communicated its technology performance to the public or regulators in advance of final
regulatory decisions. An early-mover is a firm that meets known future regulations ahead of the
established deadline.
First-mover action goes beyond the early-mover behavior of meeting previously
established regulations ahead of the deadline. Deriving benefit from first-mover behavior may
get around the free-rider problem of firms waiting for one another to take the risk of being first
with a new technology. If not for the expectation of private benefits, no firm would become a
first mover and technologies would only develop after regulations were already established. If a
first-mover firm's regulatory input does result in stricter regulations, its strategy places pressure
on other firms to meet the stricter standards, thereby improving industry-wide environmental
performance.
Early- or first-mover behavior may be indicative of a competitive regulatory strategy. A
firm employing a competitive regulatory strategy is one that strategically initiates, accelerates, or
supports more stringent regulation, motivated wholly or partly by the desire to gain competitive
advantage from the regulation. "Strategy" implies that the firm's actions are deliberate,
intentional, and pre-meditated. A firm may gain a competitive advantage once a new regulation
is implemented, but if it did not anticipate and prepare for the opportunity ahead of the regulation,
its outcome would not be considered an application of a competitive regulatory strategy. It is
assumed that the firm does have an actual advantage, whether it is in technology, management,
or cost-efficiency. The strategy may be weak or strong. An example of a weak strategy would
be a firm which makes decisions (i.e. R&D investment, product introduction) to put itself in a
position of competitive advantage in advance, but does not intentionally leverage its decisions
during the regulatory process. A strong strategy would be a firm that is fully aware of its
potential advantage and actively presses regulators to adopt more stringent regulations.
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The research began with the main research questions:
Under what conditions do competitive regulatory strategies succeed in providing private benefits
tofirst-moverfirms and environmental benefits to the public? What motivatesfirms to engage in
first-mover behavior?
Once the research was initiated, the questions were broadened to cover early-mover
behavior as well, since acting ahead of known regulation may also provide competitive benefits.
To answer the main questions, the research must also address the following:
* Why would a company introduce less polluting technology if not required by
environmental regulations?
* What are the private and public benefits and costs?
* What factors foster or discourage early or first-mover behavior?
These questions will be answered in the context of regulations and corporate strategies
for reducing diesel vehicle emissions. This environmental issue was selected because of its
serious health and environmental impacts, increasingly stringent regulations, globally
competitive industry, interdependent technology systems (i.e. vehicles, engines, fuels,
aftertreatment equipment), and the variety of regulatory and market conditions observed in three
key producer regions (the European Union, Japan, and the United States). The recent popularity
of diesel vehicles for their fuel efficiency and low CO2 emissions, combined with mounting
concerns about diesel exhaust's health effects, makes this a timely opportunity to investigate
competitive regulatory strategies in this setting. The diesel vehicle industry is competitive but
concentrated, making it relatively small compared to other industries. This makes studying
individual firm behavior and industry competition more manageable. The multiple regulatory
cycles in each region - the periodic introduction of new, more stringent standards for light-duty
vehicles, heavy-duty engines, and fuels - provides rich source material for comparative case
studies.
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1.3 Research contribution
This research uses a focused industry study to improve understanding of competitive
regulatory strategies. In past studies, economists have explored regulation's effect on industrial
competitiveness with large-scale quantitative studies, typically using aggregated data at the
sector level. Game theorists have developed two-firm models to predict competitive behavior
under different starting conditions. Meanwhile, management and social scientists have tried to
get a better understanding of firm-level activity with anecdotal corporate case studies. This
research seeks to combine the systematic analysis, theory generation, and case study
methodology featured in these fields, and recast them as part of the study of socio-technical
systems within the emerging engineering systems field. By embracing regulations as
endogenous to technology development, this research demonstrates how global regulatory
systems are commingled with the technological systems behind diesel vehicle emission reduction
(i.e. vehicle system, fuel infrastructure). Studying technological systems in a regulated industry
necessitates attention to regulatory systems.
The research design consists of studying multiple regulatory cycles and then analyzing
behavior and outcomes at the organizational level. This two-tiered approach allows for a more
comprehensive understanding of regulatory and corporate decision-making than studying a
single set of regulations or one company. Reviewing entire regulatory cycles attempts to avoid
the selection bias of only selecting prominent cases of early-mover or first-mover behavior. The
methodology provides enough representative cases to observe meaningful patterns and to make
comparisons between cycles, countries, and companies. Although this study is limited to a
single innovation field - diesel vehicle emission reduction, it does span several major industries.
Robust findings across these industries and countries make a case for the generalizability of this
research to other industries.
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1.4 Significant findings
The thesis research finds that regulatory and market conditions influence the
opportunities for competitive advantage from regulations, but other factors, which are
determined by regulatory action, public/NGO (nongovernmental organization) activity, and
corporate attitudes, affect whether any early or first-mover behavior will actually occur.
Applications of competitive regulatory strategies are seldom explicitly "strategic." Regulated
firms generally do not introduce technologies ahead of regulation and then push for more
stringent regulation to disadvantage their rivals. Technology introductions are driven by other
motivations, such as mitigating anti-diesel criticism. Nevertheless, the technologies do often
generate regulatory demand in domestic and foreign markets, which can enhance the lead firms'
competitive position.
Industry associations and environmental groups serve as channels for communication
flow about technology development, but their motivations are quite different. Industry
associations are important to forging cooperative decisions, especially in Japan, and
communicating overall technology progress to regulators. At the same time, in the interest of
minimizing compliance costs and presenting a united front, they can also place pressure on lead
firms to maintain the same position as the rest of the industry. Individual firms occasionally take
a different position, but may face alienation and criticism from their industry association.
Environmental groups or other public interest NGOs filter through industry claims and
technological advances, and communicate their perspective on the information to regulators,
media, and the general public. They can inspire consumer demand for cleaner products or
convince regulators of the merits and feasibility of greater regulatory stringency. Companies
could arguably do the same, but they risk negative publicity if they do not deliver on their
technology promises. Lead firms are more likely to present their products' performance publicly
and then allow perceptive NGOs and regulators draw their own conclusions.
In several cases, first-mover countries that used regulations to encourage cleaner
technologies did help the competitive position of their domestic firms. Those firms were well-
prepared to market their products in other regions that later adopted similar standards. This
supports the Porter hypothesis of lead countries improving national competitiveness with more
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stringent regulations (Porter and van der Linde 1995). The cases further refine existing theory by
articulating the differential effects of regulations on firms. However, not all situations behaved
as strategic trade theory would predict. Regulators in first-mover countries do not always act
strategically in favor in their domestic firms, especially if domestic firms lag foreign rivals in
technological progress. Their interest in environmental protection outweighs concerns about
national competitiveness.
1.5 Overview of chapters
This thesis consists of 11 chapters, which are arranged in three main sections. Chapters 1
to 4 are introductory background material about the research topic and methodology. Chapters 5
to 9 cover the regulatory cycles in emission and fuel standards. Chapters 10 and 11 discuss the
findings and future work.
Chapter 2, a literature review, begins with a discussion of the evolution of business
attitudes towards environmental regulation, from costly constraint to business opportunity to
competitive tool. It explains the theoretical and empirical foundations for this research, which
consists of business research on corporate environmental strategies, and political science and
economics research on "raising rivals' cost," strategic trade policy, and information asymmetry
between regulators and the regulated. Recent and ongoing empirical studies on the effect of
environmental regulations on industry competition highlight the major conceptual and
methodological issues important to this research project.
Chapter 3 explains this study's two-tiered approach to the comparative case study method.
The first tier, the review of regulatory cycles, establishes the boundaries for the second tier, an
in-depth study of corporate and regulatory behavior at the organizational level. Cases of first-
mover and early-mover behavior are identified through a systematic analysis of the regulatory
cycles. The lack of any observed proactive behavior, or even non-compliance, is also
investigated. A diverse set of documentary sources and quantitative data, complemented by
personal interviews, form the basis of the case studies.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the various industries and regulations involved in
reducing diesel vehicle emissions. It explains the reasoning behind choosing the diesel vehicle
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industry for a focused study and provides descriptive statistics about the industry. This chapter is
particularly helpful to readers unfamiliar with recent diesel trends and differences in the industry
and regulatory processes in the EU, Japan, and the US.
Chapters 5 through 9 cover the regulatory cycles, with two chapters on light-duty diesel
vehicle standards, two on heavy-duty diesel engine standards, and one on diesel fuel sulfur
standards. In explaining the regulatory cycles leading to the recently implemented 2004-05
standards, Chapter 5 explains how tax policy and more lenient NOx emission standards in
Europe have allowed for over 50% diesel penetration, whereas more challenging regulations for
diesels in Japan and the US have made it difficult for diesels to compete with gasoline vehicles.
Chapter 6 looks forward at the 2008-09 timeframe. Since Europe has been the main market for
diesel cars, the chapter focuses on how technologies have shaped the Euro 5 standards, and
discusses two first-mover companies with varying levels of success.
Chapter 7 differs from the other four regulatory cycle chapters in that it highlights
incidents of non-compliance in the heavy-duty engine industry. In several cases, companies that
delayed or circumvented emission control requirements actually improved their competitiveness.
As a result, regulators revised testing and enforcement procedures to better monitor compliance.
The divergent technology pathways taken by heavy-duty engine manufacturers for post-2005
regulations are discussed in Chapter 8. Increased global competition and the dependence on
complementary technologies like fuels and additives have expanded government involvement.
In the interest of boosting national competitiveness, governments have helped to establish
supporting infrastructure and shape regulations at home and abroad to favor their domestic
companies' technologies. Chapter 9 shows how first-mover countries have effectively used
fiscal incentives to encourage the early adoption of ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel. In several
European countries, tax differentiation has led to rapid diffusion of the fuel. Japan has used
subsidies and negotiated agreements to accelerate adoption. Meanwhile, the US has faced
slower and limited adoption because of the lack of fiscal incentives and a larger fuel distribution
infrastructure.
Chapter 10 is the centerpiece of the research because it draws on the lessons learned from
studying the regulatory cycles. It analyzes the regulatory and market contexts that shape whether
firms engage in regulatory competition. The cases demonstrate that government-sponsored fiscal
incentives are the major driver for early adoption, while market preservation and technology
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development can motivate first-mover behavior. Even if companies appear to have a clear
technological advantage over their competitors, they may be reluctant to act on it because of
insufficient customer demand, risk aversion, industry pressure, or lack of supporting
infrastructure. In the rare cases that a company did step forward ahead of regulation, the success
of their technology introduction depended on their ability to shape regulations to their advantage.
Generally this influence was not in the form of direct lobbying, but through technology
demonstration or limited sales of the new product.
The recommendations in Chapter 10 are aimed toward regulators, NGOs, and companies,
especially those who support encouraging the adoption of more effective emission reduction
technology and rewarding technology leaders for higher environmental quality. First,
governments should use tax incentives as a tool for spreading the adoption of leading-edge,
commercially available technology. While cleaner technologies would be rewarded with lower
taxes, it assumes that more polluting technologies would be penalized with higher taxes. Second,
public interest groups, like environmental NGOs, should take advantage of their credibility with
the public to communicate relevant scientific findings and technological progress. This can help
create customer and regulatory demand for more advanced technologies, and encourage
technology leaders to step forward with new products. Third, lead companies should use
technology demonstrations that engage regulators and/or NGOs to express their technology
readiness and to make a case for stronger regulations or incentives. As a way to institutionalize
regulatory competition, the fourth recommendation proposes a combination of long-term and
interim targets that offers increased regulatory certainty as well as accelerated emission benefits.
The final chapter, Chapter 11, briefly compares the results of this research with recent
and ongoing empirical work on other industries. While several determinants of a company's
ability to capture competitive advantage from regulation are comparable, this research offers new
perspectives on the role of industry trade associations, regulatory compliance details, and
technology demonstration as an alternative to political lobbying.
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
There has been growing recognition by the business community that environmental
performance can act as a source of competitive advantage. In the past decade, articles in the
business literature have offered case studies of companies whose environmental improvements
have also benefited the bottom line (Hoffman 2000; Madu 1996; Porter 1991; Porter and van der
Linde 1995; Preston 2001; Reinhardt 1999). Much of the focus has been on voluntary initiatives
and resource efficiency measures that save on regulatory compliance costs. Pressure from
customers, shareholders, and communities has also been shown to influence corporate
environmental policy, but the strongest sources of pressure come from government regulations
and customer demand (Henriques and Sadorsky 1996). According to an OECD review of eight
surveys of firm managers conducted in various countries in the 1990s, traditional environmental
regulations (i.e. direct regulations and market-based instruments) were ranked as the strongest
driver of environmental performance (OECD 2001).
Technology-forcing environmental regulations in particular are intentionally designed to
push industry beyond its current capabilities, such that companies innovate and develop new
technologies to comply with upcoming regulations. The industry-government relationship can
usually be described in one of two ways. Industry is most commonly portrayed as fiercely
opposed to stricter environmental regulations because of the added cost and resource burdens
they impose. On the other hand, regulators may rely on industry self-regulation, negotiated
agreements, or voluntary compliance. These more cooperative approaches often require
industry-wide consensus, so the resulting standards reflect the lowest common denominator in
terms of environmental performance. The adversarial and cooperative relationship styles do
work well in some situations, leading to technological innovation and improved environmental
outcomes. This research explores alternatives to these adversarial and cooperative views of
regulation - instances where the anticipation of future regulation would encourage competition
among firms. By recognizing how technology development shapes regulatory stringency, some
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firms may pursue technology and product introductions that put them ahead of regulatory
requirements. Early-movers introduce new technologies that comply with future regulations
ahead of schedule, whereas first movers introduce new technologies that surpass any known
existing or proposed regulations.
This chapter examines how environmental regulation, technology development, and
industry competition have been addressed in research literature. Much of the writing on this
topic comes from scholarship in business, economics, and international relations. The first few
sections of this chapter trace how business attitudes towards environmental policies have
changed since the advent of pollution control regulations. It then follows with a description of
competitive regulatory strategies, and more broadly, the means through which technology
development and industry input influence regulatory decision-making.
2.2 Changing attitudes about environmental regulation
Prior to the 1960s, pollution control in industrialized countries was largely a local matter.
However, with the rise in environmental awareness in the late 1960s and 1970s, countries began
adopting national environmental protection laws. In the U.S., President Richard Nixon
established the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 by executive order. Two years
later, Japan established its Environment Agency under the Prime Minister's office. In 1972,
Stockholm, Sweden, hosted the first global United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (Schreurs 2002). In 1973, the then nine-member European Community set out its
environmental policy objectives in its "Programme of environmental action of the European
Communities" (Hildebrand 2002). By 1974, Germany had also created a Federal Environmental
Agency in its Interior Ministry (Schreurs 2002). With the rise in environmental regulatory
activity, different perspectives on the effects of environment regulation on economic growth
have emerged.
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2.2.1 Environmental regulation as an economic constraint
The new pollution control measures of the 1970s restricted the pollution and waste
generated by industry. At the same time, critics of the new policies warned that the costs of
environmental compliance would limit innovation and economic growth. Encumbered with
significant compliance costs, domestic firms would have difficulty competing in international
markets (Jaffe, Peterson et al. 1995). In the U.S., the economic slowdown and productivity
decline in the 1970s led some economists to speculate that environmental regulations were
partially responsible (Gray 1987; Gray and Shadbegian 1995; Haveman and Christiansen 1981;
Jaffe, Peterson et al. 1995; Levinson 1992; Norsworthy, Harper et al. 1979). Empirical studies of
the manufacturing sector attribute 8 to 16% of the total factor productivity growth rate decline to
environmental regulations. This is significant, but not large enough to blame regulation for the
slowdown (Jaffe, Peterson et al. 1995). Jaffe et al. (1995) conduct an extensive review of
empirical studies on the relationship between environmental regulation and economic
performance in the US. They do not find enough evidence to support the argument that
environmental regulation has a large adverse effect on national competitiveness.
In addition to the pollution control capital and operating costs expended by firms, there is
also concern about the opportunity costs of regulation. By spending money and resources on
pollution abatement and environmental R&D, companies may miss other investment
opportunities (Stewart 1993). However, studies tend to focus on the cost and resource burden on
regulated industries, even though regulations can create lucrative opportunities for new markets
and industries.
2.2.2 Environmental regulation as a creator of markets
When faced with regulations, firms often turn to third parties - suppliers, contractors, and
consultants - to help them comply with the standards. As a result, environmental regulations
around the world have created a $550 billion global market for environmental technologies and
services (EC 2002). Because the environmental technology industry thrives on demand for
better performance and lower costs, progressively more stringent regulations are a prerequisite
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for further investment and innovation. If environmental standards stagnate at one level for too
long, there is little incentive to change. Pollution prevention efforts have moved firms closer to
the "efficient frontier," but they have mostly involved picking "the low-hanging fruit." In order
to prevent stagnation and to keep the efficient frontier moving forward, industry needs to have
continuous leadership by firms who keep innovating (Ashford 2000). Regulations may also be
formulated or timed in such a way that firms do not have sufficient opportunity to adapt through
true organizational learning. Instead, firms adopt "quick-fix" solutions, opting for costly "end-
of-pipe" solutions instead of more creative but potentially less costly upstream changes. The
more creative changes that lead to sustained innovation require major organizational change
(Wallace 1995).
2.2.3 Environmental regulation as a business opportunity for regulated industries
In the debate over regulations' effects on competitiveness, empirical researchers have
focused largely on national competitiveness, and the aggregate effects of regulation on
innovation and productivity. Most empirical studies employ time-series data at the aggregate
industry level to measure the effect of regulation on R&D patenting, R&D expenditures, and
productivity (Gray 1987; Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1990). Firm-specific
information is generally not available, and if it is, it usually lends itself to a qualitative case study
rather than a quantitative study. One 1986 empirical study did try to measure the effect of
environmental regulation on within-industry competitiveness. Farber and Martin (1986) found a
positive relationship between pollution control effort and increased market concentration, after
controlling for firm size, profitability, and pollution potential. However, this study was
conducted for 1977 only, and did not account for the stringency of the regulation. Because
census data was only available for manufacturing subsectors, and not individual firms, their
study could not determine the differential effects of environmental regulation on individual firms.
Beginning in the 1990s, companies began to view environmental protection as
commingled with economic competitiveness rather than as a "good" within itself (Hoffman
2000). Business thinkers challenged the empirical research that claimed regulations hurt
competitiveness. Michael Porter (1991) presented his "revisionist" view, arguing that
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environmental regulations could improve national competitiveness. The adoption of stringent
environmental standards in one country would spur innovation among its domestic firms. With
their technological advantage, they would be well prepared to dominate more markets once other
countries adopt the higher standards. The Porter hypothesis assumes that the lead country has a
large economic influence on the world economy; it must properly anticipate that other countries
will eventually ratchet up their standards. Because of incomplete information and
organizational problems, firms are not always profit-maximizing. Regulations offer an impetus
for firms to discover more resource-efficient and cost-saving opportunities. In addition to
lowering compliance costs, such "innovation offsets" could potentially give firms advantages
over less regulated foreign firms and increase profits. In the end, environmental regulations
produce "win-win" outcomes for the regulated firm and the environment (Porter 1991; Porter
and van der Linde 1995).
The "win-win" theories of Porter and his supporters were heavily criticized by
neoclassical economists, who argued that any cost-saving innovation offsets are eclipsed by the
opportunity cost of R&D investment and management effort: "While it seems likely that
environmental regulation will stimulate the innovation and diffusion of technologies that
facilitate compliance, creation and adoption of new technology will typically require real
resources, and have significant opportunity costs" (Jaffe, Newell et al. 2003). Empiricists
criticized Porter and van der Linde's (1995) case studies as "largely anecdotal" and more often
the exception rather than the rule (Jaffe, Newell et al. 2003; Jaffe and Palmer 1997). Despite the
disagreements between the "win-win" and the neoclassical economists, both sides agree that
market incentive-based, rather than conventional command-and-control regulations, are more
likely to promote innovation.
Even the economists that disagreed with the Porter hypothesis conceded that some
regulated firms will benefit competitively from regulations at the expense of other firms.
Regulations may provide advantages to early-mover firms by forcing them to introduce products
with growing demand (Jaffe, Peterson et al. 1995). A 1996 study by Klassen and McLaughlin
did try to quantitatively measure the impact of strong environmental management on financial
performance. Using financial event methodology and archived news articles, they measured the
impact of positive and negative environmental events on stock prices. They found significant
positive returns from strong environmental management, measured in terms of environmental
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awards, and significant negative returns from weak environmental management, measured in
terms of environmental crises. Despite their findings, the study authors do note the discrepancy
in past empirical studies, with some finding a positive correlation between social responsibility
and financial performance, and others finding negative or no correlation (Klassen and
McLaughlin 1996).
2.3 Corporate environmental strategies
While some empirical researchers like Klassen and McLaughlin have tried to measure the
relationship between environmental and financial performance, researchers from the
management sciences have documented corporate environmental strategies in case studies
(Maxwell, Rothenberg et al. 1997). They find evidence of companies that have successfully
turned environmental protection into opportunities for business growth (Hart 1997). Some of the
most common strategies fall into the following broad categories of cost reduction, product
differentiation, risk management, redefining business models, and competitive regulatory
strategies. The following explains each category:
1. Cost reduction: Regulation increases the cost of pollution so companies have an incentive to
reduce resource consumption in the first place. Energy conservation and waste minimization
are common examples. Life-cycle assessment - quantifying a product or process'
environmental impacts and resource consumption at every stage of its life - has been used to
identify "hot spots" for resource and fee savings (Nielsen and Wenzel 2002).
2. Product differentiation: Companies draw attention to the environmentally benign features of
their products through labeling, advertising, or publicity. Depending on consumer demand
for these "green" attributes, the products may command a substantial price premium.
Patagonia, the California-based clothing maker, has retained a loyal customer base drawn to
its commitment to environmental causes and therefore willing to pay more for its products
(Reinhardt 1999).
3. Risk management: Though not required explicitly by any regulation, companies may adopt
measures to reduce their exposure to liability risk. Some strategies include implementing
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formal environmental management systems and substituting less toxic compounds in place of
more harmful ones. Although not required by law, chemical companies routinely conduct
short-term toxicity tests on new chemicals as a way of preventively dealing with unregulated
hazards (Ashford 2000). The upfront testing costs are considerably less than the potential
liability and reputational costs incurred if a chemical were found to be carcinogenic after
widespread use.
4. Redefining business models: Efforts to move from product- to service-based business models
increase consideration of life-cycle environmental impacts in business decisions. Placing the
burden of maintenance, replacement, and disposal on the producer is often more efficient and
convenient for the individual consumer, and enables the producer to extract higher fees in
payment for the services. Xerox redefined its copier business model with its Asset Recycle
Management program. By leasing copiers to its customers, it provided the latest product
upgrades to customers and used its take-back system to remanufacture used parts into "new"
machines. This program saved the company $300 to $400 million in 1995 alone and reduced
the environmental impact of product end-of-life waste disposal (Hart 1997).
5. Competitive regulatory strategy: Companies may proactively seek or support regulation
based on their ability to meet regulations at lower costs or with better technology than their
competitors.
The literature on industrial ecology, green marketing, corporate social responsibility, and
environmental management usually focuses on the first four categories. These strategies often
involve saving costs in the present or the future, or assume that customers are willing to pay
more for environmental features. Companies may claim that their decisions are based on a sense
of altruistic concern for the environment and the local community. Competitive regulatory
strategy, the fifth category and focus of this research, acknowledges companies' strong profit
motive and does not assume higher customer valuation for environmentally safer products.
Competitive regulatory strategies are a type of nonmarket strategy. Nonmarket strategy
differs from market strategy in that the former deals with forces outside a company's markets,
such as governments, interest groups, activists, and the public. The nonmarket environmental
consists of "social, political, and legal arrangements that structure interactions among companies
and their public" (Baron 1995b). Lobbying legislators for favorable policies, pursuing
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endorsement from consumer groups, or influencing regulation are examples of nonmarket
strategies which can enhance a company's competitive position. According to David Baron
(1995b), nonmarket forces "can foreclose entry into new markets, limit price increases, and raise
the costs of competing. They can also unlock markets, reduce regulation, handicap rivals, and
generate competitive advantage."
2.4 Competitive regulatory strategies
A proactive approach towards environmental innovation, well ahead of established
regulations, can offer companies more time and flexibility to introduce a new technology and
capture competitive advantage. By advancing technology beyond regulatory requirements, a
company can offer input to regulators in the form of technical documents or R&D results, which
may result in stricter standards and a higher return on their original investment (Vaitilingam
1993). The expectation is that companies will be able to strategically position environmentally
responsible products to capture market share more aggressively (Preston 2001). In some cases,
stricter environmental regulations may increase costs for the company, but it stands to benefit if
the higher standards cost its competitors disproportionately more. Early- and first-mover
companies place themselves in a better position to meet tighter standards in the future, and they
even may establish an industry standard with their superior technology, effectively creating a
barrier to entry (Klassen and McLaughlin 1996). Companies already compete aggressively on
product attributes such as cost, quality, and technological performance. Since environmental
protection is a public good that is undervalued by individual consumers, regulations are a means
of giving it a value, by rewarding technology leaders and penalizing technology laggards.
The concept of regulated companies using regulations for competitive advantage has
been discussed in the context of "raising rivals' cost," a concept popularized by economic
theorists Steven Salop and David Scheffman. They propose a "raising rivals' cost" strategy as a
better alternative to predatory pricing. A first-mover firm can raise its rival costs in a variety of
ways - vertical integration, exclusive dealing arrangements, more efficient advertising, scale
economies, and product regulation. Salop and Scheffman specifically point out that mandatory
product standards or other government regulation can raise rivals' compliance costs, which will
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lower their output or force them to exit the industry (Salop and Scheffman 1983). Then the first
mover could raise prices and/or gain market share. Even if other companies tried to copy the
first mover's technology, they would face costs and time delay not experienced by the first
mover, whose investments would be considered sunk costs (Barrett 1991).
Other research has expanded on using environmental regulations specifically as a way of
raising rivals' cost. It may be in the interest of an entire industry to impose stringent
environmental regulations, which can be used as a barrier to entry. Incumbent firms may
develop compliant technologies in advance of regulation, and then support regulation that uses
the developed technology or imposes tougher requirements on new entrants (Dean and Brown
1995; Maloney and McCormick 1982). Dean and Brown (1995) find that in the late 1970s, US
environmental regulations had a net negative effect on entry in manufacturing industries. Even if
an industry uniformly opposes regulation because of compliance costs, some firms will
ultimately profit because firms do not face uniform costs. Once firms are aware of regulations'
capacity to redistribute wealth within the industry, the firms with lower costs or other advantages
may work together with environmentalists to support regulation (Maloney and McCormick
1982). The motivation to raise rivals' cost can encourage innovation, even in the absence of a
prior regulatory commitment for more stringent regulations (Puller 2005). Innes and Bial (2002)
try to establish the types of regulatory policies that would encourage first-mover behavior while
limiting their market power gains. They consider the incentives to raise rivals' cost to be too
strong, and therefore propose a policy that would stagger regulatory implementation. Successful
first-mover innovators would receive lower economic rents and laggards would not be punished
as harshly (Innes and Bial 2002).
In explaining concepts, most economists use a theoretical duopoly model, with a lower-
cost firm/technology winner and a higher-cost/technology laggard (Gersbach 2002; Hackett
1995; Innes and Bial 2002; Puller 2005; Salop, Scheffman et al. 1984; Salop and Scheffman
1983). There is the built-in assumption that the lower-cost firm can successfully convince the
regulator of the merits of its technology and that regulators can successfully implement the more
stringent standards. Economics and business literature have relied on game theoretic models or
analytical frameworks to explain competitive regulatory strategies, often citing a few empirical
cases that illustrate their points. Frequently cited examples include Unocal's influence on
California's reformulated gasoline specifications and Dupont's support of the Montreal
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Protocol's CFC (chlorofluorocarbons) limits. Oil company Unocal gave substantial input into
the California Air Resources Board's gasoline standard-setting process. Unbeknownst to CARB
and other oil companies, Unocal was holding onto patents that overlapped with the standards.
Once companies had been adhering to the standards for over a year, Unocal revealed that they
had infringed on its patent. It was able to collect 5.75 cents per gallon in royalties from the other
companies (Puller 2005). Dupont, a leading manufacturer of CFCs, faced low-cost competition
from new entrants as well as an international agreement, the Montreal Protocol, to ban the
ozone-depleting CFCs. Having invested in the development of expensive CFC substitutes,
Dupont actually supported the Montreal Protocol and agreed to phase out CFCs a year early
(Murphy 2002; Puller 2005).
Much of the literature focuses on success stories, while there may be many failed
attempts to influence regulations or even recognize opportunities for competitive advantage. The
simple two-firm models, while helpful in showing how the "raising rivals' cost" strategy might
work, do not include the other factors that shape regulatory policy. Influence from other
stakeholders, like customers, environmental groups, legislators, courts, and firms in
complementary industries, can outweigh any influence that the low-cost firm/technology winner
might have (Gerard and Lave 2003). One situation that may inhibit innovation and competition
in oligopolies are research joint ventures. Companies may collude to reduce innovation, thereby
slowing technological progress and delaying further regulation. This does not mean that there is
no place for joint research; as long as independent research continues, there will be innovation in
clean technologies (Hackett 1995; Puller 2005).
Although raising rivals' cost is a compelling reason to support more regulation, there are
other reasons why a firm may pursue greater stringency. Large multinational firms have an
interest in promoting stricter and harmonized product standards. Harmonization allows them to
produce higher volumes of a single model for several markets. Incidentally, their greater
financial and technical capacity also gives them an advantage over smaller domestic firms, which
face higher costs and greater difficulty in meeting the standards (Foster 2001; Vogel 1995).
Established firms also stand to take a larger share of regulatory benefits. According to a report
on the US auto industry by the US Office of Technology Policy, "dominant, established firms in
the concentrated markets are well positioned to shape regulatory environments to their
advantage...They have greater resources to achieve their regulatory goals through lobbying,
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funding, research, public relations, and differential absorption of regulatory costs" (Fine, Clair et
al. 1996).
Companies in capital-intensive industries may pull ahead of current standards in
anticipation of future standards since it may be more cost-effective to make one major
investment than small incremental investments (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995). Others may
enhance environmental performance to preempt more stringent and costly regulations (Lyon and
Maxwell 1999; Maxwell, Lyon et al. 2000). Over-complying with environmental standards may
also improve a company's reputation and work as a marketing tool to attract customers (Arora
and Gangopadhyay 1995; Lyon and Maxwell 1999; Madu 1996). Green marketing by
companies will contribute to environmental awareness, and further spur customer demand for
their products and services (Preston 2001).
2.5 Technology development shapes regulatory policy
Competitive regulatory strategies are based on the premise that regulations are
endogenous, i.e. companies can influence regulations. This contrasts from the normative view
taken by most research in the 1970s and 1980s, which treat environmental regulations as
exogenously determined by government and companies as mere "regulation-takers" (Gray 1987).
The government identifies an environmental problem not internalized by the market, sets a
standard or requirement to mitigate the problem, and expects industry to comply by a given
deadline. Industry responses are analyzed as reactions to one-way directives. However, in
reality, companies actively influence regulations, not only through political lobbying, but by
their technological progress and firm strategy. In the past two decades, as economists have
increasingly recognized the value in treating regulations as endogenous to innovation, more
business literature has addressed influencing regulations as part of corporate strategy. Most of
this work consists of theoretical arguments, with illustrative cases (Barrett 1992; Hackett 1995;
Maloney and McCormick 1982; Maxwell, Lyon et al. 2000; Rugman and Verbeke 1998).
For example, Barrett (1992) claims that companies have moved beyond the standard
theory of environmental regulation, where companies passively respond to regulation. He uses
game theory to explain how a firm can strategically influence environmental regulation and
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increase profitability. Based on a duopoly model of one firm knowing about a new cleaner
technology that the other firm does not, Barrett finds that the rational option would be to install
the technology and then tell the government. This assumes that the government would adopt
policies that would reward the first-mover firm for its strategic behavior (Barrett 1992). Rugman
and Verbeke (2000) build on Michael Porter's basic "five forces" model, arguing that
government regulation is a "sixth force" directly affecting a firm's strategy.' At the same time,
they acknowledge that the shift in firm strategy could alter the effects of government intervention.
Viewing regulations as endogenously determined is consistent with political economy literature,
which views regulations as a product of bargaining between industry, government, and other
stakeholders (Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne 1995).
As an illustration, Figure 2-1 shows the simplified technology-forcing causal loop for
vehicle emission regulations; the ratcheting up of standards follows from the development of
cleaner technologies. Treating regulations as exogenous to corporate strategy misses the
reinforcing loop of "ratcheting up standards," which works alongside the public demand for
emission reduction.
Michael Porter's basic "five forces" model is a popular tool for strategic management. For details, see Michael
Porter, Competitive Strategy, New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1980. The five forces which influence firm strategy are
competitors, buyers, suppliers, potential entrants, and substitutes. Previously, government intervention was treated
as acting indirectly through some or all of the five forces, but Rugman and Verbeke claim it should be recognized as
a direct force in its own right.
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Figure 2-1: Simplified Model of Technology-Forcing Regulation for Vehicles
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2.5.1 Information asymmetry between regulators and the regulated
Environmental regulatory agencies rely heavily on assessments of companies'
technological progress to set standards. Companies' technical expertise - distinct from political
lobbying - gives them significant leverage over policy decisions. Regulators would like to get as
much information as possible about technologies, costs, and health impacts to inform their
decision. At the same time, the regulated industries have an incentive to downplay their
technological progress to avoid high expectations and more stringent regulation. Regulators'
ability to observe regulatory performance over time and adapt regulations based on new
information may invite strategic behavior by firms (Baron 1995a). In general, companies offer
very cautious and conservative assessments, but in the worst case, they may intentionally conceal
or delay progress on environmental R&D (Gersbach 2002; Nannerup 1998; Yao 1988). If no
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company can meet the proposed standards, regulators will weaken or postpone standards. This
constitutes a serious information asymmetry problem. Even if regulators can approximate the
probability distribution of possible marginal costs, the regulated company has better information
about its technology's performance and marginal cost (Baron 1995a; Barrett 1991). Depending
on a regulation's effect on its business, companies will be prone to some predictable bias during
these information exchanges. Third-party technology vendors, such as emission control
manufacturers, are eager to supply information about the ability of their technology to meet
regulatory standards. They are more likely to be optimistic about technological progress because
regulations will give them a market for their products. Meanwhile, companies responsible for
purchasing and integrating the new technologies into their products will express less confidence
about their capabilities.
In response to regulatory proposals, industry associations collect information from
member companies about expected compliance costs and technological progress. They usually
present aggregated data to regulators to protect the individual company's competitive position.
Even though reporting is anonymous, companies may cautiously understate their progress and
overstate costs because of the uncertainty surrounding new technologies. Situations may arise
where a company has a particularly unique technology approach that it is unwilling to disclose,
even anonymously, to its trade association. Confidential one-on-one meetings between
regulators and company representatives may encourage the company to be more open and frank
about its progress than it would be in a public forum or to its trade association (Ng 2003). After
meeting with a variety of companies, regulators are able to compare private claims against each
other, which is something that companies and trade associations usually cannot do.
Some regulatory agencies are equipped with their own research and testing capabilities,
which provides a check on industry data. The US EPA has its National Vehicle and Fuel
Emissions Laboratory in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Its ability to test emission control technology,
vehicles, engines, and fuels allows for independent evaluation of manufacturers' claims (NVFEL
2000). Research conducted by universities and by independent or government-affiliated labs can
also be a source of information. While these organizations can be helpful in indicating long-term
R&D trajectories, regulators are often interested in technology that already exists or is near
commercialization. For the near-term planning, the regulated industries are often the best source
for information because they are actively doing research on commercializable technologies.
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While a regulator may have incomplete information about a company's R&D activity and
compliance costs before a regulation is established, it can observe the actual technologies and
costs of the firm ex post. It can then use this updated information to anticipate the hidden
information for future rounds of regulatory standard-setting (Baron 1995a). The perceived
trustworthiness of an information source can also be verified over time if regulations are updated
in multiple periods and open to reassessment. This type of adaptive regulatory approach holds
much promise for improving the responsiveness and efficiency of environmental regulations
(Foster 1999).
2.5.2 Strategic use of information channels
Companies directly communicate their position on regulatory policy through established
regulatory channels, such as written comments in response to proposed regulations or in private
meetings with regulators. This process of initiating regulatory action and providing information
is known as signaling (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995; Baron 1995a; Porter and van der Linde
1995). Technological claims made in the process of regulators' information gathering often run
concurrently with political action and lobbying. A regulatory change resulting in adverse
distributive consequences for one party and rent-seeking opportunities for another is likely to
provoke political action (Baron 1995a). While it is expected that technology vendors will
support market-creating regulation, it is not as common for a regulated firm to support more
costly regulation. However, superior technology, superior management, lower compliance costs,
or favorable publicity may prompt a firm to support a regulation despite opposition from the rest
of the industry. The private, confidential meetings are especially important in such
circumstances because a firm may feel uncomfortable formally differing from their industry or
industry association's official position.
2.5.3 Avoiding rent-seeking
Although some environmental regulations simultaneously confer competitive advantage
onto some firms and offer substantial public benefits, others may be a result of rent-seeking with
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little or no benefit to the environment or human health. Regulatory capture occurs when parties
successfully lobby for a self-serving regulation that has questionable public benefits. This can
come in the form of subsidies, limits on competition, control of substitute and complementary
goods, or price fixing (Stigler 1971). Stigler (1971) focuses on parties that are able to obtain
regulation in exchange for votes or resources (e.g. campaign contributions), but there is another
reason why regulatory capture may occur. Environmental regulatory agencies have an inherent
proclivity toward optimistic technology claims because of their interest in achieving
environmental progress. The openness of technology vendors, and perhaps to a lesser extent, the
first-mover firms, boosts a regulator's confidence in the attainability of stricter regulations.
Given the large uncertainties in technology development and environmental consequences,
regulators are undoubtedly attracted to strong evidence that supports its case for a regulation. It
is important for a regulator to distinguish from genuine claims of effectiveness and public benefit,
and veiled attempts at rent-seeking.
A company seeking to increase demand for its product or technology through regulation
would need to credibly convince government regulators that any environmental standards
proposed actually do improve public welfare (Aplin and Hegarty 1980; Reinhardt 1999; Winter
and May 2002). Because of concerns about unemployment and market concentration, the
company may also have to show the regulation does not have significant distributional effects.
Companies may align themselves with well-known environmental NGOs or citizen
groups to convince the public, and perhaps more importantly, regulators, that their strategy is
genuinely environmentally beneficial. NGOs prefer cooperation over protest and opposition,
while companies seek to strengthen their reputation and credibility, so this "strategic bridging"
can help achieve environmental, social, and business goals (Stafford, Polonsky et al. 2000).
However, there is still risk in these alliances. Ultimately, NGOs are answerable to their members
and supporters, not to their corporate partners. Working together with a company on a specific
issue also does not necessarily constitute broad endorsement of the company's business practices.
NGOs may again adopt adversarial strategies to boost their profile and maintain credibility with
their base of supporters (Stafford, Polonsky et al. 2000).
Competitive regulatory strategies often give advantages to large, well-established firms at
the expense of small firms. Firms may seek environmental regulations as a barrier to entry or to
protect their existing market share from competing technologies or new entrants. Because of the
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high compliance costs, only the large firms tend to have the resources to invest in the necessary
R&D and capital expenses (Baron 1995a; Porter 1980). To protect against market concentration
and job loss, regulators frequently make special allowances for smaller-sized businesses or
particular geographic regions. Competitive regulatory strategies presume that the environmental
leaders reap benefits while environmental laggards perform poorly. Increased market power for
the lead firms may have environmental benefits but lead to higher prices for consumers (Barrett
1992). The government's desire to spread compliance costs evenly across the industry may be a
hindrance to first-mover companies seeking to gain an edge over their competitors through
regulation.
2.6 First-mover countries
Previous sections have discussed firms' strategically using environmental regulations to
their competitive advantage. National governments can also use environmental regulations to
improve the competitive position of their domestic firms in international markets. This section
discusses the emergence of environmental regulations as part of strategic trade policy.
International trade economists began analyzing strategic trade policy in the early 1980s.
According to Brander (1995), strategic trade policy is "trade policy that conditions or alters a
strategic relationship between [oligopolistic] firms." The well-known Brander-Spencer model
considers duopolists in two countries exporting homogeneous products to a common third-party
market. A government can give competitive advantage to its domestic firm by subsidizing its
domestic firm's production through export or R&D subsidies (Brander and Spencer 1985). The
cost of subsidization is perceived to be outweighed by the economic benefits accrued by helping
a domestic firm or industry gain a foothold in the international market. In a modification of the
Brander-Spencer "third-market" model, Krugman (1986) uses an international duopoly model
consisting of one domestic firm and one foreign firm selling a product to the domestic market.
The government may offer subsidies and tax incentives to its domestic firm to increase customer
demand and encourage large scale production. By accelerating the pace at which the firm moves
down the learning curve and lowers marginal costs, the government gives its domestic firm a
head start before opening the market to foreign competition (Krugman 1986). Another variant
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model is the "reciprocal markets" model, where two countries have firms competing in each
other's markets (Brander 1995). Both countries' may have governments actively trying to secure
competitive advantage for their own firms. In his book Trade Warriors, Marc Busch describes
several cases in high technology industries, where countries engaged in costly trade wars in order
to promote their national champions (Busch 1999)
Strategic trade literature eventually began to view environmental regulations as a form of
government intervention. Barrett (1994) found that depending on market structure and
competition, it may be optimal for governments to adopt "strong" environmental standards,
where the marginal cost of abatement exceeds the marginal environmental damage. The
standards can improve the competitiveness of domestic firms, in the same vein as R&D or export
subsidies (Barrett 1994). If a first-mover country adopts more stringent and costly product
regulations, it can protect its domestic industry from international competition by restricting the
sale of noncompliant imports. As the global market for the "greener" product grows, the
nation(s) with the more stringent standards will enjoy scale economies and competitive
advantage from having the early incentives to develop the technologies. This contrasts with
previous thinking that more stringent environmental regulations, which raise compliance costs,
would disadvantage firms in international product competition. However, if the other nations do
not adopt the more stringent standards, the first-mover country's industry may find itself at a cost
disadvantage in foreign countries (Stewart 1993). Instead, the domestic firms may lobby their
government to delay new standards, arguing that the compliance costs place them at a
disadvantage relative to their foreign competitors.
Regulatory heterogeneity is unsustainable in the long-term because export-oriented
multinational firms have an interest in supporting harmonized regulations. Through organized
lobbying efforts, multinational companies may be able to persuade their home governments to
push for uniform standards in other countries. Countries have an interest in harmonizing product
regulations because it reduces transaction costs and other trade barriers, while encouraging
specialization, scale economies and competition. Process standards are not as easily harmonized
as product standards. A country with more stringent product standards can limit import
competition, so foreign governments have an incentive to harmonize with the import country's
higher standard. Restricting imports from nations with weaker process standards is usually
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illegal under international trade law; moreover, there are no restrictions on businesses moving
operations to countries with weaker process standards (Stewart 1993).
In addition to competitiveness considerations, first-mover states or nations may be more
receptive to greater stringency because of their high levels of investment and/or their preference
for more environmentally protective measures. Multinational firms may find allies among
environmental and consumer organizations, who are eager to see more protective environmental
and health measures adopted internationally (Vogel 1995). A first-mover country also helps to
foster its domestic environmental industry, which can ultimately market its products and services
to other national markets. The presence of an environmental industry can propel a country to
national leadership on environmental regulations because the industry's profits improve social
welfare2 (Feess and Muehlheusser 2002).
In Trading Up, David Vogel (1995) describes cases where strict environmental, health,
and safety (EHS) regulations represent a source of competitive advantage for domestic
companies because it is easier for them to meet the requirements than their foreign competitors.
Some argue that stricter EHS regulations constitute thinly veiled non-tariff trade barriers rather
than genuine efforts to protect health and environment. Several conflicts over regulatory
diversity have reached the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement board, which has
heavily relied on evaluating parties' use of scientific evidence and risk assessment. The large
degree of scientific uncertainty in many EHS cases offers opportunities for a precautionary
approach but also substantial leeway for rent-seeking by domestic firms (Oye and Bernauer
2004). Domestic firms may be able to defend the scientific basis of more protective standards
even if the underlying motivation is a protectionist one.
Information asymmetry complicates a national government's attempts to use
environmental standards as a strategic instrument. Compared to a scenario with full information,
incomplete information reduces the distortionary effects caused by a government's strategic
behavior (Nannerup 1998). Although environmental standards may be inferior to direct
subsidies or tariffs as a means to improve competitiveness, they are more likely to avoid
allegations of illegal free trade restrictions.
2 If the environmental industry's profits are not taken into account and the government is maximizing social welfare,
the emission tax will always be below marginal damage. However, when the environmental industry is included in
the model, the tax may even exceed marginal damage, especially if there are gains from learning by a nascent
industry.
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Regulators do not necessarily automatically side with their domestic industries. They
may use the superior performance of foreign firms as leverage for domestic firms to improve
technology. Gerard and Lave (2003) give the example of the US EPA playing foreign
automakers against domestic automakers. Successful innovation by foreign automakers could
undermine claims by domestic automakers that standards are unattainable. While regulators'
decisions might credibly endanger domestic firms' market share, the resulting standards would
not be so stringent that domestic firms would go out of business (Gerard and Lave 2003).
Governments may use regulatory uncertainty - the threat of future regulation - as a way to
induce domestic firms to develop new technology that would be compatible with international
standards. If industry's progress is unsatisfactory, regulators would take punitive action by
implementing stiffer standards (Cadot and Sinclair-Desgagne 1995).
Fiscal incentives, often used by national governments to spur technology adoption, may
also serve to encourage domestic firms to keep up with foreign competition. For example, in the
mid-1980s, the German auto industry was vehemently opposed to the introduction of the
catalytic converter, even though it was already used in the US and Japan. However, when the
German government proposed fiscal incentives for catalytic converters, BMW and Mercedes
became less opposed to the technology (Wurzel 2002).
2.7 Recent and ongoing empirical studies
Very recently, researchers have begun to perform in-depth case studies and focused
industry studies on competitive regulatory strategies, going beyond theoretical models and
anecdotal evidence. These studies take on diverse regulatory instruments, corporate responses,
national settings, and outcomes, providing a basis for comparisons. In particular, they give
emphasis to industry structure and country-specific factors, which had been lacking in previous
research. Recent findings by fellow collaborators and other researchers with similar interests
help provide guidance to this research project.
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2.7.1 AGS CARE project
A multi-university research project, entitled "Competitive Advantage, Regulation, and
the Environment" (CARE) has been occupied with assessing the effects of market and regulatory
conditions on company-level environmental strategies, the effects of the strategies on company
and plant-level innovation, environmental performance, and competitiveness, and the feedback
effects of the company-level environmental strategies on market and regulatory conditions
(Adler, Bernauer et al. 2004). The project, sponsored by the Alliance for Global Sustainability,
includes research teams at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH) at Zurich, and Cambridge University. The project covers multiple industry
sectors - chemicals, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, refining and fuel, food processing and
distribution, pulp and paper, and consumer electronics. While large-scale quantitative data
collection, surveys, and interviews are still underway, early work on qualitative case studies on
companies and industries have already offered some interesting insights (Adler, Bernauer et al.
2004).
CARE collaborators have found that the actual outcomes of regulatory competition in
environmental and consumer policy do not match the two dominant schools of thought. One
school expects competition in laxity, or a "race to the bottom," would occur in liberalized
markets because governments do not want to lose their firms to locations with less regulatory
burden. The opposing perspective views regulation as driven by regulatory capture, such that
well-organized industry groups are more likely to have influence on policy than large and diffuse
public groups. Instead, empirical evidence shows that competition in laxity rarely occurs; in fact,
regulatory stringency in most industrialized countries has increased (Bernauer and Caduff 2004).
The rent-seeking theory must be qualified because firms are seeking ways to limit competition
through more stringent environmental and consumer risk regulations. Interests of producer
groups and NGOs may align when individual or groups of firms within a specific industry lobby
for more stringent regulation: "Public concerns and NGO campaigns can act as facilitators for
rent-seeking by producers" (Bernauer and Caduff 2004).
Case studies on growth hormones, electronic waste, and food safety by Bernauer and
Caduff show that firm size and sectoral characteristics play a key role in firms' ability to
influence regulations to gain competitive advantage. In the electronic waste and food safety
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cases, they find that the larger firms are more likely to have a competitive advantage because
they have greater financial and technological capacity to meet stringent regulations.
Implementation costs are also lower for larger firms, especially those in more concentrated
industries.
Environmental regulations may lead to disagreements between domestic and foreign
firms. First-mover countries may face opposition from other countries who view additional
regulations as a trade barrier. In the electronic waste case, US producers were opposed to the
EU's new Extended Producer Responsibility law, claiming that it would disadvantage American
firms and create a significant barrier to entry into European markets. However, some EU firms,
like Sweden's Electrolux, have already invested in environmentally friendlier designs and would
benefit from more stringent electronic waste laws. Similarly, in the growth hormone case, US
and Canadian meat producers accused the EU of using their ban on imported hormone-treated
meat to protect domestic producers. They even took the dispute to the WTO's dispute settlement
board, contending that the hormone ban was not based on sufficient scientific evidence
(Bernauer and Caduff 2004).
Over-compliance or voluntarily adopting standards may be an effort to preempt more
stringent government standards. In the food safety case, there is some indication that companies
push for higher standards to "buy political legitimacy and public good-will," and to give
themselves more regulatory certainty and uniformity (Bernauer and Caduff 2004). In all three
cases, the erosion of public trust in companies and government has raised the prominence and
credibility of NGOs as the public's main source of information.
Another team of researchers studied the relationship between regulation and
environmental innovation in the pulp and paper industry in Sweden, Finland, Germany, and the
US (Foster, Hilden et al. 2006). Its most significant environmental impacts are during product
manufacturing rather than during use, so process regulations, not product regulations, are the
focus. Like in the electronic waste and food safety industries, large pulp and paper firms do have
a competitive advantage because of their ability to fund R&D and finance investments. However,
the new, efficient plants are not as flexible to adapt to different regulatory standards or to
produce different types of products. More stringent regulations alone are not enough to induce
process innovations, especially as the pulp and paper industry in Germany and US falls further
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behind the global "technology frontier." They argue that public incentives for R&D are
necessary.
The different regulatory environments and corresponding industry responses in each
country show the importance of country-specific preferences on innovation. The pulp and paper
industry has more political clout in Sweden and Finland than in the Germany and the US. As a
result, the Nordic governments are more likely to listen to the industry's concerns, such as
requests for more public spending on related R&D. The Swedish and Finnish companies'
investment in environmentally-friendly and efficient technologies is motivated by the greater
environmental awareness of their home constituents (Foster, Hilden et al. 2006).
2.7.2 Other empirical work
In a discussion paper for the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEV), researchers
Beise and Rennings use case studies in high-efficiency diesel cars and wind energy to address
whether environmental regulation can create lead markets. They conceive of a lead country
adopting the innovation first, other countries following suit, and then the lead market becoming a
major exporter. Their work ties into the earlier discussion of first-mover countries. They
categorize advantages of a lead market into price, demand, transfer, export, and strict regulation
advantages. In their analysis of fuel-efficient cars, they try to explain the discrepancy between
the success of high-efficiency diesel cars in Europe and their failure to become popular in the US.
They claim that the high fuel prices in Europe are not sufficient to explain why diesel cars did
not take off in the US. Even US fuel economy standards failed to stem fuel consumption.
Customer demand played a more important role. Small, fuel-efficient cars were compatible with
the European and Japanese market, but not the US one, where customers desired more luxurious,
larger, and more powerful vehicles like trucks and SUVs. While Beise and Rennings make valid
comments about the importance of customer demand, they also do not address the role of
environmental regulation in shaping market choices, which may be another valid explanation for
a lower rate of diesel penetration in the US. They also do not offer an explanation for the lower
diesel car adoption in Japan, despite the country's high fuel prices and preference for smaller
cars.
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The second case on wind energy more readily exhibits the advantages of strict regulation,
which the authors dub the "Porter effect." A lead market's strict regulation diffuses
internationally and in turn, offers first-mover advantages in the export market to its domestic
firms. Denmark has been the lead market for wind energy. Its producers started industrial
production of wind turbines five years ahead of the competition, thanks to the Danish
government's Renewable Energy Feed Tariffs (REFITs). REFITs are cross-subsidies that
require fossil fuel energy producers to pay renewable energy producers (Beise and Rennings
2005). While their categorization of lead market advantages is a useful one, Beise and Rennings
select illustrative case studies that fit certain categories, which might indicate selection bias.
A recent report by the World Resources Institute focused specifically on the automotive
industry. In an investor-oriented report "Changing Drivers," the authors explore how emerging
carbon constraints to mitigate climate change could affect the competitiveness of the 10 leading
automotive manufacturers. It sees regulation as both an opportunity and constraint, which varies
depending on the position of the individual firm. Even if carbon constraints impose costs across
the whole industry, some manufacturers will face smaller cost increases than their competitors,
partly because of their existing product portfolio. Those specializing in smaller, less carbon-
intensive cars will have an inherent advantage over those with a sales mix consisting largely of
trucks and SUVs. The authors see opportunities for companies to innovate and capture
competitive advantage by being early-movers with lower-carbon technologies. It takes a
balanced approach of looking at all the major companies in the industry and several promising
technologies - advanced gasoline, diesels, hybrids, and fuel cells (Austin, Rosinski et al. 2003).
The recent studies discussed in this section help to highlight major conceptual and
methodological issues that will be important to this research project. They underscore some
possible factors that may contribute to companies' ability to gain competitive advantage from
regulatory stringency. Those include size advantages, country-specific preferences, proactive
governments, aligned NGO interests, and regulatory incentives for innovation. The research that
considers an entire industry, like the Foster et al. pulp and paper study and the "Changing
Drivers" report, are particularly useful because they offer an industry baseline with which to
compare the leading companies. Multiple-country comparisons also help to separate the
idiosyncrasies of a specific industry from the effects of different regulatory systems. However,
the qualitative case study-based nature of the studies leads to some doubt about the
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generalizability and selection bias of the findings. While the cases enhance understanding of
how competitive regulatory strategies might work, further research will require a more
systematic analysis of the selected industry.
2.8 Summary
This chapter explored how economics and business literature has addressed the idea that
some companies might gain competitive advantage from the environmental performance of their
products. First-mover companies and first-mover countries may have an incentive to support
more stringent environmental standards to limit competition and increase market share. Many of
the concepts are discussed in the context of game-theoretic models, aggregated panel data studies,
or company-specific case studies. There is a need to study the impact of technological progress
on the stringency of environmental regulations within a focused industry-wide case study (Jaffe
and Palmer 1997). Such a study would canvas a wide variety of corporate and regulatory
responses - not just the success stories about first-mover firms or countries that are
disproportionately represented in case studies.
In order to address some of the criticisms about the anecdotal nature of most case studies,
this study takes a broader methodological approach than most case study-based research. Like
many previous empirical studies, it selects a specific environmental innovation field - in this
case, diesel vehicle emission reduction. Instead of developing a simplifying framework or model,
the research investigates the complexities of actual organizational behavior to better understand
the interaction between technology development and environmental regulations. It studies
multiple companies and countries, with a focus on seeking explanations for different behavior
and outcomes. There have been several rounds of increasingly stringent emission and fuel
standards in the past two decades, so this study takes advantage of the series of recurring
regulatory processes. Studying the response of different industries to the same innovation field
of diesel emission reduction allows for inter-industry comparison, without the complication of
introducing a different issue. The use of multiple countries, companies, time periods, and
industries results in a larger dataset and allows for meaningful controlled comparisons.
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CHAPTER 3 - Research Methods
3.1 Introduction
The research seeks to understand the conditions under which companies in the diesel
vehicle industry introduce cleaner technology ahead of regulations, and the factors that influence
the public and private outcomes. The goal is to understand the causal mechanisms behind
corporate behavior, while acknowledging that causation is not unidirectional. Environmental
policy and technology development influence each other, and the many other factors potentially
motivating corporate decisions (e.g. public pressure, customer demand, economic incentives)
may also be shaped by corporate actions.
Because theory is still forming in this area, theory will be generated by collecting and
analyzing research data. This research approach is commonly known as "grounded theory,"
where the purpose is theory generation, not theory verification. Instead of starting with
hypotheses expected from existing theory, this approach lends itself to generating plausible
explanations or propositions from real-life observations that may be tested through further study.
Theory-building research should ideally start with a "clean theoretical slate," where there is no
thinking about relationships between variables and theories at the outset of the research.
However, formulating the research problem and identifying potentially important variables are
essential first steps (Eisenhardt 1989).
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In creating a basis for investigating the research questions, the main causal relationship
can be articulated as a set of independent variables affecting the dependent variables - corporate
behavior and outcomes - which in turn also affect the independent variables.
Figure 3-1: Main Causal Relationship
This multiple-causes and multiple-effects relationship, where some of the causes are not
known a priori, lends itself to a deductive approach. Findings from the research will generate
propositions that plausibly explain the outcomes.
3.2 Comparative case method
A typical case study approach would be to use a company as the main unit of analysis.
This might involve selecting several companies that chose to introduce advanced pollution
reduction technologies ahead of regulatory requirements, and some that did not. However,
taking the company as the unit of analysis overlooks larger contextual reasons for corporate
behavior. Sampling a subset of companies for case studies may limit the breadth of comparison
possible. Selection bias would be a problem because it would be tempting to choose the most
prominent examples of unusual corporate behavior. To mitigate some of these problems, this
research uses a two-tiered approach, first evaluating motivations and outcomes in different
regulatory cycles, and then investigating behavior at the organizational level.
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Independent Variables
Countries/regions (EU, Japan, US)
Regulatory cycles
Industry sector
Economic conditions
Company management
Pressure from public, interest groups
Lobbying power of industry groups
Others...
Dependent Variables
Corporate Behavior
Outcomes (private and public)
A
-
Since the research focus is on companies' interaction with environmental regulations, the
cycles of regulatory change can be used to form the boundaries of the case studies. A
"regulatory cycle," as used in this thesis, is a set of emission or fuel regulations in a country or
region that must be met by a certain date or timeframe. Studying a regulatory cycle includes
reviewing several phases of its accompanying regulatory process:
Figure 3-2: Regulatory Process
Problem
identification Technology Regulatory Stakeholder Revision and Technology Compliance\
and information andcost proposal feedback finalization development and
gathering (by assessment /solicitation /of proposal nforcement 
regulators) perio
In some situations, this process may be iterative, with revised proposals and rounds of
technology assessments and stakeholder feedback; in other situations, the process may be
simplified if government regulators and industry can come to a mutually acceptable agreement
without entering a formal decision-making process.
The countries and regions investigated in this study - the EU, Japan, and the US - do not
have simultaneously timed regulatory cycles for emission and fuel standards. Yet there is
enough overlap that they can be grouped to study collectively. Since many companies in the
auto, truck, engine, fuel, and emission control industries sell their products globally, they must
cater to each market's regulatory cycles, leading to a natural comparison among overlapping
cycles.
In Table 3-1, the groups of regulatory cycles highlighted in gray were selected for this
research. They cover light-duty vehicles, heavy-duty engines, and diesel fuel, with at least two
groups of regulatory cycles within each category for comparison. Because of their recent
occurrence, the accompanying regulatory processes are well documented in the public record.
Implementation and outcomes are observable from the earlier cycles, while the later cycles, with
some regulations yet to take effect, allow for consideration of strategic firm behavior and future
regulations.
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Table 3-1: Recent Regulatory Cycles for On-road Diesel Vehicles and Fuels
2000-2004 2004-2007 2008+
Light-duty Euro 32000 Euro 42005 Euro 5 2008
vehicles lP LD 2002 IPLD 2005 lPLB 2009
US Tier 1 1997-2003 .US :f,ier 2 2004-07
CA LEVI 1994-2003 CA LEVII 2004-10
Heavy-duty
engines
00-road fuel
sulfur
Off-road EU Stage 2 2001-04 EU Stage 3 2006-13 EU Stage 42014
vehicles IP MOT Stage 1 2003 IP MOT Stage 2 2006- US Tier 4 2008-15
& MaC Stage 2 2003 08
US Tier 22001-06 US Tier 3 2006-8
Off-road fuel EU 1994, 2000ppm lP 2005-07, 10ppm EU 2008, 1000ppm
sulfur lP 2003-05, 50ppm US 2007, 500ppm EU 2009,10 ppm
US pre-1993, 5000ppm US 2010, 15ppm
Regulatory cycles from the off-road sector were not selected because most regulatory
developments are still very recent and in progress during the time of this research study. Based
on preliminary research, some of the most contentious debate about regulatory standards has
focused on the highway vehicles and fuels. Although the technology required for off-road
emission reduction is costly and challenging, it lags the development of light-duty and heavy-
duty highway vehicles by several years, so many of the policies and technology solutions may be
passed down from the automobile and truck sectors.
Within each selected group of regulatory cycles, individual companies and industries are
closely examined for their behavior, comprising the second tier of analysis. The regulatory cycle
provides a convenient and natural framework to understand their actions. Companies and
industry groups often announce their positions on regulations and offer information about their
technology progress at different phases of the regulatory process. In addition to comparing
company behavior, the variations in government, NGO, and public responses in the EU, lapan,
and the US provide the opportunity for comparative study. The two-tiered comparative case
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study approach is more comprehensive, starting off broadly with the regulatory cycles and then
focusing in-depth at the organizational level. This deeper level of analysis allows the "cases" to
be reconfigured in a variety of ways - as a single regulatory cycle in a country, an entire
industry's interaction with a set of regulations, or one company's response to the regulatory
process. Grouping the cases in various ways can lead to important patterns of within-group
similarities and inter-group differences. Pairing seemingly similar cases for comparison may
reveal important variables responsible for differences (Eisenhardt 1989).
By taking this approach, this study avoids the biased selection of cases that occurs in
most qualitative studies. The cases are not selected for their ability to fit the definition of an
early or first mover. Instead, reviewing each regulatory cycle will generate cases of corporate
behavior, which could range from non-compliance to first-mover behavior. Although this
process is by no means exhaustive, it does capture representative behavior that is documented by
the media, industry, or regulatory agencies.
The need for an open-ended approach to identifying causal mechanisms is fulfilled
through process tracing. Process tracing is an approach in which the researcher examines the
decision process by which the initial conditions are translated into outcomes. It studies the steps
of the decision-making process, often down to the level of the motivations and perceptions of the
individual actor. Process tracing is especially useful in cases where there are a limited number of
observations because it yields many observations within each sequence of events or organization
(George and McKeown 1985; King, Keohane et al. 1994). For this research, the process tracing
approach was used to investigate organizational positions and decisions at various stages of each
regulatory cycle, and to assess the attitudes of decision makers over time and on different issues.
Looking beyond the final outcomes offers opportunities to improve understanding of
intermediate decisions. It also leaves the door open for more than one causal mechanism to
explain the phenomena. While this does make it difficult to generate one clear explanation for
behavior, it sacrifices clear determinacy for comprehensiveness. However, with multiple
regulatory cycles suitable for comparative study, patterns may emerge to strengthen confidence
in the explanations.
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In approaching each regulatory cycle, the following questions served as a guide for gathering
information.
* What was the regulatory process?
* How and when did the regulatory levels first get proposed and then finalized?
* Who were the early movers, first movers, or supporters, if any? Opponents? What were
their motivations?
* What technologies were available to meet the standards?
* What influence did companies and their technologies have on regulations - from design
to implementation?
a What were the private financial and reputational benefits and costs to the individual
companies and to the industry?
* What were the public environmental, health, or economic benefits and costs to the
customers and the greater public?
The data sources used to answer these questions are described in the next section.
3.3 Data sources
A combination of documentary sources, quantitative data, and personal interviews are
used as a source of data. Documentary sources include industry databases, professional/trade
journals, research project summaries, patent databases, company reports, and regulatory
documents. Descriptive statistics about individual companies, industries, and countries are
available from company financial reports, industry associations, and government agencies.
Phone or live interviews were conducted with individuals in industry, government, NGOs, and
academia/research who have been involved with at least one of the regulatory cycles.
3.3.1 Documentary sources
Primary documents are a rich source of information about public and private behavior
and decisions. Most documentary resources were obtained through public channels, such as
government agencies, company websites, or public-private research projects. Some were
subscription-only electronic databases and journals, which require Virtual Electronic Resource
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Access (VERA) from the MIT Libraries. Table 3-2 summarizes the types of documents used and
the information they provide.
Table 3-2: Types of Documentary Research
Type Purpose Example of Sources
Research papers These show the status of existing technology and Society of Automotive
and reports promising developments. They provide technical Engineers Technical Paper
information about the effectiveness of specific Series
technologies. Organizations often use these publicly
available reports to communicate their results with
academia, industry, and regulators.
Patents The volume of patents in a certain area can reflect the JAPIO (Japan Patent
amount of interest in pursuing a particular technology. Information Organization),
However, patents are not perfect indicators of innovation US Patent and Trademark
because heavy patenting is not a direct measure of Office, esp@cenet
innovativeness. Within a given company, the timing of (European Patent Office)
patents may show chronological trends.
Regulatory Technical regulatory documents often show the US Environmental
documents technical rationale behind regulatory decisions. Industry Protection Agency,
submissions or comments reveal individual company or European Commission,
shared industry positions. Japan Ministry of the
Environment
Corporate press Companies may announce their technology Company websites,
releases and developments, product introductions, or positions on LexisNexis Academic
annual reports regulatory issues through press releases. database (MIT
subscription)
Government Regulatory agencies may give advance notice of Government agency
press releases rulemaking procedures. websites
Investment Based on financial data and market trends, analyst Gale Group databases such
analyst reports reports provide analysis about the current and projected as Investext (MIT
performance of a company or industry. subscription)
NGO press NGOs draw attention to their initiatives and campaigns NGO websites
releases and through public statements, often highlighting their key
issue reports health and environmental concerns. They also draw
attention to specific company behavior deserving
criticism or praise.
Joint research Public-private research projects may demonstrate the Japan Clean Air Program,
projects type of research that interests and/or influences European and US Auto-Oil
government policymakers. Programs
News articles Newspaper and magazines offer a real-time snapshot of New York Times,
events and attitudes. Popular press also indicates Associated Press, Asahi
whether regulatory issues have received attention from Shimbun, Financial Times
interest groups and the mainstream media. (via LexisNexis database)
Trade articles Industry-specific media sources offer in-depth Diesel Fuel News, Heavy
information about company activities, and reflect the Duty Trucking,
concerns and biases of that particular industry. Automotive News Europe
(via LexisNexis database)
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Because of the proliferation of electronic publishing, there is wide variation in the
reputability of sources obtained from the Internet. Concerted effort was made to only use
sources from well-known organizations or with published print equivalents. Multiple sources
were used to verify information obtained from lesser known sources.
3.3.2 Quantitative data
Quantitative data can also be seen as another form of documentary source, but they are
distinct in that they are the result of collected numerical data that must be processed further for
genuine usefulness. Quantitative data, such as financial data, demographic data, and air quality
measurements, are helpful in understanding corporate financial performance, market conditions,
and public and private outcomes. Statistics may come in a tabular format, requiring calculations
and graphical display to reveal meaningful trends.
Table 3-3: Types of Quantitative Data
Type Purpose Example of sources
Financial data Financial reports contain information about Company annual reports,
profits, returns, sales, expenditures, etc., which SEC filings, analyst
indicate the financial performance of the reports (Investext), Ward's
company and/or industry. Auto World
Certification Data from regulatory agencies on vehicle and Regulatory databases
data certification test results give information about
the margins with which companies can meet
regulatory standards.
Industry data Statistics, such as total sales and market share can Industry associations,
demonstrate the industry's overall health, business databases,
competitiveness, and trends. government census reports
Country/ Demographic figures about a geographic area Transport agencies,
regional may explain the reasons for differences in its government census reports
demographics industries or special challenges faced by its
companies.
Air quality Air quality trends show the seriousness of air Environmental agencies
measurements quality problems and progress in reductions.
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3.4 Interviews
The purpose of the personal interviews is to build upon the information gathered from
documentary sources and quantitative data, and to explore organizational and individual
perceptions of technology and regulatory decisions. Interviews uncover motivations and
concerns that are not revealed or even contradictory from the other sources. The selection of
potential interviewees was based on their depth of involvement in a given regulatory cycle or
cycles and their organizational affiliation. The types of interviewees are summarized below:
Table 3-4: Interviewee Affiliations and Roles
Organizational affiliation of interviewees Organizational roles
Industry Government/regulatory affairs officers
Environmental affairs officers
R&D managers
Environmental/health NGOs Transport or air quality issue leaders
Professional or trade organizations Regulatory or environmental specialists
Government (state, national, regional) Regulatory officials
Technical staff
Academic/research Emissions, fuel, and health effects experts with
strong connections to industry and government
Various sources were used to identify appropriate participants for interviews.
Documentary resources such as trade journals, government reports, industry publications, press
statements identified spokespeople on diesel-related issues. Organizational websites for
regulatory agencies and companies listed the individuals responsible for environmental
regulatory policy on diesels. International meetings and conferences on diesel regulatory issues
listed speakers and participants. Reviewing the publicly available presentations and biographies
in advance helped to determine the relevance of the speakers' experience to this research.
Attendance at several conferences and workshops relevant to diesel emissions helped to establish
relationships with potential interviewees and individuals who facilitated introductions to other
diesel experts. Based on a wide search of potential interviewees and close attention to diversity
of affiliations and organizational roles, a contact list was created. Personal contacts and initial
interviews also led to additional contacts. This "snowball" strategy allowed for a more informed
selection of interviewees once interviewing was underway. Reassessment of areas requiring
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more investigation influenced the types of organizations and individuals contacted for additional
interviews.
The MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects (COUHES)
reviewed and approved the interview procedures that are part of this research (COUHES 2003).
Using the COUHES guidelines, procedures for protecting confidentiality were developed. They
were explained to the interviewees through the initial contact letter and at the beginning of the
interview. The following are the confidentiality procedures for the interview process:
Table 3-5: Interview Procedures for Protecting Confidentiality
Participation is voluntary.
The interviewee may decline to answer any questions.
The interviewee may decline further participation at any time without prejudice.
The interviewee may designate any comment as "off the record," and will be given the
opportunity to stipulate this designation for any earlier comments at the end of the
interview.
Any notes from the interview will be for personal use and not publicly distributed.
Comments will not be attributed to the interviewee unless consent is granted.
When comments remain anonymous, the information collected will be reported in such a way
that the identity of the individual is protected.
Proper measures will be taken to safeguard the collected information. Written notes will be kept
in a private, locked space, while electronic notes will be kept on a password-protected
computer.
Each potential interviewee was contacted by a mailed or emailed letter requesting his or
her participation. The letter described the purpose and scope of the research project and
interview. It discussed the interview procedures for protecting confidentiality listed in Table 3-5.
Once a potential interviewee agreed to participate, a follow-up email exchange or phone
conversation arranged a convenient time and date. In a few cases where an in-person meeting
was feasible, the interview was conducted at the interviewee's office or meeting room.
The interview question format was semi-structured, meaning that there was a set list of
questions created for each interview, but also flexibility to depart from the list to pursue further
discussion in certain areas. Although some questions were common across many interviewees,
other questions were specific to each interviewee, based on institutional affiliation and
experience. Most interviews were conducted by phone. If time and resources allowed, the
interviews were conducted in person. The average interview duration was 45 to 60 minutes.
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Each interview began with a brief review of the research motivation and confidentiality
protection. Because the interviewee usually received the questions in advance by email, the
order and pacing of the questions were flexible, allowing for a more natural flow of conservation.
In select cases, a second interview or follow-up phone call was conducted to continue the
interview or to clarify a response. References to information obtained from documentary sources
or insights from other interviews (with the source disguised) were incorporated into interviews as
a method of triangulation to test a claim with multiple respondents. None of the interviewees
were tape recorded; only notes were taken.
Once the interviews had been conducted, there had to be a systematic way of reviewing
and organizing the interview notes. Interview "coding" organizes the interview responses into
coherent topics or themes for further analysis. The interview responses were manually coded
based on pre-defined broad categories, which are underlined in Table 3-6. Based on the content
of the responses, subcategories were also created.
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Table 3-6: Categories Used in Interview Coding
Motivations for Early/First-Mover Behavior
First-mover or receptive countries/regions
Fiscal/tax incentives
Top management
R&D staff innovation
Customer demand
Opportunity for technology spillover to other companies or markets
Protect existing market share
Gain competitive advantage through regulations
Anticipation of future regulations
Improve reputation
Media influence
NGO influence
Disincentives for Early/First-Mover Behavior
Lack of business case
Fear of more regulation
Technological uncertainty
Fear of upsetting customers
Lack of infrastructure
Industry/trade association pressure
Contextual Factors
Country/culture-specific differences
Concern about national competitiveness and employment
Regional leaders
Relationship with regulators
Relationship with NGOs
Outcomes
Private benefits
Public benefits
Early- or first-mover examples cited by interviewees
Tools
Credibility of technology assessments and cost estimates
Cultural differences make "best practices" hard to transfer from one country to another
Use of third-parties and demonstration projects to enhance credibility
Early action on presently unregulated pollutants
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3.5 Accessibility of data sources
There were limitations to data accessibility for this research project. Documentary
sources consisted of publicly available sources or subscription-based sources through MIT's
library subscriptions. In some cases, public agencies were contacted to obtain publicly
accessible documents. However, some third-party reports and datasets were not reviewed
because they required a substantial purchase or subscription fee. Although some private
companies did provide some specific sales data not readily available through their published
literature and website, they could not provide detailed financial or marketing information for
confidentiality reasons. Some government agencies collect and produce more extensive
documentation and datasets than others. Compared to the EU and Japan, the US provides the
most extensive data about its government decision-making and regulatory processes. For
example, the US EPA provides all the supporting documentation for its emission and fuel
standard proposals on its website or by written request. Most major European and Japanese
regulatory and technical documents already had English translations because they are intended
for sharing with other regulators and company representatives worldwide. On rare occasions,
documents not in English were available only in German or Japanese, posing a significant
language barrier, even with use of free online translation software. However, the variety of other
sources available did not make these limitations a serious liability for this research project.
3.6 Summary
The documentary sources, quantitative data, and interviews described in this chapter form
the basis for the comparative case studies. The two-tiered methodological approach is based on
the comparative case study method. However, it is much broader than the company-level case
studies typical for research on corporate environmental strategies. Studying the regulatory
cycles first helps set the market and regulatory context for corporate and regulatory decision-
making. Analyzing behavior and outcomes at the organizational level then generates
representative cases to observe meaningful patterns and to make comparisons between cycles,
countries, and companies.
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CHAPTER 4- Diesel Vehicle Industry
4.1 Introduction
Empirical researchers have suggested the greater need for focused industry studies to
understand company responses to regulation: "Studies could focus on firms in heavily regulated
industries.. .and could include a more detailed analysis of the impacts of particular classes of
regulation, say, by media, on innovative effort. Ideally an in-depth study of one or two
companies in a particular industry, such as chemicals, could be used to develop an understanding
about how regulated firms respond to new regulations and some related hypotheses which could
then be tested using data from other firms in the industry" (Jaffe and Palmer 1997).
For this research study, the diesel vehicle industry is chosen for a focused industry study,
which will generate propositions about how competitive regulatory strategies might work. It will
also shed light on the types of regulatory policies that encourage firms to act as early or first
movers on technology or product introductions. Since diesel vehicles are actually a system of
technologies, the "diesel vehicle industry" incorporates several industries - automobile, truck,
engine, petroleum, and emission control companies. While the vehicle, engine, and petroleum
industries face environmental regulation on their processes and products, this research focuses on
product regulations, such as performance standards or specifications. The increasingly stringent
emission and fuel regulations, the subsequent high levels of regulation-driven R&D and capital
investment, and the oligopolistic industrial structure make competition based on environmental
performance relevant to business practice. Because environmental performance and regulatory
compliance are so central to their technology development, the companies are more likely to
include environmental concerns as part of their overall corporate planning and strategy.
The recent interest in diesel vehicles as a partial solution to fuel consumption and carbon
dioxide (CO2 ) concerns makes the selection of this industry especially timely. In Europe, fuel
taxes are very high, making fuel prices equivalent to $5-6 per gallon. Diesel vehicles are an
attractive choice because they have up to 30% higher fuel economy than gasoline vehicles.
Diesels also produce lower CO, emissions, which is an appealing feature to government officials
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and customers increasingly concerned about anthropogenic CO2's impact on climate change.
Differential fuel taxes and lower vehicle fees for low CO2-emitting vehicles in many European
countries have also given diesel an extra edge over gasoline. Diesel penetration in Western
Europe's light-duty fleet has risen since the 1980s, and has now reached approximately 50%, as
shown in Figure 4-1. Major technology developments by the European automotive industry have
aided this diesel boom. Turbocharged diesel engines (1979 - Peugeot), electronic direct injection
(1989 - Audi), and common-rail injections systems (1997 - Bosch) have greatly enhanced the
power, fuel economy, and driveability of diesels.
Figure 4-1: Diesel Penetration
Diesel Penetration in Passenger Car Sales
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Although higher oil prices from the oil crises in the 1970s did increase diesel cars sales in
the US and Japan during the 1980s, diesel demand eventually died out, and now passenger cars
in Japan and the US have a diesel penetration of less than 1%. Stringent PM standards proposed
by US and Japanese regulators in the 1970s constituted a virtual ban on diesel cars. In Europe,
relatively lenient PM standards were finally introduced in the late 1980s. The German
government wanted to adopt more stringent diesel standards, but German automakers Mercedes
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and Volkswagen lobbied the European Commission for greater leniency. Furthermore, fiscal
incentives intended for catalytic converter-equipped gasoline cars were expanded to include
diesel cars compliant with the PM standard (Wurzel 2002).
sIn the US and Japan, diesel power is reserved mainly for medium to heavy-duty
highway and off-road vehicles, where its greater power, higher fuel economy, and lower
operating costs are especially valued. Poor performance by diesel cars introduced in the US in
the 1980s left American consumers with a negative image of diesels. Relatively low fuel prices
also did not justify diesel cars' higher purchase cost. Japanese auto manufacturers have held a
negative perception of diesel as a dirty and outmoded technology. For example, Honda founder
Soichiro Honda vowed that the company would never make a diesel engine. However, after
Honda missed out on the diesel boom in Europe, Honda went against the founder's words in
2003 by offering a new diesel engine for some of their European Accords (Griffiths 2003; Honda
2004). Growing concerns about high oil prices and oil security, as well as improvements in
diesel emission control and Europe's diesel boom, have prompted the US and Japan to
reconsider diesels for an expanded role in personal transportation.
Despite the technological advances in emission control, diesel exhaust still poses a major
air pollution problem because of its particulate matter (PM) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions.
Diesel exhaust consists mostly of PM by weight and contains a variety of air toxics, many of
which are not yet fully understood or regulated. In a growing number of scientific studies, diesel
exhaust has been linked to respiratory diseases, heart disease, cancer, and premature deaths.
NOx contributes to the formation of ground-level ozone, which causes asthma and other
respiratory problems. NOx also leads to acid rain and ecosystem damage (EPA 2002c; Health
Effects Institute 2003). Since diesel exhaust comes primarily from vehicle transportation,
especially large commercial vehicles, governments in the EU, Japan, and the US have been
setting emission limits on vehicles and engines since the 1980s. They have also regulated fuel
quality, with particular attention to lowering fuel sulfur levels, which helps emission control
equipment function effectively.
Studying the diesel vehicle industry provides plenty of built-in variation. While the EU,
Japan, and the US, have the most the most stringent emission and fuel standards, they have very
different economic conditions, environmental priorities, and regulatory contexts. They also are
home to very strong and influential automobile, truck, and oil industries.
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Increasingly stringent standards on diesel vehicles, engines, and fuels have spurred
development of cleaner vehicle and engine technologies. Because compliance with tighter
standards usually imposes additional R&D and production costs on the regulated industries,
proposed standards have often met with stiff resistance from individual companies and industry-
wide trade associations. Emission standards may be technology-forcing, which means they
require the development of technologies that are not yet currently available. Technologies
capable of compliance are expected to reach a commercializable stage when the regulation
deadline arrives. Companies face uncertainties about technological progress and future
discoveries about diesel exhaust's health effects, which can affect the stringency of future
regulation. Nevertheless, they must continue producing products, so they still have to make
investment, R&D, and production decisions. Companies that are better equipped to handle
stringent environmental regulations have an advantage over their competitors.
The next two sections give an overview of the motor vehicle industry and road
infrastructure in the EU, Japan, and the US, which can help explain some of the trends in each
region. The popularity of diesel vehicles parallels mounting concern about the health risks
associated with diesel exhaust. This chapter ends with a discussion of the different regulatory
processes in the three regions.
4.2 Motor vehicle industry
As of 2004, 62% of the world's passenger cars and commercial vehicles (trucks, buses,
etc.) were made in the EU-15, Japan, or the US. This is significantly less than their collective
share of 80-90% in the 1970s and 1980s, a result of the decline in the US auto industry and the
dramatic growth of automobile industries in South Korea, Brazil, and China (US Bureau of
Transportation Statistics 2005a). Figure 4-2 shows the passenger car production trends from
1960.
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Figure 4-3: World Commercial Vehicle Production
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The US is still the dominant player in manufacturing trucks and buses, while the EU-15
and Japan have significantly lower commercial vehicle production (see Figure 4-3). China has
already surpassed them in vehicle units, and South Korea looks to overtake them within a few
years. The demand growth for commercial vehicles worldwide is even greater than that for
passenger cars. From 1991 to 2004, global passenger car production increased by a mere 21%
compared to 76% for commercial vehicles. Much of this growth in demand is coming from
developing countries with rapidly growing economies, like China and India. Although
established multinational companies have tried to take advantage of this growth by producing
vehicles in local plants, the booming market has opened the door for more competitors,
especially those from developing countries.
Although the EU, Japan, and US are not as dominant as they were in the 1960s-1980s,
their domestic motor vehicle industries and reliance on automobile use have led to global
leadership on motor vehicle standards. In order to ensure greater uniformity on emission
standards, other countries are expected to adopt standards and test protocols already developed
by the EU, Japanese, or US government. Even as other countries grow their own domestic auto
industries, they seek to ultimately sell to the world market, which is converging towards more
stringent regulations. Concerns about air quality, urban congestion, and fuel consumption are
increasingly shared by developed and emerging markets alike.
4.3 Road infrastructure
Trends in road transportation influence each national and regional government's
approach towards regulating mobile sources. Pollutants are regulated on a per-vehicle and per-
distance basis, so a growing vehicle fleet and increased travel distances can cut into progress on
emission reduction. Europe, Japan, and the US have all experienced significant growth in both
passenger car travel and freight travel. Passenger car travel has increased by over 10% in each
region. The greatest growth has occurred in freight travel by road in Europe and the US, which
experienced a 40% increase in tonne-kilometers traveled between 1990 and 2000. This reaffirms
the need to place greater attention to regulating emissions from heavy-duty diesel vehicles.
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Figure 4-4: Passenger Car and Freight Travel Growth, 1990-2000
Passenger Car Travel Growth, 1990-2000
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Although distance traveled has increased, vehicle ownership rates in the Europe, Japan,
and the US appear to have reached a plateau. The US has the highest ownership rate in the
world: 775 private cars per 1000 Americans. Many factors are behind the high ownership rate:
low fuel taxes, large geographic area, overall low population density, a well-developed road
network, and a weak public transportation network. The EU and Japan have stabilized their
ownership rates around 500 cars per 1000 inhabitants (IFP 2005).
Because the US has such a large geographic area, its road transportation network is far
more extensive than those in Japan and the EU. As seen in Table 4-1, the total length of US
roads, railways, and oil pipelines far surpass EU and Japan figures. The greatest discrepancy
among the three regions is the length of oil pipelines, where the total US pipeline length is
almost an order of magnitude larger than even the EU-25 and 3 orders of magnitude larger than
Japan's. Because of its enormous scale, the operation and maintenance of the transportation
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infrastructure in the US, and to a lesser extent, the EU, is much more costly than in Japan. This
means that any environmental policy changes involving the infrastructure will likely be more
challenging to implement in the US and the EU.
Table 4-1: Passenger and Freight Infrastructure, 2001 Figures
(in 1000 km) EU-25 US Japan
Road network 4,800 7,173 1,172
Railway network 199.7 315.3 23.7
Oil pipelines 27.5 255.2 0.2
Source: EC Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (2004)
Although the US has more roads than Japan and the EU, more of its inland freight (on a
weight basis) moves by railway than by truck (Figure 4-5). The EU and Japan rely
predominately on roads for freight transport within their borders. The US share of road use is
only 40%. As a result of this discrepancy, it would be expected that the freight transportation
lobby would be stronger in the EU and Japan than in the US. This seems to be true in European
countries, where pressure from the trucking industry, which predominately uses diesel-powered
vehicles, has kept duties on diesel fuel low relative to gasoline.
Figure 4-5: Inland Freight Shares, 2003
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4.4 Factors driving the growing interest in diesels
The strongest factors explaining the growth in diesel popularity have been high oil prices
and concerns about the contribution of anthropogenic CO2 emissions to climate change. Fuel tax
and vehicle registration policies in the EU have encouraged customers to purchase more fuel-
efficient and low CO2-emitting vehicles, many of them diesels.
4.4.1 Energy consumption
In the three regions, the transportation sector's consumption of energy has grown in both
absolute terms and in its share of total energy consumption.
Figure 4-6: Transportation's Contribution to Energy Consumption
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The amount of energy consumed by transportation in the U.S. is particularly striking. By 2002,
U.S. transportation energy needs already comprised 40% of the country's total energy
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consumption, while it was 260/0 and 30% in Japan and the EU-15. Road transport is by far the
most energy-consuming of transportation types. It makes up over 80% of the total energy used
by transportation in the three regions. The rise in consumption comes from an increase in both
vehicles on the road and vehicle distance traveled (DECO 2005a).
Over 98% of all energy for transportation comes in the form of liquid petroleum-based
fuels, either gasoline or diesel fuel. Figure 4-7 shows the trend of gasoline and diesel
consumption. Europe's rapid adoption of diesel cars in the 1990s is reflected in its rise in diesel
fuel consumption from 1990 to 2002, and the accompanying decrease in gasoline consumption.
By 2002, its diesel consumption had surpassed its gasoline consumption, whereas in Japan and
the US, gasoline is still the dominant transportation fuel.
Passenger car owners who have above-average annual driving distances are more
inclined to choose diesel over gasoline cars. The money saved from lower fuel costs and higher
efficiency makes up for the more expensive upfront cost of the vehicle. In 2001, when France
already had a diesel penetration approaching 60%, the annual mileage of a diesel car was 19,700
km, compared to 11,400 for a gasoline car (Orfeuil 2001).
Figure 4-7: Motor Gasoline and Diesel Consumption in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2002
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The freight transportation industry is even more sensitive to fuel prices than individual
passenger car customers. The large vehicle size and weight, and the longer annual distances
traveled translate to greater fuel consumption. For example, a large tractor-trailer truck (e.g.
Class 7 or 8 truck in the US) can typically travel 5-7 miles per gallon (2-3 km/liter). In the US,
such a vehicle travels an average of 63,000 miles (101,000 km) per year, compared to the 12,000
miles (19,300 km) traveled by typical passenger car or light truck (US Census Bureau 2004). In
Europe, a typical light-duty vehicle travels 6,000-9,000 miles (10,000-15,000 km) annually,
while a heavy-duty diesel vehicle travels 37,000 miles (60,000 km) per year (European
Environment Agency 2005).
Table 4-2: Average Annual Distances Traveled by Light-duty and Heavy-duty Vehicles
Annual distance EU-15 Japan US
Light-duty 9,300 miles 5,800 miles 12,000 miles
(15,000 km) (9,300 km) (19,300 km)
Heavy-duty 37,000 miles n/a 63,000 miles
(freight) (60,000 km) (101,000 km)
Sources: European Environment Agency (2005), US Census Bureau (2004), FIA Foundation
(2003)
4.4.2 CO2 emission reduction
Awareness about climate change as a serious global environmental problem has increased
in recent decades. Although some controversy persists about the extent of the human
contribution to the problem, most scientists agree that higher levels of greenhouse gases, like
CO2, and methane, will lead to higher average global temperatures and sea level rise.
Governments around the world have been seeking ways to reduce CO2 emissions from industrial
activity. The EU and Japan are both parties to the Kyoto Protocol, an international and legally
binding agreement to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels by the 2008-2012
commitment period. The EU has agreed to an 8% reduction and Japan has agreed to a 6%
reduction (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 2006). Even though the US did not
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ratify the agreement, US firms with markets overseas have begun to turn their attention to CO2
reduction as well.
Transportation is a leading contributor to CO2 emissions, second only to electricity and
heating. CO2 emissions roughly correspond to the quantity of energy consumed, so the US leads
with almost one-third of its CO2 emissions coming from transportation.
Table 4-3: CO2 Emissions from Transportation
EU-15 Japan US
CO2 emissions from transportation 843.4 250.1 1,794.0
(billion tonnes/yr)
Transportation as a percentage of total 25.4% 20.8% 31.3%
Per capita CO2 emissions from transportation 2.20 0.85 14.05
(million tonnes/yr)
Source: OECD (2005b; 2005c)
Because transportation, and specifically road transportation, is a leading contributor to
energy consumption and CO2 emissions, there is a major incentive to reduce vehicle fuel
consumption. Some technological approaches have been to add energy-efficient features to
vehicles, reduce vehicle weight, or to adopt alternative powertrains, like battery-electric or
hybrid gasoline-electric engines. Although not a new technology, diesel powertrains have
advanced with the development of electronic control and common-rail fuel injection, making
diesels a highly popular option for passenger cars in Europe. As noted earlier, diesel vehicles
consume energy and emit CO2 at a level 30% lower than their gasoline equivalents. Many
national governments in Europe tax diesel fuel at a lower rate than gasoline, further encouraging
diesel penetration in the passenger car fleet.
4.4.3 Government tax policy
High tax rates in Europe and Japan have generally led to smaller vehicle sizes, whereas in
the US, where the fuel tax is relatively low, light trucks, SUVs, and vans have grown in
popularity. In Europe, the fuel excise tax is often more than 50% of the final end-user price, as
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shown in Figure 4-8. Several European countries, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Iceland, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland, have some of the highest end-user fuel prices in the
world (GTZ 2005).
Figure 4-8: Petroleum Product End-User Prices
Petroleum Product End-User Prices, June 2005
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Although diesel fuel usually has a slightly higher base price than gasoline, its
significantly lower tax rate in Europe makes diesel less expensive overall. Europe has
historically taxed gasoline more heavily than diesel to encourage drivers to switch to the more
energy-efficient diesel cars. This was partially driven by the oil crises in the 1970s, when fuel
was scarce; the tax differentiation policy has persisted ever since. Also, the trucking lobby is an
influential force in keeping the diesel tax rates lower than gasoline. The diesel-gasoline price
differential is not as pronounced in Japan, but diesels still have a tax advantage. In the US, the
price differential between diesel and gasoline is usually negligible. Figure 4-9 shows the
difference between gasoline and diesel in Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
only), Japan, and North America (US and Canada only). It shows the discrepancy in fuel price
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differentials in Europe, where gasoline has averaged US$0.34 per liter ($1.30 per gallon) more
than diesel, or 40% more. Such a strong difference gives an incentive to European customers to
purchase diesel cars, even though diesel cars cost more.
Figure 4-9: Monthly Gasoline-Diesel Price Differentials, October 2000 to January 2006
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4.5 Health and environmental concerns
4.5.1 Diesel vehicles' contribution to pollutant emissions
For diesel vehicles, the key pollutants of concern are NOx and PM, especially fine
particulates, which are especially damaging to human health because of their long-term impacts
on premature mortality. This section offers an overview of the contribution of diesel vehicles' to
total air pollutant emissions. It would have been preferable to directly compare the situations in
the EU, Japan, and US, but different measurement and data collection methods require that each
region be discussed separately.
81
United States
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) documents annual emission trends data,
taking input from state and local air agencies, tribes, and industry. The National Emissions
Inventory is used for modeling, regional strategy development, regulation setting, risk
assessment, and trend tracking (EPA 2002d).
Table 4-4 summarizes on-highway diesel vehicles' share of major air pollutants, with
NOx and PM highlighted in gray. Even though total NOx emissions have decreased, diesels have
been contributing to an increasing share of NOx emissions. Their contribution to PM10 and
PM2.5 appear relatively small, but unlike the other pollutants, which have specific chemical
compositions and sizes, PM is a complex mix of hundreds of constituents. Not all particulates
are equal in their risk to human health. For example, wind-blown fugitive dust (i.e.
uncontaminated soil) is not a critical source of particles responsible for health effects, while
particles from internal combustion engines, coal combustion, and wood burning have serious
adverse effects (WHO 2003).
Table 4-4: Highway Diesel Vehicles' Contribution to US Air Pollutant Emissions
0.5%
1.4%
2000
1.1%
0.1%
1.4%
1.9%
1990
1.2%
0.1%
0.9%
1.6%
1980
0.8%
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0.3%
1.30/0
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0.3%
nJa
S02 (sulfur dioxide)
VOC (volatile organic
compounds)
* Figures for 1970 and 1980 may not be accurate because EPA was reporting missing emission
data during that time period.
Source: EPA National Emissions Inventory (2002d)
Criteria pollutants
CO (carbon monoxide)
NH3 (ammonia)
NOx (nitrogen oxides)
PM 10* (particles below 10
.micron in diameter)
PM2.5 (particles below 2.5
micron in diameter)
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Approximately 55% of US NOx emissions come from transportation. Stationary source
fuel combustion is responsible for another 40%. Despite increases in vehicle distance traveled,
the US has made substantial progress since the 1970s in reducing NOx emissions from gasoline
vehicles (see Figure 4-10). However, progress in reducing NOx from diesel vehicles has been
slower. Freight travel with diesel vehicles has increased, and heavy-duty diesel engines were not
regulated for NOx until 1984 and for PM until 1988, much later than light-duty vehicle
regulations. As a result of increased freight travel and later adoption of emission standards,
NOx emissions from highway and non-road diesel vehicles increased up until the late 1990s.
Figure 4-10: NOx Trends in the US
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At 8%, transportation's contribution to PM appears very small compared to the over 60%
of particulates coming from agriculture, forestry, fugitive dust, and fires. Despite vehicles'
relatively small contribution to particulates, the particulates emitted during fuel combustion are
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more harmful to human health than natural sources, like fugitive dust. Agricultural sources and
forest fires usually occur sporadically in remote locations, whereas the highest levels of vehicle
pollution routinely occur in densely populated urban centers. Of all transportation sources,
highway diesel vehicles emit 23% and non-road diesel vehicles emit 36% (EPA 2002d).
Highway diesel vehicles used to make up a larger proportion of transportation-generated PM2.5
emissions, but more stringent PM standards have brought those emissions down. Non-road
vehicles are now the largest emitter among transportation sources.
Figure 4-11: PM2.5 Trends in the US
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Europe
EU member states have made significant progress in reducing air pollutant emissions
from road transport. From 1990 to 2000, the EU reduced road transport's NOx emissions by
25% and PM10 emissions by 26%. The introduction of catalytic converters in the late 1980s to
early 1990s and increasing diesel penetration led to significant NOx reduction in passenger cars.3
Catalytic converters and fuel switching aided the PM reduction (European Environment Agency
2003). Measures to reduce transport emissions continue into the future. Road transport remains
the dominant source of NOx emissions, accounting for 47% of the total across all sectors. It is
responsible for 28% of total PM emissions.
Unlike the US data on transportation sources of pollutants, data from the European
Environment Agency do not distinguish between diesel and gasoline passenger cars. However,
each diesel car emits more NOx than a modern gasoline car with a catalytic converter. Since the
1996 Euro 2 standards, European NOx limits have been more lenient for diesel cars than gasoline
cars. The impact of increasing dieselization is seen in the light-duty and heavy-duty diesel
categories. As seen in Figure 4-12, light-duty and heavy-duty diesel vehicles have grown in their
contributions to road transport's NOx emissions. Even though increased diesel penetration in
Europe's vehicle fleet may have ultimately had adverse effects on PM and NOx emissions, it was
actually a key factor in the 47% and 51% reductions in CO and NMVOC emissions in 1990-
2000 (European Environment Agency 2003).
Although the mode-based transport emissions data from the European Environment
Agency combines gasoline and diesel passenger cars, it can be reasonably assumed that most PM
emissions from passenger cars come from diesel cars. Up until 2005, gasoline cars had been
exempt from PM standards because of their relatively low PM emissions. Most buses are diesel-
powered and light-duty (e.g. light-duty trucks) and heavy-duty diesel vehicles contribute over
70% of the total transport PM emissions (see Figure 4-13). PM emissions from road transport
are clearly a problem attributable to diesels (European Environment Agency 2003).
3 Prior to the advent of catalytic converters, gasoline cars emitted more NOx than diesel cars. Today, modemrn
catalytic converter-equipped gasoline cars emit less NOx than modem diesel cars.
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Figure 4-12: EU Road Transport Mode Contributions to NOx Emissions
EU Road Transport NOx Emission Shares by Mode
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Figure 4-13: EU Road Transport Mode Contributions to PMIO Emissions
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Japan
In Japan, diesel vehicles contribute to a disproportionate share of the PM, NOx, and HC
emissions from motor vehicles. Diesel vehicles accounted for 17.4% of the total Japanese
vehicle fleet (including light-duty and heavy-duty) in 2000, but they contributed to 80% of the
motor vehicle NOx emissions and virtually all the particulate emissions. Particulates from
gasoline vehicles were not included in their totals because they are considered negligible (JAMA
2004).
Table 4-5: Pollutants from Motor Vehicles in Japan in 2000
Pollutant Pollutant quantity Diesel contribution
PM* 79,000 tons Almost 100%
NOx 670,000 tons 80%
HC 200,000 tons 63%
*Because of the exclusion of gasoline vehicles, the diesel contribution to PM may be an
overestimate.
Source: Japan Ministry of the Environment (2002; 2005)
If all emission sources are included, diesel vehicles are still a very significant source of
NOx emissions. In urban areas, diesel vehicles contribute to approximately one-third of all NOx
emissions. Although the NOx shares in Figure 4-14 date back to 1994, they do reflect the
relative magnitude of the diesel vehicles' share of NOx emissions compared to gasoline vehicles
and other sources. As of 2000, an estimated 44% of Tokyo's NOx emissions and 52% of its PM
emissions came from diesel vehicles (Tokyo Metropolitan Government 2005).
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Figure 4-14: NOx Emission Sources in Japan
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4.5.2 Off-road and marine sources of diesel emissions
As the highway diesel vehicle fleet becomes less polluting in response to increasingly
stringent regulation, the next challenge is reducing diesel emissions from off-road vehicles and
marine vessels. Off-road vehicles mainly consist of construction, farm, and industrial vehicles.
Off-road diesel vehicles are responsible for 36% of PM2.5 emissions and 14% of NOx emissions
from transportation sources. By 1996, off-road vehicles were already emitting more PM2.5 than
highway diesel vehicles (EPA 2002d). The first off-road diesel engine regulations were not
implemented until 1996 in the US, 1999 in the EU, and 2003 in Japan. Revised standards are
already scheduled for implementation into the next decade. Fuel quality for off-road equipment
must also improve in order to facilitate the use of emission control equipment. Off-road fuel
sulfur is generally much higher than sulfur levels in highway fuel (e.g. in the EU, 2000ppm
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compared to 50ppm), but by the 2009-2010 timeframe, the regulatory agencies in the US, the EU,
and Japan have mandated the same diesel fuel sulfur levels for highway and off-road applications.
Marine diesel engines have been subject to relatively lenient regulations compared to highway
vehicles and off-road applications.
Regulators at different agencies consider marine emissions the "last frontier" of emission
regulations, and have recently turned their attention to regulating marine vessels. The growth in
international trade has led to more ship traffic and greater air pollution problems in ports, which
are usually adjacent to populated urban areas. Because of the high sulfur content in marine
diesel, usually ranging from 15,000 to 45,000 ppm sulfur, sulfur oxides (SOx) are a primary
concern. By mid-2006, the EPA is expected to issue a final rulemaking that would call for
dramatic reductions in locomotive and marine diesel emissions (EPA 2006). In November 2002,
the European Commission adopted a strategy to reduce emissions from seagoing ships.
Numerous studies have been generated, along with policy recommendations for reducing ship
emissions. In 2005, the Commission adopted a Directive requiring the reduction of marine fuel
sulfur levels to 1000lppm. In 2005, upon discovering that the ships anchoring at the Tokyo Port
emit 8 times more SOx than all the automobiles in six Tokyo wards, the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government began negotiations with industry groups to use lower-sulfur marine diesel fuel
(Yomiuri Shimbun 2005)
4.5.3 Diesel exhaust's health effects
Most health concerns about diesel exhaust center around diesel PM, largely because of its
long-term health effects. Diesel exhaust is a complex mixture of gases and particles. Gaseous
constituents include CO2, oxygen, nitrogen, water vapor, CO, NOx and other nitrogen
compounds, sulfur compounds, and various hydrocarbons. Several hydrocarbons are known to
be individually toxic, including aldehydes, benzene, 1,3-butadiene, polycyclic aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAHs), and nitro-PAHs (EPA 2002c). PM is composed of elemental carbon and
adsorbed hydrocarbons, sulfate, nitrate, metals, and other trace elements. Particle size is
important to the particle's impact on human health. The heavier coarse-mode and accumulation-
mode particles, with diameters ranging from 1 to 10 micron, are usually trapped in the nose,
89
mouth, and throat, never making it to the lungs. They can cause acute health problems, such as
bronchitis or asthma, or exacerbate existing respiratory or cardiovascular problems. Smaller
particles have a large surface area relative to their weight, making it easier to adsorb toxic
hydrocarbons. Ultrafine particles with diameters 0.1 micron or less are more easily deposited in
the deep lung, potentially leading to long-term respiratory problems (EPA 2002c).
When measured in terms of mass, the small nuclei mode particles can be easily
overlooked. However, in number-based measurements, ultrafine particles make up the largest
fraction of particles. Figure 4-15 shows how the concentration distribution varies depending on
whether a mass or number weighting basis is used. Existing particulate regulations measure
particulates on a mass basis. However, as emission control technology improves and particle
mass decreases, the proportion of ultrafine particles in diesel exhaust has increased. In recent
years, regulators have begun to consider regulating particle number as well.
Figure 4-15: Particle Size Distribution in Diesel Particulates
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Since 1989, the World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) has classified diesel exhaust as "probably carcinogenic to humans." This
classification means that "there is limited evidence of carcinogenicity in humans and sufficient
evidence of carcinogenicity in experimental animals." It is one category short of saying that a
substance is definitely carcinogenic. Most of the scientific evidence for carcinogenicity comes
from occupational studies of lung cancer in workers exposed to diesel exhaust (EPA 2002c).
Two influential cohort studies, the 1993 Harvard "Six Cities" study and the 1995 American
Cancer Society study, drew attention to the health effects of fine diesel particles. They found
that exposure to fine particles (PM2.5) significantly increases mortality rates. Following a
reanalysis of the studies, the Reanalysis Team found that based on the Six Cities study, an 18.6
Rg/m3 increase in fine particle concentration led to a 28% increase in mortality risk from all
causes (including cancer, cardiopulmonary disease, and other causes). According to the
reanalyzed ACS study, a 24.5 jig/m3 increase in fine particles led to a 18% increased mortality
risk (Health Effects Institute 2000). In 1997, the US EPA adopted new particulate standards for
PM2.5, not just PM10, largely based on the findings of these two studies.
Regulatory agencies have used scientific studies to calculate unit risk factors, which
estimate diesel exhaust's cancer risk. Unit risk is defined as the probability of contracting cancer
per 1 Rg/m3 diesel PM over a 70-year lifetime exposure. One of the most well-known unit risk
estimates comes from the California Health Assessment of Diesel Exhaust. Its estimated unit
risk of 3 x 10-4 is equivalent to 300 cancer cases out of a population of one million with an
average lifetime exposure of 1 pg/m3 diesel PM (SRP/CARB 1998a). For the US EPA, an
excess cancer risk exceeding one in a million for a single pollutant is considered unacceptable.
Diesel exhaust's cancer risk of 300 in a million is therefore considered very high, exceeded only
by dioxin, chromium VI, cadmium, inorganic arsenic, and benzo(a)pyrene.
Table 4-6: Unit Risk Factors for Diesel Exhaust
Agency Unit risk estimates (excess cancers) Unit risk used for regulation
California EPA 1.3 x 10-4 to 2.4 x 10-3 3 x 10-4
(130-2400 per million) (300 per million)
US EPA 10- to 10- 3 none
(10-1000 per million)
Source: Scientific Review Panel, CARB (1998a); EPA (2002c)
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Some recent research studies have drawn attention to the mortality risks of diesel exhaust.
The World Health Organization (WHO) used a new study by Harvard researchers Pope et al.
(2002) in its 2002 World Health Report review and recommendations. The new 2002 Pope et al.
study conducted for the American Cancer Society showed that every additional 10 g/m3 of
PM2.5 exposure increased the risk of all-cause, cardiopulmonary, and lung cancer mortality by
4%, 6%, and 8%, respectively. The linear exposure-effect relationship applied to a range of
exposures from 7.5 gg/m3 to 50 gg/m3 (Pope III, Burnett et al. 2002). According to a report by
Professor Dr. H.-Erich Wichmann at the National Research Center for Environment and Health
in Neuherberg, Germany, 1-2% of the 800,000 annual deaths in Germany are attributable to
premature death from diesel exhaust exposure. Of the 10,000 to 18,000 diesel-related deaths,
8,000-17,000 are from respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, and 1,100 to 2,200 are from lung
cancer. In 2003, the average PM2.5 exposure in Germany was 15 gg/m 3 PM2.5. Installing
particulate filters on all diesel vehicles would bring the national average down to 3 gg/m3 PM2.5.
Wichmann estimated that equipping diesel vehicles with particulate filters would extend the
average German's life expectancy by to 3 months (Rodt 2003). A multi-country study by
Kunzli et al. (2000) estimated that 6% of deaths in Switzerland, Austria, and France, equivalent
to 40,000 deaths, are attributable to particulate pollution, half of which comes from motor
vehicles.
4.6 Regulatory processes in the EU, Japan, and the US
Motivated by the health and environmental risks of air pollutants and diesel vehicles'
significant share in NOx and PM emissions, the EU, Japan, and the US have taken the global
lead in establishing stringent emission and fuel standards. Each government has a different
regulatory decision-making process, but all involve an initial proposal, consultation with
scientific experts, industry, and other interested parties, and a final regulation. The regulatory
decision-making process is also supported by research programs designed to establish a scientific
basis for future standards. For example, each government sponsors auto-oil research programs
designed to investigate the emission reduction possibilities through modifications in vehicles and
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fuels. This section outlines the main actors and steps involved in each region, while the
upcoming chapters explain the processes in the context of specific regulatory cycles..
United States
Since the Clean Air Act Amendments were passed by Congress in 1970, following the
original 1963 Clean Air Act, sources of air pollution have been regulated to improve the
country's air quality. The Clean Air Act was again amended in 1990, and subsequent laws and
regulations have been added since then. Vehicle emission standards and fuel specifications have
been used to reduce emissions from the motor vehicle industry. The US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards for six principal or
"criteria" pollutants detrimental to human health - carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen oxides,
ozone, particulate matter, and sulfur dioxide. The Clean Air Act and its amendments grant EPA
the regulatory authority to create national standards and strategies to control emissions of these
criteria pollutants from both mobile and stationary sources.
EPA has a panel of outside experts that provides advice on air quality policy issues,
especially in assessing the technical feasibility of proposed regulations. The Clean Air Act
Advisory Committee (CAAAC) is comprised of approximately 60 senior managers and experts
representing state and local government, environmental and public interest groups, academic
institutions, unions, trade associations, utilities, and industry. CAAAC has subcommittees that
convene to discuss more specific scientific and technical issues. The Mobile Sources Technical
Review Subcommittee is still active in offering advice and recommendations on mobile source
emissions and fuels. The Clean Diesel Independent Review Panel, which is no longer active,
reviewed industry's progress in technology development to meet the new heavy-duty engine and
fuel standards promulgated in 2001.
There are several steps that the EPA follows for new emission regulations. The EPA first
issues a "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking" in the Federal Register. The notice explains the
proposed rule and the motivation behind revising the existing regulations. It is accompanied by a
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) which provides analysis and supporting data for the new
regulations. For example, the RIA for the 2004 on-highway heavy-duty diesel regulations
covered the health impacts, technological feasibility, economic impact, environmental impact,
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and cost-effectiveness of the proposed standards. There may also be additional documentation
that provides the air quality modeling analyses used to support the proposed rule.
Along with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the EPA schedules a comment period
that allows interested parties to submit comments about the rule. It may hold public hearings,
especially for major regulatory changes. Once the deadline for comments passes, the EPA
reviews the comments and public hearing testimony. EPA staff members respond to them in the
final rule, which may be amended or withdrawn depending on EPA's review of the comments.
In order to be sold in the US, engine and vehicle models must be certified by EPA as
meeting emission limits under pre-specified test conditions. Separate certification may be
necessary in California. California is the only state allowed to adopt more stringent light-duty
vehicle emission standards because its state air regulations predated the EPA. Most states can
choose between California and federal standards. Given the nature of interstate commerce,
heavy-duty engines are required to adhere to federal standards only, but states and municipalities
can impose restrictions on publicly-owned fleets. The Clean Air Act requires that EPA provides
4 years of lead time and 3 years of stability for heavy-duty engine and vehicle standards.
Europe
The European Union's emission and fuel standards are established by the European
Commission, the executive body of the EU. The Environment DG (Directorate-General) is
responsible for initiating and defining new environmental legislation, and is headed by the
Commissioner for the Environment. Member State governments may also recommend new
regulation to the Commission because of environmental concerns from constituents or pressure
from domestic industries. For example, Germany has always taken an active role in shaping
emission and fuel quality standards because of its population's environmental awareness and its
strong domestic auto industry. All EU countries must adopt the same vehicle emission and fuel
standards, but they are permitted to offer fiscal incentives to spur early adoption. Member States
are responsible for granting type approval to vehicles and engines that meet the standards in
accordance with the appropriate testing cycle.
Light vehicles are regulated under Directive 70/220/EEC and its amendments, and heavy
vehicles are regulated under Directive 88/77/EC and its amendments. The amended Directives
contain emission limit values and fuel quality specifications enforceable at a stipulated date. The
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Parliament and the Council may fully articulate the upcoming standards in a Directive, but in
some cases, Directives are incomplete and further clarification is needed.
When the European Commission prepares to amend a Directive, the European
Commission prepares a preliminary draft proposal of new regulations. This draft proposal is
based on discussions with key stakeholders (i.e. technical experts, manufacturers, national
governments) and a technical review of ongoing research programs. To invite input from other
interested stakeholders, the Commission initiates a public consultation process. Stakeholders can
submit responses to the topics in the "call for evidence" or "call for consultation." The responses
are then reviewed and summarized by a panel of independent experts. Taking the responses into
consideration, the Commission finalizes the proposal, which takes the form of an amendment to
a Directive.
Japan
Japan's Air Pollution Control Law, passed in 1968, gave the Director General of the
Environmental Agency (called the Ministry of the Environment since 2001) the authority to
establish emission limits for motor vehicles and specify standards for fuel quality (Japan
Ministry of the Environment 1996). Motor vehicle emissions standards had already been
enforced since 1966, beginning with the regulation of CO from gasoline vehicles. Over time,
HC, NOx, and PM regulations were added and revised. In 1995, the Air Pollution Control Law
was amended to include permissible limits for gasoline and diesel fuel quality, which were
implemented in 1996.
The Central Environment Council is the highest government advisory body on
environmental policy. It regularly reviews progress towards Japan's Basic Environmental Plan,
and makes recommendations for improvement. In May 1996, the Director-General of the
Environment Agency asked the Central Environment Council to make recommendations about
the "Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Reduction." In response to this request,
the Central Environment Council has issued 8 reports between 1996 and 2005 (Japan Central
Environment Council 2005). In each report, the Council proposes short-term and long-term
emission and fuel quality targets. Like the US EPA's reliance on expert panels, the Council
consults with groups of experts. The Air Quality Committee of the Central Environment Council
has an Experts Committee on Motor Vehicle Emissions, a group of 11 professors and research
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institute directors. They continually conduct studies of future emission reduction measures by
reviewing industry progress through investigations and hearings (Japan Central Environment
Council 1997). The Committee then makes recommendations on future emission target values to
the Environment Minister. After public and private meetings with interested parties, such as
industry representatives and citizen groups, the Minister finalizes the target values proposed by
the Council's report. In many instances, the Environment Minister, other government officials,
and industry work collaboratively to agree upon emission target values and deadlines. In general,
the consultation process is less transparent in Japan than in the EU or US, but the outcome tends
to be a mutually acceptable agreement between government and industry.
4.7 Summary
All three regions' procedures for new regulations require soliciting input from industry,
often at various points in the decision-making process. In addition to public consultations and
private meetings with regulatory officials, industry has the opportunity to express its position
through research programs, expert panels, and marketing/public awareness campaigns. While
environmental regulations for the automobile have focused on air pollutants like PM and NOx,
growing concerns about CO2 emissions and energy consumption suggest the need for reasonable
trade-offs across multiple goals. The oil industry is also increasingly sharing the regulatory
burden that had previously been shouldered mainly by the vehicle and engine manufacturers.
The upcoming chapters will document a wide range of regulatory experiences, with varying
degrees of cooperation between industry and government and diverse corporate responses.
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CHAPTER 5 - Light-duty Diesel Vehicles, 2004-2007
5.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the regulatory and market implications of the new light-duty diesel
vehicle emission standards, set for 2004-05 in the EU, Japan, and the US. Regulatory and
market conditions since the 1990s are described and compared in each region. Different
outcomes stem from each region's specific regulatory priorities and economic incentives. The
strength of the European diesel passenger car market has given European regulators added
incentive to balance pollution concerns with preserving the booming market for the popular and
fuel-efficient diesels. America's low fuel prices and the Japanese preference for small, gasoline
or hybrid vehicles and have contributed to the two countries' lukewarm feelings toward diesels.
Although US regulators had previously given diesel cars slight leniency on emission standards
compared to the gasoline counterparts, recent technology-forcing regulations harmonizing
gasoline and diesel standards will make compliance extremely difficult and costly for diesel cars.
Japanese diesel standards previously had the reputation for lower stringency compared to the EU
and the US, but recent anti-diesel regulation in Japan has made the regulatory environment more
challenging for diesels.
By the 1990s, the motor vehicle industry had already experienced repeated cycles of
increased regulatory stringency on emission levels. In the US, passenger vehicles were subject
to the Tier standards from 1997 to 2003. Meanwhile, cars sold in California had to reach the
lower emission levels of the state's LEV I (Low Emission Vehicle) standards, which were in
effect from 1994 to 2003. In Europe and Japan, standards change more frequently and at smaller
increments, such that there are revised standards approximately every 4 years. Japan had new
diesel passenger car standards in 1986, 1990, 1994, 1997, 2002, and 2005. The European Union
had their Euro 1 standards starting in 1992, Euro 2 in 1996, Euro 3 in 2000, and Euro 4 in 2005.
Because each region has a different timeline for establishing and implementing emission
standards, one practical approach to comparing them is to take a representative year or narrow
time window when vehicle manufacturers had to meet the standards.
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Table 5-1 shows the regulatory timelines for the EU, Japan, and the US (including
California).
Table 5-1: Regulatory Milestones for Vehicle Emission Standards Starting in 2004/2005
Event EU Euro 4 Japan US federal California
Tier 2 LEV II
Standards proposed 1995 1998 1998 1998
Standards finalized 1998 2002 2000 1998
Start of compliance 2005 2005 2004 2004
Phase-in period 2005 2005 2004-07 2004-07
Sources: Dieselnet (2006), EPA
Environment Council (2002).
(2000), European Commission (1998), Japan Central
The following are the standards adopted for each region. Except for the US and California
standards, they are not directly comparable because of each country's different certification test
cycles and conditions.
Table 5-2: Light-duty Diesel Vehicle Emission Standards
Pollutant Euro 4 Japan US Tier 2 Bin 5* &
CA LEV II LEV
NOx 0.25 g/km 0.14 g/km 0.07 g/mi
(0.044 g/km)
PM 0.025 g/km 0.013 g/km 0.01 g/mi
(0.006 g/km)
CO 0.5 g/km 0.63 g/km 4.2 g/mi
(2.61 g/km)
NMOG 0.09 g/mi
(0.056 g/km)
HCHO 0.018 g/mi
(0.011 g/km)
NMHC 0.024 g/km
HC+NOx 0.3 g/mi
Full life 100,000 km 80,000 km 120,000 mi
I_____I_____ _ (193,080 km)
* The US does not have a single emission standard, but 8 different certification "bins" with
different levels of stringency. Manufacturers may certify vehicles in any bin, but the average
emission level of the total fleet sold must be equivalent to the emission standard of the middle
bin (Tier 2 Bin 5). California's LEV II program has a single standard, which is the same as the
Tier 2 Bin 5 level.
Sources: Dieselnet (2006), EPA (2000), European Commission (1998), Japan Central
Environment Council (2002).
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By the year 2005, the US was already in its second year of implementing its federal Tier
2 standards, with California and several Northeast states implementing California's LEV II
standards. California is permitted to set more stringent regulations than the federal standards
because its standards predated the creation of EPA, and the state's historically poor air quality
requires stricter control strategies. Euro 4 had just gone into effect in Europe; Japan had a set of
new standards for 2005. Although these regulatory deadlines converge in 2004-05, the processes
for setting these regulations and the technological and political influences occurred at various
points in the 1990s.
5.2 Europe
Since 1970, under Directive 70/220/EEC, the European Commission has regulated
exhaust emissions from passenger cars. Amendments to this directive have required increasingly
lower levels of pollutant emissions. By 1992, new vehicles were expected to meet Euro 1
standards limiting emissions of PM (diesel only), CO, HC, and NOx. Starting with Euro 2,
diesel cars had to meet more stringent CO standards than gasoline cars, but less stringent NOx
standards.
Table 5-3: EU Diesel and Gasoline Passenger Car CO and NOx Standards
Regulation CO (km) NOx (g/km)
Diesel Gasoline Diesel Gasoline
Euro 1 2.72 2.72 0.97* 0.97*
Euro 2 1.0 2.2 0.9* 0.5*
Euro 3 0.64 2.30 0.50 0.15
Euro 4 0.50 1.0 0.25 0.08
Euro 5 0.50 1.0 0.20 0.07
* HC + NOx
Source: Dieselnet (2006), Original: European Commission (1998)
Vehicles are tested and certified as meeting these emission limits before they can gain
type approval, a prerequisite for sales. In subsequent years, emission limits have become more
stringent, with Euro 2 in 1996, and then Euro 3 in 2000. However, diesel vehicles are perceived
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as receiving more lenient standards than their gasoline counterparts and benefiting from
advantageous fuel policy. Europe may be giving more leeway for emissions from diesel vehicles
in recognition of their higher fuel economy.
5.2.1 Market for diesels in Europe
The combination of the diesel car's greater fuel efficiency, high fuel taxes, and
differential taxes favoring diesel has spurred diesel demand in Europe since the oil crises in the
1970s, with the greatest growth in the last decade. Diesel cars are approximately 30% more
efficient than their gasoline counterparts. In 2000, gasoline prices in Europe averaged £0.80 per
liter (US$3.70 per gallon) and average diesel prices were significantly lower, equivalent to $2.70
per gallon. Government agencies taxed diesel fuel at a lower rate to encourage fuel efficiency.
Its use in commercial transport and strong lobbying by the freight sector also contributed to the
lower diesel taxes. The greater efficiency of diesel vehicles and the preferential fuel taxing
policy persuaded consumers to pay the higher price tag for diesel vehicles, which generally retail
for E1000-1500 more than their gasoline counterparts. In Chapter 4, Figures 4-8 and 4-9
illustrated the high fuel prices and large diesel-gasoline tax differential in European countries,
and to a lesser extent, Japan. High excise taxes make fuel prices in Europe and Japan
approximately double that of the US.
In Europe, diesels' share of new passenger cars rose steadily from 13.8% in 1990 to
47.5% in 2004 (Figure 5-1). New car sales in Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Spain
are already around 70% diesels (ACEA 2005). They are also among the countries with the
highest diesel-gasoline tax differentials. In a study of diesel taxation, Mayeres and Proots (2001)
found that diesel penetration rates are higher in countries with the relatively low ownership and
fuel taxes for diesels, indicating a clear economic explanation for the popularity of diesels. By
2004, Volkswagen, DaimlerChrysler, Renault and PSA Peugeot Citroen were selling more diesel
than gasoline vehicles (Lewis 2004).
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Figure 5-1: European Diesel Boom
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Sources: ACEA 2003, AID Newsletter 2004, LMC-JD Power 2004
The diesel boom increased concern about the long-term health effects of exposure to
diesel exhaust. NGO campaigns and greater public awareness put pressure on government
regulations to set more stringent emission limits on diesel vehicles. While vehicle emission
policies would encourage the adoption of cleaner diesel technologies, they also had the potential
to greatly restrict the future growth of the diesel market. Ultimately, the development of the
European emission policy for 2005, i.e. the Euro 4 standards, allowed the diesel market to
continue to flourish. Financial incentives promoting the early introduction of Euro 4-compliant
vehicles encouraged manufacturers to meet the standards up to 2 years ahead of schedule.
However, some environmental critics have claimed that the EU standards are still-too lenient for
diesels.
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5.2.2 Regulatory process in the EU
At an October 1992 conference, the European Commission discussed vehicle emission
standards for 2000 and beyond. Previous discussions about vehicle emission policy had
generated heated disagreements among the auto industry, oil industry, and the government. In
particular, industry complained that the cost of further emission reductions would outweigh the
environmental and health benefits. The auto and oil industries debated about the extent to which
their respective industry should invest in cleaner technologies. Government and industry agreed
that they should develop a more cooperative and integrated basis for future regulations. This led
to the 1993 formation of the Auto Oil Programme, a collaboration among the European
Commission, ACEA (the European auto companies' industry association) and EUROPIA (the
European oil companies' industry association).
The purpose of the program was to find the most cost-effective ways to reduce vehicle
transport emissions to reach air quality goals. It was designed to promote a collaborative, rather
than antagonistic, relationship between government and industry. The parties sought to avoid the
lawsuits that plagued the US emission standard-setting process (Automotive Environment
Analyst 1996a). The automobile and oil industries would share the burden of emission
reductions, based on the measures that would be the most cost-effective. The program included a
technical research portion (European Programme on Emissions, Fuels and Engine Technologies),
an air quality modeling study, and a cost-effectiveness modeling study. Recommendations were
made for fuel quality and automobile emission standards. The first phase, Auto Oil I, ran from
1993 to 1997. It generated results that provided the basis for the 2000 Euro 3 standards and
tentative 2005 Euro 4 standards (European Commission, Standard & Poor's DRI et al. 1999). By
November 1995, the cost-effectiveness results from the Auto Oil Programme were released
(European Commission, Standard & Poor's DRI et al. 1999). In December 1995, the Commission
proposed the following Euro 3 and Euro 4 passenger vehicle emission standards:
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Table 5-4: Draft Diesel Passenger Car Emission Standards, December 1995 Proposal
CO (g/km) NOx HC+NOx PM
2000 Euro 3 0.64 0.37 0.50 0.05
2005 Euro 4 0.53 0.28 0.39 0.04
Source: Automotive Environment Analyst (l996b)
The complete Auto Oil Programme results were released in early 1996. After reviewing
the Auto Oil I results and consulting with the auto and oil industries, the Commission worked on
a revised package of measures to reduce emissions. A revised proposal was adopted in June 1996.
In the six months between the draft proposal and the revised proposal, the auto industry lobbied
the Commission heavily, arguing that diesel technology was not advanced enough to reach the
2000 NOx target. Also, the ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel needed for some of the NOx reduction
technologies would not be widely available until 2005. NGOs claimed that the reliance on the
Auto-Oil I's cost-effectiveness methodology led the Commission to overlook the public health
effects and to sympathize with the auto industry's complaints about high compliance costs
(Europe Information Service 1996b).
Table 5-5: Revised Diesel Vehicle Emission Standards, June 1996 Proposal
CO ( /km) NOx
2000 Euro 3 0.64 0.50
2005 Euro 4 0.50 0.25 030 .0.02
Note: Changes from December 1995 proposal are shown in shaded boxes.
Source: European Commission (1998)
As shown in Table 5-5, the June 1996 proposal did feature a significantly weakened
Euro 3 NOx standard, from 0.37 g/km to 0.50 g/km, but it proposed a significantly more
stringent Euro 4 PM standard. PM control strategies are generally easier and less costly for the
auto industry than NOx control strategies. In exchange for the weakened 2000 NOx standards,
the indicative standards for 2005 would be more stringent (Europe Information Service 1996a).
The Commission promised to finalize the indicative standards in 1998, then run a review
program to verify their feasibility in 2002 (EC 2000).
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5.2.3 Role of the Auto Oil Programmes
The emission and fuel recommendations from the Auto Oil I Programme placed a
significantly larger burden on the auto industry than the oil industry. The Auto Oil I study had
shown that greater and less costly reductions came from vehicle improvements rather than fuel
specification changes. Over a 15-year time horizon, the package of recommendations would cost
the auto industry 62.44 billion per year and cost the oil industry 6765 million per year. Even
though both industries contributed resources to the research program, they disagreed about the
fairness of the recommendations. The auto industry criticized the imbalanced contributions
while the oil industry supported the results' reliance on cost-effectiveness. A Commission
official responded by saying that "Auto-Oil is not based on a cost-sharing principle but on cost-
efficiency" (Europe Information Service 1996a).
The second phase of Auto Oil, called the Auto-Oil II Programme, began in 1997. In
addition to fulfilling a variety of air quality and related objectives, it was intended to provide a
technical basis for confirming or revising the indicative 2005 standards that were proposed
during the Auto Oil I process. By October 1998, the European Parliament was already prepared
to finalize the 2005 vehicle emission standards with Directive 98/69/EC, using the same
standards that had been proposed in June 1996 (EC 2000). The European Parliament and the
Council issued an official document in December 1998, setting the Euro 3 and Euro 4 standards
for 2000 and 2005. By the end of 1999, the Commission submitted a proposal to the European
Parliament and the Council finalizing this Directive.
Because the Euro 4 standards were settled earlier than expected, the Auto Oil II
Programme was not needed to provide meaningful input into vehicle emissions standards. As a
result, the mission of Auto-Oil was revised in fall 1998 to assess future air quality policy options
using a cost-effectiveness framework and to provide a methodological foundation for future air
quality studies (European Commission, Standard & Poor's DRI et al. 1999).
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5.2.4 A premature first mover
As reflected in the European auto industry's complaints about the high cost of emission
regulation, it has generally been opposed to increased regulatory stringency. However, once the
standards and implementation timeline are established, the companies do strive to produce
compliant vehicles in a cost-effective manner. However, a regulatory requirement is not the only
motivation behind developing environmental technology. Perception of customer demand or
future regulatory demand has prompted some companies to introduce technology early or in
advance of regulation. A company is unlikely to voluntarily pursue such an early or first-mover
strategy unless it expects to derive some private benefit from it. It may desire to improve its
environmental image, appeal to environmentally conscious customers, or to demonstrate its
technology leadership.
Because the Euro 4 standards were established by 1996, 9 years before their
implementation date, there were no first-mover companies at that point who introduced
technology to meet the standards. The Auto-Oil Programme was committed to identifying cost-
effective, best available technologies to meet upcoming standards, so it did not assume that still-
developing technologies would be at a commercial stage to meet Euro 4.
One company that did make an attempt to act as a first mover in diesel technology in the
pre-1996 time frame was Volkswagen (VW). In 1993, when Euro 1 standards were still in effect,
VW announced its plans to introduce the "Ecomatic" Golf model with a hybrid diesel-electric
powertrain. The company planned to market its Ecomatic as a more "ecological" version of its
1.9-liter Golf diesel. It expected that environmentally-minded consumers would be attracted to
its lower emissions, fuel economy, and unique technology. The Ecomatic was VW's response to
Europe's growing interest in battery-electric cars and other alternatives to gasoline and diesel-
powered cars. Rival PSA Peugeot Citroen already had a test fleet of 50 electric cars on the road,
and it planned to sell 5,000 of its electric cars in 1994. PSA even teamed with French national
power generating company EDF to establish electricity refueling infrastructure. French and
Italian automakers projected the Europe's electric car market to grow to 200,000 cars by 2000.
VW sought to counter that with its hybrid diesel-electric technology (Marshall 1994).
After VW introduced the Ecomatic in Germany in January 1994, it introduced it in
Britain in mid-1994, where it generated considerable excitement in the automotive press, but a
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lukewarm reception from consumers. The vehicle was touted by one journalist as "a new car
[which] leaps ahead of the pack" (Kemp 1993). Its hybrid diesel-electric engine turned off when
the vehicle was not in motion and it could run on sunflower seed-derived biodiesel. According
to VW's 1995 Environmental Report, its fuel consumption, CO2, pollutant emissions, and engine
noise in average urban driving would be reduced significantly compared to the regular diesel
Golf. For high-speed, highway driving, the reductions would not be as noticeable because of the
relative lack of stop-and-go driving; the vehicle's fuel economy would be no better than a regular
Golf diesel.
Table 5-6: Volkswagen Ecomatic's Fuel and Pollutant Reductions in Urban Driving
Characteristic Reductions compared
to regular diesel Golf
Fuel consumption -22%
CO2 emissions -22%
HC + NOx -25%
CO -36%
PM -60%
Noise emissions (from engine off periods) -60%
Source: Volkswagen (1995)
The development cost of the Ecomatic was 20 million DM (US$11.5 million in 1994
dollars). In the UK, it retailed for 1000 GBP (US$1500) more than the normal diesel Golf,
which was 10,000 GBP (US$15,000). The price never had the chance to go down because
production volumes were so low. VW had hoped to sell 10,000 vehicles in 1994, but changed its
target to 3,000 by mid-year. It ultimately sold closer to 2,000 units (Kemp 1993; Marshall 1994).
Electric car sales by PSA, Renault, and other automakers were also disappointing - annual sales
were in the hundreds rather than the thousands (Diem 1996). Despite the promise of fuel savings,
customers were unwilling to pay the higher price for the hybrid or battery-electric cars.
The Ecomatic's higher retail price was not the only hurdle to consumer adoption. It
operated differently from a typical diesel car. It lacked the quick, responsive acceleration of a
normal diesel, because its engine shut off during idling (Catterall 1994). Citing poor consumer
demand, VW pulled the Ecomatic off the market in 1995 after only one year of sales. Although
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the emission reductions and fuel savings of the vehicle were impressive, the lack of financial
incentives or regulatory requirements for this technology prevented its adoption.
There is no evidence that the performance of the Ecomatic influenced government
regulators, at the country or EU level, to consider more stringent regulations. Moreover, while
the Ecomatic emission reductions were significant compared to the regular diesel Golf, they were
not large enough to be compliant with the proposed Euro 3 regulations.
5.2.5 Countries and companies as early adopters
Some European countries - Sweden, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands, among
others - have a long record of introducing tax incentives to encourage early compliance with
future regulations. Promoting cleaner technologies and penalizing the more polluting ones help
to accelerate the environmental and health benefits of emission requirements. Governments also
have national interests in mind. They recognize that emission regulations are becoming more
stringent around the world. If they can encourage their domestic firms to market advanced
technology in their home market, their domestic industry will be well poised to capture more
market share when other countries tighten their standards. For this reason, these "first-mover
countries" often lobby other countries to harmonize their standards upward.
In an effort to encourage early adoption of Euro 4-compliant technologies, individual
national governments began offering tax incentives for customers to purchase Euro 4 cars before
the 2005 deadline. In Germany, a diesel car is taxed at an annual rate more than twice that of a
gasoline car to compensate for its higher particulate emissions and lower fuel prices, but diesels
complying with Euro 3 or Euro 4 standards early receive larger tax breaks. If a diesel car
complied with Euro 3 before 2000 or Euro 4 before 2005, it received a tax break equivalent to
US$553. If it also emitted less than 90 g of CO2 per km, it would be eligible for a US$1,012 tax
reduction (GTZ and UNESCAP 2002). In the UK, company cars, which comprise 50% of new
car purchases, are taxed according to CO2 emissions, measured in gram per kilometer. Cars with
lower CO2 emissions pay a higher tax rate, so diesels have an inherent advantage. However,
because of concern about diesels' higher particulate emissions, the British government added a
3% supplemental tax on the purchase price of diesels in 2002. To encourage the adoption of
new clean diesel technology, the government waived the 3% tax if the vehicle was Euro 4-
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compliant before 2005 (Burt 2001). Although the cleaner vehicles may have a higher retail price,
these tax policies made the lower-emitting technologies cost-neutral or even cost-effective
compared to the older technologies.
At the time that Germany and the UK offered tax incentives for diesel cars compliant to
Euro 4 standards before 2005, no auto manufacturer had any such vehicles on the market.
Although Fiat had announced in 1998 that its new prototype common-rail turbo diesel was
already capable of meeting the Euro 4 standards, it did not put any such models into production
until years later, once other manufacturers had introduced Euro 4-compliant models (Automotive
Environment Analyst 1998).
5.2.6 First early mover Toyota, followed by the rest
In December 2002, Toyota announced that its new Corolla and Avensis models would be
Euro 4-compliant, 2 years in advance, thanks to their new D-4D engines. The models would be
available in the UK first, in March 2003, and then in the rest of Europe in April 2003. Toyota's
announcement as the first mover preempted other companies' announcements of Euro 4-
compliant vehicles. In early 2003, when the new Avensis was already on the market, Toyota
introduced its even cleaner D-CAT (Diesel Clean Advanced Technology) engines for the
Avensis. D-4D already meets the Euro 4 standards, but D-CAT surpasses the NOx limit by 50%
and the PM limit by 80% (Toyota 2003). However, it requires ultra-low sulfur fuel, below 50
ppm sulfur and preferably 10 ppm. In its first years, the vehicle could only be offered in
countries with fuel sulfur levels 50 ppm or lower, such as the UK, Germany, and Sweden (Auer
2002). Toyota introduced the technology in advance of regulation and fuel availability largely to
demonstrate itself as a clean diesel technology leader in a diesel vehicle industry dominated by
European automakers. It recognized that introducing the D-CAT system early would prepare the
system for widespread introduction in 2005, once ultra-low sulfur fuel was available throughout
the EU (Toyota 2003). D-CAT's impact on subsequent regulations is discussed further in the
next chapter.
By summer 2003, several other manufacturers followed with their Euro 4 announcements.
PSA Peugeot Citroen, which was already receiving a lot of publicity for its particulate filter
system, announced that their third generation of their filter system, available June 2003, would
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be fully Euro 4-compliant. Previously, it had not met the NOx limit of the Euro 4 standard. In
July, Volkswagen announced that most of its VW and Audi models would reach Euro 4
standards by 2004. Many other manufacturers showcased their Euro 4-compliant vehicles at the
September 2003 Frankfurt Motor Show. A review of press releases and industry publications
from that time indicates that Toyota, PSA, Volkswagen, Audi, Vauxhall, Fiat, Ford, BMW, and
Renault had Euro 4-compliant models ready for 2003. Other auto manufacturers followed
shortly in early 2004 (Maslen 2003; Peckham 2003b).
When the Euro 4 standards were proposed in 1995, it was expected that the PM standards
would require the installation of PM filters on all diesel cars. However, improvements in engine
technology allowed most cars to meet the PM standards without filters. Because the NOx
standard was not as stringent as proposed earlier in December 1995, engineers had more
flexibility to optimize for PM reduction. Emission control manufacturers had anticipated huge
demand for their aftertreatment devices, but most automobile manufacturers were able to use in-
house technology to meet the Euro 4 standards.
5.3 United States
5.3.1 Market for diesels in the US
The last time that light-duty diesel vehicles were popular in the U.S. was in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, when the fuel crises prompted Americans to buy more fuel-efficient diesel-
powered cars. Despite the fuel savings, diesels then were considered noisy, dirty, and unreliable
(Winter 2002; Wright 1999). Sales of diesel passenger cars peaked at 6.1% in 1981. Once fuel
prices fell, the diesel share tapered off to below 0.5% in 1986-2004 (Ward's Automotive
Yearbook 2005). Light-duty trucks have a higher proportion of diesel-powered engines than
passenger cars. However, even when they are included in the figures for the broader category of
light-duty vehicles, the US diesel share is still only 3.2% (J.D. Power and Associates 2006). As
described in Chapter 4, the relatively low fuel prices and the lack of diesel bias in fuel tax
policies have offered US customers little incentive to purchase diesels.
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5.3.2 Regulatory process in the US
In 1997, just as the Tier vehicle standards went into effect, the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was already preparing the Tier 2 standards, new federal vehicle
emission and fuel standards for 2004 onwards. EPA held informal workshops and consultations
to lay out the issues and solicit input from interested stakeholders, i.e. companies, NGOs, other
government agencies. Several key issues pertaining to diesel vehicles were under discussion:
(I) Should light-duty diesel vehicles be subject to the same NOx limits as gasoline vehicles?
(2) Should PM limits be based on the performance of diesel engines or gasoline engines,
which have lower PM levels?
(3) Should passenger cars and light-duty trucks/SUVs face the same emission standards?
Ultimately, US regulators harmonized the light-duty vehicle regulations across
powertrains and vehicle sizes, and used the cleanest gasoline-powered vehicles as a basis for the
standards. This biggest regulatory challenge for diesel vehicles is NOx emission reduction,
which is far more difficult for diesels than for gasoline vehicles. Very low sulfur fuels are
essential to significantly reducing NOx and other pollutant emissions. In order to convince
regulators that clean fuels was necessary, automakers had to demonstrate very clean prototype
vehicles early to show that their technology would be ready once very low-sulfur fuel was
available. For this reason, auto industry opposition to Tier 2 was not as strong as it would have
been had the EPA not also proposed significant reductions in gasoline and diesel fuel sulfur
levels.
EPA issued a proposal of the Tier 2 regulation in May 1999, and gave notice of a 3-
month comment period, during which interested parties could submit comment letters in
response to the proposal. During the summer of 1999, EPA also hosted public hearings in four
cities and received oral and written comments. EPA completed its Regulatory Impact Analysis
in December 1999, and published the final version of the Tier 2 regulation in the Federal
Register in February 2000 (EPA 2000). The federal Tier 2 standards were primarily based on the
California LEV II standards, which had been finalized in 1998, well before the Tier 2 proposal.
EPA sought greater harmonization between the federal and California standards, a move
supported by manufacturers seeking a single standard.
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Table 5-7: US Tier 2 and California LEV II standards
Pollutant Proposed Tier 2 Tier 2 Bin 5 California
(as of 1997) (average) LEV II
CO 1.7 g/mi 4.2 g/mi 4.2 g/mi
NMOG 0.09 0.09
NOx 0.2 0.07 0.07
PM 0.01 0.01
HCHO 0.018 0.018
Sources: EPA (1997), CARB (1999), EPA (2000).
5.3.3 California's lead in standard-setting
In an April 1997 Tier 2 Study White Paper, EPA outlined the need to solicit information
about the cost of requiring diesel vehicles to meet the same standards as gasoline vehicles as well
as the potential air quality impact if leniency to diesels were allowed. Originally, according to
the 1997 white paper, the national standards would be different from California's standards (EPA
1997). However, this changed when automakers and northeastern states entered into an
agreement that led to the voluntary National Low Emission Vehicle program. By 1999 in the
northeastern states and 2001 nationally, auto makers were expected to sell cars and light-duty
trucks cleaner than federally mandated by the Tier I standards (Dieselnet 2006). The National
LEV program harmonized the federal and California standards, so it was not a surprise that EPA
would use the California LEV II standards as a template for the Tier 2 standards.
California LEV II standards
Table 5-8: Light-Duty Vehicle Emission Standards for 120,000 Miles (Full Useful Life)
Cate or NMOG CO NOx HCHO Diesel PM
LEV 0.090 g/mi 4.2 g/mi 0.07 g/mi 0.018 g/mi 0.01 g/mi
ULEV 0.055 2.1 0.07 0.011 g/mi 0.01
SULEV 0.010 1.0 0.02 0.004 g/mi 0.01
Source: CARB (1999)
The California LEV II standards were finalized in November 1998, with a phased-in
implementation from 2004 to 2007. In 2004, only 25% of each manufacturer's fleet must meet
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the LEV II standards; the remaining vehicles must meet interim standards. For every year until
2007, the LEV II-compliant share must increase another 25% until it reaches 100% in 2007.
Diesel and gasoline vehicles face the same standards, and medium-duty vehicles (trucks, SUVs,
vans) below 8,500 lbs must meet the same standards as passenger cars. Vehicle manufacturers
must produce a certain percentage of vehicles in the more stringent ULEV and SULEV emission
categories, which increase during the implementation period. The full useful life was increased
from 100,000 miles to 120,000 miles. CARB had proposed a 0.07 g/mi NOx standard from the
beginning, and it is reflected in the final standards (CARB 1999).
Matching the California regulations, EPA changed its full-life durability requirements to
120,000 miles. Full-life durability refers to the distance of testing for which vehicles must meet
emission requirements to receive certification. While California has three emission categories -
LEV, ULEV, and SULEV, Tier 2 has a fleet bin averaging system, with 8 certification bins.
Each manufacturer can certify vehicles in any bin, but their fleet must have an emission average
equivalent to Bin 5, which matches the California LEV II standards (EPA 2000).
Because Tier 2 was based on the California standards, which were finalized 2 years prior,
it is more meaningful to focus on the LEV II regulatory process - technical submissions and
regulatory documents from 1998 and earlier, and the influence of technology development on
California rulemaking. For example, in EPA's technical feasibility analysis, EPA cited the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) and the Manufacturers of Emission Control Association
(MECA) evaluation programs targeted toward the LEV II standards because it was known that
the Tier 2 standards would be the same as the LEV II standards. California had a crucial role in
leading the way for emission standards.
Testing and public statements
CARB and EPA relied on their own testing as well as technical submissions from
industry to set emission standards. The testing conducted by CARB and MECA demonstrated
that gasoline-powered light-duty vehicles would be capable of meeting the proposed emission
standards. Much of the focus was on the NOx standard, which was arguably the most
challenging standard to meet. MECA sponsored a test program at the Southwest Research
Institute (SwRI) to demonstrate the ability of Tier l-compliant vehicles to meet Tier 2 and LEV
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II standards when equipped with advanced catalytic converters provided by MECA members.
Catalysts were aged to 100,000 miles, and all the retrofitted vehicles achieve NOx levels below
0.07 g/mi.
CARB also ran tests on MY 1997-1998 models of passenger cars. They measured it
without alterations, and then again after modifying them to meet LEV II standards. However,
they were not aged so the effectiveness of the modifications may have degraded over time.
CARB even tested modified 1998 Ford Expeditions, which had been certified to 0.14 g/mi.
Meanwhile, EPA conducted tests on large heavy light-duty trucks (LDT3 and LDT4), modifying
the trucks to meet Tier 2 standards at intermediate useful life (50,000 miles, as opposed to the
full life of 100,000 miles).
Both CARB and EPA conceded the difficulty for diesel vehicles to meet the new
emission standards. In its preliminary staff report, CARB acknowledged the uncertainty about
whether diesels would meet the new standards in the near term: "The data for light-duty diesel
vehicles suggest that significantly more development is needed for these vehicles to meet a 0.010
g/mi PM standard. Recent certification data from two light-duty diesel vehicles shows PM
emissions of 0.05 g/mi and NOx emission of 0.7 g/mi. Given the low NOx standards being
proposed for LEV II and the difficulty associated with simultaneously achieving both low NOx
and PM emissions from diesel engines, it is unclear whether diesel vehicles will be able to
achieve a 0.01 g/mi LEV or ULEV PM standard in the foreseeable future" (CARB 1998). In the
Tier 2 Regulatory Impact Analysis, the EPA shared this recognition.
The ability of some gasoline-powered light-trucks and SUVs to meet NOx emission
levels below 0.07 g/mi as early as 1999 had the effect of convincing regulators that there was
justification for reducing all vehicles to that emission level. "[CARB] concluded that the more
stringent standards for the remaining vehicle emission categories could be met by a full range of
gasoline and alternative fuel vehicles, making it inappropriate to allow substantially higher NOx
and particulate levels to assure availability of diesel cars and light trucks" (CARB 2001). EPA
also believed that light-duty diesels should not receive greater leniency, especially when most
U.S. light-duty vehicles were gasoline-powered. Weaker diesel standards would "undermine the
emission reductions expected from this program" (EPA 1999).
During CARB's rulemaking processes in 1997-1998 and EPA's in 1999-2000, there were
no diesel vehicle manufacturers that stepped forward with technologies capable of meeting the
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proposed standards. Emission control manufacturers were characteristically optimistic about the
ability of their developing technologies to meet the standards, because they stand to sell more
products with more stringent standards. However, a truck/bus manufacturer and an engine
manufacturer publicly acknowledged that the proposed standards might be attainable in the
future. A few years later, but prior to the regulatory deadlines, they introduced low-emission
diesel vehicle prototypes capable of meeting the Tier 2 standards.
Navistar International, which specializes in medium-duty trucks and buses, submitted
comments for EPA's Tier 2 "Notice and Comment" period. Navistar claimed that Tier 2
standards would be "challenging but achievable" if low-sulfur fuel were available (EPA 1999).
Cummins, a leading diesel engine manufacturer, indicated to the trade press in 1999 that it could
meet the interim Tier 2 standards for vehicles and trucks in the early years of Tier 2 through
future development of currently available engine technology (Hart Diesel Fuel News 1999).
EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Tier 2 rulemaking made note of this statement in
justifying the stringency of the emission standards and articulating the later phase-in dates of the
diesel vehicles (EPA 1999). EPA was in agreement with manufacturers about the need for ultra-
low sulfur fuel to meet the final diesel standards in 2007 for light-duty cars and trucks and in
2009 for heavy light-duty trucks (EPA 1999).
Navistar International and Cummins' expression of confidence in reaching the new Tier 2
standards was indicative of their technology readiness. In 1999 and 2000, their public
announcements and technology demonstrations confirmed this readiness. Navistar International
had already been developing their Green Diesel Technology for the school bus market. In June
1999, the company strategically demonstrated their Green Diesel school bus outside the EPA
hearings on Tier 2 regulations. The bus had a continuous regenerative particulate trap capable of
reducing PM by over 90%, so that PM emissions were well within the EPA's Tier 2 PM limit
(Automotive Environment Analyst 1999). Buses are typically regulated with heavy-duty engine
regulations, which are separate from the light-duty vehicles regulations in Tier 2. Showcasing a
school bus when the hearings were focused on cars and light-duty trucks may have appeared
confusing. Navistar's main goal was not to show support for the Tier 2 vehicle emission limits,
but to stress the necessity of ultra-low diesel fuel (PR Newswire 1999). Cummins continued
working on light-duty diesel engines, trying to get them to meet the elusive Tier 2/Bin 5
emission standards. In the 2001 Diesel Engine Emissions Reduction (DEER) conference,
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Cummins presented a prototype diesel engine for light-duty trucks and SUVs that could reach the
Bin 5 standards. In 2003, it conducted durability testing for the engines, in hopes to ready them
for commercialization (Peckham 2003a).
The strongest opponents of the Tier 2 regulations were not the automakers, or even the oil
industry, who wanted more time to meet the low-sulfur fuel standards. Instead, it was the users
of commercial vehicles - the trucking associations and business organizations - that raised the
greatest opposition to the Tier 2 proposal. The American Trucking Association and other
business groups brought a case against the EPA before the federal appeals court in May 1999.
They claimed that the new standards were unconstitutional because of inadequate scientific basis
for the rulemaking. The judges ruled in favor of ATA 2 to (Winter and Zoia 1999). However,
EPA went on to appeal the decision and successfully defended the standards in the Supreme
Court.
5.3.4 Tracking technology development
Not all industry positions on technology were publicly stated or demonstrated.
Regulators often meet with individual companies on a confidential basis to discuss the progress
of proprietary technologies. Although outside access to those interactions is prohibited, accounts
from regulators and the review of corporate behavior following the finalization of the standards
indicate the technology leaders that might have influenced LEV II or Tier 2 rulemaking. In
addition to developmental work done by EPA engineers, input from technology vendors, and
engineering analysis by EPA staff, the EPA used previous years' certification data to form a
basis for the Tier 2 emission levels. EPA staff examined which models were able to achieve
emission levels a significant margin below the mandated levels. Then they investigated the
companies and technologies behind these margins, and used the information for the Tier 2
4
standards.4
Examination of the certification data for gasoline-powered vehicles indicates that many
automakers were already well below the EPA Tier standards in 1997, by as much as 80% less
than the limit. The majority of the gasoline vehicles already had NOx emission levels of 0.1 to
4 Interview with Margo Oge, Director, US EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, December 8, 2005.
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0.2 g/mi for a 100,000-mile useful life, even though Tier 1 requirements were 0.6 g/mi and
California LEV requirements were 0.3 g/mi. By 1999, several manufacturers, such as Mazda,
Ford, Honda, Volvo, Hyundai, Volkswagen, and Mercedes already had multiple models with
NOx emissions at or below the 0.07 g/mi Tier 2 Bin 5 level (EPA 1997-2003). Most of these
low-emission vehicles were passenger cars, with the exception of several large trucks and SUVs
sold by Ford.
Meanwhile, diesel vehicles were at the most lenient end of the Tier 2 bin systems. The
model year 2001-2003 diesel Volkswagen Jetta Wagon had NOx emissions between 0.5 to 0.7
g/mi (see Table 5-9). However, the EPA Tier 1 requirement for diesels at that time was 1.25
g/mi and the California requirement was 1.0 g/mi. Since the diesel Jetta Wagon's NOx
emissions were well below the requirement, the EPA may have taken that into consideration in
designing its fleet bin averaging system. The most lenient bin, Bin 10, has a NOx limit of 0.6,
very close to the Jetta Wagon's range.
The major source of contention in the Tier 2 rulemaking was not the emission standards
themselves, but the requirement that most light-duty trucks, SUVs, and vans would have to meet
the same emission standards as passenger cars. With the previous Tier 1 standards, emission
requirements varied depending on vehicle weight. A 6,000-lb truck had more lenient standards
than a 3,000-lb car. Tier 2 would eliminate that distinction. As expected, manufacturers which
sold many large vehicles felt that the proposed Tier 2 regulations were biased against large
vehicles. Nevertheless, following the finalization of the Tier 2 standards, Ford did have large
gasoline-powered vehicles, including the Expedition, Ranger, F150, and F250, certified in 1999
as meeting the 2004 standards (EPA 1997-2003). This implies that their emission control
technology was ready at the time that EPA conducted technology reviews for the Tier 2
rulemaking. Ford's progress may have contributed to EPA's confidence that its Tier 2 standards
were feasible for heavier vehicles.
In interviews, EPA and CARB regulators expressed the usefulness of private meetings
with individual automakers. Automakers may be reluctant to reveal the details of their
technology developments publicly, but may share proprietary information with regulators on a
confidential basis. Regulators observed greater candidness in private one-on-one meetings with
automakers compared to public statements.
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5.3.5 Impact of LEV II/Tier 2 standards on diesel sales in the US
Requiring diesel-powered light-duty vehicles to meet the same emission standards as
their gasoline counterparts has virtually closed the U.S. market to diesel passenger vehicles, at
least in the near term. The few diesel cars that have been certified in 2004-2005 to sell in the US
cannot be sold in California, which has more stringent NOx standards than the federal ones.
Several northeastern states - New York, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont - have chosen to
adopt California's standards as well. California Tier 1 standards, effective 1994-2003, gave
diesel passenger cars the option to meet a 1.0 g/mi standard, which is more lenient than the
gasoline cars' 0.6 g/mi NOx requirement, but more stringent than the 1.25 g/mi standard set by
EPA for 1994-2003. Table 5-9 lists the diesel passenger cars certified by the EPA between 1999
and 2005. Larger light-duty vehicles, between 6,000 and 8,500 lbs, used to have more lenient
Tier emission standards. Under Tier 2, however, vehicles below 8,500 lbs will all be part of
the bin averaging system. The table also lists their certified NOx levels and standards for the full
useful life, 100,000 miles (which was changed to 120,000 miles as of 2004).
Table 5-9: Diesel Passenger Cars Certified by the EPA, 1999-2005
INJX standard instea oI lhe
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Manufacturer and model Year NOx level Standard to meet
Chevrolet Tahoe 1999 1.35-1.41 1.53 (EPA Tier 1 HLDT)
Mercedes E300 1999 0.8 1.25 (EPA Tier 1)
Volkswagen Golf 1999 0.9 1.0 (CA Tier 1 diesel)
Volkswagen Jetta and New Jetta 1999 0.6
Volkswagen New Beetle 1999, 2000 0.6-0.9
Volkswagen Jetta Wagon 2001, 2002, 2003 0.5-0.7
London Taxi 2004 0.814
Volkswagen Touareg 2004 1.295 1.53 (EPA Tier I HLDT)
Volkswagen New Beetle 2004, 2005 0.25 0.3 (EPA Tier 2 Bin 9)
Volkswagen Jetta Wagon 2004 0.46 0.6 (EPA Tier 2 Bin 10)
Volkswagen Jetta Wagon 2005 0.55
Volkswagen Passat Wagon 2005 0.45
Mercedes E320 CDI 2005 0.39
Note: rlor to UU4, alesel cars nad me opuon ot meeting a .u g/mi
0.6 g/mi standard required of gasoline cars.
Up until 2004, when diesel cars only had to meet a 1.0 g/mi NOx standard in California,
some passenger car models manufactured by Volkswagen and Mercedes could still meet
California's standards. However, under the LEV II program, California's stringent NOx
standard of 0.07 g/mi has in effect banned diesel passenger car sales in California, New York,
Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont, whose populations comprise 24% of the passenger car
market (US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2005). Diesel models could not meet the NOx or
PM standards. Adding a particulate filter could solve the PM problem, but there were no feasible
technologies at the time for reaching such low levels of NOx. The lowest NOx level reached by
Volkswagen was 0.25 g/mi with their 2005 VW New Beetle. While this can be certified as
meeting the Tier 2 Bin 9 requirement under the federal standards, it exceeds California's 0.07
g/mi requirement. Several models that had been previously sold in the U.S. fell short of the 0.6
g/mi NOx limit required by Tier 2 Bin 10, the most lenient of the bins. The Mercedes E300 had
NOx emissions of 0.82 g/mi; the Volkwagen Golf and Jetta TDI had 0.9 g/mi NOx; the
Volkswagen New Beetle Sedan, Golf Sedan, and Jetta Sedan TDI had 0.8 g/mi NOx (EPA 2000).
Because there were few diesel models on the market in the late 1990s, EPA and CARB did not
place much emphasis on ensuring that diesel vehicles would be viable for Tier 2. Moreover,
Volkswagen and Mercedes' diesel models sold considerably fewer units than their gasoline
equivalents. Out of its 194,149 Mercedes cars sold in 2004, only 4,000 were diesel; for
Volkswagen, only 25,000 of its 301,487 cars sold were diesel (Truett 2005; Ward's Automotive
Yearbook 2005). As foreign companies, they arguably had less sway with government officials
than domestic automakers.
Tier 2 and LEV II's equivalent treatment of light-duty diesel and gasoline vehicles in
terms of emission levels has made it very difficult for manufacturers to sell diesel cars in the U.S.
EPA and CARB held firm about not giving diesel cars and light trucks any preferential treatment,
despite their significant fuel economy advantage. Also, the unavailability of ultra-low sulfur
diesel fuel, at least until mid-2006, makes effective NOx and PM reduction extremely
challenging.
121
5.4 Japan
Japan shares Europe's high fuel prices, fuel tax differential in favor of diesel, and concern
about CO2 emissions. However, it has not shared the diesel popularity witnessed in Europe. Air
quality concerns and strict local standards on particulates have limited the spread of diesels.
5.4.1 Market for diesels in Japan
While diesel-powered vehicles dominate the bus and special-purpose vehicle market (e.g.
construction, mining, and farming equipment), and make up over 30% of trucks, they command
a relatively small share of the passenger car market. Even at the time of high worldwide oil
prices in the 1980s, the diesel share barely peaked at 6% of total new passenger cars. In terms of
in-use vehicles, diesel cars did reach an 11% share of the total car fleet in Japan in the early
1990s, a holdover from the higher sales of diesels in the 1980s. However, since 1990, purchases
of new diesel cars have significantly declined. By 2002, the percentage share of diesel cars fell
to 0.1 % of all new car sales (Green Car Congress 2005; JAMA 2004).
Figure 5-2: Share of Diesel Cars in Japan
Diesel Cars as Percentage of Total Cars in Japan
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5.4.2 Regulatory process in Japan
Japan has enforced motor vehicle emission standards since 1966. Beginning in 1989, it
published its Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Reduction to present its
recommendations for future regulatory action on emission and fuel standards. In subsequent
updated policy reports in 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2005, the Japan's Central Environment
Council, an advisory body to the Ministry of the Environment, has recommended increasingly
stringent targets for pollutant emissions from motor vehicles and specifications for automotive
fuels. For diesel vehicles, the "Future Policy" recommendations have focused on NOx and PM
emissions reduction and sulfur reduction in diesel fuel.
The reports stipulate both long-term and short-term targets. In 1998, in their Third
Report, the Council anticipated setting short-term standards for 2002-2004 and long-term
standards to be met by 2007. The short-term targets were designed to reduce emissions by 30-
70%, as an intermediate standard before the long-term targets went into effect. Between 1998
and 2000, the Air Quality Committee consulted with the Experts Committee on Motor Vehicle
Exhaust Emissions, which is comprised of experts in academic and research institutions. Citing
the rapid progress of emission control technology, the Committee felt justified in shortening the
amount of time allowed to meet the long-term standard. Backed by the auto and oil industries'
March 2000 commitment to meet the standards in 2005, the Council published its Fourth Report
in November 2000. The report announced that new long-term emission standards would come
into effect by 2005 but did not specify the exact levels. The targets would be finalized by the
end of fiscal year 2001. The Ministry of the Environment estimated that compliance with the
2005 long-term standards, which are listed in Table 5-2, would reduce motor vehicle PM by 67%,
NOx by 44%, and HC by 70%, even when accounting for traffic growth, changes in vehicle mix,
and gradual penetration through the existing fleet (Japan Central Environment Council 2002).
The Council was able to accelerate the deadline only after government officials
successfully persuaded the representatives from the auto and oil industries to agree to meet the
long-term targets 2 years early. Prior to the announcement of the accelerated deadline, Japanese
Environment Agency chief Kayoko Shimizu had conferred with the heads of the Japanese auto
and oil trade associations - the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and the
Petroleum Association of Japan. She sought their cooperation in accelerating the adoption of
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new emission reduction technologies and reduction of fuel sulfur (Japan Economic Newswire
2000). JAMA announced that they would meet the long-term diesel standards by 2005, and that
some vehicles would be capable of meeting the new PM emissions standards by 2003-04 (Japan
Central Environment Council 2000; Jiji Press 2000a). This was made possible by the Petroleum
Association of Japan agreeing to offer low sulfur diesel fuel (< 50ppm) by the same time,
enabling advanced but sulfur-sensitive aftertreatment technologies. Therefore, by the time the
government released Fourth Report, industry was already in agreement with the accelerated
deadline.
The April 16, 2002, Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Reduction (Fifth
Report), finalized the long-term diesel emissions standards for 2005. The long-term targets for
light-duty diesel vehicles constitute a 50% reduction in NOx, 75% reduction in PM, an 80%
reduction in HC, and no change in CO. The new 2005 standards are more lenient on diesel
vehicles than gasoline vehicles in terms of NOx, but diesel passenger cars and diesel light-duty
trucks are expected to adhere to the same standards. The new PM emission standard of 0.013
g/km is significantly tighter than the 2002 value of 0.052 g/km. The dramatic reduction of the
PM level is designed to require particulate traps: "Accomplishment of the new long-term targets
calls for the adoption of new technologies, such as diesel particulate filters (DPFs)." Yet the
report expresses some doubt about the durability and fuel efficiency of such systems, and
advocates more research and testing. The Council is also receptive to catalysts requiring the
addition of urea (Japan Central Environment Council 2002).
In March 2003, the Ministry of the Environment officially adopted the new 2005
standards. These apply to all new vehicles sold in Japan, but the government has issued
additional, more stringent policies which affect both new and in-use vehicles. These policies
arguably have had greater impact on spurring technological development and adoption of cleaner
diesel vehicles than the federal new vehicle standards.
5.4.3 Lawsuits put pressure on PM reduction
A series of pollution-related lawsuits in metropolitan areas put pressure on local Japanese
governments to accelerate emission reduction deadlines and reduce PM emissions. In 1988, 483
Amagasaki residents filed suit against the government and the Hanshin Expressway Public
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Corporation for failing to adequately regulate vehicle particulate emissions. The plaintiffs
allegedly suffered respiratory ailments from vehicle exhaust. In 2000, the Kobe District Court
ruled that the government must pay 212 million yen ($1.97 million) and the public corporation
121 million yen ($1.12 million) to the 50 plaintiffs who lived closest to the highway.5
Additionally, the court ordered the government to keep levels of suspended PM below 0.15
mg/m3 , with a specific recommendation to restrict diesel vehicles from road access. This was the
first court ruling to require the government to cut exhaust emissions (Kyodo 2000).
Another vehicle pollution lawsuit was filed in 1996 by 99 Tokyo residents and their
families. The plaintiffs in the suit held the national government, the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government, Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation, and seven automakers responsible
for high air pollution levels, which caused their respiratory ailments. The plaintiffs sought 2.24
billion yen (US$20.6 million) and demanded specific measures to improve air quality (Corliss
2002). In 2002, a Japanese court awarded 79.2 million yen (US$634,000) to 7 plaintiffs.6 The
court reprimanded the national government, the Tokyo metropolitan government, and
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation for not adequately protecting public health and
required them to pay the plaintiffs' damages. The seven automakers were not held responsible.
These prominent lawsuits put great pressure on local governments in Tokyo and Kobe to
reduce PM emissions by placing strict limits on diesel vehicles. The courts had found them
negligent in protecting residents from air pollution, and demanded that they do something
specifically about diesel PM. The 2003 Tokyo Diesel Retrofit Program and the more broadly
applied Automobile NOx/PM Law, modified in 2002 to include diesel passenger cars, were
government responses to these lawsuits and the subsequent public pressure.
5.4.4 Automobile NOx and PM Law
Under a 1992 law called the "Automobile NOx Law," the Japanese government is
allowed to regulate NOx emissions from automobiles in 196 designated areas in the Tokyo,
Saitama, Kanagawa, Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures, areas with the worst air quality problems.
Since diesel vehicles are the biggest contributors to mobile NOx, diesel trucks and buses became
5 Historic rates obtained through FXTOP.com. In 2000, 100 Japanese yen = US$0.928.
6 Historic rates obtained through FXTOP.com. In 1996, 100 Japanese yen = US$0.920. n 2002, 100 Japanese yen
= US$0.800.
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the focus of this regulation. It regulated in-use vehicles retroactively. Existing vehicles will be
banned from the designated areas if they cannot meet the in-use standard, even if they met the
standards at the time they were sold. This shifts the burden of compliance to the vehicle owner
rather than the vehicle manufacturer, whose sales would actually benefit from accelerated
turnover of vehicles. Emission control manufacturers would also benefit from product sales as
owners retrofit their vehicles.
The Automobile NOx Law was revised in June 2000. PM was added as a designated
pollutant because government authorities were increasingly concerned about the carcinogenicity
of diesel particulates. The law is now referred to as the Automobile NOx/PM Law. It also
includes a certification system for ultra-low PM diesel vehicles.
Originally, the law was designed to regulate heavy-duty vehicles, but by 2002, diesel
passenger cars were also subject to this law. These new procedures, effective October 2002,
apply the 1997/1998 new vehicle standards onto vehicles already on the road. All vehicles have
a 9- to 12-year grace period during which they must be taken off the road or retrofitted with
catalyst filter systems. The vehicle inspection program works in conjunction with these
standards so that they are enforced (JETRO 2004).
The auto industry had requested that the government offer subsidies and tax breaks to
cover the cost of purchasing filter-equipped vehicles, and policymakers agreed. Most of the
subsidies in 2001-03 went to help defray the costs of diesel particulate filters on trucks and
buses; there were no such policies for diesel passenger cars. However, vehicle owners who
purchased a new 2005 emission-compliant diesel car between April 2004 and September 2005
received a 1% reduction in their vehicle acquisition tax (JAMA 2005). This was designed to
promote early introduction of the cleaner vehicles, which were not required until October 2005.
Cars registered less than 7 years before were still exempt from having to meet the Automobile
NOx/PM Law.
5.4.5 Tokyo Diesel Retrofit Program
Restrictions on diesel vehicles did not end with the Automobile NOx/PM Law. The
Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), which sets local standards for the Tokyo area, adopted
an "Ordinance on Environmental Preservation" in December 2000 that includes, among other
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pollution control measures, a diesel retrofit program. Starting October 2003, in-use diesel
vehicles had to be retrofitted with PM emission reduction equipment or face a ban in the TMG
area. Older vehicles are subject to higher PM reduction requirements (in percentage terms),
while relatively newer vehicles (MY1997-99) have more lenient requirements. The goal is to
target to the highest polluting vehicles and to encourage turnover of the older vehicles. Vehicles
have a 7-year grace period to meet the requirements. By 2005, the diesel PM requirements
became even more stringent. The TMG diesel retrofit program was intended to coexist with the
national Automobile NOx/PM Law, but the TMG requirements for PM are far more stringent
than the Central Government's requirements. The TMG program applies to the 420,000 diesel
vehicles registered in Tokyo (as of 2000) and any vehicles that travel through Tokyo (Dieselnet
2005). The program was set to go into effect in the Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama and Chiba
prefectures.
5.4.6 Industry response
The central government and local governments' requirements for diesel vehicles were
influenced by the readiness of industry to provide cost-effective emission control technology for
new and in-use diesel vehicles. The commitment to meet the long-term emission targets in 2005
was made collectively by all the Japanese auto companies, as represented by JAMA. Since they
all agreed to the level set by the Japanese government, there was little opportunity for one
company to maneuver ahead of the others in terms of supporting even more stringent regulation.
However, the Japanese government's aggressiveness in pushing for greater stringency and earlier
compliance helped Japanese companies become first movers in other markets. Emission control
manufacturers with technology capable of meeting the new standards also stood to benefit from
the regulation-induced market demand for their products.
5.4.7 Early movers and first movers in other markets: Toyota and Hino Motors
Toyota began working on its Diesel Particulate-NOx Reduction (DPNR) System starting
in the mid- 1990s. The system reduces emissions of PM and NOx through the combination of a
NOx storage reduction catalyst and a particulate filter. Toyota was initially motivated to pursue
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this technology by the increasingly stringent heavy-duty diesel emission standards in Japan, but
it saw the potential to spread the technology to the light-duty vehicle market, particularly in
Europe.
In July 2000, Toyota Vice-President Shinichi Kato announced that Toyota would provide
the DPNR technology to Hino Motors, a Toyota affiliate specializing in heavy-duty vehicles.
The Toyota announcement hinted that they hoped to license the DPNR technology to other auto
manufacturers (Jiji Press 2000b). At that time, Toyota expected to start offering the system in
heavy-duty diesel vehicles in Japan first, in 2003, and then expanding to the light-duty diesel
market in Europe.
DPNR technology represented a major breakthrough for Hino Motors. In 1998, it was
still working on a catalyst prototype capable of cutting NOx emissions by only 25%, with the
expectation that improved versions would cut NOx emissions by 50%. With Toyota's DPNR
technology, NOx and PM reductions were as high as 80%. In its 2001 Environmental Report,
Hino Motors claimed that it would use this technology to meet the anticipated 2005 long-term
PM and NOx regulation. At this time, it was known that 2005 standards would be very stringent,
but the exact standards were not settled until spring 2002. The 2005 heavy-duty diesel engine
standards would require the adoption of this technology. Some municipalities began banning
diesel vehicles without advanced emission control equipment as early 2002, so this put pressure
on Hino to have low-emission vehicles ready before 2002. By FY1999, Hino already had 65
catalyst-equipped vehicles approved by the "LEV-6 Designation System" in Japan's Kansai
region (Hino Motors 2001).
Toyota's motivation for developing the DPNR system was the anticipation of new
stringent truck and bus regulations. It began selling the small trucks equipped with these devices
in October 2003. Those first models were the Dyna and the Toyoace, which earned the top 4-
star rating for PM emissions in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport's tests. Since
the vehicles' emissions were 85% below the required 2000 level for PM, the vehicles could be
labeled as ultra-low PM vehicles. Toyota went on to market other DPNR-equipped vehicles in
2003 - the Dutro, a Hino Motors truck (Hino is part of the Toyota Group) and Avensis, a
medium-sized sedan sold in Europe. The problem is that the DPNR only works well with fuel
having sulfur content less than 10 ppm.
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Figure 5-3 is based on a patent abstract search of the Japanese Patent Database for the
terms "diesel" and "emissions." It is not meant to be exhaustive in accounting for patents related
to diesel emission control, but it does indicate periods when higher rates of relevant patenting
occurred. Based on the timing of their patent filings for diesel emission control technology,
Toyota Motor Corporation began working on diesel emission reduction technology in the 1980s
and ramped up research in the 1990s, while its truck manufacturing affiliate, Hino Motors,
pursued the bulk of its clean diesel R&D in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The timing
corresponds roughly with the regulatory developments in Japan. Light-duty diesel vehicles were
subjected to regulations for the first time in 1986, and then to increasingly stringent levels in
1990, 1994, 1997, 2002, and 2005. Heavy-duty vehicles were subjected to emission standards
somewhat later. The first set of regulations came in 1988/89, followed by updated standards in
1994, 1997,2003, and 2005. The revised 2002 Automobile NOx/PM Law and 2003 Tokyo
Retrofit Law requiring retrofits of in-use diesel vehicles contributed to Hino Motor's ramp-up of
research in the early 2000s.
Figure 5-3: Hino and Toyota Patents on Diesel Emission Reduction Technology
Japanese Patents by Hino Motors and Toyota Motor Corp .
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5.4.8 Influence on regulations
While stimulated by regulatory requirements in Japan, Toyota's DPNR technology had
more impact as a first-mover technology in outside markets, in Europe and US. DPNR was
expected to meet 2005 Japanese regulations, and based on its performance, it also would be
marketed to meet the 2008 Euro 5, and possibly post-Tier 2 (after 2007) US standards. Starting
in 2002, Toyota began publishing technical papers through the well-known Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) and making presentations about DPNR in the US, for the light-
duty passenger car and truck market (Nakatani, Hirota et al. 2002). They filed international and
Japanese patents for the DPNR technology in 2003 (Japan Patent No. JP2003254038).
Toyota even tested the Toyota Avensis DPNR at the EPA's National Vehicle and Fuel
Emissions Laboratory, but their primary intent was to ready this vehicle for introduction in
Europe. Although the vehicle was tested in the US, under US testing conditions, it would not be
offered for sale in the US. The system's need for very low sulfur fuel was the strongest reason -
it was tested with 9 ppm fuel. EPA used the test data to evaluate the progress towards clean
diesel technology that can meet the Tier 2 standards for 2004-07. Tests show that at least for
50,000 miles, the Toyota Avensis can meet the mid to upper bins (Bins 5-8) of Tier 2 (McDonald
and Bunker 2002). The next chapter discusses Toyota DPNR system's impact on the European
discussion of Euro 5 standards (for 2008/09).
The Automobile NOx/PM standard had the effect of benefiting vehicle manufacturers
because it increased vehicle turnover. For example, diesel truck and bus manufacturer Hino
Motors a 23.7% increase in revenues from FY2002 to FY2003. Industry sources primarily
attribute the increase to the Tokyo government's more stringent diesel emission standards (CBR
2005).
5.5 Summary
Industry experts argue that the Euro 4 standards, though initially criticized by industry as
very difficult to attain in the late 1990s, actually enabled diesel penetration to continue growing
in Europe. The EU has focused on reduction of CO2 , where diesel has an inherent advantage
over gasoline. The amounts of fuel consumed and CO, emitted by diesels are 30% less than their
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gasoline counterparts. Meanwhile, PM standards have been relatively tough but greater leniency
has been given on NOx, which is probably the hardest pollutant to reduce (Visnic 2001). Japan
has shared the high fuel taxes and demand for more fuel-efficient cars seen in Europe, but it has
gone down the avenue of small gasoline or hybrid-powered cars rather than diesel cars.
Although industry experts have claimed that the Japanese government has had less stringent
emission standards in the past than Europe or the US, their regulations have been increasingly
more challenging. The Tokyo government's explicit policy of targeting polluting diesels has
reduced consumer interest in diesel vehicles. Moreover, their stringent in-use vehicle restrictions
for diesel cars and trucks have made it financially less attractive to own a diesel vehicle. In
California and the US, the LEV II and Tier 2 standards have such strict PM and NOx standards
that they have virtually eliminated the chances for light-duty diesel vehicles in the U.S.
Mercedes and Volkswagen, have had limited diesel sales in the US. Tier 2 threatens to
effectively lock them out of the light-duty vehicle market in the US unless their R&D progress
enables them to technically and economically overcome the NOx emission hurdle. Some have
argued that the US emission standards have acted as non-tariff trade barriers to European auto
manufacturers seeking to sell diesel vehicles to the US.
The EU, Japan, and the US have different expectations as to the level of technology-
forcing their future standards require. The European Auto-Oil Programme considered standards
based on Best Available Technology (BAT) rather than requiring technologies that were not yet
available. The focus was on the most cost-effective options. The Japanese government worked
collaboratively with industry to set standards that were attainable with existing, albeit costly,
technology. In the US, especially California, vehicle emission standards are intentionally
technology-forcing. Regulators acknowledge that existing technology cannot meet future
standards, but expect the regulations to spur industry to develop new products.
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CHAPTER 6 - Light-duty Diesel Vehicles, 2008 and Beyond
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on industry and individual corporate behavior that influenced the
regulatory process for the light-duty vehicle emission standards starting in 2008-09. Although
activities in Japan and the US are discussed briefly, this chapter deals primarily with technology
development leading up to the finalization of the EU's Euro 5 standard. The US has not yet set
light-duty standards beyond Tier 2, which will be in effect through 2010. Although the US
standards are not updated as frequently as the Japanese or EU standards, the Tier 2 standards, to
be phased in between 2004 and 2007, are at least as stringent as Euro 5 and Japan's 2009
standards. Japan did recently set diesel emission standards for 2009; their stringency has the
potentially of further squeezing diesels out of the passenger car market. The difficulty of
meeting emission standards in the US and Japan means that diesel automakers must focus their
attention on regulatory decision-making in Europe, which is the focus of this chapter.
In Europe, first movers PSA Peugeot Citroen and Toyota introduced their emission
reduction technologies ahead of any regulatory requirements. PSA's particulate filter technology
for passenger cars gained popularity among the environmental community, regulators, and the
greater public in Germany. Although the filter system adds to the vehicle cost, the potential for
tax incentives and some automakers' readiness to follow PSA's lead resulted in widespread
adoption of filters in many European countries. Although national governments usually
champion their own domestic companies, German regulators surprisingly supported French
company PSA, signaling that environmental protection outweighed industrial competitiveness.
The early filter introduction also shaped the PM standards in upcoming Euro 5 standards, which
had yet to be finalized. Toyota's Diesel Clean Advanced Technology (D-CAT) system is
capable of dramatic PM and NOx reductions from Euro 4 levels and far surpasses the proposed
Euro 5 levels. However, the timing and public reception of the technology, its reliance on ultra-
low sulfur diesel fuel, and regulators' prioritization of PM over NOx control gave Toyota less
influence over the Euro 5 regulations compared to PSA's filter introduction.
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The cold, and occasionally hostile, reception given to these new technologies by the rest
of the auto industry suggests other companies' aversion to more stringent and costly regulation.
Meanwhile, regulators and environmental groups are enthusiastic about first-mover behavior and
early adoption. Even if private financial benefits are not easily attributable to these first-mover
strategies, companies often benefit from improved relations with regulators and interest groups,
and are better prepared for future regulations.
6.2 Regulatory processes
As soon as the new 2005 vehicle emission standards went into effect in Japan and Europe,
their governments were already releasing draft proposals of the next phase of emission standards.
Their timelines are shown in Table 6-1. The US (including California) has not yet held
discussions about the next round of standards after Tier 2.
Table 6-1: Timing of the Japanese and European Regulatory Processes
Japan Euro 5
Standards proposed 2005 1996
Standards finalized 2005 2005
Start of compliance 2009 2008
Source: European Commission (2005b), Jiji Press (2005b)
Table 6-2 lists the standards adopted for each region, as of October 2005, including the
US Tier 2 and California LEV standards from the previous round of regulations. Except for the
US and California standards, they are not equivalent because each country's test cycle and test
conditions differ.
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Table 6-2: Light-duty Diesel Vehicle Emission Standards Beyond 2008
Pollutant Euro 5 (2008) Japan (2009) US Tier 2 - Bin 5
& CA LEV II LEV
NOx 0.20 g/km 0.08 g/km 0.07 g/mi
(0.044 g/km)
PM 0.005 g/km 0.005 g/km 0.01 g/mi
(0.006 g/km)
CO 0.5 g/km 0.63 g/km 4.2 g/mi
(2.61 gkm)
NMOG0.09 g/mi
(0.056 g/km)
HCHO0.018 g/mi
(0.011 g/km)
NMHC 0.024 g/km
HC+NOx 0.25 g/mi
Full life 160,000 km 80,000 km 120,000 mi
(193,00 km)
Sources: CARB (1999), EC (2005b), EPA (2000), ICCT (2005).
6.3 Europe
In the early 2000s, before the Euro 5 standards were proposed, automakers were already
conducting research into vehicle technologies that would enable diesel cars to meet increasingly
stringent emission regulations. Two auto companies - PSA Peugeot Citroen and Toyota -
developed technologies well in advance of Euro 5, and therefore influenced the Euro 5 standard-
setting process that began in 2004.
6.3.1 PSA's particulate filter stems diesel criticisms and sets the stage for Euro 5
In 1996, when the European Commission adopted the 2005 Euro 4 standards, it expected
that the PM standard would require the installation of diesel particulate filters. Filters trap
particles in the engine exhaust, before they exit the tailpipe. However, because of technological
progress in engine design, auto manufacturers were able to meet the Euro 4 standards in the early
2000s without filters. Various auto companies and emission control manufacturers continued to
develop filter technology in anticipation of one day needing it to meet more stringent PM
regulations. It was expected that filter equipment manufacturers would be supportive of
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regulations requiring filters, and that auto manufacturers, who would have to purchase the
additional equipment, would be opposed to any filter requirements. However, the French
automaker, PSA Peugeot Citroen, emerged as a first mover on filter technology, even before the
Euro 4 standards went into effect.
PSA had already been developing filter technologies at a small scale starting in the mid-
1990s. Jean-Martin Folz, who became CEO in 1997, led a restructuring effort in early 1998
(Farhi 2000). The new management board pushed environmental issues to the forefront, and
began to consider the introduction of diesel particulate filters as a strategic decision. They were
concerned about medical studies reporting on the negative effects of diesel exhaust.7 Because of
PSA's focus on small and medium diesel cars, growing attention to the health impacts of diesels
threatened to dampen diesels' popularity and erode PSA' s future market share. From 1994 to
1996, the diesel market share in France, Germany, and UK actually dropped, attributed largely to
concerns about diesel exhaust's health effects (ACEA 2005).
Figure 6-1: Diesel Market Share in Europe
Diesel Market Share in the 3 Largest European New Car Markets
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7 Interview with Bruno Costes, Technical and Political Affairs, PSA Peugeot Citroen, September 3, 2004.
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In the late 1990s, partly in reaction to these environmental concerns, Folz put pressure on
PSA engineers to develop vehicles with filters for commercial introduction.8 The filter itself was
developed by Faurecia, a PSA subsidiary. By April 1999, PSA announced its plan to offer its
new diesel particulate filter system as standard in its Peugeot 607 model by May 2000.
According to PSA, the system took 18 months and 666 million (US$71 million) to develop.9
Over the next three years, it introduced the system as standard on six more Peugeot and Citroen
models (PSA 2000-2005).
The effectiveness of the filter system was validated by a third-party study published in
August 2001. PSA provided Germany's environmental agency (Umweltbundesamt, or UBA)
and the German Auto Club (ADAC) with a filter-equipped Peugeot 607 diesel car for a testing
project. Durability testing demonstrated that the filter had a 99.999% efficiency in removing fine
diesel particles from the exhaust tailpipe. The diesel car emitted 0.001g/km PM over a 80,000-
km distance, 25 times lower than the level required by the 2005 Euro 4 standard (Rodt 2003).
The filters also performed well in on-road tests. From 2001 to 2003, PSA conducted field testing
with a Paris taxi fleet of four Peugeot 607s over 80,000 km of urban driving. The study was
designed to evaluate the durability of the first-generation filter prior to its first maintenance. The
filters removed over 95% of the particles throughout the 80,000 km interval, with an average of
0.0027 g/km from the all the tests (Jeuland, Dernenthon et al. 2004; Jeuland, Dernenthon et al.
2002).
Following the public announcement of the new filter system's effectiveness, health and
environmental NGOs seized upon PSA's filter introduction as an opportunity to criticize other
auto manufacturers for not adopting filters. In Germany, where environmental awareness is
particularly strong, an alliance of organizations - health insurance companies, the auto club,
environmental organizations, children's groups, travel/transport agencies, and health groups -
launched a coordinated "shame campaign" in November 2002, aimed at German automakers
(VW, DaimlerChrysler, BMW) which did not offer filter-equipped diesel cars. With the tagline,
"No Diesel without Filter," the campaign called for a government mandate requiring filters on all
diesel cars, while commending PSA for already voluntarily equipping six of their car models
with filters (Peckham 2003a).
8 Interview with Bruno Costes, Technical and Political Affairs, PSA Peugeot Citroen, September 3, 2004.
9 Historical exchange rate from FXTOP.com. In April 1999, El = US$1.07.
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The "No Diesel without Filter" alliance held press conferences and issued press releases
to build awareness about the value of filters on diesel cars. Their dramatic public displays
garnered mainstream media attention. Posters depicted people wearing T-shirts printed with
their "dirty" hearts, "soiled" from breathing diesel exhaust. Television news showed campaign
leaders holding a soiled cloth next to an unfiltered tailpipe and a clean white sheet next to a
filtered tailpipe. The activists specifically targeted individual companies, especially VW, which
holds the largest passenger car market share in Germany. They projected a giant "Diesel Causes
Cancer" slide on VW's headquarters and used costumed protesters to deter customers at VW
dealerships (Peckham 2003a). The campaign had a dramatic effect in Germany. A 2003
consumer awareness survey showed that 93% of Germans surveyed were familiar with diesel
particulate filters (PSA 2005a). Although PSA did not fund the alliance's activities and made a
concerted effort to keep its marketing activities separate, it was a beneficiary of the campaign.°0
Government interest in the campaign was strong. UBA (the German environmental
agency which supports the Environment Ministry) and the World Health Organization were
partners in the alliance. Their presence at the campaign's press events and fact-filled
presentations about diesel particulate filters lent credibility to the more activist portion of the
campaign. The media attention gave the campaign "free advertising." Government officials,
such as Axel Friedrich, frequently spoke at press conferences alongside NGO alliance leaders.
Even though UBA usually tries to keep government and NGO activities separate, its active
participation in the filter campaign was frowned upon by other parts of the German
government. 
German Environment Minister Jurgin Trittin was sympathetic to the call for particulate
filters. He called for the voluntary adoption of filters and floated the proposal of a E600 tax
break for filter-equipped diesels.12 The alliance placed pressure on individual companies to
offer filters, offering to help publicize a company's filter adoption, even if it only offered the
filter in one model.' 3 In 2003, other companies, such as Fiat, Ford, Toyota, Renault, and Opel
10 Interview with Jurgen Resch, Executive Director, Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V., September 3, 2004, and with
Bruno Costes, Technical and Political Affairs, PSA Peugeot Citroen, September 3, 2004
1 Interview with Dr. Axel Friedrich, Head of the Division of Environment, Transport and Noise, Umweltbundesamt
(UBA), August 31, 2004.
12 Historical exchange rate from FXTOP.com. In 2003, El = US$1.13.
3 Interview with Juiirgen Resch, Executive Director, Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V., September 3, 2004.
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began promising to offer filters in some of their diesel models, but the German auto companies -
VW, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz - stood firm in refusing the filter option until mid-2003.
Table 6-3: Automaker Filter Announcements at the 2003 Frankfurt Auto Show
Maker Models Expected availability
Audi A4, A6, AS Early 2004
BMW Ser Early 2004
Citroen C3, C5, C8 In production
Fiat-Alfa Stilo, Alfa 156 2004
Ford Focus C-Max, Mondeo (2004) End-2003
Honda Accord 2004
Jaguar X-Type 2004
Mazda Mehrere Modelle 2004
Mercedes C-, E-Classes Oct. 2003
Opel Vectra, Signum, Astra (ab 2004) End-2003
Peugeot 304, 406, 607, 807 In production
Renault Vel Satis, Espace End-2003
Toyota Avensis Nov. 2003
Volvo Mehrere Modelle 2004
VW Passat 2004
Source: Peckham (2003b); Original source: Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer, B&D Forecast (2003)
VDA, the German auto association, challenged the durability of PSA's filter technology,
pointing out the first-generation filter's inability to meet the Euro 4 NOx standards, and
emphasized the uncertainties of diesel exhaust's health effects. VDA lobbied hard against the
government's proposed C600 filter incentives. VDA claimed that such an incentive would give
an unfair advantage to foreign manufacturers who had already chosen to adopt filters. Many of
their models already met Euro 4 standards early, and they were likely frustrated that public
attention had shifted from their early Euro 4 compliance to a demand for filters, which VDA
viewed as a costly and inelegant technical solution. Equipping cars with filters did result in a 3%
fuel penalty (Michelin, Figueras et al. 2000). Manufacturers claimed that the filters would add
e300-800 to their vehicle prices. Meanwhile, the UBA estimated the real additional costs to be
E150-300, perhaps assuming costs would spread across larger volumes (Rodt 2003). Ultimately,
the German auto companies relented and began offering filters in some of their diesel models.
For example, DaimlerChrysler began offering filters as a £580 option in October 2003. By mid-
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April 2004, it made them standard in diesel models sold in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and
the Netherlands, but also increased list prices by E800 (DaimlerChrysler 2005b).
Besides concern about environmental protection, customers purchased filter-equipped
cars for economic reasons. The trade press predicted that cars without filters would depreciate
faster. Customers anticipated that tax incentives would eventually be offered. Also, some cities
proposed limiting inner city access to all diesel cars, unless they were equipped with filters. The
response to filters by German customers was very different from the customers in the rest of
Europe. Both Ford Europe and DaimlerChrysler reported that over 80% of diesel car customers
purchased the extra filter option in Germany, whereas only a minority of customers in other
countries, even France, chose the option (DaimlerChrysler 2005). Ford Europe chose not to even
offer the filter option in the UK because of the lack of filter demand.1 4
Private benefits to PSA
PSA posted strong sales following the debut of its first filter-equipped model. In
Germany, its passenger car market share climbed from 2.7% in 1999 to 5.8% in 2003; in
Western Europe, its market share increased from 12.1% in 1999 to 14.8% in 2003 (see Figure
6-2). During this time period, PSA was able to increase its sales even as total passenger car sales
in Western Europe declined. PSA's market share has since fallen slightly in Western Europe, to
14% in 2004-2005, but this is still substantially higher than its pre-2000 levels.
14 Interview with Dr. Wolfgang Schneider, Vice President of Legal, Governmental, and Environmental Affairs, Ford
of Europe, August 31, 2004.
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Figure 6-2: PSA Market Share Growth
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PSA's performance in the 1999-2003 time period in Western Europe iseven more striking when
compared to itscompetitors, as shown in Figure 6-3.
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Figure 6-3: lVlanufacturer lVlarket Shares in Western Europe
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PSA executives have been hesitant to attribute any quantifiable financial benefits from
their early filter introduction, because it is difficult to separate out the impact of the popularity of
their new car models and the restructuring of their sales and distribution system, which also
began in 1999-2000.15 However, praise from environmental groups and government agencies
undoubtedly boosted PSA's reputation. Because of its particulate filter, PSA has won numerous
awards from environmental groups, automobile clubs, and auto enthusiast magazines in France,
Germany, Italy, UK, and Austria (PSA 2000-2005; PSA 2005a).
By being the first to embrace DPF technology, PSA generated enthusiasm about filters
from government agencies and the environmental community, and put its competitors at a
disadvantage when filters became popular. In addition to the free publicity, PSA got a head start
on technology development and experience with filters. Even before German manufacturers had
their filters ready, PSA had sold 500,000 filter-equipped cars and was already on its third
generation of filter systems by mid-2003. PSA had sold its one millionth filter-equipped diesel
by January 2005 (PSA 2005a). PSA's filter supplier, Faurecia, a PSA subsidiary, held onto 60%
of the filter market in 2004 as other manufacturers also sought its filter expertise to equip their
cars (PSA 2005a).
Following PSA, Mercedes-Benz was a distant second in filter-equipped diesels sales,
selling 110,000 cars with filters by the end of 2004 (DaimlerChrysler 2005b). Of all the German
brands, Mercedes was probably the best equipped to introduce filters because it had introduced
them in the US in the 1980s and had continued research on them, anticipating their use in future
regulation. Despite its filter technology readiness relative to other manufacturers, Mercedes is
still in favor of in-engine controls that reduced emissions upfront instead of end-of-the-pipe
controls, provided the desired emission levels can be achieved. Also, the company's past
experience in California with filter regeneration problems and the fuel consumption penalties
associated with the filter technology contributed to its initial reticence in 2003-2004 to support
filter requirements.' 6 Even in mid-2005, when Mercedes was offering the filters as standard in
all diesel models, they were available in only 4 European countries (DaimlerChrysler 2005a).
Volkswagen, the leading automaker in Europe and among the most resistant to filters, moved
15 Interview with Bruno Costes, Technical and Political Affairs, PSA Peugeot Citroen, September 3, 2004.
16 Interview with European auto industry representative, November 2004.
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more slowly. Although it began to offer the filter in all Audi models by 2005, it did not offer the
filter in all Volkswagen models until 2006 (Volkswagen 2005).
The German manufacturers' slowness to adopt filters hurt their image as innovative
technology leaders. The German research firm Media Tenor evaluated 20,704 German news and
business stories about the automobile industry in the first 8 months of 2005. According to the
researchers, foreign manufacturers like the Renault-Nissan alliance and PSA were praised for
qualities usually associated with German firms, like safety, reliability and innovation. German
automakers were frequently criticized in the media for missing the trends in hybrids and diesel
particulate filters (Krix 2005).
Impact on regulation in Germany
The "No Diesel without Filter" campaign and customer and government pressure for
filter options eventually led the German automakers to reconsider their position on filters. By
summer 2003, German manufacturers announced their plans to offer filter options in 2004
models. However, unlike PSA, they initially planned to offer the filters for an additional 6600-
700. This was counterbalanced by the existing reductions in registration taxes, up to C614 less,
for Euro 4-compliant cars. German manufacturers continued to object to the proposed filter-
specific tax incentive (Peckham 2003b).
The attractiveness of the diesel particulate filter as an effective emissions-reducing
technology created tension within the German government. Environment Minister Trittin
supported a 6600 tax incentive for cars with PM levels below 2.5 mg/km, a level attainable only
through filters. On the other hand, Finance Minister Hans Eichel openly criticized the proposed
tax incentive in an interview with the Financial Times Deutschland. Concerned about the
competitiveness of the German auto industry, he claimed that the incentive served as an
incentive to foreign firms (i.e., PSA, Renault, Fiat) that had already adopted the filters (Walsh
2004). Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder brokered a compromise in a series of meetings with
German automakers. They promised that by 2009, all their diesel models would have filters.
New cars meeting a 8.5 mg/km limit between 2005 and 2009 would receive a £600 euro tax
break. By February 2005, disagreement among the Environmental and Finance Ministries was
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resolved, and the German government agreed to offer the tax break starting January 2006 (AFX
2005).
Regulatory agencies use PSA as an example
PSA's early introduction of filter-equipped diesels spurred widespread industry adoption
of filters and prompted discussion of more stringent emission standards at the EU level. Since
2003, the German and French environmental agencies have been pressuring the European
Commission to adopt a stricter Euro 5 PM standard as low as 2.5 mg/km (Peckham 2003a;
Peckham 2003b). The German environmental agency, Umweltbundesamt (UBA), featured
PSA's filter technology (known as FAP technology) prominently in its 2003 "Future Diesel"
report. The report authors cited the emissions testing conducted by the German auto club ADAC
in 2001 on the effectiveness of the filter technology on the Peugeot 607. They comment on
PSA's major influence on future regulations: "FAP technology therefore defines the state of the
art and the possibility of setting limit values on that basis" (Rodt 2003).
Prior to proposing the Euro 5 emission standards, the European Commission issued a
document in January 2005, entitled, "Fiscal Incentives for Motor Vehicles in Advance of Euro
5." It suggests that Member States base their fiscal incentives for diesel passenger cars on a PM
limit value of 5 mg/km and acknowledges that this value can currently be reached by particulate
filters only (EC 2005a). Even though Euro 5 requirements may have ultimately necessitated
filters, PSA's early action mobilized interest groups and government officials and accelerated the
adoption of the technology. By the time the Euro 5 regulatory process began, PSA had already
demonstrated that filter-equipped diesel cars were technically and economically feasible and
attractive to consumers.
6.3.2 Toyota's D-CAT system shows promise
In the 1990s, Toyota began working on its D-CAT (Diesel Clean Advanced Technology)
system to reduce NOx and PM emissions from diesel engines. The D-CAT system features
DPNR, the diesel particulate-nitrogen oxides reduction system, which is capable of reducing PM
by 80% and NOx by 50% from Euro 4 levels (Toyota 2003). DPNR combines a diesel
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particulate filter with a NOx adsorber. The NOx adsorber adsorbs and stores NOx under lean
conditions (normal for diesel engines). During brief periods of rich conditions, the NOx is
released ("desorbed") in the presence of CO and catalytically reduced to N2. Because the
adsorber also adsorbs sulfur oxides, which interferes with NOx adsorption, it is important that
the diesel fuel used has very low sulfur content (AECC 2006). The system also incorporates
other new technologies, such as a common-rail fuel injection system, exhaust port fuel injection,
low temperature combustion, and exhaust gas recirculation (EGR). Its first commercial use was
in heavy-duty diesel engines developed by Toyota's affiliate, Hino Motors. However, Toyota
saw the opportunity to apply the technology for light-duty vehicles for the European market.
Beginning in March 2002, Toyota conducted an 18-month field test of 60 Avensis models
in seven European countries - Germany, UK, Austria, Norway, Italy, Finland, and Belgium.
Most of the models were tested in Germany and the UK, which later became the first markets in
which the diesel Avensis with D-CAT was introduced (Toyota 2002).
Toyota launched its Avensis 2.0 D-CAT car in Germany and the UK in November 2003
as a Euro 4-compliant car eligible for reduced registration fees in several EU countries. Its
ability to meet the Euro 4 standards early was not particularly unique - many other vehicles from
Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes, etc. were also able to reach Euro 4 in 2003. Even Toyota's own
D-4D engines, the basis for the D-CAT engines, met the Euro 4 standards in early 2003.
However, the D-CAT system performance significantly surpassed Euro 4, getting to 2 mg/km
PM and 110 mg/km NOx, a 90% PM reduction and a 50% NOx reduction over Euro 4 standards.
Toyota viewed the D-CAT-equipped Toyota Avensis as its "flagship" car for the upcoming Euro
5 standards.17 The proposed Euro 5 NOx standard was 200 mg/km, easily attainable by the D-
CAT system.
Toyota has actively promoted its D-CAT system, publishing trade articles, presenting at
industry meetings, and discussing the technology with regulators. Yet Toyota's management in
Europe claims that there has been no explicit intention to influence Euro 5 levels with these
numbers. Intentional or not, Toyota's technology did make a strong favorable impression with
environmental groups and regulators, but their enthusiasm about the D-CAT system was
dampened by the other automakers' opposition to significant NOx reductions.
17 Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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Support from environmental groups and auto clubs
The diesel Avensis' performance on emission reduction was cited by various groups
during the discussion leading up to the Euro 5 proposal. When ADAC, the German Automobile
Club, submitted its comments for the Euro 5 consultation to the Commission, it referred to the
Avensis' performance in its EcoTest program. FIA Foundation, a worldwide association of
automobile clubs, sponsored ADAC's EcoTest program to help customers select low-emission
vehicles and to encourage competition by manufacturers on emission characteristics. ADAC
assigned points to 276 models based on their pollutant and CO2 emissions. Of the diesel cars,
the Toyota Avensis scored the highest, performing the best of all diesels on pollutant reduction,
and among the best for CO2 emissions (ADAC 2005). In presentations and reports, the German
Environmental Agency, UBA, cited the performance of Toyota's DeNOx technology in its
argument for lowering the NOx limits to as low as 80 mg/km, from the proposed limit of 200
mg/km (Rodt 2003).
Private benefits to Toyota
Early sales of Toyota cars with the D-CAT system were limited, because in 2003, the
system was only offered on the 2.0L D-4D diesel engine in the Avensis. Toyota was also
constrained by the limited availability of low-sulfur diesel fuel - sales were restricted to the UK
and Germany, where fuel sulfur levels were less than 50ppm. To get around the problem of
misfueling with higher sulfur fuel, the D-CAT system is equipped with a switch that the driver
can turn off if ultra-low sulfur diesel is unavailable (Nayer 2004). Clearly, with the switch off,
the dramatic PM and NOx reductions do not occur. Toyota's limited release of its D-CAT
technology in 2003 was in preparation for its more widespread introduction in 2005, when 50
ppm sulfur diesel became widely available. According to Toyota's own European
Environmental Report: "The success of these field trials means that the DPNR-equipped Toyota
Avensis will have a limited launch in the UK and Germany, where low sulphur diesel is
available, before the end of 2003, and an anticipated pan-European market launch from 2005
onwards when low sulphur fuel will be mandatory in EU Member States" (Toyota 2003). The
early introduction allowed Toyota to improve the technology prior to large-scale production.
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By 2005, the D-CAT was standard in the new 177 hp 2.2L engine, which became
available in the Avensis, Corolla Verso, RAV4, and Lexus IS 220d. Due to the lack of legal
obligation and the availability of Toyota's less expensive 4-D4 engine systems already meeting
the Euro 4 standards, sales of D-CAT equipped cars were minor. From January to July 2005,
only 2,657 cars with the 2.2L D-CAT engines were sold. 18 Meanwhile, Toyota sold 145,111
units of Avensis cars in 2004 (Toyota 2004).
The Avensis has been popular with fleet owners because of its affordability and features
(Meredith 2003). In spring 2003, the 2.0-litre D-4D diesel engine in the Avensis, even without
the D-CAT system, was the first in its class to meet the Euro 4 standards, allowing UK fleet car
owners to avoid the 3% diesel car tax. The Avensis won the New Fleet Car of the Year in the
2004 Fleet Excellence Awards, which is given by UK fleet owners. From 2003 to 2004, sales of
the Avensis model have increased by 25% (Toyota 2004). Offering the D-CAT technology in
such a popular vehicle may have hinted at Toyota's hopes to make D-CAT mainstream.
Toyota's limited influence on Euro 5 regulation but continued growth in the EU
Despite Toyota's efforts to publicize D-CAT technology and the enthusiasm of
environmental and auto clubs, Toyota was less successful with European regulators. Unlike US
regulators, who tend to base standards on levels attainable by the industry leaders, European
regulators prefer to set standards based on technology that can be met by most automakers.
Moreover, Toyota's status as a foreign company in a market dominated by French and German
automakers limited its influence in Europe. In 2003, when the European Commission met with
ACEA, the European automobile manufacturers association, to discuss Euro 5 regulations, the
Japanese auto manufacturers were excluded from the meetings. ACEA is comprised of
European auto manufacturers and also Ford Europe and GM/Opel because they are considered
European firms despite their American parent companies. Toyota expressed its frustration to the
trade media about being shut out from the Euro 5 discussions because it considered itself a major
player in the European passenger car market. However, its growing sales are already challenging
the European manufacturers' stronghold in the diesel passenger car market. Toyota has the
largest market share of the Japanese auto companies, which together command 14% of European
18 Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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passenger car market. As shown in Figure 6-4, Toyota's sales growth has been the main driver
behind the growing market share of Japanese companies in Europe. The success of Toyota and
the Korean automakers has primarily come at the expense of American automakers Ford and
GMiOpel and struggling Italian automaker Fiat (ACEA 2005). Toyota has also strengthened its
position in the diesel passenger car market, such that in 2004, diesels accounted for 37% of
Toyota's European sales, compared to only 21% in 2001 (Toyota 2005).
Figure 6-4: Rise of Toyota and Korean Manufacturers in the European Car Market
Asian Automaker Market Shares in Western Europe
18%
(j)
c
16%0 I!J Korean.~
~
.~ 14% oToyota0)
Q)
12%~
Co ~Nissan
()
10%~
Q) • MitsubishiC 8%>.e oMazdaQ) 6%
Co.c
C/) [J Honda
Q)
~ 2%
Co ~Other
~ Japanese0%
~C) ~, ~C"l" ~~ ~t:> ~0 ~Io ~ ~co ~Q) ~C) ~, ~C"l" ~~ ~t:> ~0
,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> ,<?> 15 C"l"CS 15 15 15 15
Year
Source: ACEA (2005)
PSA's large-scale introduction of diesel particulate filters and the subsequent "No Diesel
without Filter" campaign in Germany shifted the focus of regulators and auto companies to PM
reductions rather than NOx reductions. Tackling dramatic PM and NOx reductions at the same
time would have been politically difficult, especially when many automakers had already been
fiercely opposed to PM filters. Also, NOx is considered more challenging and costly to reduce.
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However, Toyota was convinced in 2003 that its D-CAT technology could accomplish
significant NOx and PM reductions (Automotive News Europe 2003). Jim Rosenstein, Toyota
Motor Europe's communications vice-president was quoted in the press as saying, "The industry
believes Euro 5 may kill the diesel...At the moment, we are probably the only carmaker who
could meet eventual Euro 5 standards" (Automotive News Europe 2003). Other automakers saw
Toyota's ability to reach substantially lower NOx levels - 110 mg/km v. Euro 5's 200 mg/km -
as counter to their desire for more lenient NOx standards.
Toyota's D-CAT technology came under a lot of fire from automobile associations in
Europe and US, who questioned its durability. In a 2002 EPA diesel progress report, the US
EPA cited Toyota's diesel Avensis and D-CAT system as preliminary evidence of a diesel
vehicle capable meeting the US Tier 2 standards. US automakers, as represented by the Alliance
for Automobile Manufacturers (AAM), claimed that EPA was overly optimistic and that
Toyota's system still fell short of meeting the supplemental test cycle limits and durability limits
(Peckham 2002). In Europe, German auto manufacturers criticized the system, and showed data
illustrating the shortcomings of the D-CAT system. BMW's development head, Burkhard
Goschel, expressed doubts about the NOx adsorber system, arguing that urea-SCR technology
was the only viable NOx emissions solution (Dieselnet 2005). An unnamed Toyota supplier
released data showing that the D-CAT-equipped Toyota Avensis could not meet the Euro 4 NOx
standard after 20,000 to 40,000 km of testing. This goes against the fact that the Toyota Avensis
received official Euro 4 type approval from the European Commission, which requires 100,000
km of testing. Toyota Europe's Manager of Government Affairs Didier Stevens claimed that the
durability testing overseen by the other manufacturers did not adhere to the same test conditions
used by Toyota's testing, resulting in the discrepancy.19
Some critics speculate that Toyota was purposely supporting greater NOx reductions not
to promote its D-CAT technology, but to encumber diesel passenger cars with more costly
regulations. Its gasoline-electric hybrid technology, in which Toyota is the world leader, would
then become more cost competitive with diesels. Toyota has denied such intentions, but
statements made by Toyota executive vice-president Akikhiko Saito in a 2003 Financial Times
article on diesel standards reveal the company's clear preference for hybrids over diesels. He
stated that if diesel and petrol cars had the same NOx and PM standards, diesels would be priced
19 Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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out of the market. "European manufacturers are trying to emphasize their European (diesel)
technology...But it is predicated on rather lax NOx regulations on diesel compared to
gasoline...If those NOx regulations are brought into line much more effort will be needed for
diesel. The diesel-driven cars' cost could be higher than gasoline-driven hybrid vehicles"
(Mackintosh 2003).
Despite Toyota's exclusion from the ACEA talks and hostility from other manufacturers,
European regulators did look favorably upon Toyota's D-CAT technology. Other European
automakers' proposed NOx reductions had not been significant, so Toyota's claim of reducing
NOx by 50% over Euro 4 levels stood in direct contrast to their proposals (Mackintosh 2003).
The European Commission is generally not comfortable making regulations that only one
manufacturer can meet. They prefer to wait until NOx aftertreatment technology is mature on a
larger scale. 20
The next section describes the formal Euro 5 consultation process, which began in 2004.
By that time, the European Commission had already conducted preliminary technology
assessments.
6.3.3 Euro 5 consultation process
In early 2004, the European Commission sent out questionnaires to stakeholders to get
feedback on the upcoming Euro 5 standards. The questionnaires presented 7 scenarios with
varying PM and NOx limit values as alternatives to the previously proposed Euro 5 standards,
and sought information on the technology and cost required for meeting those limits. HC and
CO limits were presumed to remain the same as in the Euro 4 standards. Based on feedback
from the questionnaires, the Commission produced a preliminary draft proposal for the Euro 5
standards. It invited comments during 2-month consultation period in summer 2005.
20 Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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Figure 6-5: Proposed NOx and PM Limits for Future Diesel Standards
Euro 5 Questionnaire Scenarios
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All seven scenarios in the questionnaire featured NOx limits of 150 mg/km or less and
three of them had NOx limits of 75 mg/km. However, when the Commission released its draft
regulation, the proposed Euro 5 NOx limit was higher than any of the scenarios. The NOx level
would be reduced by only 20% from 2005 levels, from 250 mg/km to 200 mg/km. In the
questionnaire responses and technology submissions, the auto industry had convincingly
persuaded the Commission of the technology and cost challenges of more significant NOx
reduction.
Technology reports by vehicle manufacturers cast doubts about the availability of NOx
aftertreatment devices for Euro 5. As a result, the Commission supported setting standards that
would not require NOx aftertreatment on light-duty vehicles (EC 2005a). In the Commission's
154
30 -
25
20
E
C 15 -
Q.
10
5-
0
0
- -
-
-
- I
I
i
I
I
i
i
I
draft Euro 5 proposal, it remarked: "This emission limit has been set so that reductions can be
achieved by further internal engine measures, to avoid the need for NOx aftertreatment to be
installed at this stage. As the technology for further NOx reduction is not yet mature, it is
therefore proposed not to reduce NOx emissions beyond the 200 mg/km limit value." It was
generally accepted by the Commission and industry stakeholders that to maintain the fuel
economy and CO2 emission benefits from diesel vehicles, they had to be less aggressive about
NOx reduction. Industry and environmental groups disagreed about the difficulty of a 20% NOx
reduction. Auto manufacturers argued that the 20% reduction would be "significant and
challenging," while environmental groups and emission control suppliers provided evidence of
the feasibility of lower NOx limits.
Environmental agencies in Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, the European Environment Bureau, and some environmental NGOs expressed their
disappointment in the minor NOx reduction. They supported lower NOx limits, suggesting
values as low 75 mg/km. They felt that the proposed 200 mg/km level was not sufficiently
technology-forcing. A lower limit would encourage manufacturers to use urea SCR systems or
other NOx aftertreatment. In the case that the technology is not ready for Euro 5, some
commenters suggested setting up Euro 6 standards at this time to encourage R&D. Many of
these organizations also expressed support for a PM limit of 2.5 mg/km rather than 5 mg/km,
since existing vehicles with particulate filters were already capable of getting down to mg/km.
Unlike US and Japan, Europe will still have different emission standards for diesel and
gasoline-powered vehicles after this latest set of regulations. If diesel cars were held to the same
NOx standards as gasoline cars - 60 mg/km instead of 200 mg/km - no existing diesel car would
be able to meet it. According to industry perspectives in the trade press, such a move in the near
term would essentially ban diesel cars. However, large passenger vehicles, like SUVs and light
trucks, will be subject to the same Euro 5 standards as passenger cars, much to the chagrin of the
auto industry.
Expected supporters: emission control manufacturers
Emission control manufacturers are consistent supporters of more stringent emission
standards because regulatory-driven demand helps them sell more products. The Association for
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Emissions Control by Catalyst (AECC), a European-based trade association representing the
interests of emission control manufacturers, felt that the proposed Euro 5 NOx and PM standards
were not ambitious enough. They offered technical evidence that vehicles were capable of
meeting much lower limits.
An AECC test programme showed that a "state-of-the-art" Euro 4-compliant vehicle with
good fuel economy would already reach a 150 mg/km NOx limit. According to the UK's
Vehicle Certification Agency's database of vehicles receiving type approval, 45% of Euro 4
diesel vehicles already meet the proposed 200 mg/km limit (AECC 2005). AECC acknowledged
vehicle manufacturers' concerns about the cost and vehicle integration issues for the new
aftertreatment systems (NOx adsorber, urea SCR), but felt that manufacturers and their suppliers
needed more significant NOx targets to spur progress: "However, if there is no prospect of NOx
control systems being required for future European vehicles, then there will be no impetus for
their application in Europe and hence no forward movement on their development." AECC also
hinted that stricter standards would better prepare European manufacturers to compete in other
markets; technological advances were already happening in the US (AECC 2005).
In terms of the PM limits. AECC observed that current new vehicles, when outfitted with
diesel particulate filters, were already well below the 2.5 mg/km limit proposed by one of the
Commission's scenarios. In contrast to vehicle manufacturers, it supported the development of a
particle number limit, since vehicles with low PM mass emissions could still emit a large number
of ultrafine particles, which are more damaging to lungs. AECC agreed with ACEA that the lead
time of 18 months for type approval of new vehicles is too short, but thought two years, rather
than ACEA's preferred three years, was enough (AECC 2005).
6.3.4 Impact of PSA and Toyota as first movers
Why did PSA's diesel particulate filter technology have such a strong impact on the
Euro 5 regulations, while Toyota's D-CAT technology did not? There are several reasons: (1)
timing, (2) NGO and public involvement, (3) ease of technology diffusion, and (4) less urgency
to reduce NOx than PM.
PSA introduced its diesel filter technology in 2000, three years earlier than Toyota's first
offering of the Avensis with D-CAT technology. This gave PSA more time to showcase its
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technology to customers and regulators prior to discussion about the Euro 5 regulations. By
2003, enthusiasm about diesel particulate filter had already spread throughout Europe, especially
in Germany and France. PSA had sold 500,000 cars with filters by mid-2003. Toyota did not
begin selling any Avensis models with the D-CAT system until November 2003. It offered
D-CAT as an option with added cost, so the vast majority of Avensis buyers did not order
D-CAT.
PSA's introduction of diesel filter technology triggered environmental NGO activity in
Germany, culminating in the "No Diesel without Filter" campaign. The organized campaign and
media publicity placed pressure on the auto industry to adopt filters. While Toyota's D-CAT
technology caught the eye of trade press, automobile clubs, and some regulators, it did not
generate the same kind of activism from the environmental community.
Diesel particulate filters are not a new technology - they have been around since the mid-
1980s (Johnson 2001). For example, by 2000, the leading diesel filter manufacturer, Johnson
Matthey, had already sold over 20,000 catalyzed diesel particulate filters for installation on
heavy-duty diesel engines for trucks and buses (MECA 2000). The major challenge was not the
technology, but making it affordable enough for light-duty vehicles. A crucial part of PSA's
achievement was getting the filter cost low enough to make it standard in every car. Although
the other automakers lagged PSA in adding filters to their cars, it did not take long for them to
develop and market their own systems. When the Euro 5 consultations were underway, most
manufacturers had already begun voluntarily installing filters in some of their diesel car models.
By this time, it was easier to persuade them to accept a very low PM limit. NOx reduction is
much more difficult to accomplish. Other automakers were not prepared to follow Toyota's lead
with NOx adsorbers, still considered a developing technology. Most of the other manufacturers
supported urea SCR systems as the favored NOx reduction technique, so it did not help that
Toyota's technology of choice deviated from the majority's preference. Another problem with
Toyota's technology is that it requires very low fuel sulfur levels - definitely below 50 ppm, and
preferably below 10 ppm. PSA's filter technology did not require any special diesel fuel. Since
fuel suppliers in European countries were not required to sell fuel with 50 ppm sulfur levels until
2005, Toyota was constrained to introduce their D-CAT-equipped Avensis in countries which
had introduced 10 ppm early.
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From a public health standpoint, particulates cause more serious respiratory and
cardiovascular problems than NOx. In recent years, attention to particulate emission control has
come to the forefront of the public and regulatory arena because of many medical studies linking
diesel particulates with increased cancer and mortality rates. Therefore, regulators have decided
to tackle PM before NOx. Images of soot-covered cloths placed near diesel engine exhaust pipes
and clouds of black smoke from cars have more salience and emotional appeal with the public
than explaining how complex interactions among NOx, VOCs, and sunlight in the atmosphere
create ozone.
6.3.5 Beyond Euro 5
In the past few years, Toyota's relationship with European regulators has improved
significantly. Because of its introduction of hybrids and D-CAT diesels, Toyota is perceived as a
technology leader. On several occasions, European Commission officials have contacted Toyota
to ask them about specific issues, and treated Toyota as a sounding board for ideas.21 Toyota
may not have had influence over Euro 5, but in the next round, in Euro 6, regulators may feel
more confident setting more stringent NOx standards and identical standards for light-duty diesel
and gasoline vehicles. However, by this time, other manufacturers may have developed effective
and commercially viable NOx emission reduction strategies, challenging Toyota's 2004 status as
having the "cleanest diesel car" in the world in terms of PM and NOx emissions.
6.4 United States
The US EPA has not begun its regulatory process for the next round of light-duty vehicle
emission standards after Tier 2. However, it is clear that federal and state regulators and
environmental groups are closely following the developments in Europe and Japan.
German environmental officials have been eager to share the success of their country's
filter technology introduction with the US. Stefan Rodt, the head of the transport pollutant
emissions at the Germnan environmental agency (UBA), gave a presentation about European
21 Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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diesel emission standards at the Diesel Engine Emissions Reduction (DEER) conference in San
Diego, California in 2002. Rodt compared the dramatically reduced particulate emissions of a
filter-equipped Peugeot 607 to a Mercedes E220 CDI without a filter. He showed that filters
reduced particulates for all sizes of particles, and the resultant levels of particulates were below
those detected by the particulate number test procedure (Rodt 2002). He and Axel Friedrich, the
UBA's Head of Environment and Transport, have been very vocal about their support of diesel
filter technology and eagerness to see other manufacturers follow PSA's lead. Unlike the US
EPA, which tries to keep its activities distinct from environmental interest groups, the UBA
teamed up with Deutsche Umwelthife (DUH), the German environmental NGO that led the "No
Diesel without Filter" campaign, to make presentations to U.S. environmental groups. They held
a special conference at the Washington, D.C., office of the non-profit group Environmental
Defense, to pass on their experiences and inspire their American counterparts to support diesel
particulate filter adoption (Peckham 2003).
So far, the PSA diesel filter technology and the Toyota Avensis D-CAT system have
shown their relevance to discussions about Tier 2 regulations, but their current inability to meet
the full Tier 2 requirements have prevented them from influencing the next round of US
regulations. Even so, the Toyota Avensis' progress toward reaching Tier 2 PM and NOx
standards may reaffirm EPA's preference for NOx adsorbers over urea SCR systems. The latter
requires a national urea distribution infrastructure to supply the urea additive to vehicles.
Approval of urea SCR systems would require a rewrite of current EPA requirements, which
require emission control systems to go without maintenance for at least 120,000 miles. Cars
with urea SCR systems would need to be refilled with urea every 5,000-10,000 miles for NOx
reduction to occur. If EPA sees that NOx adsorbers work sufficiently well to meet standards,
they may not see the need to modify the regulations.
Even though the EU and Japan have more frequently updated their emission standards
than the US, US standards are actually on par or more stringent with the Japanese and EU
standards in the 2008-09 timeframe. According to the German UBA, the US Tier 2 standards are
80% lower in NOx and almost 70% lower in PM than the Euro 5 standards.
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6.5 Japan
Japan's Central Environment Council submitted a draft proposal for the 2009 light-duty
vehicle emission limits to the Environment Minister in February 2005. The proposal, entitled the
Eighth Report on Future Measures to Reduce Vehicle Pollutant Emissions, was open to public
comment in February and March 2005, with plans to finalize it at the end of 2005 (Jiji Press
2005).22 The Council had originally intended to reduce PM and NOx emissions by 90% from the
2005 levels, but chose to make the reductions less dramatic - only 60% for PM and 45% for
NOx. This may have resulted from consideration of energy efficiency and CO2 emission
reduction, which can be at odds with pollutant reduction (Kyodo 2005).
6.5.1 Negotiating the NOx-PM trade-off
Although the US and Japanese standards are associated with different test conditions, the
2009 Japanese standards - 80 mg/km NOx and 5 mg/km PM - are considered comparable to the
2004 US Tier 2 standards in PM, but weaker in NOx. In its 2003 report on future emissions
policy, the Japanese Central Environment Council had already articulated its prioritization of PM
reduction over NOx reduction: "The new long-term targets for diesel motor vehicles to be
adopted in 2005 emphasize regulation of PM emissions over that of NOx. For this reason, it is
estimated that in 2010, while the volume of PM emissions from diesel motor vehicles will have
decreased by two-thirds from the 2000 level, NOx emissions will have decreased by no more
than about 30%" (Japan Central Environment Council 2003b). Japan's 2009 NOx standard is
more stringent than the Euro 5 (post-2008) standard of 200 mg/km. The 2009 regulation is also
the first time that diesel cars will have the same emission limits as gasoline cars, which has yet to
happen in Europe. Arguably, any diesel car that can be certified in Japan will receive type
approval in Europe, keeping Japanese auto manufacturers competitive in the European diesel
market.
22 The environmental ministry estimates the proposed regulations will reduce PM emissions from 79,000 tons in
FY2000 to 5,300 tons in FY2015 and NOx emissions from 566,000 tons to 188,000 tons.
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As part of the Kyoto Protocol agreement, Japanese manufacturers had to produce cars to
meet the EU's midterm target of 165 to 175 g/km CO2 by 2003, and long-term target of 120
g/km CO2 by 2010. Japanese manufacturers met the 2003 targets one year early, with a new car
average of 174 g/km. This achievement has been attributed to a recent increase in diesel vehicle
sales in Europe. By modeling Japanese diesel emission standards closer to those in Europe -
strict on PM but more lax on NOx, the Japanese government has helped their manufacturers
compete on a level playing field with European manufacturers. As Japanese manufacturers sell
more diesel cars in Europe and develop more effective emission reduction technology, the
Japanese government has become more open to greater diesel car sales in Japan. The Japanese
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) has encouraged the development of clean
diesel technology. METI issued a report in August 2003 recommending government and
industry work together to develop advanced diesel and hybrid diesel passenger cars. In
particular, greater investment would help Japanese manufacturers harness their technology lead
over foreign automakers in hybrid technology (Kyodo 2003). Increased diesel car use over
gasoline cars could reduce CO2 emissions and fuel consumption and take advantage of the
existing diesel fuel surplus. In 2005, METI identified the 2009 emission standards and
improvement of public perception of diesels as the main challenges (Ito 2005).
The proposed 2009 standards are an effort by Japan's national government to build on the
stringent measures already adopted by Tokyo and other metropolitan areas. The new country-
wide limits have stringent PM limits which all but require particulate filter technology on new
diesel vehicles. The NOx standards are not yet attainable in commercially available cars but the
Japanese government expects technology to progress sufficiently to meet the standards by 2009.
Technological progress by the automakers on diesel particulate filters made it easy for the
Japanese government to call for such low PM levels.
6.5.2 Auto industry response
The stringency of the 2005 Japanese diesel emission standards have already posed a large
barrier for diesel car manufacturers hoping to sell to the Japanese market. European
manufacturers such as DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen have wanted to sell diesel models, but
in recent years the emission requirements have been prohibitively stringent. As of 2005, the
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diesel NOx standard of 140 mg/km has only been met by the Toyota Avensis, equipped with the
D-CAT system. However, the D-CAT-equipped vehicle still falls short of meeting Japan's 2009
80 g/mi NOx standard.
Despite METI's interest in diesels, diesel cars produced by Japanese manufacturers have
been primarily destined for sales in Europe. Diesel cars are better suited to long-distance, high
speed driving, and are not as well suited to the short-distance, stop-and-go driving typical in
Japan. The Japanese vehicle industry has never seriously invested in a domestic diesel car
market, choosing to focus its diesel sales on Europe, where diesels make up half the new car
market. Even JAMA, the Japanese auto industry association, sees hybrid gasoline-electric
vehicles as superior to diesels in terms of fuel efficiency, CO2, and emission reduction (JAMA
2001).
Like the US Tier 2 standards, the 2009 Japanese standards will probably create a nearly
insurmountable hurdle for diesel automakers, at least in the next 3-5 years. Diesel power may
remain the purview of trucks and buses.
6.6 Summary
Stringent US and Japanese standards have made it increasingly difficult to market
emission-compliant and affordable light-duty diesel vehicles in those countries. However,
advanced technology developments and regulatory decisions in Europe are likely to shape
American and Japanese regulators' attitudes towards diesels' future in their countries. PSA's
diesel particulate filter and Toyota's D-CAT system demonstrate that some companies will
market cleaner technologies in advance of regulatory requirements. Influencing regulations may
not be their main motivation, but those technology introductions do affect future policy. PSA's
filter introduction had a dramatic effect on the support for filters in Germany. Pressure on other
automakers and countries to adopt filter technology ultimately influenced the stringency of the
Euro 5 PM standard. Although Toyota's D-CAT system had limited impact on Euro 5, further
refinement of the system, along with other automakers' development of similar systems, could
prompt European regulators to significantly tighten NOx regulations in Euro 6.
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CHAPTER 7 - Heavy-duty Diesel Engines, 1990s to Early 2000s
7.1 Introduction
The next two chapters cover emission regulations and technology development of heavy-
duty diesel vehicles. The previous two chapters on light-duty diesel vehicles showed instances
where certain companies complied with emission standards early or supported more stringent
emission standards. In some instances, the companies with cleaner technologies did well in the
marketplace and also influenced the design of regulatory policy. This chapter on heavy-duty
diesel engines from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s tells a different story. It documents
situations where individual companies or the entire industry were non-compliant. Disputes over
technical details and unchecked noncompliance hampered air quality improvements. Examples
from the US, Europe, and Japan document cases where companies that delayed or circumvented
regulatory compliance improved their market share over their competitors. While manufacturers
remain accountable for any illegal activities that hamper air quality improvements, customer
demand and regulatory design can contribute to perverse outcomes. Once the motivations and
mechanisms behind these outcomes are understood, regulators have the opportunity to revise
testing and enforcement procedures to strengthen safeguards against noncompliance in the future.
7.2 Heavy-duty diesel engine regulations and test cycles
Heavy-duty diesel vehicles are regulated in terms of engine emissions, not vehicle
emissions. Engine manufacturers must obtain emission certification before selling their new
engine models. Whereas light-duty vehicles are tested on a chassis dynamometer, which varies
speed only, heavy-duty engines are tested on an engine dynamometer, which varies both speed
and load. As a result, emissions are measured in terms of mass per unit of work (g/bhp-hr in the
US or g/kWh in the EU and Japan), rather than mass per unit of distance (g/mi or g/km). Test
cycles consisting of timed combinations of speed and load vary by country, and usually try to
simulate driving conditions typical to that country. The emissions from each portion of the test
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cycle are recorded, weighted, and averaged to produce a weighted average that must fall within
the regulatory limits. An engine model must receive emission certification or approval from
regulators to be eligible for sale. Table 7-1 summarizes the emission standards for several
regulatory cycles from the mid-1990s to 2004.
Table 7-1: Heavy-duty Diesel Engine Emission Standards for Mid-1990s to 2004
US US US Japan | Japan Japan Euro2 Euro 3
(1994) (1998) (2002/04) (1994) (1997) (2003) (1996) (2000)
CO 15.5 g/bhp-hr (20.8 g/kWh) 7.40 g/kWh 2.22 4.0 g/kWh 2.1 g/kWh
g/kWh on ESC, 5.45
on ETC
HC 1.3 (1.7) 2.90 0.87 1.1 0.66
NMHC 2.5 (3.25)
+ NOx
NMHC 0.5 (0.65) 0.78
NOx 5.0 (6.5) 4.0 (5.2) 2.0 (2.6) 6.0 4.50 3.38 7.0 5.0
PM 0.10 (0.13) 0.70 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.10 Oon ESC,
0.15 (1998) 0.16 on ETC
Weight > 8500 lb (3860 kg) > 2500 kg |> 3500 kg
Test FTP FTP, SET, 13-mode test ECE R-49 1 ESC, ETC,
NTE ELR
Note: FTP = Federal Test Procedure, SET = Supplemental Emission Test, NTE = Not-to-exceed Limits;
ECE R-49 is a 13-mode steady-state test, ETC = European Transient Cycle, ESC = European Stationary
Cycle, ELR = European Load Response (for smoke opacity).
Sources: US EPA, Japan Ministry of the Environment, European Commission (2005); Dieselnet
(2006).
By the 1990s, the EU, Japan, and the US were regulating hydrocarbon (HC), carbon
monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxide (NOx), and particulate (PM) emissions from heavy-duty engines.
Of those pollutants, NOx has been the most difficult and expensive for the manufacturers to
reduce. Reducing HC, CO, and PM coincides with improving combustion efficiency, and
consequently, fuel economy. Since fleet operators highly value fuel economy to save on fuel,
manufacturers have an incentive to invest in such improvements. However, reducing NOx
requires retarding combustion to lower combustion temperatures, which decreases fuel economy.
Figure 7-1 shows the general relationship between NOx emissions and fuel consumption.
Reducing fuel consumption also reduces carbon dioxide (CO2) and PM emissions.
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Figure 7-1: NOx-Fuel Consumption Trade-off
Source: Gill (1988), Dieselnet (2002)
Increasingly stringent regulations required diesel engine manufacturers to reduce NOx
emissions from 10.7 g/bhp-hr in 1988 to 5.0 g/bhp-hr in 1991 and then to 4.0 g/bhp-hr in 1998.
According to Khair (1992), going from 10.7 g/bhp-hr to 4.5 g/bhp-hr requires injection timing
retard which causes a 6% fuel economy loss. Increasing fuel injection pressure is one way to
mitigate to this fuel consumption loss. Manufacturers relied on a more effective but legally
questionable technique to reconcile the problem.
With the rise of electronic controls in vehicles, engine manufacturers incorporated
software to electronically adjust the NOx-fuel consumption trade-off depending on the engine's
drive cycle. An industry-wide circumvention of NOx controls was first exposed in the US in the
late 1990s, accompanied by later evidence that similar practices were common in Europe. The
discovery of these "defeat devices" changed the landscape of the diesel engine industry as well
as engine certification test procedures.
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7.3 United States
7.3.1 Heavy-duty diesel consent decree
In 1998, seven heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers, comprising 95% of the US diesel
engine market - Caterpillar, Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Mack, Navistar International, Renault,
and Volvo Truck - were charged with violating the Clean Air Act by installing "defeat devices"
that circumvent emission controls. Most model year 1993-99 US engines operated with dual-
mapping software. It keeps emissions below the limits during EPA certification test cycle
conditions, but optimizes for fuel economy and power during the off-cycle (U.S. House
Committee on Commerce 2000). Engine maps dictate engine operating parameters under
different combinations of speed and load. An engine is expected to stay below emission limits
for these various combinations. During certification testing under the EPA's transient FTP
(Federal Test Procedure) test, the on-board diagnostic software would detect that the engine was
on one of the speed-load combinations in the EPA test cycle. As shown in Figure 7-2, the
transient FTP cycle reflects urban driving conditions, where there is frequent acceleration and
deceleration.
Figure 7-2: US Transient Federal Test Procedure (FTP) for Heavy-Duty Engines
Source: Dieselnet (2004)
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Under such conditions, the engine operated so that NOx emission levels were below the
EPA limit. However, in actual highway driving conditions, when the engine entered a steady-
state mode (e.g. 55 mph on a highway), the "defeat device" software overrode the emission
controls by advancing the fuel injection timing relative to the timing used for NOx control (U.S.
House Committee on Commerce 2000).
This improved combustion efficiency but increased NOx emissions by up to three times
the allowable EPA limit, which was 5 g/bhp-hr from 1991 to 1997 and 4 g/bhp-hr from 1998
onwards (EPA 1997a-a). Therefore, the resulting higher emission levels during highway travel
exceeded the pre-1988 level of 10.7 g/bhp-hr. A new 1998 engine could be emitting more NOx
than its decade-old predecessor. Truck drivers and fleet owners value fuel savings and engine
performance well above emissions reduction, so manipulating emission controls with dual-
mapping software was aligned with their self-interest. Aware of their customers' sensitivity to
fuel costs, all major heavy-duty engine manufacturers used some form of "defeat device"
software.
The problem surfaced during a routine EPA enforcement audit of an engine in 1997. Test
results indicated the existence of questionable calibration strategies. EPA conducted an industry-
wide compliance investigation and software review, and learned that the use of defeat devices
was widespread (U.S. House of Representatives 2000). In October 1998, opting to avoid a
drawn-out litigation process, the manufacturers settled with EPA for over $1 billion, the largest
settlement in Clean Air Act history. As part of the $1 billion, they had to cover $83.4 million in
civil penalties, $109.5 million for environmental projects, and over $850 million in R&D, engine
rebuild, recalls, and new emissions testing. A portion of this settlement was paid to the
California Air Resources Board as part of the related California Settlement Agreement. The
manufacturers sold 1.3 million engines between 1988 and 1998 with these defeat devices,
resulting in the release of almost 16 million tons of excess NOx in that decade. The excess
emissions for 1998 alone was 1.3 million tons, representing 6% of total NOx emissions from
mobile and stationary sources, equivalent to an additional 65 million cars on the road (EPA
2004a). Highway heavy-duty vehicles account for 12% of total US NOx emissions, so the
excess NOx emissions were a significant share (EPA 1997a-b).
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NOx is a key precursor to ground-level ozone, which is formed chemically in the
presence of NOx, VOCs (volatile organic compounds), and sunlight. Ozone exposure causes
respiratory symptoms, decreased lung function, and even premature death. Children are
particularly susceptible to asthma attacks. NOx also leads to environmental damage, such as
reduced crop yield and forest growth, excess nutrients in aquatic systems, and acid rain. Because
ozone depends on photochemical processes, the impact of excess NOx varies by geographical
region, depending on whether it is NOx or VOC-limited. Although NOx does not have as
serious health effects as diesel particulates, it was particularly egregious for these excess NOx
emissions to surface when EPA was setting forth new 2004 NOx standards. It would not make
sense to propose more stringent standards for 2004 when previous standards were not properly
enforced. Table 7-2 lists each manufacturer's NOx excess emissions and penalty.
Table 7-2: 1998 Diesel Engine Consent Decree Settlements
Engine Engines sold Years Excess NOx Civil penalty Expenditures on
manufacturer with defeat engines emissions in tons environmental
devices sold and % of total projects
Caterpillar 320,000 1988-98 2,100,000 $25 million $35 million
(13.3%)
Cummins 400,000 1991-98 3,600,000 $25 million $35 million
(22.9%)
Detroit Diesel 430,000 1988-98 9,000,000 $12.5 million $12 million
(57.2%)
Mack/Renault 90,000 1990-98 860,000 $13 million $18 million
(5.5%)
Navistar 78,000 1994-98 40,000 $2.9 million --
International (0.25%)
Volvo 10,000 1994-98 148,000 $5 million $9 million
(0.94%)
TOTAL 1.3 million 15,748,000 $83.4 million $109 million
Source: EPA (2004)
As part of the consent decree, all the manufacturers, except for Navistar International,
agreed to meet the model year 2004 standards 15 months early, by October 2002 (U.S. EPA
1998). Navistar had a separate consent decree with the EPA in which it was not required to "pull
ahead" the MY04 standards because of the relatively small amount of excess NOx emissions
from their engines (Samuelsohn 2002a).
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7.3.2 Minimal media coverage of the settlement
Although news of the $1 billion settlement between the engine manufacturers and EPA
made it to the front pages of the New York Times and the Washington Post on the days
immediately after the settlement, few details about the illegal "defeat devices" themselves or the
company decision-making processes were revealed. The first indication in a major US paper of
the suspected illegal "defeat devices" was tucked away on page 16 of the February 11, 1998 New
York Times, with the headline: "Makers of Diesel Truck Engines Are Under Pollution Inquiry."
At the time, the case was still before the Justice Department, so many details were kept
confidential since negotiations between national and state pollution officials and engine
manufacturers were underway. By settling out of court, the manufacturers avoided the more
intense public scrutiny that would have resulted from having to present their case in court. As
part of the agreement, they did not have to defend their intent or admit that they violated the law.
7.3.3 Early signs of a defeat device problem
While the manufacturers' behavior was legally questionable and detrimental to public
health, they argued that they had adjusted engine controls within the bounds of the certification
requirements. The Federal Test Procedure (FTP) heavy-duty transient cycle has long been
criticized for being flawed and outdated. As early as 1978, EPA was aware of the existence and
increasing use of sophisticated electronic engine controls that could potentially be used to
circumvent the test procedures, and even issued an advisory called "Prohibition on Emission
Control Defeat Devices." Circumventing electronic controls has not been limited to the heavy-
duty diesel industry. From 1995 to 1999, there were four cases of automobile manufacturers
using "defeat devices." In separate cases, General Motors, Honda, Ford, and Toyota settled out
of court after they were sued by EPA or CARB for circumventing emission controls and emitting
excess CO, HC, or NOx in their gasoline-powered cars. Compliance audits or field tests shed
light on the discrepancy between actual in-use emissions and certification test cycle emissions.
A US House of Representatives Commerce Committee report, entitled "Asleep at the
Wheel," claims that as early as 1991, various sources informed EPA of the existence of
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electronic engine control software which was being used to circumvent emission control systems
(U.S. House Committee on Commerce 2000). EPA insists that it did not know of the defeat
devices until 1997. The diesel engine manufacturers contend that EPA learned in 1994 how
flaws in the FTP test allowed actual NOx emissions to be much higher than those reflected in the
test. The issue was discussed at a meeting of a working group for the UN Economic
Commission for Europe's Group of Rapporteurs on Pollution and Energy (ECE-GRPE). The
ECE-GRPE's informal working group on the worldwide heavy-duty certification procedure
(WHDC) meets periodically to develop a new international testing cycle for heavy-duty engines.
Reportedly, an EPA observer was present at their 1994 Geneva meeting, when the International
Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA for Organisation Internationale des
Constructeurs d'Automobiles) presented data on the weaknesses of the US transient FTP. As an
OICA member, Volvo had a team that measured emissions from a US engine running on the
steady-state Euro 2 test cycle. They discovered NOx emissions 2-3 times higher than those of the
US regulatory limit. The EPA observer claimed to not recall hearing the Volvo presentation, and
EPA declined to state whether anything relevant to defeat devices was learned (Parker 1998;
U.S. House Committee on Commerce 2000).
Even if the EPA genuinely did not know about these excess emissions until 1997, the
EPA was sensitive to the possibility of "defeat devices" once electronic controls became
widespread in engines. In 1996, an explicit prohibition of defeat devices was added to Part 86 in
Title 40 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, which describes vehicle and engine emission
control regulations. It also gives EPA authority to test for defeat devices using normal driving
conditions outside of the standard FTP test: "The manufacturer must show to the satisfaction of
the Administrator that the vehicle or engine design does not incorporate strategies that
unnecessarily reduce emission control effectiveness exhibited during the Federal emissions test
procedure when the vehicle or engine is operated under conditions which may reasonably be
expected to be encountered in normal operation and use" (40 CFR §86.000-16). The language of
the federal code also implies that EPA has the authority to regulate off-cycle emissions, even
though engine manufacturers argued that their circumvention of the NOx controls during
highway conditions was legal.
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7.3.4 Pre-buy
The civil penalties and environmental project expenditures were insignificant compared
to the engine manufacturers' agreement to meet the previously established 2004 emission
standards by October 1, 2002. This required the manufacturers to accelerate product
development, which also decreased the amount of time for field testing the new engines.
Industry press estimated that the new emission technologies increased engine prices $3,000 to
$5,000 per engine on average, which was well above EPA's $1,000 estimate. Those figures did
not even account for the possible reduction in resale value and increases in operating and fuel
costs (Hampton 2004; Mercer 2002). According to manufacturers' submissions to the EPA in
2001, fuel consumption of the new engines was expected to drop by 2-5% (Moulis 2002b).
Engine manufacturers also cut back on the number of engine models and power ratings offered
(Heavy Duty Trucking 2002). Many truck fleet owners purchased trucks prior to the
introduction of the new October 2002 trucks, held onto their older vehicles longer, bought used
trucks, or purchased engines not subject to the accelerated compliance deadline. By 2003,
Mercedes, which was not a party to the settlement, experienced a quick rise in heavy-duty engine
market share to 10% as a result of the consent decree (Ward's Automotive Yearbook 2005).
According to a Bear Steams survey of truck fleet owners, 54% intended to keep existing trucks
longer and 16% planned to buy used trucks (Wolfe and Yagerman 2003). All these options
resulted in higher emissions than if they had purchased vehicles with the new, compliant engines,
thereby compromising the emission benefits associated with the accelerated deadline.
Suspecting misconduct by manufacturers, EPA conducted an investigation of the
manufacturers' sales and marketing practices to determine if they encouraged customers to buy
engines before the October 2002 deadline (Angelo 2002). Manufacturers denied engaging in any
activity that encouraged pre-buy, and no evidence was found to suggest otherwise. It is likely
that the concern about the new engines' performance, durability, and cost, and the truncated field
testing time were enough to motivate the pre-buy.
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Figure 7-3: Monthly US and Canadian Production of Class 8 Diesel Trucks
Source: GAO (2004)
According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO)23, the increase in
production volume between April and September 2002 shown in Figure 7-3 cannot be explained
simply by economic growth rate or fuel prices. The GAO estimates that 20-26% of the Class 8
trucks sold in that 6-month time period were attributable to the accelerated October 2002
deadline. During those 6 months, orders for trucks with pre-October 2002 engines were so high
that engine and truck manufacturers had to operate their production lines 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week. Their capacity was not even enough to meet the surging demand. Many had to hire
temporary workers, only to fire them a few months later. After the October 2002 deadline
passed, engine and truck orders plummeted, and engine and truck companies laid off thousands
of temporary and full-time employees (Associated Press 2002; Gordon 2002; Inside Fuels and
Vehicles 2002b).
23 Prior to 2004, known as the General Accounting Office.
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7.3.5 To comply or not to comply?
Not all the manufacturers met the October 2002 deadline. The table below lists the
manufacturers' introduction of their first compliant engines, the technology used, and their
certification levels. The NOx+NMHC limit, originally intended for a 2004 deadline, was 2.5
g/bhp-hr, which meant a NOx limit of 2.0 g/bhp-hr.
Table 7-3: EPA Emissions Certification by Engine Manufacturers
Manufacturer First compliant engines Technology NOx+NMHC
certified (date) certification levels
by end of 2002
Caterpillar C9 (1/17/03) Diesel oxidation catalyst and 2.8-3.2 g/bhp-hr
proprietary ACERT
Cummins ISX (4/2/02) Cooled EGR with variable 2.0-2.5 g/bhp-hr
ISB (8/15/02) geometry turbocharger
1IlL ISM (10/28/02)
Detroit Diesel Series 50 (10/14/02) Cooled EGR with variable 2.4-2.5 g/bhp-hr
Series 60 (10/14/02) nozzle turbocharger
Mack/Renault ASET (7/02) Cooled EGR with variable 2.2-2.7 g/bhp-hr
geometry turbocharger
Navistar 4000, 7000, 8500 (1/04) Cooled EGR 2.7-3.8 g/bhp-hr
International*
Volvo VED12 (9/30/02) Cooled EGR with fixed 2.4 g/bhp-hr
geometry turbocharger and
variable pulse technology
Mercedes MBE 4000 12.8L Cooled EGR with fixed 3.6-3.9 g/bhp-hr
Benz** MBE 900 (1/04) geometry turbocharger and
waste gates
* Under separate consent decree and not required to meet the standard until January 2004.
** Not party to the consent decree, and therefore not required to meet the standard until January
2004.
Sources: Arnum (2003), Inside Fuels and Vehicles (2002a), Samuelsohn (2002), Trailer/Body
Builders (2002; 2003).
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7.3.6 Noncompliance penalties
Prior to the implementation date of new emission standards, EPA establishes
noncompliance penalties (NCPs) for engines that do not meet the standards. According to the
Clean Air Act, NCPs can be used by the EPA when an emission standard is more difficult to
meet, substantial R&D is required to meet the standard, and/or a "technological laggard" may
develop. NCPs are designed to encourage long-term compliance while preventing manufacturers
from being forced out of the marketplace if they cannot meet the standard. Penalties increase
after a year of noncompliance (EPA 2001; EPA 2002a).
For the MY2004 standards, which had been accelerated to October 2002 for most
manufacturers, the per-engine penalty varied depending on the engine type and emission levels.
It was based on a formula that also accounted for manufacturers' estimated compliance costs and
fuel economy loss. EPA issued a proposed set of penalty rates in January 2002, but revised their
penalties downward for the final rule in August 2002 after receiving lower cost estimates from
the emission control industry. Table 7-4 lists the proposed and revised penalties for heavy heavy-
duty engines for the first year of noncompliance; there were also penalties for light and medium
heavy-duty diesel vehicles. The NCPs are meant to be very costly so that companies prefer to
comply rather than continue paying the penalties.
Table 7-4: Penalty Rate per Non-compliant Heavy Engine in 2001 Dollars
NHMC+NOx Proposed Rule Final Rule
compliance level (as of 1/2002) (as of 8/2002)
(g/bhp-hr)
2.5 $0 $0
3.0 $4,680 $3,640
3.5 $9,043 $6,946
4.0 $10,193 $7,999
4.5 $11,342 $9,052
6.0 $14,790 $12,210
Source: EPA (2002a)
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Basing the penalties on the manufacturers' expected costs was not an easy task because
of the wide range of cost estimates given by the manufacturers. For example, in anonymous cost
submissions for the heavy-heavy truck engines, the estimated fixed costs per engine were $273,
$407, $516, $1,013, and $1,775. Other reported costs such as hardware costs and warranty costs
also exhibited great variability (Moulis 2002a). Moreover, since some estimates were submitted
as early as 1998, they were only rough projections of the actual costs (EPA 2002b).
7.3.7 Attacking the accelerated deadline
Leading up to the October 2002 deadline, the engine manufacturers were at different
stages regarding the readiness of their technology. Cummins and Mack publicly expressed
confidence that they would be able to certify their new engines in time. However, Caterpillar
and Detroit Diesel were more hesitant, and tried to turn to the courts for relief. In July 2002,
they filed lawsuits against the EPA in the US District Court for the District of Columbia,
contending that unexpected cost increases would make compliance to the consent decree more
expensive than previously estimated and less beneficial to the public (US v. Caterpillar 2002; US
v. Detroit Diesel 2002). At the same time, the American Trucking Association (ATA), which
represents the trucking industry, petitioned the EPA to reconsider the early October 2002
implementation of the 2004 rule. ATA argued that new information about costs and
performance, as well as the pre-buy, undermined emission reduction goals. Caterpillar even
urged some lawmakers to postpone the noncompliance penalties (Samuelsohn 2003). On
September 5, 2002, the US District Court denied them any modifications of the consent decree,
and defended EPA's commitment to levy noncompliance penalties for each engine sold not
meeting the MY2004 emission standards (US v. Caterpillar 2002; US v. Detroit Diesel 2002).
After Cummins became the first manufacturer to successfully certify a compliant engine
with EPA, Caterpillar attacked Cummins' technology, using the legal system and the media.
Caterpillar filed a separate motion before the US Court of Appeals for the District Columbia,
contesting EPA's certification of Cummins engines in April 2002. Caterpillar argued that
Cummins' technology did not really reduce emissions but was another form of defeat device
(Samuelsohn 2002b). According to a senior Cummins executive, the negative attacks by the
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country's leading diesel engine manufacturer hurt Cummins sales as many customers began to
doubt the quality and durability of Cummins EGR technology.
In addition to bringing cases to court, some companies operated in the "court of public
opinion" and lobbied Congress members to delay the onset of the October 2002 deadline.
Caterpillar spokespeople frequently brought up doubts about the reliability of the other
manufacturers' new engines, justifying the company's decision to delay the introduction of their
compliant engines. Caterpillar Engine Division Vice-President James Parker sent letters in
March 2002 asking its customers to write EPA, Congress, and the US Chamber of Commerce to
postpone the implementation of the new standards (Samuelsohn 2002b). Caterpillar's public
skepticism toward other manufacturers' technology and efforts to delay the new standards
coincide with its decision to take a different technology path than its peers.
7.3.8 Latecomer Caterpillar
Of the manufacturers involved in the consent decree, Caterpillar was the only one that did
not use cooled EGR in its new engines, opting instead to go with its own Advanced Combustion
Emission Reduction Technology (ACERT). Its decision to use ACERT instead of EGR
represented the largest US heavy-duty engine technology divergence in at least 20 years.24
Leading up to October 2002, Caterpillar was very vocal about ACERT's ability to outperform
EGR, claiming that EGR had reliability and performance problems. Tapping into truck owners'
worries and capitalizing on its status as the heavy-duty engine market leader, Caterpillar touted
ACERT's higher fuel economy and resale value (Arnum 2003). While Cummins, Detroit Diesel,
and Volvo introduced compliant engines by the October deadline, Caterpillar's first ACERT
engine was not certified until January 2003. In the meantime, Caterpillar sold "bridge engines"
that were above the NOx+NMHC limit and subject to a per-engine noncompliance penalty
(NCP). Caterpillar's noncompliance penalties (NCPs) for FY2003 totaled $128 million. Since
the ACERT engines had certification test emissions of 2.8-3.2 g/bhp-hr NOx, Caterpillar
probably paid around $3,640, the per-engine penalty for engines emitting 3.0 g/bhp-hr. On
average, the Caterpillar priced their "bridge engines" $5,000 more than pre-October 2002
24 Interview with a senior expert in the US heavy-duty engine industry, 2003.
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engines (Wolfe and Yagerman 2003). Other manufacturers with fully compliant engines priced
their engines $3,000 to $5,000 higher to cover the cost of the EGR system and other emission-
reducing technology. Therefore, the non-compliant Caterpillar engines were comparable in price
to the compliant engines. Perhaps not surprisingly, many truck customers ordering engines after
October 2002 chose the older, "proven" technology over the new, relatively unproven
technology with an expected fuel economy loss (Mercer 2002).
7.3.9 Better sales on non-compliant engines
The consent decree and accelerated deadline for the MY2004 standards contributed to
substantial changes in market share and industry structure. According to sales data gathered by
the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the four manufacturers with compliant
engines by the October 2002 deadline - Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Volvo, and Mack (owned by
Volvo since 2000) - witnessed a decline in their market share between 1998 and 2003 (GAO
2004). Caterpillar and International, who did not meet the October 2002 deadline, increased
market share during that time.
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Figure 7-4: Market Share Comparisons from the 2004 GAO Report
Figure 3: Comparison of Market Shares of Producers of Class 8 Diesel Engines That
Complied with the Decrees' Nitrogen Oxide Standard and Those That Did Not
Comply with the Decrees' Nitrogen Oxide Standard: 1998 to 2003
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Caterpillar chose to pay the nonconformance penalties, while Navistar International's
separate consent decree did not require it to meet the standard early. After the consent decree,
Renault left the US heavy duty engine market altogether. Mercedes-Benz was not party to the
consent decree because it did not sell electronically controlled engines to the US prior to 1998. It
did not have to comply with the standards until the original 2004 deadline. Taking advantage of
truck customers' skepticism toward the new compliant engines, Mercedes began to sell their
engines in the US in 1999. The truck manufacturer Freightliner gave customers the choice
between a compliant Detroit Diesel engine and a non-compliant Mercedes engine, and eventually
made the Mercedes engine its standard heavy-duty engine. Mercedes appealed to customers
because of its lower price, lighter weight, and strong performance. Mercedes' market share rose
to 10% in 2003 after it entered the market in 1999 (Berg 2003). Ironically, the US companies
who met their consent decree requirements on time were penalized in the marketplace, losing
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market share to a European entrant (Mercedes), a US late-comer (Caterpillar), and a US
manufacturer subject to a less demanding consent decree (Navistar International). The market
shares reflect customers' reticence to try a new technology that they perceive as more costly and
less reliable than its predecessors, despite reassurances by manufacturers, such as Cummins'
Uptime Guarantee. The 3-5% fuel economy penalty associated with the new engines also did not
help sales.
7.3.10 International - Different from the rest?
The "defeat device" investigation and consent decree reveal that no engine manufacturer
was ahead of existing regulations; rather, they were circumventing them. However, the extent of
each company's transgressions and post-consent decree response varied considerably.
International Truck and Engine, held by parent company Navistar International, was found to be
in violation of the Clean Air Act, but its engines' relatively lower emissions and progress on
cleaner technologies resulted in a lesser penalty compared to its competitors. International is the
world's largest manufacturer of mid-range engines (160 - 300 hp) and the third largest heavy
truck manufacturer in North America, after Freightliner and PACCAR. It also produces school
buses, medium trucks, and aftermarket parts. International was subject to a different consent
decree than the other engine manufacturers, whose consent decrees were identical.
Unlike the other manufacturers whose engines operated with a dual-mapping strategy to
control emissions, International's control strategy was the same for both the real-life vehicle
operation and the test cycle. International's emission control strategy was consistent with pre-
1994 regulations and EPA policy on fuel economy dating back to the 1970s. In particular,
International's control strategy would only activate at high-speed, steady-state modes of
operation normally seen only on interstate highways (i.e., "non-urban" operations). When not at
high, steady-state speeds, International's control strategy would not operate. International's
engine product line had a lot to do with this different strategy. For example, medium-duty
delivery trucks, such as International's, would only infrequently operate on interstate highways
between deliveries and, therefore, would only infrequently utilize a control strategy. Their mid-
range engines go into medium-duty trucks and buses that predominantly run within local areas.
They source their heavy-duty engines for their highway tractor-trailer trucks from Cummins and
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Caterpillar. The long distances traveled by highway trucks make fuel economy more important
to fleet operators than it would be to medium-duty truck or bus operators. There was less
pressure for International to optimize for fuel economy on its mid-range engines.25
International had 78,000 non-compliant engines, 6% of the total non-compliant engines,
but their emissions contribution was less than 0.3% of the estimated total emissions from all the
"defeat device" engines (EPA 1998b). International was penalized with the smallest penalty -
$2.9 million. Unlike the other companies, it was not required to hire a compliance auditor, fund
special environmental projects, or comply with the MY2004 emission deadlines by October 2002
(EPA 1998c). In the consent decree agreement, EPA did specify its anticipation of "New
Technology HDDE" (heavy-duty diesel engines) from International after October 1, 2002.
During its consent decree negotiations with EPA, International demonstrated its latest emission
reduction technology. It promised that any new engine models introduced before 2004 would
have reduced levels of NOx+NMHC, closer to the 2004 standards than the 1998 standards
(Herman 2002). Because of International's advanced future engine plans and the lesser degree
of their emission violation, EPA did not require them to meet the MY2004 deadlines.
International's reputation for early compliance and its advanced engine design for
MY2004 helped it achieve a less punitive result in its unique consent decree. International
boasted of its record of "proactively improving diesel emissions ahead of government
deadlines," which is supported by an examination of its past technology introductions (Navistar
International 1998). Back in 1989, International was the first company to demonstrate a
prototype engine meeting the 1994 NOx and PM standards (PR Newswire 1995; PR Newswire
1997). As early as July 1996, International was the first manufacturer to demonstrate an engine
capable of surpassing the proposed MY2004 federal standards. Then in January 1997, it
introduced its second prototype engine which was equipped with a passive, self-regenerating trap,
which required adding a cerium additive to normal diesel fuel. It emitted 2.0 g/bhp-hr
NOx+NMHC and 0.01 g/bhp-hr PM, significantly less than the 2.5 g/bhp-hr NOx+NMHC and
0.1 g/bhp-hr PM required by the 2004 regulations, which were finalized in October 1997.
International was the only US diesel engine manufacturer to receive unconditional approval for
its MY 1999 engines (Navistar International 1998).
25 Interviews with senior experts in the diesel vehicle industry, 2006.
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Despite efforts by International to differentiate itself from its competitors to the press and
public with regards to the engine settlement, journalists, and even the EPA, tended to lump all
the engine manufacturers into one large group when reporting the consent decree (Navistar
International 1998; PR Newswire 1997). International tried to point to its different consent
decree, especially since the company was trying to promote the advantages of low-emissions
26diesel technology at the same time. However, International's "return" for higher performance
was in the consent decree agreement itself, not in the preferential treatment by the media. By
having lower-emitting engines that its peers (even if those engines were still in violation of the
Clean Air Act), International was able to avoid the same penalties, i.e. the acceleration of the
MY2004 standards, as the other engine manufacturers. While it was still expected to introduce
lower-polluting engines before 2004, it did not have to fully comply with the MY2004 standards
until January 2004.
7.3.11 Evaluating the new engines on the road
By mid-2003, it seemed that fleet operators' early fears about unreliability of the new
compliant engines were mostly unfounded. According to the trade press, fleet operators were
pleased with the reliability and driver acceptance. In general, the fuel economy loss of 3-5% was
as predicted by the manufacturers, while a minority of operators reported 7-10% gains in fuel
economy with the new engines. This is likely attributable to the deteriorated fuel economy of
their previous engines. The biggest sticking point was the $3000 to $5000 added to the upfront
cost of the engines, which was the first time emission compliance costs were noticeably passed
onto the fleets (Hampton 2004; Petty 2003). The technical complexity of the engines, especially
the electronic controls, and the increased purchase of extended warrantees have also forced truck
customers to turn to truck dealerships for major repairs, rather than rely on their own mechanics
(Hampton 2004).
As concerns about the new compliant trucks died down and engine manufacturers turned
their energy to meeting the next round of emission standards in 2007, an inventor challenged
Caterpillar's patents on its ACERT technology. In October 2004, Clyde Bryant, an inventor and
chairman of Entec Engine Corporation filed a petition with the US Patent Office, claiming that
26 Interviews with senior experts in the diesel vehicle industry, 2006.
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two key patents related to Caterpillar's ACERT technology infringed his 2001 patent. By this
time, Caterpillar had touted its ACERT technology as a breakthrough technology, different from
other manufacturers' EGR technology. Two of its engineers had even received a national
"Inventors of the Year" award from the Intellectual Property Owners Association for ACERT. A
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examiner claimed that the Caterpillar patents, which
had been awarded in 2003 and 2004, should be withdrawn. By September 2005, Caterpillar had
already sold 200,000 ACERT engines worth billions of dollars, so the USPTO decision opened
the door for Bryant to demand royalties from engine sales (ENR 2005; Nesmith 2004; Nesmith
2005).
In late 2003, the largest trucking companies in the US were still actively bringing claims
against the EPA about their decision-making process for their MY2004 emission standards,
which most engine manufacturers had already met by October 2002. At this point, engine
manufacturers had already made substantial investments to meet the standards, so any attempts
by the trucking industry to reverse the standards would actually be contrary to the manufacturers'
plans.
7.3.12 Engine reprogramming delays
EPA underestimated the role of vehicle owners in the effort to reprogram existing
engines to lower NOx emissions. The consent decrees focused on the activities of the
manufacturers without accounting for the behavior of vehicle owners. As part of their consent
decrees with EPA, engine manufacturers are required to provide "low NOx rebuild kits," which
include software upgrades to make MY 1993-98 engines with "defeat device" problems
compliant with emission standards. When owners bring their trucks to the dealer for an engine
rebuild, the dealer must install the low NOx rebuild kit at no added cost to the owner. EPA gave
the engine manufacturers firm deadlines with penalties for failing to submit a low NOx rebuild
plan, identify a compliance auditor, conduct in-use tests, or submit quarterly progress reports
(EPA 1998d). By 2000, most engine manufacturers had the low NOx rebuild kits ready for use.
However, EPA did not give a deadline for when the engines had to be rebuilt, assuming that
normal engine rebuild occurs at 200,000 to 300,000 miles of service. By 2004, it came to the
attention of federal and state regulators that owners and operators were running heavy-duty
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diesel engines for 750,000 to 1,000,000 miles without servicing, resulting in more excess NOx
emissions than estimated (CARB 2004). By July 2005, 6 years after the consent decree
agreement, only 7.2% of eligible engines with defeat devices had their software upgraded. Half
of the 4.5 million tons of NOx emission reductions from the consent decree were supposed to
come from engine rebuilds, but the low rebuild rate resulted in only 200,000 tons of NOx
reduction (Inside Fuels and Vehicles 2005).
Disappointed in the progress of the low NOx software upgrades, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) implemented low NOx software regulation in 2004. CARB
established deadlines for upgrades for various model years. Vehicle inspections would identify
non-complying vehicles and issue citations with a $300 penalty. CARB had a target of installing
the upgrades on 35% of eligible engines by December 2004, 60% by May 2005, and all the
engines by the end of 2006. Owners of specific Caterpillar, Cummins, Volvo, Mack/Renault, or
International engines were subject this CARB regulation. Detroit Diesel was held exempt from
this new regulation because it had made good progress towards upgrading engines through its
voluntary program (CARB 2004; CARB 2005). Truck owners were probably intentionally
delaying their engine rebuilds because they feared that the software upgrades would reduce their
fuel economy. The Engine Manufacturers Association and four engine manufacturers -
Caterpillar, Cummins, Volvo, and Mack/Renault- filed a motion for an injunction against this
regulation because it was outside the terms of their consent decrees. The court denied their
injunction and the regulation was finalized in March 2005 (CARB 2005).
Other states wrote letters to the EPA requesting regulatory action similar to California's.
The lack of response from EPA and Department of Justice regulators prompted state and local
regulators to devise their own plans to accelerate low NOx engine rebuilds. Because the timing
of rebuilds was not stipulated upfront in the consent decree, EPA had no leverage to change its
requirements and force manufacturers to follow an engine rebuild schedule. EPA's failure to
account for the owners' slowness to pursue engine rebuilds greatly reduced the air quality
benefits expected from the consent decrees.
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7.3.13 Consent decree's impact on regulatory reform
Addressing the fuel economy-NOx emissions trade-off
The investigation and the consent decree had the immediate effect of bringing to EPA's
attention (1) the importance of fuel economy impacts of increasingly stringent NOx standards
and (2) the need to regulate off-cycle emissions. The 1997 and 2000 rulemakings which
established the 2004 standard did not analyze the fuel economy impacts of going from 6.0 g/bhp-
hr to the 2.0 g/bhp-hr NOx standard because EPA expected manufacturers to optimize fuel
consumption while meeting emission requirements. Instead, manufacturers wound up doing so
outside the bounds intended by EPA. In response to the consent decree, manufacturers shared
their estimates of fuel consumption losses to the EPA (EPA 2002b).
Development of a worldwide harmonized test cycle for heavy-duty engines
The violations of diesel engine manufacturers in the US that resulted in the 1998 consent
decrees drew international attention to the importance of procedures that reflected real-life
driving conditions. Growing awareness of the ability of onboard diagnostics to circumvent
pollution controls compelled the international community to use the UN as a vehicle to address
the problem. In June 1997, the UN Economic Commission for Europe's Group of Rapporteurs
on Pollution and Energy (GRPE) tasked its ad-hoc working group on worldwide heavy-duty
certification procedure (WHDC) to develop a harmonized test cycle that would be representative
of real-life engine operation and acceptable for engine certification around the world (UN ECE-
GRPE Working Group 2001). The motivations are relatively straightforward- (1) the public
benefits from the same high standards in the participating countries, (2) engine manufacturers
can more effectively sell their models worldwide if they only have to meet one set of emission
requirements, and (3) regulators gain new knowledge about testing and compliance by working
within an international community.
The WHDC working group was part of a larger effort to harmonize global vehicle
standards. The 1998 global agreement on global technical regulations for wheeled vehicles
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established the World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29). Contracting
countries have agreed to promote the harmonization of technical regulations on environmental
protection, health, safety, energy efficiency, and anti-theft performance. So far, there have only
been global technical standards on door locks and latches and motorcycle emission
measurements. However, there are groups within GRPE working on harmonized certification
test procedures and off-cycle emission regulations (UNECE 2005).
Starting in October 1999, the heavy-duty certification procedure group began collecting
"worldwide" driving pattern data. Even though "worldwide" referred only to the EU, Japan, and
the US, the new test cycle was designed to be representative of real-life engine operations. From
their database of driving patterns, researchers ultimately developed a reference transient cycle
(WHTC) and a reference steady-state mode cycle (WHSC) (Steven 2001).
Concerns about off-cycle emissions and defeat devices were prominent in the discussion,
as indicated by the summary notes of the fourth WHDC meeting in June 1998: the Chairman of
the WHDC group "reported that a particular effort would be necessary to make the future test
procedure safe against cycle by-passing or beating and that results on this matter should also be
available before the completion of the project" (UNECE-GRPE Working Group 1999).
Supplemental Emission Test and Not-to-Exceed Limits
A positive outcome from the diesel engine consent decree is the changes in the US
certification procedures that make it more difficult to circumvent the emission standards. As a
result of the consent decree, engines were subject to two additional testing requirements - a
supplemental emission test (SET) and not-to-exceed (NTE) limits. These requirements are
designed to prevent manufacturers from circumventing emission standards during steady-state
driving or off-cycle conditions. The supplemental emission test (SET) is based on the EU's 13-
mode ESC schedule, also known as the Euro 3 test. It was first used in the EU in 2000 to
accompany the Euro 3 standards. The Euro 3 test puts the test engine through 13 different
steady-state modes, under various speeds and loads, for 2-minute intervals.
Unlike SET, the NTE limits are not accompanied by a specific test procedure. Instead,
there is an "NTE zone" for a range of speed and load combinations where specified values of
pollutants, usually 1.3-1.5 times the engine emission standard, cannot be exceeded. It is
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supposed to cover steady-state, transient, and ambient conditions that occur in use but may not
be captured by the standard US FTP or Euro 3 test procedures. Emissions are measured and
averaged over a time period of 30 seconds or more, and then compared to the NTE limit (EPA
2003a).
The Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) and its member engine manufacturers
International and Cummins filed five separate lawsuits against the EPA, charging that the NTE
limits were not allowable under the Clean Air Act. They argued that the lack of a specific test
procedure and the freedom to test over an infinite number of driving conditions would make
compliance impossible. In June 2003, EMA settled with EPA, and engine manufacturers agreed
to run an in-use testing program for heavy-duty diesel trucks. This would be the first testing
program to use portable emission measurement systems to measure in-use exhaust emissions.
The details of the program were proposed in June 2004. Although it will not be fully
implemented until 2007, 2005 and 2006 serve as test years. Manufacturers will test fleet or
customer-owned trucks at their own cost and submit documentation on their emission
performance for EPA review. Instead of the cumbersome traditional procedure of removing
engines from trucks for testing, this program tests the complete vehicle under normal driving
conditions (EPA 2004b).
7.4 Europe
Given that all the major engine manufacturers in the US were accused of using defeat
devices in their engines, it was conceivable that similar practices could occur elsewhere.
Although European NOx standards have not been as stringent as US standards, there has been
evidence that engine manufacturers across the Atlantic were also manipulating electronic
controls to optimize for fuel savings instead of NOx emission reduction.
7.4.1 European test cycles
In the 1990s, the European Commission reduced the heavy-duty diesel engine NOx
emission standards from 8.0 g/kWh in 1992 (Euro 1) to 7.0 g/kWh in 1996 (Euro 2), and then to
5.0 g/kWh in 2000 (Euro 3). Electronic injection systems became popularized in the early 1990s.
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By the onset of the Euro 2 standards in 1996, manufacturers had the ability to use complex but
questionable control strategies to adjust the trade-off between fuel economy and NOx emissions.
Prior to sale in the European Union, new engine models must receive type approval (similar to
certification in the US) from the European Commission. For Euro 1 and 2 type approval,
engines were placed on an engine dynamometer and emissions were measured with the R49 test,
a I3-mode steady state test cycle, consisting of 13 combinations of speed and load. The final
result is a weighted average of the emissions at the 13 modes, which must be within the emission
limits.
Figure 7-5 illustrates the 13 load and speed points in the R49 cycle, with the number
order of testing noted in the circles. The size of the circles is proportional to the weights given to
each point, which are used to calculate the weighted average. There is noticeable emphasis on
testing at the maximum torque and at full load. The emissions are measured for various loads at
the maximum torque speed and maximum power speed, and at idle. An unintended consequence
of having pre-designated load and speed points is that electronic controls enable the engine to
meet NOx emission limits at those 13 points, but then allow the engine to emit more NOx during
conditions between those points.
Figure 7-5: ECE R49 Test Cycle
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In the "Future Diesel" report written by UBA, the German environmental agency, the
UBA staff pointed out the ability of electronic controls to optimize for fuel economy between
testing points. The report shows the NOx emission measurements of two comparable diesel
engines, tested outside the R49 cycle's testing points. Both are from the same manufacturer and
have the same rated power at 230 kW.
Figure 7-6: NOx Characteristic Curves for a Euro 1 Engine and a Euro 2 Engine
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The points with gray triangles at 1,260 and 2,100 rpm represent the speeds at maximum
torque at maximum power, which are covered by the R49 test cycle. For the heavily weighted
points at 75% and 100% load, the Euro 2 engine's emission levels are significantly lower than
the Euro 1 engine's, but its emissions at the lower loads are worse. The other 3 R49 test points,
at idle speed, are not shown here. Measurements were taken at different loads at 3 other speeds
not in the test cycle. The Euro 2 engine actually has higher emissions at all these other points
than the Euro 1 engine. Moreover, the Euro 1 engine has a relatively even emission behavior
between points, while the Euro 2 engine clearly emits an unexpectedly high amount of NOx
between the two key test speeds. By adjusting fuel injection between test points, electronic
controls can improve fuel efficiency by a few percent, albeit increasing NOx emissions at the
same time. The engine manufacturer clearly intended for the electronic controls to optimize for
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higher fuel economy in this off-cycle region. This was not an outcome intended by the
regulatory design of the steady-state test cycle.
Because the ECE R49 steady-state test consists of discrete points rather than a transient
test like the US heavy-duty cycle, manufacturers selling engines in Europe did not have to use
the dual mapping strategy used by the US manufacturers to differentiate between transient urban
conditions (like in the US transient FTP cycle) and steady-state highway conditions. They could
bypass the cycles by adhering to emission limits only at the specified cycle points.
Senior staff at the UBA in Germany claimed that cycle bypass has been a problem since
the introduction of electronic controls for engines. In a study led by transport chief Axel
Friedrich, UBA found evidence of type-approved engines with off-cycle emissions double the
level permitted under the Euro 2 standards. UBA estimated that the discrepancy resulted in an
additional 140,000 tons of NOx in Germany per year (UBA 2003a). When UBA confronted the
European heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers, the manufacturers admitted to bypassing the
cycles, but argued that the regulations left room for legal "freedom of interpretation." The
German auto association, VDA, also denied any wrongdoing, claiming all engines were
compliant with emission regulations. The results of the UBA study were reported on the German
television program, Monitor, and other media outlets. There was some media coverage in
Austria and Switzerland on excess truck emissions as well (UBA 2003b). UBA worked with
lawyers to investigate the legality of this practice. Convinced that manufacturers had violated
the law, UBA submitted technical information to the Ministry of the Environment, but no action
was taken.
Unlike the US EPA, the German UBA does not have enforcement power. It serves a
technical advisory function to the Environment Ministry, which is responsible for policy
decisions. Although the Environment Ministry is often guided by UBA recommendations, it
appears that pressure from other government ministries, such as the Transport and Finance
Ministries, allegedly prevented further investigation of engine manufacturers' questionable
practices.27 Whereas the EPA could sue manufacturers for violating the Clean Air Act, the UBA
had no legal authority to do the same to the European engine manufacturers.
27 Interview with a German government representative, January 2005.
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7.4.2 Transient versus steady-state
Despite the lack of legal action in Europe, the awareness of the off-cycle emission
problem in US led to changes in European's type approval and testing procedures. It also
highlighted the ongoing debate between the Americans and Europeans/Japanese on the
appropriate choice of test cycles.
Up to this time, the US had used transient testing (continuous changes in speed and load)
while Europe and Japan had used relatively simpler steady-state tests with fixed time intervals at
13 or 6 different speed-load points. Up until 1998, it seemed likely that Europe and Japan would
eventually adopt transient testing as well. The US EPA had assumed that transient testing would
more accurately simulate real road driving conditions. However, as demonstrated by the
investigation leading up to the consent decrees in 1998, the US FTP test's absence of steady-state
highway driving conditions allowed for the circumvention of NOx controls. Expectations about
the inevitable domination of the transient cycle began to shift, and some speculated that steady-
state tests could be a viable choice (Automotive Environment Analyst 1998). Yet, evidence of
cheating in Europe, though not prosecuted as in the US, showed that the steady-state tests had
shortcomings as well.
7.4.3 Manufacturers' response to test cycle discussions
Most major engine manufacturers sell in multiple markets, where they face country-
specific certification procedures and standards. They support the adoption of a single
harmonized test cycle because it would be more efficient, in terms of cost and ease of obtaining
certification. However, manufacturers have disagreed on whether to choose a transient or
steady-state cycle. European manufacturers supported a test cycle modeled after the steady-state
test cycle used for Euro and Euro 2, using the consent decree as an example of the transient
cycle's failings. The steady-state cycle is also a less complex and costly test procedure. In 1998,
the head of diesel truck engine design at Mercedes, Michael Schittler, asserted that basing the
worldwide test cycle on the 13-mode European cycle would give a more realistic emission
performance than the US cycle (Automotive Environment Analyst 1998). Schittler clearly
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supported persuading the EPA to move away from the transient cycle to something similar to the
European cycle (Automotive Environment Analyst 1998). US regulators argued that the
transient cycle is more representative of real-world driving. Despite European manufacturers'
support for a regulatory shift from steady-state cycles to transient cycles, European and Japanese
regulators added transient test cycles in time for the 2000 Euro 3 and 2005 Japanese emission
standards, while the EPA adopted the steady-state Euro 3 test as a supplemental procedure.
Using multiple test cycles to cover a greater variety of conditions would presumably reduce the
opportunities for off-cycle emissions.
7.4.4 New European Transient Cycle
New heavy-duty diesel emission standards and test procedures for Euro 3 were finalized
by the European Commission in Directive 1999/96/EC. The directive also proposed Euro 4 and
5 emission standards. As of 2000, two new test cycles - the European Stationary Cycle (ESC)
and the European Transient Cycle (ETC) - replaced the steady-state R49 test cycle. For Euro 3,
manufacturers could choose either ESC or ETC, but by 2005, their engines would have to be
tested with both. Instead of replacing the steady-state cycle with a transient one, European
regulatory staff decided to use both.
The new steady-state ESC, shown in Figure 7-7, resembles the R49 test. It still has 13
modes with various timed speed-load combinations, but the engine speeds are based on the
maximum net power and no testing occurs at 10% load. The certification personnel may request
additional random testing of points lying between the designated test points, as long as they are
in the cycle control area. This helps to get avoid the cycle bypass problem caused by pursuing
higher efficiency and higher NOx emissions between test points.
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Figure 7-7: New European Stationary Cycle
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The second cycle, ETC, was developed by Germany's FIGE Institute to reflect real road
driving conditions, and includes 3 main segments - urban, rural, and motorway. The urban
segment bears some similarity with the US transient FTP cycle, but the rural and motorway
segments reflect the type of driving that FTP fails to simulate. By requiring both the steady-state
and transient tests, the Commission sought to reduce the opportunities for high off-cycle
emissions to occur.
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Figure 7-8: European Transient Cycle
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In April 2001, the Commission directly addressed the defeat device issue in Directive
2001/27 IEC:
"Directive 1999/96/EC provided for new emission test cycles and prescriptions to prevent
the use of defeat device and/or irrational emissions control strategy. It is now appropriate
to strengthen those requirements and to provide a tool for authorities to determine
whether engines are using defeat devices and/or irrational emissions control strategies
under normal conditions of use to manipulate engine performance at the expense of
emissions control."
A section in the 2001 directive defined when devices or strategy would be considered a defeat
device. It also required manufacturers to provide documentation of any auxiliary control device.
Type approval or test authorities could request a NOx screening test in addition.to the ETC test.
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7.5 Japan
7.5.1 Japanese test cycles
From 1994 to 2004, Japan relied on a 13-mode steady-state cycle for diesel engine
certification (see Figure 7-9). Driving conditions in Japan are characterized by predominantly
urban, stop-and-go driving, more so than US and Europe. Therefore, its 13-mode test cycle
focuses on low-speed driving, with lower loads and exhaust temperatures.
Figure 7-9: Japanese Heavy-duty Diesel Engine 13-Mode Cycle
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However, as in Europe, the Japanese Ministry of Environment moved from this steady-
state cycle to a transient cycle, JE05 (or EDI2), effective 2005. The transient cycle tests heavy-
duty engines, and is made up of vehicle speed vs. time points. Special software converts these
points to the torque-speed-time points needed to test engines on a dynamometer. Although most
of the test still emphasizes low-speed city driving, a portion of the cycle, around 1500-1650
seconds, reflects steady-state highway conditions.
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Figure 7-10: Japanese JE05 Transient Test Cycle
Source: Japan Central Environment Council (2002)
In the 2002 Fifth Report on the Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission
Reduction, Japan's Central Environment Council gave its reasons for shifting to a transient test
cycle. First, the anticipated use of new emission control devices, like diesel particulate filters,
necessitated the simulation of exhaust temperature changes, which affects the pollutant removal
rate. The steady-state 13-mode test was not capable of assessing how well the new devices were
working. The new test would also allow for engine-specific speed and load, unlike the previous
practice of using the same speed-load points irrespective of engine size. Since the new 2005
regulations drove this test cycle change, the Council decided to introduce the new cycle at the
same time as the new regulations (Japan Central Environment Council 2002).
7.5.2 Regulatory process in Japan in the early 2000s
In 1998, the Central Environment Council issued its Third Report on the Future Policy
for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Reduction. This Third Report specifically addressed the
reduction of NOx and PM emissions from diesel-powered vehicles, calling for short-term targets
for 2002-2004 and long-term targets for 2007, which would be half the emission levels of the
short-term targets. The emission limits were finalized in September 2000 (Japan Central
Environment Council 2002). At the same time, the Fourth Report was issued and the deadline
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Vehicles with Gross Vehicle Weight of over 3,500kg
1001
.~~~~~
m o 4 20 mn e 2To "i, 13e I
Tine (seconds)
for the long-term targets for both light-duty diesel vehicles and heavy-duty diesel engines was
accelerated two years, to 2005, because of an industry-government agreement.
In addition to the Japanese central government's emission standards, the Tokyo
metropolitan government and other districts began instituting their own restrictions on in-use
diesel vehicles. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the 1992 Automobile NOx Law allows special
regulation of NOx emissions from vehicles in 196 designated areas in the Tokyo, Saitama,
Kanagawa, Osaka and Hyogo Prefectures, which have the worst air quality problems. When the
law was revised in 2000 to include PM, it focused primarily on diesel trucks and buses. Under
the new Automobile NOx/PM Law, vehicle owners were required to retrofit or replace their
existing vehicles within a specified timeframe. This encourages the purchase of new and cleaner
vehicles, giving an incentive to manufacturers introduce new models to the market.
7.5.3 Industry prepares for regulation
Engine manufacturers, recognizing that increasingly stringent engine standards were
inevitable in Japan, ramped up their R&D efforts on cleaner diesel technology. Even though one
company made some significant early progress on emission control, ultimately all the Japanese
manufacturers supported the same target emission levels.
In 1998, Hino Motors, a subsidiary of Toyota Motor Company, was the first Japanese
manufacturer to announce the successful development of an effective prototype catalytic
converter to reduce NOx emissions from diesel trucks. Although the prototype reduced NOx
emissions by only 25%, Hino expected to market a commercial version capable of 50% NOx
reduction by 2003-2005. However, Hino overestimated the stringency of Japan's long-term
NOx target, while underestimating the stringency of the long-term PM target. According to its
2001 Environmental Report, the company estimated that the targets would be 0.045 g/kWh PM
and 1.69 g/kWh NOx, which represent a 75% and 50% reduction, respectively, from the short-
term 2003 levels. Instead, in 2002, the manufacturers and the government agreed upon long-
term targets of 0.027 g/kWh PM and 2.0 g/kWh NOx, to be met in 2005.
The discrepancy in the expected and actual emission standards stems from the status of
progress for NOx- and PM-reducing technologies. In the early 2000s, particulate filters were
shown to be reliable and relatively affordable devices, capable of reducing PM with over 90%
199
efficiency. Meanwhile, the Automotive NOx/PM law already required that in-use diesel vehicles
be equipped with a PM filter or be replaced by a new, cleaner vehicle. The trend towards
widespread filter use was clear, so it made sense to base the PM standards for new diesel engines
on filter technology. However, reducing NOx is much more costly and difficult, while PM
reduction has more dramatic health benefits. The government recognized the trade-off between
NOx and PM reduction. Manufacturers likely also lobbied the central government to agree to
more lenient NOx standards in exchange for very stringent PM standards and a 2-year
accelerated timeline. A March 2002 risk assessment report on the health risk of diesel exhaust
particles further convinced the government to prioritize PM reduction over NOx: "Judging from
comprehensive knowledge obtained so far, we consider there to be strong indications that DEP
possesses cancer-inducing qualities" (Japan Central Environment Council 2002).
Even though Hino may have had earlier success with NOx reduction than its Japanese
rivals, ultimately all the manufacturers found themselves under similar pressures to reach the
short-term emission standards for 2003. No manufacturer had a clear advantage in meeting the
recommendations. However, this did not mean that they had no influence in shaping the
stringency of the regulations. Rather than one manufacturer stepping forward with a proposal,
all four major Japanese heavy vehicle makers joined together to propose special emission limits.
7.5.4 Cooperative approach to regulations
Japan benefited from a cooperative government-industry relationship in setting and
implementing heavy-duty diesel engine standards for the early 2000s. In March 2002, the four
major Japanese truck manufacturers - Hino Motors, Mitsubishi Motors, Isuzu Motors, and
Nissan Diesel Motor - agreed to adopt industry standards for PM that would be more stringent
than the government's 2003 short-term target of 0.18 g/kWh. The government standard
constitutes a 28% reduction over 1997-2002 levels, while industry proposed reducing PM by
70%. In addition to meeting these reductions by 2003, the four manufacturers claimed that they
would each budget 20 billion yen (US$150 million) annually in R&D toward environmental
technologies (AFX 2002)28. By the publication of the Fifth Report from the Central
Environment Council in April 2002, industry had also agreed to meet the long-term standards by
28 Historic exchange rate from FXTOP.com. n March 2002, 100 yen = $0.7631.
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2005. Those standards promised a 56% reduction in NOx and a 89% reduction in PM over the
1997-2002 levels (Japan Central Environment Council 2002).
The Japanese manufacturers' shaping of emission targets gave them the regulatory
certainty for substantial technology investment. Once the regulations were finalized, they
competed intensely against each other to develop diesel engines capable of meeting the
upcoming regulations and maintain good fuel economy. Manufacturers expected that earlier
compliance with the new standards would help them gain greater market share. In mid-2002,
Isuzu announced that its new Elf truck series met the 2003 emission standards, and was soon
followed by announcements by Hino and Mitsubishi, eager to showcase their new trucks (Kyodo
2002). While these emission standards applied only to new vehicles, the local government's
Automobile NOx/PM law tackled pollution from in-use vehicles. The law helped to create
customer demand for cleaner vehicles and retrofits because it holds the owners responsible for
replacing or retrofitting old diesel trucks and buses.
7.5.5 Sales boom for diesel engine and truck manufacturers
Truck sales in Japan follow a highly cyclical pattern, with purchases peaking in March
and September, corresponding to sales pushes at the midpoint and end of the fiscal year. Public
data on standard truck sales from the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA)
provide a good indication of diesel truck sales patterns in Japan. Japan has three categories of
trucks - standard, small, and mini - with standard trucks being the largest in size. They are also
the most diesel-dominated: in 2003, 80% of standard trucks were diesel-powered. When
comparing standard truck sales in the months of 2003 to the previous 2 years in Figure 7-11, it is
clear that standard truck sales increased significantly. Figure 7-12 separates out the monthly
cyclical variations in sales by indexing the monthly 2002 and 2003 sales according to 2001 sales
figures. Sales picked up significantly in the middle of 2002; by the end of the 2003, sales were
almost twice that of 2001, a great boon to the manufacturers.
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Figure 7-11: Truck Sales by Manufacturer
Standard-sized Truck Sales in Japan, January 2001 - March 2004
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Figure 7-12: Total Truck Sales in 2002-2003 Compared to 2001
Total Standard Truck Sales in Japan, Relative to Monthly Sales in 2001
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The sales increase of diesel trucks in 2003 was a direct result of owners' replacing their
old diesel trucks and buses with new models before the Automobile NOx/PM law went into
effect in October. Manufacturers hired temporary contact workers and canceled summer
holidays to accelerate the production of the new trucks. Individual companies benefited from
increased profits, especially since they had been plagued with weak domestic truck demand since
the mid-1990s. In particular, Isuzu had suffered four years of consecutive losses until 2003,
when the company's April to September 2003 sales were 76.5% higher than the same time in the
previous year. In a press release, the company attributed the surge in domestic truck demand to
the tightening of emission regulations in 2003 (Channel NewsAsia 2003). Trade articles
supported this explanation, but also speculated that the strong demand would fade once people
replaced their old vehicles.
7.5.6 Mitsubishi Fuso's defect cover-up obscures clean diesel product
Initially all the truck manufacturers seemed well-prepared to meet the standards and to
benefit financially from the sales boom. Despite frequent announcements of new clean diesel
progress, no clear technology leaders emerged. In 2004, Mitsubishi had difficulty selling its new
models, but not because of emission control problems. Mitsubishi Fuso, its truck and bus
division, spent spring 2004 mired in a major corporate scandal and a series of vehicle recalls. As
far back as 1996, Mitsubishi Fuso executives had been receiving customer complaints about
potential defects. Instead of reporting these cases to the proper Japanese authorities at the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the company covered up the defects, going as far
as to falsify documents. A whistleblower's tip-off in 2000 and two fatal accidents related to
faulty wheel hubs in 2002 brought government attention to the issue. Following a government
investigation, former Mitsubishi Fuso executives were arrested and indicted for criminal
negligence in spring 2004. They admitted to neglecting the problem since 1996 (Kyodo 2004).
By September 2005, over 100 cases of defect cover-ups had been found, and over 2.5 million
vehicles had been recalled, covering almost all the vehicles made by Mitsubishi Fuso in the past
30 years (Yomiuri Shimbun 2005). Granted, many of those vehicles are no longer on the road,
but the number of vehicles requiring repair is on the order of hundreds of thousands. The scandal
spread to the car division, where defect cover-ups were also found to be widespread.
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As Japanese customers lost confidence in Mitsubishi Fuso's safety record and
accountability, the company's domestic sales volume suffered. Mitsubishi Fuso's January 2005
domestic truck sales were down 48.1% from the year before, and its market share declined from
29.1% in January 2004 to 19.3% in January 2005. Meanwhile, its three competitors all gained
market share. The defect cover-up inhibited Mitsubishi Fuso's ability to sell its new diesel truck
models, which were designed to meet the 2004 emission standards for large diesel vehicles.2 9
Wary of the company's history of defects, the Transport Ministry delayed company's
introduction of the new models in order to perform stricter checks on the vehicles (Asia Pulse
2004).
7.5.7 Environmental benefits
One year after the October 2003 law went into effect, Tokyo officials claimed a
measurable improvement in air quality. Based on measurements taken at 35 monitoring sites in
the metropolitan area, particulate levels have dropped from an average of 42 gg/m 3 to 36 pg/m 3,
a 14% drop in 12 months (Asahi Shimbun 2004a).
Despite the air quality improvements, regulatory officials were still finding violations of
the law. They have inspected only half of the vehicle fleet required to make retrofits or
replacements. Some truck drivers are merely avoiding the inspection officials, biding their time
until they get caught. There has also been the problem of vehicles from outside Tokyo illegally
entering the metropolitan area without filter devices (Asahi Shimbun 2004a).
7.5.8 Impact on trucking companies
While manufacturers of diesel engines, trucks, and aftertreatment devices reported
improved sales from the Automobile NOx/PM law, truck companies have complained about the
high costs of installing filter devices or replacing their vehicles. Truckers claim that the retrofits
have reduced fuel economy and power. The retrofit costs range from 400,000 to 1.3 million yen
29 Diesel trucks and buses weighing more than 12,000 kg had until September 2004 to comply with the short-term
emission standards introduced in 2003.
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(US$3,500-11,300) per truck.3 0 Although municipalities administered subsidy programs to help
cover half the cost, some ran of money before the 2003 deadline. The rush to meet the October
2003 deadline overwhelmed vehicle suppliers, who delayed the fulfillment of customer orders
for new trucks and filters. Because so many trucking companies encountered difficulty installing
the emission control equipment, municipal governments promised to delay enforcement and
fines until April 2004.
According to the Tokyo Trucking Association, 70% of its member companies were
reporting losses (Asahi Shimbun 2004). Over half of the 206 businesses that left the 4,300-
member Tokyo Trucking Association in fiscal year 2002-03 cited the new retrofit requirement as
their reason for going out of business. This was the largest number of firms leaving the
association in its history. Most exiting companies were small businesses, which had the greatest
difficulty covering the retrofit costs (Asahi Shimbun 2003; Okamoto and Ishii 2003). With the
regulations hurting smaller firms disproportionately more, the industry outcome could be
increased average firm size and industry concentration.
7.5.9 A different type of pre-buy
Japan's surge in factory production of engines and trucks leading up to the Automobile
NOx/PM Law's October 2003 deadline may seem reminiscent of the 2002 pre-buy in the US.
However, in this case, the demand was for new, cleaner engines, not the pre-regulation ones.
Japan's experience stands in sharp contrast to the US "pre-buy" of older engines prior to the
EPA's accelerated October 2002 deadline. In the US, the EPA regulated the manufacturers only,
with no incentives or requirements for customers. In Japan, the central government's 2003 short-
term emission standards placed pressure on the manufacturers, while the local governments'
restrictions on older diesel vehicles placed pressure on the customers. Despite delays in
compliance and enforcement, this two-pronged approach had the effect of motivating technology
development and demand for the cleaner technology.
30 Historical rate from FXTOP.com: In September 2003, 100 Japanese yen = $0.870.
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7.5.10 A DPF scandal
Barely a year after the implementation of the Automobile NOx/PM Law, illegal behavior
by Japan's leading diesel particulate manufacturer led many to question the government's diesel
emission reduction efforts. Regulations requiring filter retrofits on existing diesel vehicles in
Tokyo and other metropolitan area represented a huge opportunity for emission control
manufacturers. In addition to restricting the use of high-emitting diesel vehicles, local
governments offered subsidies to cover the cost of vehicle retrofits. The regulation-induced and
subsidy-supported demand also risked attracting newcomers who did not necessarily have the
technical expertise to develop and market filters. To verify a technology's effectiveness,
companies had to have their devices certified by the government before they could sell them for
vehicle retrofits.
Mitsui & Co., a major Japanese trading company, eyed the lucrative market for diesel
particulate filters, and immediately established a filter subsidiary, PUREarth Inc. It used a
prototype filter design from British company Johnson Matthey, but ran into quality problems.
The actual particle removal rate of the Mitsui filters was only 70-80% of the reduction rate
required by the government program. Instead of improving its technology, Mitsui falsified the
data submitted to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. It was the first manufacturer to receive
government approval for its filter in April 2002. In November 2004, a Mitsui employee reported
the data falsification to his supervisor, and news eventually reached the Tokyo government. That
month, Mitsui voluntarily recalled defective particulate filters made by its subsidiary PUREarth
Inc. It had already sold 21,500 units of its SOW-301B filter for use in subsidized government
programs to retrofit buses and other vehicles. The filters, which sold for 20 billion yen in total,
had qualified for more than 8 billion yen (US$78.2 million) in government subsidies which
Mitsui was required to repay (Asahi Shimbun 2004b; Nikkei Weekly 2004). Prior to the
revelation about Mitsui's data falsification, the company was Japan's leading DPF manufacturer,
with a third of the market share. It had clearly benefited from being the first manufacturer to
gain approval for its filters. However, after the scandal, Mitsui quickly exited the DPF business.
Following the Mitsui scandal, media reports began to question whether the government's
rush to reduce diesel emissions had led them to overlook the inadequacies of Mitsui's technology,
especially when major automakers had been hesitant about filter technology. The Tokyo
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Metropolitan Government had been in discussion with Nissan Diesel, which was doing
promising work with the Tokyo Metropolitan Research Institute for Environmental Protection on
filters. However, in April 2001, Nissan Diesel told the government it did not plan on
commercializing the filters. The government turned to the ready-and-willing Mitsui, which
began equipping public buses with filters in 2001 (Dieselnet 1997; Okamoto 2004). One Tokyo
journalist for Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest newspaper, observed: "Many metropolitan
officials feel betrayed, and questions are being raised over whether the government
underestimated the risk of leaving the development and manufacture of a technology that even
automobile makers found difficult to a trading company, exposing blind spots in the business of
environmental cleanup into which the government has sunk so much money" (Okamoto 2004).
7.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrates the importance of testing procedures and enforcement to
emission regulations. While standard-setting often attracts the most attention from interest
groups and gives companies the opportunity to provide technical input into the regulatory
process, the challenges are not over once the standards are finalized. In terms of identifying
technology leaders and laggards, a company's competitiveness may often be better understood in
the ramp-up to meet the finalized regulations and in the demonstrated performance on the road
after the compliance deadline has passed.
The experience of emission regulations in the US, the EU, and Japan in the late 1990s
and early 2000s go against the idealistic expectation that first movers in environmental
technologies are necessarily technologically superior or do better in the marketplace. In the
aftermath of the consent decree, the companies that did comply with the accelerated October
2002 deadline performed more poorly with truck customers in the several months following the
deadline. Meanwhile, Caterpillar paid penalties for months of noncompliance and but benefited
from increased sales. Mercedes entered the US heavy-duty diesel market after the consent
decree, and quickly gained 10% market share. Circumventing NOx controls was widespread
among engine manufacturers in Europe as well, but no company was ever held responsible. In
Japan, Mitsui, the first company to introduce diesel particulate filters and the market share leader,
207
turned out to be defrauding the Japanese government with falsified certification data for
substandard filters.
Government agencies may lack the enforcement authority or resources to determine
whether the implemented regulations are having their intended effect. The test cycle bypass and
faulty filter problems were not caught immediately; afterwards, government agencies came under
scrutiny for overlooking these violations. The EPA was slow to hold engine manufacturers
responsible for defeat devices. Even after the settlement, in which manufacturers agreed to
reprogram the software, EPA did not have the authority to force truck owners to bring their
engines in for servicing. UBA, the German environmental agency, felt even more powerless
than the EPA. It did not have the enforcement power to bring a lawsuit against European engine
manufacturers for using defeat devices. Japanese officials acknowledge there are still many
diesel trucks without the required retrofits in operation. In their enthusiasm for subsidizing
emission improvements, Tokyo officials did not thoroughly scrutinize the performance of
Mitsui's filter, which sold for 2 years before it was recalled. Government agencies have tried to
prevent repeat occurrences of these problems by improving testing and enforcement procedures.
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CHAPTER 8 - Heavy-duty Diesel Engines, Beyond 2005
8.1 Introduction
The diesel vehicle industry faces a new set of challenges and technology choices to meet
the emission regulations in the second half of 2000-2010. The focus on NOx and PM emissions
continues, but the ever decreasing levels will push the technology beyond what is currently
possible. Although particulate filters seem assured to be a requirement, there is still pressure to
improve reliability, and to reduce cost and the associated fuel penalty.
This second chapter on the regulation of heavy-duty diesel engines mostly focuses on the
PM and NOx regulations that will be implemented between 2007 and 2009. However, because
of the time overlap and greater frequency of regulatory change in Japan and Europe, there will be
some discussion of the 2005 Japanese standards and the 2005 Euro 4 standards as well. The
post-2005 period is particularly interesting because it is considered by heavy-duty engine and
truck manufacturers as the first time that they have diverged in their technology paths. In the
past, there have been dominant emission reduction strategies collectively adopted by the industry.
In Chapter 7, it was already clear that Caterpillar had opted to pursue its own ACERT
technology while the rest of the US heavy-duty engine industry would be pursuing exhaust gas
recirculation (EGR) technology. Some Europeans and Japanese manufacturers have embraced
urea selective catalyst reduction (SCR) systems as their preferred NOx reduction strategy while
most American companies are opting for non-SCR strategies. The decisions are based largely on
individual manufacturers' strengths and government support.
Engine companies cannot push for their new technologies on their own. As emission
control systems become more technologically sophisticated, they require supporting
infrastructure for higher quality fuels and chemical additives. For example, most filter
technology for heavy-duty engines also requires very low sulfur fuel, so widespread
implementation of filters is not possible until the appropriate fuel is available. Technology
adoption therefore hinges on the oil industry's readiness to market lower sulfur fuel and the
government's aptitude in coordinating the timing of clean vehicles and clean fuels.
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The industry has become more global, with companies aiming to develop markets in all
major industrialized countries and in developing regions as well. In the 1990s, engines
purchased in the US were made mainly by US manufacturers. However, after major industry
restructuring in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some of those US manufacturers were acquired
by European firms. Sweden's Volvo Truck bought the US company Mack Trucks and
Germany's DaimlerChrysler acquired the US company Detroit Diesel and gained control of
Japan's Mitsubishi Truck. Manufacturers were not just dealing with their home market's
regulators, but they were increasingly involved in regulatory discussions with authorities in other
markets as well. Countries with strong domestic interests in specific technology paths have
helped to facilitate infrastructure development and regulatory requirements to improve the
competitiveness of their national champions. Governments have lobbied for favorable regulatory
conditions for their domestic companies in outside markets as well.
8.2 Regulatory processes
As seen with light-duty vehicle and previous heavy-duty diesel engine emission standards
covered in Chapters 5-7, the US, EU, and Japan do not have overlapping time periods for
regulatory standards. Because the US Clean Air Act requires at least 4 years of lead time before
heavy-duty vehicle emission standards go into effect, the regulatory process in the US tends to
occur much further in advance of the implementation date. For the new engine standards
effective in 2007, the US began its regulatory process in mid-1999, culminating in a final rule in
December 2000. At that time, the 2004 standards had not yet come into effect. Japan and
Europe tend to set their standards in a shorter timeframe, and usually closer to the
implementation date. Japan finalized its 2005 heavy-duty vehicle emission standards in 2002.
Its 2009 standards were proposed in February 2005, and finalized 2 months later. In Europe, the
Euro 3, IV, and V standards, effective 2000, 2005, and 2008, respectively, were proposed
together in December 1998 and finalized a year later with the December 1999 Directive
1999/96/EC. These overlapping regulatory periods and multiple deadlines are particularly
challenging to manufacturers, especially those with overseas markets.
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Figure 8-1: Heavy-duty Diesel Vehicle Emission Timelines
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Sources: US EPA, Japan Ministry of the Environment, European Commission 2005.
Table 8-1 shows the emission standards themselves. Because the test procedures and
cycles are not hannonized worldwide, the emission standards are not directly comparable.
Because of their similar timing, industry experts group together the US 2007 standards, the 2009
Japanese standards, and the 2008 Euro 5 standards (Muller, Olschlegal et al. 2003). However,
their relative stringency varies. The Japanese standards are considered more stringent overall
than the European standards, but less stringent on NOx than the US standards (Automotive
Environment Analyst 1999~MIRA, PBA et al. 2002). All three regions share extremely
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stringent requirements on PM emissions, which effectively require the installation of a diesel
particulate filter.
Table 8-1: Overlapping Regulatory Cycles
US (2007-10) Japan (2005) Japan (2009) Euro 4 (2005) Euro 5 (2008)
CO 15.5 g/bhp-hr (20.8 2.22 g/kWh 2.22 g/kWh 1.5 g/kWh on 1.5 g/kWh on
g/kWh) ESC, ESC,
4.0 on ETC 4.0 on ETC
HC 0.46 0.46
NMHC 0.14 (0.19) 0.17 0.55 on ETC 0.55 on ETC
NOx 1.2 (1.6) in 2007-09 2.0 0.7 3.5 2.0
0.20 (0.27) in 2010
PM 0.01 (0.013) 0.027 0.01 0.02 on ESC 0.02 on ESC,
0.03 on ETC 0.03 on ETC
Weight > 8,500 lbs (3860 > 3500 kg > 3500 kg > 3500 kg > 3500 kg
kg)
Test FTP & SET & NTE JE05 JE05 ESC, ETC, ESC, ETC,
(1.5xFTP) and ELR and ELR
Note: ETC and ESC refer to the European Transient Cycle and European Stationary Cycle.
Sources: US EPA, Japan Ministry of the Environment, European Commission 2005.
8.3 Europe
The regulatory timing for heavy-duty vehicle emission regulations in Europe has been
very different from the US and Japan. In December 1998, the EU Environment Ministers had
already proposed the Euro 3, 4, and 5 emission limits, which were formally introduced with the
1999 Directive 99/96/EC. Since the Euro 5 standard was being proposed 10 years before its
implementation, the NOx standard in particular would be revisited in 2002 to review its
feasibility. "The Commission shall, no later than 31 st December 2002, consider the available
technology with a view to confirming the mandatory NOx standard for 2008 in a report to the
European Parliament and to the Council, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals"
(Automotive Environment Analyst 1999; MIRA, PBA et al. 2002). Because the European
emission standards had been established so far in advance, industry leaders influenced standard-
setting as well as later progress reviews and fiscal incentives.
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8.3.1 Countries champion their own technology leaders
Leading up to the 2005 Euro 4 and 2008 Euro 5 standards, various companies have been
promoting their own technology strengths. Individual countries have been perceived as
championing their domestic companies' technologies, going as far to support the standards that
can be met by those technologies. The British catalyst manufacturer, Johnson Matthey, has
already been well known in the diesel vehicle retrofit world for its continuously regenerating trap
(CRT), a highly effective diesel particulate filter. A very stringent heavy-duty engine PM limit
in Europe would give them a huge regulatory-induced demand from truck and bus manufacturers.
Prior to the finalization of the Euro 4 standards, British environmental representatives to the
European Commission had been accused by engine and vehicle manufacturers of pushing for a
very low PM standard, for the benefit of their domestic firm (Automotive Environment Analyst
1999).
A Germany-based consortium of engine and aftertreatment manufacturers, which
included DaimlerChrysler, IVECO, MAN, and Siemens, conducted joint research in the 1990s
on selective catalyst reduction (SCR) systems. Siemens had developed their SINOx SCR
aftertreatment system for stationary engines, and now wanted to develop it for vehicles. Siemens
ultimately spun off its SINOx business to the new Argillon GmbH. Beginning in 1992, the
consortium set out to develop an SCR system for trucks, with a target of 70% NOx reduction on
the ECE R.49 test cycle, and later, the newer European Stationary Cycle (ESC) and European
Transient Cycle (ESC) tests. The SINOx system, developed predominately by German
companies, has long been a favorite of the German government. The SINOx consortium had
influence over Euro 4 and 5 standard-setting, which required the use of aftertreatment devices.
Their promotion of SCR technology resulted in regulators' support of SCR as the dominant NOx
reduction strategy in Europe.
8.3.2 Technology development
The SINOx consortium first began their collaborative R&D efforts with laboratory
testing and then conducted their major on-road testing in 1995-2000. After completing bench
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tests and chassis dynamometer tests on SCR systems, the consortium published their results in a
1999 SAE paper (Fritz, Mathes et al. 1999). By this time, the Euro 4/V and US2004 standards
were already known. However, the results gave evidence of promising SCR effectiveness, as
shown in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2: Test Results from SINOx Consortium's Laboratory Testing
Comparison of Measured Emissions and Emission Standards
in European Steady-state (ESC) and Transient Test Cycles (ETC)
(units in kWh)
Test c de Condition PM
ESC (OICAI before catal st 0.06
ACEA) after catal 0.06
Euro 3
Euro 4
Euro 5
ETC (FIGE) before catal st
after catal
Euro 3
Euro 4
Euro 5
Source: Fritz, Mathes et al. (1999)
Note: Highlighted boxes indicate the emission levels that can be attained by the SiNOx system.
In addition to bench testing and chassis dynamometer testing, the SINOx consortium
performed on-road tests in Europe to demonstrate the NOx reduction performance of the urea-
SCR systems. The first on-road demonstration project, entitled "Development and Testing of a
Diesel Catalyst to Reduce Diesel Exhaust Gas Emissions," was funded by the Bavarian
government. It occurred in 1992-94, and provided a starting place for subsequent test programs
(Fritz, Mathes et al. 1999).
The SINOx consortium conducted two sets of on-road demonstration tests starting in
1995 and 1998 to evaluate the SCR system's NOx reduction performance, durability, and
readiness for volume production. Trucks equipped with SINOx systems were driven by actual
trucking companies. The scheduled maintenance interval for urea refilling was 31,000 miles, or
50,000 km.
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Table 8-3: SINOx On-road Tests
1995-1998 1998-2000
Goal Evaluate SCR's effectiveness Demonstrate durability and
and prove durability readiness for serial production
Engine type 12-L MAN D2866 LF 12-L Mercedes OM 501 LA
12-L MAN D2866 LF
Trucks 8 MAN trucks 10 DaimlerChrysler trucks
3 MAN trucks
Trucking companies 3 4
Reports issued First interim report: 8/96
Second interim report: 8/97
Final report: 3/98
Source: Fritz, Mathes et al. (1999)
TUV Institute of Germany measured on-road emissions with a mobile measuring cell.
Tests demonstrated an average NOx reduction of 65%, even after 80,000 to 111,000 miles of
operation (Fritz, Mathes et al. 1999). Based on program results, the urea SCR system would be
capable of meeting the 2005 Euro 4 and US MY2004 NOx standards. It was short of reaching
the Euro 5 requirements, but it was expected that further improvements would make the standard
attainable by 2008. Industry sources claim that the SiNOx consortium's program results
influenced the Euro 4 NOx standard because it demonstrated a feasible pathway for increased
stringency. The next table summarizes the programs.
8.3.3 Europe's enthusiasm for urea SCR
European governments and manufacturers prefer urea SCR systems for NOx reduction.
In a 2002 EC-sponsored study evaluating future emission control technologies, SCR was
expected to be the universal technology to meet Euro 5 requirements. EGR was deemed a
"short-lived interim technology." The study recognized that choosing one technology path for
Euro 4 might preclude the competing technology for Euro 5. For example, if manufacturers
select an EGR system for Euro 4, they may prefer to incrementally improve that technology for
Euro 5 rather than pursue an entirely new technology. Meanwhile, manufacturers would feel
committed to SCR if they already had made a heavy investment in a urea infrastructure (MIRA,
PBA et al. 2002).
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Fuel savings is a very important priority of the truck and bus industry. Instead of having
the fuel consumption penalty associated with EGR (approximately 3%) and NOx adsorber
technologies, SCR offers a 3-5% fuel economy benefit. With an SCR system, the engine's
electronic controls optimize for fuel economy while still reducing NOx emissions by
approximately 65%, sufficient to meet the 2005 Euro 4 standards. A closed-loop system, which
uses feedback from NOx sensors, is capable of reducing NOx emissions by over 85%, which
would be sufficient to meet the upcoming 2008 Euro 5 NOx standards (Muller, Olschlegal et al.
2003). The high cost of fuel in Europe and the lower cost of the urea additive, which comprises
3-5% of the fuel volume, also translate to fuel savings with the SCR system.
8.3.4 Industry dynamics
ACEA, European Automobile Manufacturers Association, representing 13 European
vehicle manufacturers, has placed their support behind SCR technology. In 2003, ACEA issued
a public statement of the industry's decision to introduce SCR technology starting in 2005,
accompanied by a new production and distribution infrastructure for AdBlue, a commercial
32.5% urea-based solution (ACEA 2003). In 2004, DAF, IVECO, Mercedes-Benz, Renault
Trucks and Volvo Trucks, comprising 80% of the European truck market, publicly announced
their commitment to SCR technology to meet Euro 4 and 5 standards (PR Newswire Europe
2004). Not surprisingly, DAF, IVECO, and Mercedes-Benz were participants in the German
consortium of companies conducting R&D and testing of SCR technology for vehicle
applications since 1992.
Not all the companies are committing to SCR. MAN and Scania, once supportive of the
SCR pathway, decided to rely mainly on EGR for NOx reduction instead (Barnett 2005).
Commercial Motor, a UK industry trade journal, reported on a comparison of operation costs for
EGR- v. SCR-equipped engines in Germany. A test compared three equivalently sized Euro 4-
compliant trucks from Mercedes-Benz, MAN and Scania. The Mercedes-Benz truck had an
SCR system, while the other two had EGR systems. Although the Mercedes-Benz truck had a
0.2 mpg fuel advantage over the Scania truck and 0.6 mpg over the MAN truck, factoring
AdBlue cost made the Scania slightly more cost competitive over the Mercedes-Benz (by 0.06
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pence/km). In the end, the comparison results demonstrate that the current operating cost
differences between the two technologies may be negligible (Barnett 2005).
The different technology choices led to a rift in ACEA. Mercedes-Benz has always been
SCR's biggest advocate. It tried to persuade ACEA to issue a public statement in favor of SCR
in 2004, but opposition by member companies MAN and Scania blocked this move. Instead,
executives from the companies have resorted to publicly criticizing the other companies'
technologies. DaimlerChrysler has touted SCR's cost and fuel economy benefits over EGR, but
MAN and Scania contend that SCR is no better than EGR (Semple 2004). MAN's chairman,
Hakan Samuelsson, has even appealed for increased regulatory scrutiny of SCR technology. He
urged the European Commission to establish more specific regulatory guidelines for SCR, such
as requirements for on-road monitoring and proper urea fueling (Semple 2004). Coming from a
company with a competing technology, this appears to be a lobbying effort to create regulatory
barriers for MAN's competitors. However, the end-user compliance concerns are valid, and
have been flagged by regulators and manufacturers during the developmental phases of the
technology.
8.3.5 Urea infrastructure
With the manufacturers' tentative commitment to introduce SCR-equipped trucks starting
in 2005, the availability of AdBlue infrastructure is crucial. AdBlue production and distribution
has coevolved with the development of SCR technology. Because of the lack of oil industry
interest in supplying and distributing urea, the chemicals industry has moved into the market. As
of 2005, urea suppliers have made AdBlue available in six European countries. They have
worked together with oil companies to allow for AdBlue sales at retail fuel stations.
After the October 2005 deadline passed for Euro 4 compliance, operational issues entered
the limelight. Currently, there is no method of detecting whether the urea tanks are properly
refilled. AdBlue sensors for SCR engines are not a requirement until 2009, so truck operators
may fill tanks with water and go undetected. Rental companies report preferring EGR over SCR
because they do not want to worry whether the different drivers will have access to AdBlue
(Shiers 2005).
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8.3.6 Government policy supporting SCR and urea infrastructure
National governments in several European countries have offered monetary incentives to
truck operators to use SCR systems. For example, Germany began a new road tolling scheme
effective January 2005, as shown in Table 8-4. The rates vary with the emission standard
attained. Euro 4 and 5-compliant trucks pay only 10 cents per km in road tolls, 2 cents less than
Euro 3 trucks. The 10 cents per km rate lasts until October 2009 for Euro 5 trucks, 3 years
longer than for Euro 4 trucks. The Netherlands also offers more favorable depreciation rates for
compliant vehicles.(PR Newswire Europe 2004)
Table 8-4: Emission Categories for the German Autobahn Tax
(A lies to vehicles with 4 or more axles)
Emission Jan. 1, 2005 - Oct. 1, 2006-
standard Se t. 30, 2006 Se t. 30, 2009
Euro 1 0.14€/km 0.14€/km
Euro 2 0.12 0.14
Euro 3 0.12 0.12
Euro 4 0.10 0.12
Euro 5 0.10 0.10
Source: Toll Collect (2006)
Following the success of the SINOx consortium's on-road demonstration program,
Mercedes-Benz and MAN had anticipated offering the SINOx system on heavy-duty trucks for
MY2000 (Brodrick, Farsh-chi et al. 1999). Ultimately, early mover Mercedes did not introduce
its Euro 5-compliant, SCR-equipped trucks until 2004 (Motor Transport 2004). It was motivated
to do so by the fiscal incentive provided by the German road tolling scheme.
8.3.7 Transferability of European results to US results
The consortium testing programs were conducted with more than the European market in
mind. In laboratory and on-road tests, they also measured emissions of vehicles running on the
US FTP cycle, showing their intention to introduce the urea SCR system to the US market
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(Amon and Keefe 2001). Measurements conducted in 1995-96, showed that the SCR system
reduced emission levels to 1.22 g/bhp-hr NOx and 0.062 g/bhp-hr PM, well below the US 2004
standards of 2.0 g/bhp-hr NOx and 0.10 g/bhp-hr PM (Fritz, Mathes et al. 1999). The US
demonstration programs reflected the European manufacturers' interest in demonstrating SCR
feasibility in the US.
8.4 United States
In May 1999, the US EPA gave advance notice of its intention to propose new rules for
heavy-duty vehicle and engine emissions and diesel fuel (EPA 1999). This was the first time
that EPA treated engines, aftertreatment, and fuel as "one system." A year after the advance
notice, the US EPA published its proposed new emission and fuel requirements in June 2000.
That summer, EPA held several public hearings, followed by a 45-day comment period. EPA
staff also released its Regulatory Impact Analysis in December 2000, which provided the
technical and public health basis and economical analysis for the new standards.
Although much of the debate centered on the diesel fuel sulfur levels, which will be
discussed in the next chapter, the heavy-duty diesel emission standards were a contentious
subject as well. Although the engine manufacturers uniformly supported 15 ppm or lower diesel
fuel sulfur levels as key to effective aftertreatment, they considered the new emission standards
infeasible. They felt the NOx reduction technologies were not developed enough to reach the
standard set by the EPA.
The PM standard of 0.01 g/bhp-hr will be effective immediately in 2007, while the new
NOx and NMHC levels will be phased in between 2007 and 2010 (see Table 8-1). CO levels
remain unchanged from the 2004 standards. As was the case in previous regulatory periods, the
NOx and PM standards are the most challenging for the diesel engine manufacturers to meet.
223
8.4.1 Regulatory input into the 2007 emission standards
Although the EPA has the authority to propose technology-forcing emission standards
which cannot yet be met with existing technology, it values the demonstration of technical and
economic feasibility in its proposals. The effectiveness of any regulation is dependent on the
manufacturers' ability to meet it in a timely, cost-effective manner. EPA is sensitive to the
national economy's dependence on heavy-duty diesel vehicles for freight and passenger transport,
arguably more so than for light-duty vehicles. Therefore, while the regulations do not prescribe
a particular technology, the regulatory officials did have in mind technologies that they expected
to be available in the near future to meet the standards. In EPA's Regulatory Impact Analysis
(RIA) of the 2007 Heavy-Duty Highway Final Rule, the EPA staff evaluated the technological
progress of emission reductions for heavy-duty diesel engines. In Chapter 3 of the RIA, they
made clear their preferred PM and NOx reduction technologies:
On PM: "Because of the significant PM reductions that they enable and their proven
durability on low sulfur diesel fuel, we believe the CDPF (catalyzed diesel particulate
filter) will be the control technology of choice for the future control of diesel PM
emissions."
On NOx: "While other technologies exist that have the potential to provide significant
emission reductions, such as selective catalytic reduction systems for NOx control, we
believe that the NOx adsorber will likely be the only broadly applicable technology
choice by the makers of engines and vehicles for the national fleet in the 2007-2010 time
frame."
EPA expected continued and improved use of cooled EGR to reduce NOx emissions.
EGR works by recirculating a portion of the exhaust gas to the intake manifold. This dilutes the
fresh intake air and reduces oxygen, thereby decreasing NOx formation. Cooling the exhaust gas
prior to mixing with the intake air can reduce combustion temperatures and contribute to
reducing NOx formation. Most US heavy-duty engine manufacturers had been using cooled
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EGR for their MY2004 engines, many of which were introduced early in October 2002 because
of the consent decree.
8.4.2 CDPF as a PM control technology
EPA was very confident in the capability of catalyzed diesel particulate filters (CDPF) to
meet the 0.01 g/kWh PM standard. In a CDPF, a ceramic or metallic filter collects PM in the
engine exhaust. To prevent the filter from becoming clogged with particles, the filter
continuously regenerates, or "burns off" the PM with the help of precious metal catalysts, which
ensures that particles are oxidized. CDPFs had been installed on heavy-duty diesel buses and
municipal trucks since the 1990s, and on diesel passenger cars in Europe since 2003. However,
they require very low fuel sulfur levels to be effective. In regions without widespread
availability of lower sulfur diesel fuel, CDPF-equipped vehicles require a dedicated and more
costly fuel source, limiting their adoption to public fleets.
EPA cited numerous studies and pilot programs that evaluated the effectiveness of
CDPFs in the field. Retrofit applications in the UK, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark showed the
CDPFs to be effective, as long as sulfur levels were very low (e.g. 10 ppm). In addition to citing
the results of these field studies, EPA also obtained information from industry representatives
and their trade associations.
8.4.3 Input from emission control manufacturers
Not surprisingly, emission control manufacturers who made catalyzed diesel particulate
filters gave substantial input to the EPA, in the form of industry publications about the filter
effectiveness and personal interviews and letters. They have a clear financial stake in supporting
regulations that would increase demand for their aftertreatment devices. Johnson Matthey, a
leading catalyst manufacturer, was the first to develop a continuously regenerating trap (CRT), a
type of CDPF that has been considered the most practical option (Automotive Environment
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Analyst 1999). The EPA's RIA frequently refers to the company's information on field tests and
demonstration programs. Johnson Matthey was the CDPF manufacturer for many of the field
programs conducted in Europe, as well as the CDPF supplier (along with main competitor
Engelhard) for the ARCO EC-D program in California (EPA 2000b).
Despite emission control manufacturers' market interest in regulatory stringency, they
strive to be information providers rather than policy advocates. In a personal interview with a
senior expert in the diesel emission control industry, he expressed that his role was to provide
regulators with information about the technical capabilities for his company's products, not to
push for new regulations. Based on his 40-plus years of experience in the catalyst industry, he
thought it very rare that an emission control equipment manufacturer would individually force
new regulations into place, rather preferring to work with other emission control manufacturers
through trade organizations to influence the regulatory process.31 Even if manufacturers are not
aggressively pushing for regulations, their input invariably has impact on the ultimate outcome
because EPA solicits their technical and cost data. The emission control industry tends to be
more optimistic about technology than the vehicle or engine manufacturers. However, if it casts
doubts about the technical or cost feasibility of proposed regulations, EPA may reconsider the
stringency or timing. On the other hand, an enthusiastic endorsement of the technology's
readiness for new regulations, which EPA received from emission control manufacturers for the
2007 HD Rule, would strengthen EPA's commitment to its proposal.
8.4.4 Using other countries' experience
In addition to citing the field tests of retrofitted vehicles conducted in Europe, the EPA
turned to the EU, whose 2005 Euro 4 standards would require the use of particulate filters. In
order to meet Euro 4, manufacturers had already begun field testing with CDPFs, so the EPA
could use the EU as an example of CDPFs being used to meet regulatory requirements (EPA
2000b).
Since the Euro 5 standard for 2008 was already known at this time, European
manufacturers definitely had an interest in getting the US regulations as close to the European
31 Interview with a senior expert in the diesel industry, August 2005.
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ones as possible. In its comments to the EPA about the HD 2007 Rule, DaimlerChrysler felt that
the US should use Euro 5 as a basis for US regulations. Having similar sets of standards makes
certification and field testing much easier for international manufacturers, but EPA defended its
decision to call for regulations significantly more stringent than Europe's (EPA 2000a).
8.4.5 NOx adsorber catalysts as a NOx control technology
When evaluating NOx control technologies, EPA considered lean NOx catalysts, NOx
adsorbers, selective catalytic reduction (SCR), and non-thermal plasma. EPA still viewed the
NOx adsorber as the most promising of the NOx reduction strategies. NOx adsorbers are an
extension of the three-way catalyst developed for gasoline vehicles. While gasoline vehicles run
very close to the stoichiometric air-fuel ratio, diesel vehicles run in oxygen-rich conditions.3 2
Rather than achieving a balance between the oxidizing potential of the exhaust's NO and 02 and
the reducing potential of the HC and CO, a catalyst-equipped diesel produces very low HC and
CO but high NOx emissions. As a result, a NOx adsorber must contain additional storage
materials on the catalyst surface to absorb the excess NOx as metallic nitrate during the oxygen-
rich, or lean conditions. Periodically, the engine must switch to stoichiometric or fuel-rich
conditions such that the metallic nitrate releases excess NOx, which is then reduced by CO and
HC (EPA 2000b).
Unlike CDPFs, there has been greater uncertainty about the future development and
viability of NOx adsorber technology. CDPFs had been on the market and commercially
available since the mid-1990s for heavy-duty diesel vehicle applications. Their main
technological hurdle was the availability of ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel, which will be overcome
by the new 2006 sulfur limits. Meanwhile, the NOx adsorber is still at the early development
stages. At the time of the December 2000 RIA, NOx adsorbers had been used commercially for
less than 5 years, and limited to stationary source applications and lean burn gasoline vehicles
sold by Toyota and Honda.
32 In a gasoline engine, the ratio of air to fuel (A/F ratio) in the air-fuel mixture is very close to the stoichiometric
ratio of 14.7 to 1. For every 14.7 units of air, unit of gasoline will be burned. For proper operation of the three-
way catalyst, the A/F mixture must stay very close to this ratio, and an oxygen sensor detects whether there is
adequate oxygen for the catalyst to work. A diesel engine has a much higher air-to-fuel ratio, even as high as 60:1 if
idling with no load.
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EPA also looked to progress in NOx adsorber use in passenger cars. By 2000, Toyota had
already announced that it was planning to introduce a diesel passenger car equipped with a
CDPF and a NOx adsorber in 2003. According to Toyota, its Diesel Particulate-NOx Reduction
(DPNR) system could reduce PM and NOx emissions by 80% for a useful life of 50,000 miles.
Although this is less than half the useful life required by the US light-duty regulations and far
from the US heavy-duty diesel engine requirement of 435,000 miles, EPA viewed DPNR as very
promising. EPA also noted the progress of DaimlerChrysler and Volkwagen on NOx adsorber
technology to meet Euro 4 diesel passenger car standards. Despite some promising results, the
two German companies ultimately relied on less costly in-cylinder engine modifications to meet
the Euro 4 standards.
Although cooled EGR had been sufficient to meet MY2004 requirements, engine
manufacturers knew they would have to pursue more advanced technologies to meet future
standards. They were already conducting tests with NOx adsorber-equipped engines. According
to the EPA's RIA, Cummins had presented its success with a NOx adsorber catalyst in two
recent industry presentations. The company reported an 80% NOx reduction over the
Supplemental Steady State test and a 98% NOx reduction over the heavy-duty transient FTP
(EPA 2000b). In making the argument that the proposed NOx standard of 0.20 g/bhp-hr is
attainable with a NOx standard, EPA specifically refers to Cummins' results: "One HDDE
manufacturer has also demonstrated greater than a 98 percent NOx reduction over the HD FTP
using a NOx adsorber" (EPA Docket A-99-06 II-E).
The Department of Energy worked with industry in a public-private partnership called the
Advanced Petroleum Based Fuel (APBF) program. Part of the program included research at
DOE national labs on NOx adsorbers for light-duty and heavy-duty applications. The tests
showed NOx emission reductions of 90% or higher, but the NOx adsorber was easily poisoned
by sulfur in fuel (EPA 2000b).
The emission control industry's trade association, the Manufacturers of Emission Control
Association (MECA), was eager to demonstrate the capabilities of NOx adsorber technology.
Some of its members would eventually be the ones to manufacturer and market NOx adsorbers.
MECA provided four different catalyst systems for the EPA to test in its National Vehicle and
Fuel Emission Laboratory (NVFEL). The catalysts reduced NOx emissions by more than 90%
on the Euro 3 steady-state test cycle. Under "road-load" conditions, the NOx adsorber was able
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to reduce NOx emissions from an engine-out emission level of 5 g/bhp-hr down to below 0.1
g/bhp-hr. The EPA placed a lot of credence in these tests, using the lab results as its main
justification for the NOx standard:
"We have demonstrated in our laboratory that a NOx adsorber can produce greater than
90 percent reduction in NOx emissions over the hot start HDDE transient FTP. The
results of this test program lead us to believe NOx adsorbers will be capable of meeting
the Phase 2 FTP NOx emission standard of 0.20 g/bhp-hr" (EPA 2000b).
Even though EPA recognized the challenges related to the cold start FTP, durability, and cost, it
anticipated that given several years of lead time and various design options, industry would make
the advancements necessary to meet the standard. In its submissions to EPA, Johnson Matthey
and MECA "conclude[d] that there are no significant barriers to the commercialization of either
catalyst based diesel particulate filters or NOx adsorber technology" (EPA 2000a). Engelhard,
another major emission control manufacturer, also believed that NOx adsorber development was
on schedule to meet the 2007 regulations (EPA 2000a).
8.4.6 Response of engine manufacturers to 2007 HID emission standards
The engine manufacturers, as represented by the Engine Manufacturers Association,
expressed their concern about the timeline and stringency of the HD 2007 standards. They
supported a delay to 2010 or a revision of the standards. Even though EPA used Cummins' early
results on NOx adsorbers to support its regulatory decision, Cummins was by no means
supportive of the proposed standards. Regulators' interpretation of Cummins' technical input
was actually counter to the company's regulatory position. Success at early stages of R&D did
not eliminate substantial uncertainty, especially about commercial feasibility. In its numerous
comments to EPA on the 2007 HD Rule, Cummins, along with other engine manufacturers,
called for the delay or revision of the standards and criticized many aspects of the regulation
(EPA 2000a). Cummins, Caterpillar, Mack, Detroit Diesel, and Volvo, engine companies which
had also been parties to the 1998 consent decree, offered an alternate proposal. They offered a
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more gradual phase-in approach compared to the EPA's proposal for a 2007 deadline for the 0.01
g/bhp-hr PM standard and a 2007-10 phase-in for the 0.20 g/bhp-hr NOx standard.
Table 8-5: Alternate Proposal from "Consent Decree" Engine Manufacturers
Timeframe PM standard NOx standard
2007-2009 0.03 g/bhp-hr 1.5 g/bhp-hr
2010-2012 0.03 0.5
2013 and beyond 0.01 0.2
Source: EPA (2000).
They argued that they were at a competitive disadvantage compared to companies like
International and Mercedes, which did not have to meet the supplemental emission requirements
(NTE and SET). The consent decree companies claimed that after the consent decree
requirements were over in October 2004, they would be "forced to reduce the effectiveness of
their emission control systems in order to compete with non-CD [consent decree] companies
which must only meet the Phase 1 [2004] FTP standards" (EPA 2000a). However, if their
alternate proposal were adopted, they offered to voluntarily meet the supplemental emission tests
in the "gap years" of 2005 and 2006, so as not to create a lapse in emission control.
8.4.7 Optimism from industry
International Truck and Engine Corporation
It is not a surprise that engine manufacturers would oppose the proposed emission
standards. They faced substantial technological hurdles and costs of complying with the new
standards. However, not all the companies had the same level of opposition to the standards.
Even though International generally sided with the rest of the engine manufacturers in critiquing
the new standards, it offered some glimpses into its own technological progress in its comments
to EPA. International referred to its "Green Diesel Technology," which was already capable of
meeting the proposed 2007 NMHC and PM standards in 2001. As discussed in Chapter 5, it had
already demonstrated the technology to the EPA and CARB in a public event in Washington,
D.C., strategically timed to coincide with the EPA's Tier 2 emission hearings. Although its
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public presentation of a Green Diesel school bus was intended to persuade regulators to adopt
very low fuel sulfur levels, necessary for the technology's effectiveness, it undoubtedly assured
regulators that very clean diesel engines were feasible. International planned to commercialize
the technology for buses where ultra-low diesel fuel (<15ppm) was available (EPA 2000a).
EPA even went as far to cite International's success with CDPFs on school buses as a
demonstration of the feasibility of the PM standard: "Given International's commitment to
produce a CDPF equipped diesel bus in markets where 15 ppm can be made available, makes us
confident that CDPFs will regenerate reliably when operated on the mandated fuel under this
program which is expected to have an in-use average level between seven and 10 ppm" (EPA
2000a). Compared to other US manufacturers, International was generally supportive of the
proposed 2007 emission standards, because the company already had technology prepared to
meet the new levels. Also, International has a strong presence in school buses, which became a
rallying point for citizen and environmental groups seeking to protect children from diesel
emissions.
Competition from compressed natural gas (CNG) buses in the school bus market was a
key motivation behind International's early introduction of 2007-compliant diesel school buses.
In the 1990s, International had made a conscious decision to not produce alternative fuel engines,
after early evaluations showed their poor performance relative to diesel engines.33 Their
exclusive commitment to diesel technology meant that mounting criticism of diesel exhaust
could seriously hurt their bottom line. EPA and CARB were already considering mandates that
all transit and school buses run on CNG. International had to convince the public and more
specifically, municipalities, school districts, and regulators that diesel buses could be very low-
emitting and benefit from the preexisting fuel and maintenance infrastructure. In its public
relations and marketing material, International compared the emission levels of its Green Diesel
bus and a typical CNG bus. Although the Green Diesel bus has higher NOx emissions than CNG
(2.2 g/bhp-hr vs. 1.2 g/bhp-hr), it has lower PM and HC emissions. International also made an
argument for diesel's cost and performance superiority over alternative fuels, including CNG,
methanol, ethanol, and liquefied natural gas (International Truck and Engine 2004).
International's focus on protecting their existing market may have constituted a defensive
strategy, but their behavior had the effect of reducing diesel school bus emissions in advance of
33 Interviews with senior experts in the diesel vehicle industry, 2006.
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regulation and making the case for clean diesel. Sales have still been limited by the availability
of funding for new school buses. From 2001 to 2006, International sold 200 Green Diesel buses,
mostly in California, where CARB has offered subsidies to replace old buses (International
Truck and Engine 2006).
Toyota and its DPNR
Toyota's DPNR system had a far-reaching, cross-industry impact. Although it was
developed for light-duty vehicles in Europe, DPNR drew the interest of EPA while it was setting
heavy-duty standards. EPA extrapolated Toyota's ability to integrate the CDPF with the NOx
adsorber to heavy-duty applications. The RIA frequently mentions Toyota's technology based
on Toyota's press releases on DPNR from summer 2000 and an in-person meeting between
Toyota representatives and EPA's Todd Sherwood in October 2000 (EPA 2000b). Ironically,
Toyota had not actively submitted technical documentation on DPNR to the EPA for its RIA or
to the comment period. Instead, EPA relied primarily on Toyota's press releases. In response to
comments by engine manufacturers and oil companies doubting the technical feasibility of the
NOx standard, EPA cited Toyota's success with DPNR (EPA 2000a).
8.4.8 Urea SCR as a competing technology
When EPA proposed its 2007 HD standards, it showed its clear preference of the NOx
adsorber as the dominant NOx reduction technology. On the other side of the Atlantic, European
manufacturers were favoring the use of selective reduction catalysts (SCR), which requires urea
as a fuel additive. SCR systems provide fuel economy benefits while reducing NOx levels by up
to 90% (Muller, Olschlegal et al. 2003). EPA had been reluctant to consider urea SCR
technology as a practical option. It was concerned that truck owners would fail to refill their
urea tank, leading to high NOx emission levels, as if there were no NOx control technology at
all: "We do not believe that there are acceptable means to ensure widespread compliance under
an SCR program where an entirely new fluid needed to be added in order to ensure proper
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emission control system function" (EPA 2000a). EPA recognized that the technology worked
well, but was skeptical about truckers' interaction with the technology, whereas the NOx
adsorber was a "passive" technology that did not require any changes in truckers' behavior.
Although EPA insists that its regulations are performance-based and technology-neutral,
it had expressed concern about SCR technology as early as 2001, during the 2007 HD
rulemaking. It has cites the lack of national urea infrastructure and end-user compliance as
major challenges to implementing SCR technology (EPA 2004b). Both regulators and
manufacturers have identified the following as issues to be addressed in order for SCR to be
viable in the US market:
* Closed-loop performance feedback: Without feedback, a malfunctioning SCR system
may not properly convert the NOx. On-board NOx sensors at the outlet of the SCR
catalyst have been proposed as one solution, but improving NOx sensor durability is still
in progress.
* System tampering or negligence: The added cost of urea may provide a financial
incentive for truck operators to tamper with the SCR system. An operator may
intentionally or accidentally fail to refill the urea tank, refill it with a substandard
ammonia-water mixture, or otherwise tamper with the urea injection system.
* Fault accommodation: Once a fault is detected, there must be a system in place to give
operators an incentive to take their vehicle in for repair. For example, in the event of low
urea tank levels, a warning light may switch on, and at very low levels, the engine may
not be able to restart.
* Lack of urea infrastructure: Because of the frequency in which the urea tank must be
refilled (approximately every 31,000 miles), urea filling pumps must be established at
diesel retail stations.
(EPA 2004b; Nebergall, Hagen et al. 2005)
The legal requirements of the HD engine rule also presented an obstacle for the system.
It requires that a vehicle's emission control system be maintenance-free for 150,000 miles.
However, based on the European demonstration programs, a typical SCR system has a 31,000-
mile scheduled maintenance interval. Companies must seek guidance from EPA on this issue
before they can market SCR-equipped vehicles. Although its concerns about SCR technology
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persist, the EPA has been less skeptical in the past few years, as SCR catalyst vendors and
engine and truck manufacturers have approached the Agency about ways to address its
concerns. 3 4
8.4.9 Petroleum industry support of SCR
The interdependency between vehicles and fuels has led to tension between the oil and
auto/engine industries, as both sides try to convince regulators that the other is better equipped to
tackle emission reduction. The oil industry claims that vehicle and aftertreatment manufacturers
have plenty of room to improve their technologies; automobile and engine industries argue that
their more advanced technologies are constrained by the poor quality of fuel. Ultimately, the
combination of clean fuels and clean vehicles, requiring investment from both sides, is necessary
to meet the EPA's proposed emission standards. The industries' differing attitudes toward SCR
technology is a perfect example of their disagreement about the distribution of the regulatory
burden.
NOx adsorbers require very low fuel sulfur levels compared to urea SCR technology.
Because of the high investment costs associated with desulphurization, the oil industry was
enthusiastic about urea SCR. The NOx adsorber requires sulfur levels below 15 ppm, but SCR
has been shown to operate well with fuel with higher than 50 ppm sulfur content. The American
Petroleum Institute (API), the US oil industry trade association, had been advocating a 50 ppm
sulfur standard to the EPA. It went as far as to fund a third-party study by Engine Fuel and
Emissions Engineering (EF&EE) to support its claim that SCR has significantly lower life cycle
costs than NOx adsorbers and tolerates higher sulfur levels (EPA 2000a). Oil companies viewed
a combined CDPF and SCR system as a more "proven" technology than the EPA's preferred
CDPF and NOx adsorber combination.
US engine manufacturers treated urea SCR as a promising technology but had their
reservations about its readiness for 2007. According engine manufacturers, urea suppliers will
only find the market attractive if the entire US industry uses urea SCR, just as the majority of
European manufacturers are opting for urea. They also disagreed with API's assertion that urea
34 Interview with Margo Oge, Director, US EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, December 8, 2005.
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SCR would work with higher levels of sulfur because the accompanying oxidation catalysts
would still require very low sulfur levels (EPA 2000a). Even environmental groups and
local/state regulatory agencies like the Natural Resources Defense Council and
STAPPA/ALAPCO expressed their reservations about urea SCR because of the necessary urea
infrastructure and possibility of missed refueling by truckers (EPA 2000a).
8.4.10 European manufacturers try to promote urea SCR in the US
While gaining support from the European Commission after using the SINOx system in
European demonstration projects, the SINOx consortium had yet to win over American
regulators. DaimlerChrysler took the lead in encouraging the EPA to consider urea SCR for a
NOx control technology, considering it superior to NOx adsorber technology. As the champion
for SCR, the company also cast doubt about the effectiveness of cooled EGR for 2007 (EPA
2000a). They were already developing these for trucks in Europe to meet the 2008 Euro 5
standards, and expanding to the US market would allow them to increase sales volume and lower
per unit costs.
The SINOx consortium participated in test projects in the US, as a way to show US
regulators and other companies the feasibility of SCR systems. It had started testing the system
for vehicle applications in 1992. The Siemens SINOx system seemed ready for
commercialization by 1998, and the European diesel truck manufacturers were eager to use it as
their primary NOx reduction technology. However, the US response to urea SCR systems was
far more tepid. To demonstrate the technology's performance and durability, several
demonstration projects were initiated in the US, many of them with participation from companies
with ties to the European consortium.
ITS-Davis Project - Demonstrating the SINOx technology on the West Coast
The Institute of Transportation Studies at the University of California, Davis (ITS-Davis)
brought together Siemens-Westinghouse, Detroit Diesel Corporation, Freightliner Corporation,
and Valley Material Transport for the SINOx demonstration program. Detroit Diesel and
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Freightliner are both part of DaimlerChrysler, the largest promoter of urea SCR technology. The
program would test emissions and fuel economy from 10 new Class 8 heavy-duty diesel vehicles,
equipped with SINOx, operating in California. The program also included investigation of
truckers' acceptance, infrastructure needs, technical feasibility, and cost-effectiveness. These
additional components addressed regulatory agencies' concerns about urea infrastructure and
truckers' failure to refill the urea tank. Part of the program was funded by air pollution control
districts in the San Joaquin Valley and Sacramento and the California Air Resources Board
(CARB), demonstrating the growing US interest in the technology (Brodrick, Farsh-chi et al.
1999).
Mack SCR Project - Demonstrating SINOx technology on the East Coast
The consortium companies initiated a testing program with Mack Trucks and
NESCAUM in the US in 2000. Funding for the project came out of Mack Trucks' commitment
to fund an SCR project through the 1998 consent decree agreement. At the Southwest Research
Institute (SwRI) in 2002, participants measured the emissions from heavy-duty 12-L Mack
engines with two emission control system configurations on a transient test cell. One
configuration had an Argillon SINOx SCR catalyst only, and the other had the SINOx system
and an Engelhard DPX diesel particulate filter (DPF). The engines were run on both the US
transient FTP cycle and the European steady-state cycle (ESC). The combined DPF and SCR
system reduces PM by 89%, such that emission levels are below the 0.01 g/bhp-hr PM standard.
NOx is reduced by 82%, to 1.06 g/bhp-hr, still considerably higher than the 0.20 g/bhp-hr limit,
but capable of meeting the 2007-09 NOx phase-in average of 1.2 g/bhp-hr allowed by the US
HD rule's regulatory flexibility (Scarnegie, Miller et al. 2003).
The field test phase of this project involved 2 years of monitoring 10 Mack trucks in
commercial use. Of the 8 tractor-trailer highway trucks used by the United Parcel Service (UPS),
5 had SCR only and 3 had DPF and SCR. Two urban refuse trucks used by the New York
Department of Sanitation had DPF and SCR. The trucks began operating in mid-2002. Two of
the UPS trucks and one of the refuse trucks were emission-tested with the West Virginia
University Translabs after 1 and 2 years of operation (Block, Clark et al. 2005). Based on those
three trucks, the Mack SCR Project team measured a 79-95% NOx reduction after year and
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81%-91% after 2 years. The team emphasized that the tests were conducted on fuel with regular
sulfur levels (e.g. 350 ppm), which did not affect the performance of the SCR system. Other
NOx reduction strategies such as NOx traps require very low fuel sulfur levels (Block, Clark et
al. 2005).
There are other limited demonstration projects involving SCR systems. For example,
Extengine Transport Systems, a company recently established in 2001, was the first to
commercially offer a mobile retrofit SCR system. A 2003 CARB-verified test showed that the
ADEC system reduced NOx by 90% and PM by 95%. Because of system's impressive emission
reduction performance, Europe's largest transit operator and Japanese firms have sought out the
Extengine for diesel retrofits. In the US, ADEC has been used by the City of Houston and the
Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority for municipal vehicles (PR Newswire 2003). Extengine's
second generation device, ADEC II, incorporates self-calibration via NOx sensors to adjust the
quantity of urea injected (Extengine 2005). Although Extengine's system is not yet used in new
vehicles, success with fleet-based retrofits may lead to greater SCR acceptance in the US.
8.4.11 SCR in the US for 2010?
Although R&D in NOx adsorbers and urea SCR continues, none of the engine and
vehicle manufacturers plan to apply those two technologies broadly to meet the 2007 standards
(EPA 2004b). They will improve their 2004 technology - ACERT for Caterpillar and EGR for
the rest. The manufacturers plan to use the two-step compliance flexibility in the regulations to
meet an average 1.2 g/bhp-hr NOx standard in 2007-09, and then meet the 0.20 g/bhp-hr
standard by 2010.
Some American engine and truck manufacturers have shown increasing interest in urea
SCR systems for new vehicles. SCR systems are not yet able to meet the 0.2 g/bhp-hr NOx
standard required by the US 2007 HD Rule, but researchers in industry and at national labs are
working on configurations to meet the NOx standard by 2010, when the new standard must be
fully implemented. Researchers at the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) tested a combined
SCR, EGR, and DPF system under the auspices of the US Department of Energy's Advanced
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Petroleum-Based fuels (APBF) program. The system could only achieve 0.15-0.37 g/bhp-hr
NOx with a fresh catalyst and 0.38-0.48 g/bhp-hr with an aged catalyst. However, the SwRI
considered the technology promising enough for meeting 2010 levels (Khair and Sharp 2004).
According to representatives in industry and EPA, EPA has been more receptive to SCR
technology in the past few years because manufacturers have been working actively with the
Agency to address concerns about urea infrastructure and end-user compliance. Some industry
and regulatory experts believe that there will be greater commonality in the 2010-2012
timeframe, where the US and Europe will both have SCR systems.35
8.5 Japan
New long-term emission regulations in Japan went into effect in October 2005. The new
PM and NOx standards, 2.0 g/kWh NOx and 0.027 g/kWh PM, require technological
improvements beyond engine-only modifications, which had been sufficient to meet national
regulations in the past. Like in the US and Europe, engine and truck manufacturers found
themselves with the choice between EGR and SCR.
Like the Europeans, the four major Japanese heavy-duty vehicle manufacturers are
divided on their technology pathways. Hino Motors and Isuzu Motors have focused on
improving existing EGR and DPF technologies, the technology route taken by US heavy-duty
engine manufacturers (Asahi Shimbun 2004c). As mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, Hino Motors
had already developed its DPNR (diesel particulate-NOx reduction) system, which includes a
diesel particulate filter and NOx adsorber catalyst. It improved on their DPNR system to meet
the 2005 regulations. Meanwhile, the two other major manufacturers, Nissan Diesel and
Mitsubishi Fuso, have committed to SCR. Nissan Diesel took the lead on developing SCR
technology for the Japanese market. It faced challenges from the technology itself and the
required urea refilling infrastructure.
35 Interview with Margo Oge, Director, US EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, December 8, 2005.
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8.5.1 Nissan Diesel adopts SCR on its own
In addition to sharing the SCR technology challenges of the European manufacturers,
Nissan Diesel had to deal with the problem of poor SCR performance at low temperatures.
Compared to the US and European test cycles, the Japanese JE05 test cycle emphasizes low
loads and low speeds, characteristic of urban driving in Japan. This results in lower exhaust
temperatures, which lower NOx conversion rates in the SCR catalyst. To remedy the low-
temperature problem, the Nissan Diesel system includes a diesel oxidation catalyst upstream of
the SCR catalyst and cooled EGR. Engine controls are optimized for reducing PM, and then
NOx is reduced by the SCR catalyst, eliminating the need for a DPF.
In November 2004, Nissan Diesel introduced Japan's first commercial urea-SCR system
on a Quon heavy-duty truck. Its Final Low Emission New Diesel System (FLEDS) met the
long-term 2005 standard one year ahead of schedule. The system uses AdBlue, a 32.5% urea
solution with the same specifications as the AdBlue product in Europe. The SCR system has an
average NOx conversion rate of 70%. Nissan Diesel estimates that the SCR system has a 6.5%
better fuel economy than a high EGR and DPF system. If the urea costs are factored into the
comparison, SCR is 4% better in terms of fuel consumption (Hirata, Masaki et al. 2005).
In 2004, Nissan Diesel was the only major Japanese manufacturer planning to use SCR
on trucks, so it had to coordinate a urea distribution system on its own. By June 2005, it
arranged for AdBlue to be available at 7 main in-tank bases, 1,080 truck stops, and 192 Nissan
Diesel service centers throughout Japan (Hirata, Masaki et al. 2005). Unlike the US or Europe,
Japan is a relatively compact area, where it is easier to establish a urea distribution network.
About 80% of medium and heavy-duty truck drivers obtain fuel from their own fuel tank or truck
station, so Nissan Diesel focused on equipping those tanks and stations with AdBlue rather than
the more difficult task of ensuring supply at retail stations.
Nissan Diesel benefited from being a year early to introduce an SCR-equipped vehicle
compliant with the 2005 standards. Other manufacturers had the opportunity to observe the
Quon trucks' performance and urea distribution network and decide whether to adopt Nissan
Diesel's strategy as well. Mitsubishi Fuso agreed to team up with Nissan Diesel to share
emission reduction technology in June 2005, just a few months before the October 2005 deadline.
Already struggling financially because of its recent defect scandal, Mitsubishi Fuso licensed
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Nissan Diesel's SCR technology so that it would not have to develop its own system (Jiji Press
2005c; Kyodo 2005b). Mitsubishi Fuso also licensed the urea production technology from
Nissan Chemical Industries, another financial boon for the Nissan Group (Asia Pulse 2004).
A potential problem with Nissan Diesel's SCR-equipped trucks is its system's low
incentive for drivers to refill their tanks with urea. The only "penalty" for non-compliance, such
as an empty urea tank level or substandard urea solution, is a warning light on the instrument
panel. If the driver knows that the urea tank does not affect the driving performance of the
vehicle, he or she will probably ignore the warning (Hirata, Masaki et al. 2005).
8.5.2 Japan's clean engine technologies transferred overseas
The Japanese long-term diesel emission and low sulfur fuel regulation was originally set
for 2007, but an agreement with the auto and oil industries accelerated the deadline to 2005.
This provided a significant competitive advantage to Japanese vehicle manufacturers, whose
earlier R&D efforts and successes allowed them to license their technology to other
manufacturers. As of 2005, Japan had the most stringent vehicle emission standards, not to be
surpassed by the US until 2007 or by the EU until 2008. Isuzu Motors and Hino Motors, which
mostly used EGR and DPF technology, had deals to supply their engines to other manufacturers.
Isuzu will supply 6.6-liter V-8 engines to DMAX, its US-based joint venture with General
Motors, for school buses, cargo vans, and pick-up trucks in the US. Annual production at the
DMAX plant increased by 10% in 2004-2005, and is expected to grow with climbing US
demand for diesel-powered vehicles. Hino will supply engines to Nissan Diesel and other
companies, increasing its diesel engine sales to other manufacturers by 160% from FY2004 to
FY2007 (Asia Pulse 2005b).
8.5.3 Japanese government offers incentives for diesel vehicle turnover
To encourage consumers to replace their older vehicles and purchase compliant vehicles
under the Automobile NOx/PM Law, the government offered reductions in the vehicle
acquisition tax. New diesel trucks and buses compliant with the 2005 emission regulations
would receive a 2% reduction in the acquisition tax between April 2004 and September 2005,
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and a 1% reduction between October 2005 and March 2006. Reductions were slightly higher if
consumers demonstrated that their new vehicles were purchased to replace older vehicles (JAMA
2005). Older diesel vehicles were taxed more heavily. For example, diesel vehicles on the road
for 11 years or longer had to pay a 10% surcharge (JAMA 2005).
8.6 Summary
Manufacturers and national governments have strong interests in supporting particular
NOx and PM reduction technologies to meet engine emission standards in 2005 and beyond. In
addition to seeking to wield influence on their own country or region's regulatory processes,
manufacturers have tried to expand their influence in other countries' regulatory regimes.
Public-private research projects and technology demonstration projects have been popular
instruments to persuade regulators of a technology's high performance. On several occasions,
national governments have unabashedly supported regulations benefiting their domestic
industries.
Technical, economic, and political considerations are major drivers of technology paths,
but user responses to the technology cannot be neglected. For example, EGR and NOx adsorbers
are passive technologies requiring no behavioral changes by the vehicle operator, while SCR
gives the operator new responsibility for refilling the urea tank. Europe and the US have thus
far chosen divergent technology paths for NOx reduction - urea SCR in Europe and
predominately EGR in the US. Although it is possible that one technology will ultimately prove
superior, the Japanese situation demonstrates that EGR and SCR can coexist within the same
market and regulatory system.
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CHAPTER 9 - Ultra-low Sulfur Diesel Fuel
9.1 Introduction
There are clear air quality benefits to adopting ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel, typically
designated as 50 ppm or lower, but the cost of upgrading refineries for greater desulphurization
poses a significant barrier to the oil industry.36 This chapter demonstrates how first-mover
countries such as Sweden, Finland, and the UK have used fiscal incentives to encourage oil
companies to produce clean, low-sulfur fuels early. Their transition to ultra-low sulfur diesel has
been rapid, whereas in the US, in the absence of tax incentives, oil refineries are likely to wait
until the mandated regulatory deadline. In addition to enabling cleaner vehicle technologies,
early adoption often gives domestic companies a competitive edge in other markets. Even in
regions without tax incentives or subsidies, some companies voluntarily have sold ultra-low
sulfur diesel ahead of regulatory requirements, to protect or expand their market share. The
limited sales and contracts with municipal fleets have helped them prepare for anticipated
regulation. Countries and regions with earlier adoption also benefit from improved air quality
and more competitive domestic companies. The early-mover countries and companies are in the
position to actively lobby other governments to adopt similar policies, which further increases
the value of their proactive decision.
The availability of ultra-low sulfur diesel gives automobile and engine manufacturers the
assurance that their sensitive aftertreatment equipment will not be contaminated by sulfur.
Because poor fuel quality is no longer an obstacle to new technology, the cleaner fuel spurs
production of cleaner diesel vehicles and bus or truck retrofits. However, with more countries
adopting more stringent clean fuel standards, demand for ultra-low sulfur diesel is already
beginning to outstrip supply, leading to price jumps for low-sulfur crude feedstock and the shift
of cheaper, high-sulfur crude to developing countries.
36 In Europe and Japan, diesel fuel with 50 ppm sulfur is considered ultra-low sulfur diesel; in the US, the term is
used for diesel fuel with 15 ppm sulfur.
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9.1.1 Benefits and costs of fuel sulfur reduction
Lowering the level of sulfur in petroleum-based fuels offers direct and indirect benefits to
air quality. Less sulfur means fewer fine particulates, which contribute to respiratory ailments
and cancer, and fewer sulfur oxides, which contribute to acid rain. Lower sulfur fuel also
improves the effectiveness of emission control equipment. For example, the catalysts used to
convert pollutants into less harmful substances can be irreversibly contaminated by fuels with
sulfur levels as low as 50 ppm. Compared to standard diesel fuel with an average sulfur level of
350 ppm), using 15 ppm sulfur diesel alone can reduce particulate emissions by 10% and sulfur
dioxide emissions by 90%. Coupling it with a catalyzed diesel particulate filter can reduce
particulate, hydrocarbon, and carbon monoxide emissions by 90% (BP 2005). Some nitrogen
oxide (NOx) reduction technologies under development, like NOx adsorbers, have the potential
to reduce NOx by up to 90%, but NOx conversion efficiency drops significantly as fuel sulfur
levels go above 5 ppm (MECA 2000).
Engine and auto manufacturers have a clear incentive to promote lower-sulfur fuels.
Lower sulfur levels give them more options in emission control strategies, instead of restricting
them to sulfur-resistant technologies. While the oil industry acknowledges the benefits of lower
sulfur fuels, the high costs for the refineries have been a deterrent to desulfurization. Oil
companies are concerned about the large investment costs and the impact on retail prices. The
American Petroleum Industry (API) and Europia, the trade associations representing oil
companies in the US and EU, supported a more gradual introduction of the fuels, with longer
deadlines and smaller reductions. They questioned the air quality benefits of sulfur levels below
50 ppm, asserting that the high costs did not justify the benefits and that more studies should be
done (Automotive Environment Analyst 1998b; EUROPIA/CONCAWE 2000). At the heart of
this debate was deciding which industry would bear the brunt of the pollution control costs - the
oil industry wanted the auto industry to clean up its engines and the auto industry wanted the oil
industry to clean up its fuels.
Mandating very stringent NOx and PM standards without having requirements for very
low sulfur diesel fuel can be counterproductive. It is very costly for vehicle and aftertreatment
manufacturers to design emission control equipment to withstand high sulfur levels. This delays
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the marketing of affordable clean diesel vehicles. For example, some companies like Toyota and
Johnson Matthey, which had very effective emission-reducing technology, did not have a market
for their products because the accompanying ultra-low sulfur diesel was not available. Therefore,
it is very important to coordinate the timing of fuel availability and new NOx and PM standards.
In the EU, Japan, and the US, the timing of the fuel sulfur reductions has been very
different. The EU has mandated more frequent but more gradual reductions, while the US has
opted for more dramatic reductions over longer time intervals. The earlier availability of low
sulfur diesel in Europe and Japan, driven by tax incentives from the government, has facilitated
the sales of aftertreatment-equipped diesel vehicles capable of meeting emission standards. In
the US, early adoption of ultra-low sulfur diesel and aftertreatment devices has been driven more
by local pressures than federal action.
Table 9-1: Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Levels
Year EU Japan US
1992 3000 5000 5000
1993 2000 500
1994 2000 _
1995 _
1996 500
1997 500
1998
1999
2000 350
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005 50 (all) 50
2006 / 10 15
2007 10
2008 (avail)
2009 10 (all) 
Sources: EIA-DOE (2006a)
The cost of reducing sulfur levels in diesel fuels gets increasingly more expensive as
refiners move towards lower sulfur levels. For example, a 2000 EUROPIA/CONWAWE study
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estimated that the cost in the EU of going from 50 ppm to 10 ppm is almost three times as costly
as going from 50 ppm to 30 ppm, on an NPV basis37 (EUROPIA/CONCAWE 2000). Table 9-2
below illustrates the cost estimates for sulfur reduction in diesel fuel. The figures represent long-
term cost estimates averaged over 10-15 year timeframes, meaning that the price premiums for
ultra-low sulfur diesel immediately following adoption could be much higher.
Table 9-2: Estimated Costs of Sulfur Reduction in Diesel Fuels.
Table 9-3: Regulatory Timing for Fuel Sulfur Levels Below 500ppm
Euro 3 Euro 4 Euro 5 Japan Japan US
(350ppm) (50ppm) (10oppm) (50ppm) (10ppm) (15ppm)
Proposed 1998 1998 1998 1999 2003 1998
Finalized 1998 2003 2003 2000 2003 1999
Effective 2000 2005 2005 2005 2008 Mid-2006
(available)
2009 (all) 
Sources: EC (1998; 2003), EPA (1999), Japan Central Environment Council (2000; 2003).
37 To go from 50 ppm to 30 ppm in diesel fuel sulphur content, the NPV of refinery capital and operating costs over
15 years is 2.4 GEuro, while to go from 50 ppm to 10 ppm, it is 6.7 GEuro ( GEuro = I billion euros).
38 Historic exchange rates from FXTOP.com. In November 2000, Japanese yen = US$0.0092; in November 2000,
I Euro = US$1.17; in September 2001, Euro = US$1.10.
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Product transition Cost estimates38 Sources
Japan: 500 to 50 ppm 2 yen/liter long-term Petroleum Council
(-7 cents/gal in US dollars) (2000)
Japan: 500 to 50 ppm 20 yen/liter short-term Petroleum Association
(- 70 cents/gal in US dollars) Japan (2001)
US: 500 to 15 ppm 5.4-6.8 cents/gal for refining plus 1.1 EIA-DOE (2001)
cents/gal for distribution
EU: 50 to 10 ppm* 0.29-0.61 cents/liter Directorate-General
(-1-2 cents/gal in US dollars) Environment (2001)
EU: 50 to 10 ppm 0.3-0.6 cents/liter in Northern Europe Birch and Ulivieri
(- 1-2 cents/gal in US dollars) (2000)
0.6-0.9 cents/liter in Southern Europe
(-2-3 cents/gal in US dollars)
*Note: Cost figures for EU transition from 350 ppm to 50 ppm were not found.
The next sections consider the regulatory processes and industry action leading up to
lower diesel sulfur requirements in EU, US, and Japan, focusing on levels below 500 ppm. The
regulatory processes began in the late 1990s, and the lower levels began implementation in the
2000s.
9.2 Europe
The European Commission sets specifications for fuel quality in the European
Communities. While all EU countries must meet the same standards, individual countries are
allowed to adopt tax incentives to encourage early adoption of future standards. They cannot
mandate that companies provide a certain type of fuel unless specified by the EU. In 1993, the
EU still had a diesel sulfur standard of 3000 ppm. Since then, it has been lowered to 2000 ppm
in 1994, 500 ppm in 1996, and then 350 ppm in 2000. The growing popularity of diesel
passenger cars since the early 1990s has led to an increasing demand for diesel fuel and greater
appreciation for fuel properties that can enhance diesel vehicle performance. Industry experts
have forecasted continuing demand growth for diesel fuel, and a decline in gasoline demand.
The imbalance between diesel and gasoline demand has led some to question the preferential tax
treatment that diesel fuel has received in the EU. In almost all EU countries, diesel is taxed
substantially less than gasoline because of its use in the freight transport sector and its better fuel
economy and lower CO2 emissions. Figure 9-1 shows the two very different demand trends,
which began to diverge at the same time that the popularity of diesel cars began to surge.
The imbalance between diesel and gasoline demand has led some to question the
preferential tax treatment that diesel fuel has received in the EU. In almost all EU countries,
diesel is taxed substantially less than gasoline because of its use in the freight transport sector
and its better fuel economy and lower CO2 emissions.
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Figure 9-1: Diesel Demand Grows as Gasoline Demand Falls
Gasoline and Diesel Demand Forecasts in the EU-15
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9.2.1 Sweden leads in lower sulfur fuels
Sweden was the first country in Europe to have very low sulfur levels for its diesel fuels.
It was motivated by health and environmental concerns about diesel emissions in urban areas.
As early as 1989, the Swedish government, interested in the effect of diesel fuel quality on
emissions, asked its Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Swedish EPA) to conduct a
study and make a proposal regarding diesel fuel specifications. The research study found a
quantifiable relationship between diesel fuel quality, the emissions' chemical composition, and
their biological effects (Egeback and Westerholm 1992). As a result, the Swedish government
supported diesel fuel specifications that included 10 ppm maximum sulfur content, 50/0
maximum aromatics content, a minimum cetane index of 50. Lower sulfur content and lower
aromatics reduces PM emissions, while a higher cetane index improves combustion.
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In 1991, the Swedish government introduced financial incentives in the form of tax
differentiation to encourage refiners to distribute the Environmental Class I diesel, or "city
diesel," with these specifications. It established 3 classes of diesel fuel - Class I, II, and III. At
that time, the standard diesel fuel's sulfur limit was 2000 ppm, which went down to 500 ppm in
1996. The maximum sulfur content of Class I, II, and II fuel was 10 ppm, 50 ppm, and 500 ppm,
respectively. To keep the new tax policy revenue neutral, the government increased taxes on the
lower quality fuels.
Table 9-4: Swedish Tax Differentiation
Units in ECU/liter and in 1990/91 US dollars/gallon in parentheses 39
Environmental Class 1990 1991
Class I 0.107
(0.501)
Class II 0.131
(0.631)
Class III (standard) 0.127 0.148
(0.611) (0.693)
Source: Arthur D. Little (1998)
The Swedish government increased the tax differentiation in 1992 so that in 1992-93,
Class III was 0.053 ECU/liter (US$0.26/gallon) more than Class I, and in 1994, 0.060 ECU/liter
(US$0.27/gallon) more (Arthur D. Little 1998).40 "City diesel" was originally designed to be
used in urban areas, while the lower quality Class II and III fuels would be used outside cities
and for home heating. However, by 1995, the market share of "city diesel" was already
approaching 100% of road transport fuels. By 1996, "city diesel" had 85% of Sweden's total
diesel fuel market (EC 1995; Olivastri and Williamson 2000). Figure 9-2 shows that the Class I
fuel penetrated the market in just 3 years.
39 The ECU, or the European Currency Unit, was the predecessor to the euro. In 1999, the ECU was set equal to one
euro. Historical exchange rates from FXTOP.com: In 1990, 1 ECU = US$1.27; in 1991, ECU = US$1.24.
40 Historical exchange rates from FXTOP.com: In 1992, 1 ECU = US$1.30; in 1994, 1 ECU = US$1.20.
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Figure 9-2: Switching to Environmental Class I in the Swedish Diesel Fuel Market
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The tax differential provided financial incentives to both consumers and refineries. By
lowering the price of cleaner fuel formulations, it eliminated the cost advantage of the more
polluting fuels and encouraged consumers to switch to the cleaner formulations. Because cleaner
formulations cost more for refineries to produce, the tax differential ensured the refineries of
consumer demand for the low sulfur product and helped to cover the added cost of refinery
upgrades. Prior to the introduction of the tax differentiation, Swedish refineries did not exert any
leadership to produce cleaner fuels (Arthur D. Little 1998). At this time, no other country had a
comparable initiative, so industry had no precedent to follow and was uncertain about clean fuel
demand. Not until the tax advantages were certain did the industry make the investments.
9.2.2 Finland follows Sweden's example
In July 1993, the Finnish government introduced a tax differential to promote diesel fuel
with 50 ppm sulfur, 20% aromatics, and a 47 cetane index, which was equivalent to the Swedish
Environmental Class II. This low-sulfur diesel was taxed 0.15 FIM/liter ($0.10/gallon in 1993
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US dollars)41 less than the regular diesel with 500 ppm sulfur (Olivastri and Williamson 2000).
The tax differential was designed to be revenue-neutral, so higher sulfur fuel was taxed higher
than before. Finnish refiners invested 365 million ECU (approximately US$400 million) to
produce low-sulfur diesel. In the first year of the Finnish low sulfur diesel initiative, 70% of
diesel fuel was low sulfur diesel. By 1996, 85% of diesel fuel sold in Finland had a sulfur level
below 50 ppm (Arthur D. Little 1998).
Unlike the Swedish refineries, which only responded to the demand for lower sulfur fuels
after the government's tax differentiation, the Finnish refineries were more proactive. By 1993,
they had already observed the Sweden's early success with cleaner fuels, and anticipated the
Finnish government following Sweden's example. Finnish refiners began making clean fuel
investments before the introduction of tax differentiation in Finland. They were confident
enough in existing Swedish demand and expected Finnish demand for lower sulfur fuels.
Deregulation of fuel markets also made Finnish refineries more receptive to producing and
selling special, value-added products (Arthur D. Little 1998). According to an international fuels
expert, the Swedish and Finnish governments' adoption of cleaner fuels was partially motivated
by a desire to protect local refineries from the Russian oil industry. In the early to mid-1990s,
Russia began to upgrade its aging and inefficient oil industry, seeking to expand its business
from supplying crude oil to refining petroleum products, including high octane, lead-free
gasoline and low sulfur diesel (FT Energy 1994).
9.2.3 Environmental benefits to Sweden and Finland
The environmental benefits of the adoption of city diesel were two-fold. First, it directly
reduced emissions of S02, NOx, polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAH), and PM. A study by
consulting firm Arthur D. Little estimated the following emission changes when switching to
cleaner fuel from the normal ungraded fuel in Sweden and Finland:
41 0.15 FIM/liter is approximately equivalent to $0.026/liter in 1993 US dollars. In July 1, 1993, 1 FIM = 0.176
USD (FTXOP 2001).
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Table 9-5: Estimated Emission Changes from Switching to Cleaner Fuels in Finland and
Sweden
Pollutant Finnish Reformulated Sweden Class I Sweden Class II
(50 ppm sulfur) (10ppm sulfur) (50ppm sulfur)
CO -6to2% -6to8% 9%
HC -20% to 12% 2 to 18% -10% to 24%
NOx -12% to -5% -11% to -5% -9% to -4%
PM -25% to -10% -30% to -10% -12% to-4%
PAH -54% -75% -36%
SO 2 -96% -99% -95%
Source: Arthur D. Little (1998)
Note: Negative values denote reductions while positive values denote increases.
Although there are estimates on emission reductions from switching to cleaner fuels,
there were no specific quantitative data on the national air quality and health benefits of
switching to low sulfur fuel in Sweden and Finland (Arthur D. Little 1998). The Arthur D. Little
estimates only calculate the impact of the fuel change only, not accounting for any emission
control equipment that could then be added because of the higher fuel quality.
The second major environmental benefit was that the widespread availability of Class I
diesel fuel enabled new, cleaner diesel technologies and retrofits of existing vehicles. For the
public to realize these benefits, the burden was on the vehicle and aftertreatment industry to
market vehicles and devices with larger emission reduction capability, and for customers to
purchase these new technologies. By 1996, over 1,000 trucks and buses in Scandinavia had been
retrofitted with aftertreatment devices that required fuel sulfur levels below 50 ppm (Arthur D.
Little 1998). The widespread availability of 10 ppm sulfur diesel in Sweden allowed the largest
cities in Sweden to establish "Environmental Zones" starting in 1996. Older, high-polluting
diesel trucks and buses would not be allowed into the city centers without having an approved
retrofit device capable of reducing PM by 80% and HC by 60%. After the program's first 3
years, 3,000 vehicles had been retrofitted with aftertreatment systems. In 2002, the requirements
became more stringent: HC had to be reduced by 80% and NOx by 30% (Dieselnet 2002)
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9.2.4 Business opportunity for Greenergy International
Business opportunities arose from the early introduction of cleaner fuels. The UK-based
low-sulfur fuel supplier Greenergy International started in 1992, marketing Class I diesel to
Sweden after the introduction of the tax differentials. In anticipation of tax incentives across
Europe for 50 ppm and 10 ppm diesel, it spread its operations the UK in 1994, and to Germany,
Switzerland, and Finland in 1996. It sourced its fuel from Scandinavian refineries, which were
already producing ultra-low sulfur fuels for the Swedish and Finnish market. As of 2000, it was
the largest supplier of 50 and 10 ppm sulfur fuels. In response to the European Commission's
"Call for Evidence" on fuel sulfur levels, Greenergy supported switching the whole European
market to sulfur free (below 10 ppm) fuels (Greenergy 2000). This clearly would offer financial
benefits to Greenergy, because of its position as a leader in supplying very low sulfur fuels. The
privately-held Greenergy has grown dramatically in the last 5 years. Within 4 years, it increased
its total fuel sales volume sixfold: from a monthly fuel volume of 20 million liters (76 million
gallons) in January 2001 to 180 million liters (680 million gallons) in July 2004 (Greenergy
2005). Greenergy prides itself on its influence on UK government fuels policy. It acknowledges
actively lobbying for tax incentives in the UK, Germany, and Switzerland for ultra-low sulfur
fuels (Greenergy 2005).
9.2.5 Sweden and Finland's influence on EU sulfur standards
Sweden and Finland encouraged the European Commission to use their extensive
experience with low sulfur diesel as a basis for its decision-making on EU-wide diesel sulfur
levels. The Swedish and Finnish governments even hired Arthur D. Little to create a case study
for informational and instructive purposes (Arthur D. Little 1998). When critics claimed that
getting down to 10 ppm sulfur content would be too difficult, the Commission pointed to these
early-mover countries' success in promoting the rapid, widespread adoption of 10 ppm fuel
through tax incentives. Moreover, the Arthur D. Little study claimed that the sulfur reductions
could be done at costs lower than those estimated in the Auto-Oil Programme. In response to the
Commission's 2000 Call for Evidence about the sulfur content of gasoline and diesel, the
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Swedish Environment Ministry explained its tax differentiation system, the industry response,
and the resulting environmental benefits (Swedish Ministry of the Environment 2000). The
Swedish and Finnish experiences demonstrated that very low sulfur levels could be introduced
successfully, giving the European Commission confidence to introduce low sulfur fuel
throughout the EU.
9.2.6 Auto Oil I's influence on EU sulfur standards
When the European Commission, the European auto industry (as represented by ACEA)
and the European oil industry (as represented by EUROPIA) collaborated on the Auto Oil
Programme, they evaluated the effect of fuel quality on vehicle emission reduction. Both phases
of the program, 1993-97 Auto Oil I and 1997-2000 Auto Oil II, made recommendations on
maximum diesel sulfur levels to the European Commission. Those recommendations formed the
basis of the EU diesel sulfur limits. In 1998, the European Commission passed Directive 98/70,
which specified a diesel fuel sulfur limit of 350 ppm for 2000 and 50 ppm for 2005. Auto Oil II
led to Directive 2003/17/EC which confirmed setting the sulfur limit of 50 ppm for January 2005.
Diesel fuel with 10 ppm sulfur would have to be available on a limited, "appropriately balanced
geographical basis," and then on a systemwide basis by January 2009.
9.2.7 Expected supporters of lower sulfur
The automotive and truck industries have been longtime supporters of cleaner fuel
because it helps vehicles achieve lower vehicle emission levels. Since 1998, an international
coalition of engine and auto manufacturers has supported a Worldwide Fuel Charter calling for a
maximum sulfur level of 5-10 ppm for both gasoline and diesel fuels, which are very low
compared to the levels mandated for 2000 (ACEA, Alliance et al. 2002). While some emission
control devices operate effectively at the 50 ppm sulfur level, two key' technologies - catalyzed
particulate filters and NOx adsorbers - require sulfur levels of 10-15 ppm or less.
The European oil industry recognized the value of getting down to 50 ppm for 2005, but
was more hesitant about further reduction to 10 ppm. Two of its industry associations,
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CONCAWE (Oil Companies' European Organization for Environmental and Health Protection)
and EUROPIA (European Petroleum Industry Association), pointed out that the direct emission
reductions were "insignificant" and that the sulfur-sensitive technologies were still under
development. More R&D could reveal ways to reduce their sulfur sensitivity. They also
expressed their concerns about the considerable refinery investment needed to go from 50 ppm to
10 ppm, and the increased CO, emissions from the more intensive desulfurization processes.
The associations recommended further joint research on vehicle technologies and required sulfur
levels, a suggestion would also delay new mandates (EUROPIA/CONCAWE 2000).
9.2.8 EU-wide fuel sulfur reduction
In 1998, following review of submissions by various governments and industry groups,
the European Commission approved Directive 98/70 requiring maximum gasoline and diesel fuel
sulfur levels of 50 ppm and limited availability of 10 ppm fuel by 2005. Individual member
nations could offer fiscal incentives to encourage early production. At this point, Sweden and
Finland had already achieved full adoption of ultra-low sulfur fuel because of their tax
differentiation policy dating back to the early 1990s. Several other countries, such as the UK,
Germany, and Denmark, followed suit in using differential tax rates to accelerate adoption.
9.2.9 Early movers in the UK, motivated by tax incentives
Seeking to accelerate the adoption of lower sulfur fuels, several EU countries created tax
incentives for ultra-low sulfur fuels (below 50 ppm) sold before 2005. The UK government
offered a 1-pence per liter tax reduction on ultra-low sulfur fuels in 1997, followed by a 2-pence
reduction in 1998, and then a 3-pence reduction in 1999.42 The 3-pence differential in 1999 led
to an estimated reduction of 21% of PM and 2% of NOx (Olivastri and Williamson 2000). The
first 1-pence tax differential prompted two large UK supermarket chains, Sainsbury's and Tesco,
which also sell motor fuel, to purchase the 10 ppm sulfur "city diesel" from fuel supplier
42 One pence is approximately equivalent to 1.6 cents in 1997 US currency (FXTOP 2001).
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Greenergy and sell it at no additional cost to the consumer. Greenergy had already supplied fuel
of the same specification in Sweden, and was eager to expand its market to the UK.
Sainsbury's had been selling Greenergy's city diesel since 1995, but at a 2-pence per liter
price premium over standard diesel. Once the 2-pence per liter differential went into effect in
1998, Sainsbury's could sell the standard and 10 ppm diesel products at parity. As a result,
Sainsbury's city diesel sales jumped from 30% to over 50% of the total diesel sales in March
1998. Because of the city diesel's popularity, it was anticipated that the supermarket chain
would no longer have to offer standard diesel in the future. Sainsbury's share of total diesel sales
is significant. In 1998, it sold 300,000 metric tons per year of diesel, 16% of total UK diesel
sales (FT Energy 1998; Sainsbury's 1998).
Environmental NGOs in the UK criticized the major oil companies, especially British-
based BP and Shell (number 2 and 3 in the global market), for not following the supermarkets'
example. BP and Shell responded that the 1-pence duty differential was inadequate to cover the
estimated additional 3 pence per liter cost of producing ultra-low sulfur fuel for widespread use.
They limited their sales of the fuel to heavy-duty commercial fleets (Buie 1998). Although they
had the capability at their Haven and Grangemouth refineries to produce the fuel, they were also
tied up in exchange agreements with partners that could not match the very low 10 ppm sulfur
specification (FT Energy 1998).
Independent fuel supplier Greenergy continued to sell to supermarkets and fleets, and
growing its business in the UK, where it is headquartered. It benefited financially by selling a
specialty product to environmentally-minded businesses and customers. By 2005, Greenergy
had achieved a 5% market share of the UK fuels market (Greenergy 2005). However, it did not
take long for increasingly large tax differentials in the UK to attract competition from the oil
majors. Soon after the UK duty differential rose to 3 pence per liter in 1999, the large energy
producers reconsidered their previous reluctance to sell 10 ppm sulfur diesel (Automotive
Environment Analyst 1998a).
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9.2.10 Tax incentives motivate BP
BP was one of the major oil companies that waited for more substantial tax incentives
before selling 50 ppm sulfur diesel. In 1999, BP began marketing gasoline and diesel fuels with
sulfur levels below 50 ppm. Its Clean Cities Programme promised to voluntarily provide cleaner
fuel to 40 cities by 2000. In its home market in the UK, BP quickly introduced its new "BP
Greener Diesel" to replace standard diesel at all its retail stations, making it the first major oil
company to sell ultra-low sulfur diesel nationwide at no additional cost to the consumer. At that
time, many oil companies were offering 50 ppm sulfur diesel to urban fleet operators, but very
few retail stations carried the fuel (HM Customs and Excise 2000). By the end of 2000, BP had
cleaner fuels available in 59 cities and in 110 cities by the end of 2001 (BP 2005). In countries
like the UK, Denmark, and Germany, lower tax rates on ultra-low sulfur fuels offset the higher
production cost and encouraged 100% penetration of the new fuels, well ahead of the 2005
deadline. In 1999, BP introduced the clean fuels in 40 stations in Paris, and then to all 240
stations, but France did not offer tax incentives (Olivastri and Williamson 2000). The company
proceeded to actively lobby the French government, albeit unsuccessfully, for clean fuel
incentives (Europe Environment 2002). The lack of incentives has inhibited the widespread
introduction of ultra-low sulfur fuels in France before the EU-wide deadline.
EUROPIA, the European oil industry association, had been resistant to the European
Commission's interest in lowering sulfur levels below 50 ppm. It also did not support
accelerating sulfur reduction through financial incentives. EUROPIA argued that when one
company switched to ultra-low sulfur fuel, others would be pressured to follow, disrupting
industrial structure and disadvantaging smaller producers (FT Energy 2001). Because of the tax
differentials, this scenario did actually occur, and other large oil companies like Shell and Esso
joined BP in offering 50 ppm sulfur diesel. In the UK, the market penetration of 50 ppm diesel
rapidly climbed to almost 100% by August 1999, just months after the 3-pence differential was
announced in March 1999 (HM Customs and Excise 2000).
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Figure 9-3: ULSD Adoption in the UK
Source: HM Customs and Excise (2000)
The new fuel requirements have led to industry restructuring. Already in a market
suffering from overcapacity problems, some European refineries have found it more feasible to
close rather than upgrade (Knott 1998). In 1998, the European Commission received a report
entitled, "Oil Refining in the European Community," which estimated a surplus capacity of 1.4
to 2.0 million barrels per day, meaning that 9 to 13 refineries would have to closed (Petroleum
Economist 1998). As the world's second largest publicly traded oil company after ExxonMobil,
BP benefited from scale economies in producing ultra-low sulfur fuels, and used its political
clout to push for tax incentives in more countries. BP was better equipped to afford refinery
upgrades than small, independent refiners. In the mid-1990s, BP made upgrade investments at
its refinery at Grangemouth, Scotland, in anticipation of more stringent fuel requirements
(McCrone 1999). While its competitors eventually reduced sulfur levels in their fuels, BP took
advantage of learning from early investment and positive publicity from regulators, the media,
and environmental groups. BP has also been able to leverage its global presence and introduce
ultra-low sulfur fuels in other markets, such as Australia and the US. While Greenergy was the
first to supply ultra-low sulfur fuels to the UK market, their small size and limited geographical
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Chart 4.2: ULSD share of the diesel market
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reach did not attract the same type of attention that BP received for being the first mover of the
large energy producers. However, any financial advantage that BP had over other oil companies
was short-lived, because soon every major oil company in Europe was marketing ULSD. Its
longer-term benefits extended to other markets, such as Australia and the US, where ULSD had
not yet been widespread.
It is clear that without the tax incentives, companies like Sainsbury's, Greenergy, and BP
would not have offered the ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel at the same price as standard diesel.
Because desulfurization requires costly refinery investment, it would not have made economic
sense to produce the fuel without tax incentives. Consumers willing to pay extra for cleaner fuel
are a small majority. In order for clean fuels to become widespread, they had to be cost-
competitive with standard fuel. Additional proof that the early introduction of clean fuels was
motivated primarily by tax incentives is the delayed adoption of low-sulfur gasoline in the UK.
Gasoline did not benefit from the same tax advantages as diesel until later, and therefore, did not
experience the same rapid adoption until later. For example, in the UK, it was not until 2000 that
the UK government introduced a 1-pence tax differential on ultra-low sulfur gasoline (< 50 ppm
sulfur). A year later, the UK increased the differential to 3 pence, expecting that cleaner gasoline
would be adopted as quickly as diesel (HM Customs and Excise 2000). The switch was very
successful: by July 2001, 98% of all UK retail sites had replaced their standard unleaded gasoline
with ultra-low sulfur gasoline (Williamson 2001).
9.2.11 Environmental benefits in the UK
The UK government estimated the direct emission benefits of switching to 50 ppm sulfur
diesel before the 2005 EU deadline. Including the use of aftertreatment technology, the fuel
switch led to 5.3-5.5% less PM10 emissions and 0.4% less NOx emissions annually from road
transport in 2001-04 (HM Customs and Excise 2000). Aftertreatment systems enabled by ultra-
low sulfur fuel will lead to further reductions.
The early adoption of ultra-low sulfur fuels in Sweden, Finland, and the UK relied on
preferential tax differentials on clean fuels, which created customer demand and motivation for
refinery investment. While some companies showed initiative in getting the fuels to the market
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first, they would have not done so without government action. However, when Sweden
successfully used tax differentiation, it created a precedent for other countries to do the same. In
these cases, it was countries, not companies, which were first movers. Once companies learned
from their experiences in the first-mover countries, they moved to lobbying other countries for
similar policies.
9.2.12 System-wide problems
As more countries adopt cleaner fuels, the popularity of low sulfur diesel has led to an
uneven geographic distribution of benefits and costs. The use of tax incentives by some
countries to encourage the introduction of 10 or 50 ppm sulfur diesel ahead of the EU deadlines
poses serious problems for the fuel supply. Strong demand for light, sweet crude product, which
contains lower levels of contaminants like hydrogen and sulfur, has raised ultra-low sulfur fuel
costs. The North Sea and Nigeria are sources of this sweet crude, while most of the Middle East,
Venezuela, and Russia produce heavy, sour crude. European refineries with capability to refine
low quality, sour crude benefit from major discounts for fuel exporters in the Middle East,
central Europe, and Russia. However, many are equipped only to handle lower sulfur crude
product. Refineries with the technology to refine sour crude stand to do well in the marketplace
(Petroleum Economist 2005).
The growth of diesel vehicles and the resulting fuel demand in Europe has also led to an
imbalance in diesel and gasoline demand. Even though the EU suffered from overcapacity in the
1990s, amounting to 510 to 730 million barrels per day, overinvestment in catalytic cracking
resulted in excess gasoline production and insufficient diesel fuel. One approach has been to
reduce the price gap between diesel and gasoline by increasing taxes on diesel, which has
historically lower tax rates in most EU countries. Another option has been the export of excess
gasoline to the US and the import of diesel fuel from the US. While the US and EU export
petroleum products to other countries, they still import refined gasoline and diesel product
because of the demand for specific product specifications. There is a distinct difference in the
gasoline-diesel trade flow: in 2002, the US imported 182 million barrels of gasoline vs. 97.6
million barrels of diesel. In the same year, Western Europe imported 257 million barrels of
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gasoline vs. 650 million barrels of diesel (EIA-DOE 2003). Presently, about one-third of the US
imported motor gasoline comes from Europe (EIA-DOE 2006b).
Figure 9-4: US-EU Petroleum Product Trade Flows
US-EU Trade Flows of Refined Gasoline and Diesel Product
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Countries without requirements for low-sulfur fuel could find themselves dumping
grounds for the cheaper, high-sulfur fuel. Many of these countries are developing nations with a
rapidly growing passenger vehicle fleet. For example, China's growing petroleum demand has
increased its reliance on imported crude, which tends to have higher sulfur content than its
domestic crude. With the more industrialized countries demanding lower sulfur feedstock, the
prices of sour crude have dropped significantly, attracting Chinese refineries (Chinese Academy
of Engineering 2003). Countries with less stringent sulfur standards may find their own fuel
quality worse off than before the European countries adopted cleaner fuels.
Not all regions in Europe have access to low-sulfur crude. Refineries in southern Europe
are at a cost disadvantage because they have predominately sour crude feedstock. Their
feedstock for 2005 was estimated to be 59% sour and 35% sweet, while nortbern Europe's is
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28% sour and 58% sweet (Birch and Ulivieri 2000). Sweet crude is preferred because sour
crude has higher sulfur and hydrogen content, and therefore is more difficult and costly to refine.
Even while it is important to value the rapid adoption of ultra-low sulfur diesel in some of the
European countries, the trade and cost imbalances caused by dramatic sulfur reductions are real.
As more countries converge toward requiring very low fuel sulfur levels, there will be a greater
need to encourage refinery investment in desulfurization technology capable of handling sour
crude.
9.3 United States
Unlike Europe, where diesel-powered cars account for half of new car sales, the US
passenger car fleet is predominantly gasoline-powered. Highway diesel fuel is used primarily to
power buses and trucks. In the 1990s, research studies on the detrimental health impacts of
diesel exhaust galvanized US environmental officials to take stronger action on diesel emissions.
California, arguably the most environmentally progressive state in the US, designated diesel
particulate matter as a toxic air contaminant in 1998. This designation initiated a formal state
plan to reduce diesel emissions, and threatened to decrease the demand for diesel fuel. States
unable to meet their ambient air quality standards for ozone, particulate matter, and other
pollutants are expected to adopt more stringent measures to reach attainment levels, or risk
losing federal highway funding. California contains many severe or serious nonattainment areas
for ozone and particulates.
NGO-led campaigns drawing attention to diesel exhaust's detrimental health effects
targeted transit agencies, which operated large diesel-powered bus fleets. For example, the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) launched the "Dump Dirty Diesels" campaign in
New York City in 1995, to raise public awareness and put pressure on transit officials to switch
to alternative fuels, like natural gas, ethanol, or electricity, or use ultra-low sulfur diesel with
retrofitted buses (NRDC 2002). In response to these pressures, state regulators passed more
stringent vehicle emission standards for public fleets and offered fiscal incentives for municipal
and school bus fleets to purchase compressed natural gas (CNG) vehicles as an alternative to
diesel-powered vehicles (EESI 2005). Some municipalities funded the installation of emission
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control equipment and the purchase of ultra-low sulfur fuel for diesel bus retrofits. It was largely
state and local initiatives that led to limited industry action to adopt ultra-low sulfur fuels ahead
of federal regulation.
9.3.1 Regulatory process
Since 1994, the US has had a maximum diesel fuel sulfur limit of 500 ppm. The average
sulfur level is 340 ppm, and because of more restrictions in California, CARB diesel has 120
ppm sulfur. With diesel emission standards becoming more stringent, vehicle and engine
manufacturers had been pushing EPA for years to lower sulfur limits as well. In the late 1990s,
Europe and Japan had announced plans to lower their diesel sulfur levels from 500 ppm to 50
ppm by 2005. Around this time, government and industry agreed on the need to address
emission reduction by considering engines/vehicles, aftertreatment, and fuel quality as a single
system. Regulations should reflect their interdependency.
In 1999, EPA initiated the regulatory procedure for proposing new heavy-duty diesel
engine emission standards and diesel fuel sulfur levels. EPA gave advance notice of its
rulemaking process in May 1999, followed by a proposal in June 2000. In addition to analysis
performed by EPA staff, comments from industry and other interested parties were considered in
setting the standards. Deciding the sulfur level in diesel fuel turned out to be the most
contentious part of the rulemaking. The automobile, engine, and emission control manufacturers
pushed for very low sulfur levels, while the petroleum industry argued for a more moderate
reduction.
9.3.2 Industry supporters
It comes as no surprise that US automobile, engine, and emission control manufacturers
would want sulfur levels as low as possible. Low sulfur levels improve the performance of
emission control devices, making it easier for vehicle and engine manufacturers to meet the more
stringent emission standards. Even sulfur levels as low as 30 ppm had been shown to lower the
effectiveness of particulate removal in filters (EPA 1999c). The Alliance of Automobile
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Manufacturers (AAM), the Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA), and the Manufacturers of
Emission Control Association (MECA) were major advocates of a 15 ppm sulfur standard.
Emission control manufacturers made a strong case for reducing diesel fuel sulfur levels
well below 50 ppm. In its communications with EPA, CDPF manufacturer Johnson Matthey
attributed the success of CDPFs in European test fleets to very low fuel sulfur levels.
Comparisons between the Swedish and Finnish fleets revealed that 50 ppm fuel sulfur levels
were sufficiently high in sulfur to block oxidation of NO to NO2 and inhibit proper filter
regeneration in cold weather. The higher sulfur levels compromised the reliability of the DPFs.
The Swedish fleets ran successfully on 10 ppm fuel, while the Finnish fleets suffered a 10%
failure rate when running on 50 ppm fuel (EPA 2000b).
9.3.3 Industry opponents
The petroleum industry, as represented by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and
the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association (NPRA), contended that a 15 ppm sulfur
standard was unnecessarily low. They questioned the alleged air quality benefits and scientific
rationale behind the standard. API claimed that nearly the same emission benefits could be
obtained at a much lower cost with a maximum 50 ppm cap/30 ppm average sulfur standard
(EPA 2000a). EPA disagreed with the petroleum industry's claims, and put substantial
consideration into fuel quality as an enabler of emission control technologies (EPA 2000a).
Through their responses to the rulemaking, API, NPRA, and individual oil companies
Marathon Ashland and ExxonMobil demonstrated their strong opposition to the EPA's proposed
15 ppm sulfur standard. However, not all oil companies were adamantly opposed to the standard.
BP had expressed its ability to meet the 15 ppm sulfur limit in the timeframe proposed by the
EPA. In its comments to EPA, it was more concerned with the details of meeting the regulation
(i.e. timing of supply introduction, opposition to an averaging system or phase-in approach) than
the standard itself (EPA 2000a). According to senior EPA officials, BP was at odds with the
other oil companies and its own trade associations by not opposing the 15 ppm limit. BP had
already positioned itself as a supplier of cleaner fuels and saw market share growth potential in
stepping forward. BP's introduction of 10 ppm sulfur diesel in Europe, especially in the UK and
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Germany, had given it experience to roll out ultra-low sulfur diesel in the US. Moreover, it had
recently acquired the California-based energy company ARCO, which had already been working
closely with the California Air Resources Board since 1999 to introduce ultra-low sulfur diesel to
California.
9.3.4 Early action from ARCO/BP
In the late 1990s, federal regulators were focusing on new gasoline standards, and did not
plan to address new diesel sulfur levels until 1999 or 2000. Even though the final diesel sulfur
standard was not yet known at the time, many large metropolitan areas began requiring filter
retrofits and ULSD for their diesel-powered public buses. For example, the California Air
Resources Board mandated that by July 2002, all of its urban diesel-powered bus fleets had to
run on ULSD (CARB, 2000).
ARCO, later acquired by BP in 1999, responded to the growing public and regulatory
attention to diesel emission control. Concerned about diesel fuel losing market share to CNG,
ARCO sought to demonstrate emission reductions enabled by cleaner diesel fuel. In 1999, it
began providing ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) to municipal fleets in selected California cities
for an additional 5 cents per gallon. In large metropolitan areas with serious air quality problems,
government air quality and transit agencies provided subsidies to cover the costs of retrofits and
ULSD. Early that year, ARCO had initiated the EC-Diesel program, a fleet technology
validation program, in California to evaluate the use of catalyzed diesel particulate filters with
ULSD. It compared the performance of retrofitted vehicles with ULSD and CARB diesel (120
ppm sulfur). Based on testing of eight vehicle fleets, the combination of CDPFs and ULSD
produced over 90% less PM, CO, and HC than CARB-fueled vehicles without filters (LeTavec
and al. 2002). ARCO conducted the demonstration projects as a response to the strong anti-
diesel sentiment growing in California. It wanted to demonstrate that clean diesel was
competitive with CNG vehicles in terms of cost and emission reduction. From an economic
standpoint, it was important that diesel stay viable as a product because a decreased demand for
diesel in favor of natural gas could disrupt the balance in supply of other petroleum products.4 3
43 Interview with a senior expert in the diesel vehicle and fuel industry, February 2003
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Unlike the UK or other European countries, the US did not have federal tax incentives to
make the cost of ULSD comparable to that of regular diesel fuel. However, some municipalities
had set aside funds to subsidize ULSD and vehicle retrofits. EPA has also offered grants to some
fleets through its Voluntary Diesel Retrofit Program. These different incentive schemes changed
BP's sales and distribution strategy in the US. Rather than introducing ULSD throughout its
retail stations, BP chose a more targeted sales approach and sold limited quantities directly to
urban municipal or school district fleets. BP entered in direct contracts with the fleets, mainly
providing ULSD to retrofitted school and urban buses.
Table 9-6 lists some of BP's ULSD contracts. For many cities, the combination of ULSD
and new or retrofitted clean diesel buses proved to be more cost-effective than CNG buses. For
instance, the Cleveland Regional Transit Authority chose diesel over CNG after estimating that a
diesel bus running on ULSD would cost $419,000 to operate over its average 12-year lifespan,
compared to $550,000 for a CNG bus (Bennett 2002). As a result of the publicity generated
from successful local projects across the US, BP entered into numerous ULSD contracts with
local fleet operators.
Table 9-6: BP's Major ULSD Offerings in the US
Client Contract Scope
Ann Arbor Transit 2002: 1 million gallons ULSD 90-bus fleet
Authority annually for 12 cents/gallon premium Plans to install EGR/DPF retrofit
kits in all buses within 3 years
California 1999: ULSD sold to municipal fleets Full potential: 750,000 diesel
for 5 ¢/gal over CARB diesel; 2002: vehicles in CA
ULSD sold at ARCO stations
statewide for 5 ¢/gal premium
Chicago Transit 2003: 21.2 million gallons of ULSD 226 cleaner filter-equipped diesel
Authority annually buses
484 filter retrofits
Cleveland Regional 2002: ULSD for 225 new buses 225 new filter-equipped diesel buses
Transit Authority will use ULSD; potential to replace
521 diesel buses
Houston 2001: Fleet testing programs
Minneapolis Metro 2004: $4-5 million annually for 400 out of fleet's 867 buses will
Transit ULSD receive fuel
Sources: Blake (2004), BP (2002; 2003)
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9.3.5 BP's input into CARB and EPA rulemaking
BP's early introduction of ULSD and its collaborative efforts with regulators, engine and
bus manufacturers, and emission control manufacturers did not escape the attention of state and
federal environmental officials. The California Air Resources Board used the initial results of
diesel retrofit demonstration projects involving ARCO's ULSD to shape its 2000 public transit
bus fleet rule. The dramatic 91-99% PM emission reduction possible with ULSD prompted
regulators to treat retrofitted or new clean diesel buses running on ULSD as an equivalent option
alongside CNG vehicles (CARB 1999). Interim reports of diesel retrofit projects involving BP's
ULSD fuel were reviewed by the EPA staff as they finalized diesel fuel sulfur standards for 2006.
In response to the oil industry's complaints prior to the rule's finalization, EPA cited
BP/ARCO's early introduction of 15 ppm ULSD in California as evidence of technological and
cost feasibility. The final rule requires at least 80% of the diesel fuel supply to have a maximum
15 ppm sulfur content. The timing of the compliance deadline was another subject of debate.
EPA initially proposed a June 1, 2006 full retail compliance date. Desiring more time because of
the transition from winter to summer gasoline, API recommended a January 1, 2007 deadline,
while BP recommended a September 1, 2006 retail deadline. Ultimately, EPA finalized the rule
with a September 1, 2006 retail deadline (EPA 2000a). Since then, EPA has extended the
deadline by 45 days to October 15, 2006 to allow for a smoother refinery-to-retail transition
(EPA 2005).
9.3.6 Other early movers and ULSD supporters
Although BP may have been the largest and most vocal of the oil companies supporting
ULSD at 15 ppm, there were a few other oil companies that did not join API and NPRA in
opposing EPA's sulfur standard. Tosco, the largest independent refiner in the US, produced
ULSD (sulfur levels < 30 ppm) for municipal fleets. In 2000, it began its contract with New
York City to supply 126,000 gallons of fuel per day to the city's 4400 transit buses (Tosco 2001).
In its response to EPA's sulfur rulemaking, it openly supported a nationwide 15 ppm sulfur
standard by 2006. Tosco often shared the same positions on the regulatory details as
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environmental groups and regulatory officials. BP and Tosco's support for the regulation is
perhaps best reflected in the EPA's response: "Statements by refining companies, such as BP
Amoco and Tosco, that they will desulfurize their highway diesel fuel earlier than necessary is
further evidence that this rule is affordable" (EPA 2000a). Because BP and Tosco were ready to
make the investments to supply ULSD even before 2006, they both opposed EPA's granting of
extensions or hardship waivers to companies (EPA 2000a).
9.3.7 Limited early adoption
Other than demonstration projects and fleet contracts, availability of ultra-low diesel fuel
has been limited in the US. Without tax incentives, major oil companies have little motivation to
introduce a cleaner but more costly product to the market before the regulatory deadline. EPA
does allow for companies to obtain tradable credits beginning in 2005 if they produce 15 ppm
diesel fuel before the 2006 deadline. However, it does not provide enough incentive to act early,
and it creates an allowance for oil companies to continue producing 500 ppm fuel past 2006. It
is unlikely that ULSD will be marketed on a widespread basis until fall 2006. EPA's temporary
compliance option allows 20% of refiners to sell the high-sulfur product until 2010, as long as
they purchase credits from those who produce 15 ppm fuel. Small refiners, which make up 5%
of the US highway diesel fuel, face significantly higher compliance costs, so the EPA rule
permits them to delay selling ULSD until 2010 without purchasing credits (EPA 2000b). In the
absence of these flexibility options, companies with higher compliance costs would leave the
market. Although it is likely more efficient to leave the market to the more technologically
advanced and larger refineries, this could disrupt the available fuel supply in the short term and
hurt small businesses (EIA-DOE 2001). The government clearly has an interest in balancing the
economic health of the refining industry with environmental benefits.
Demand estimates conducted by the Department of Energy indicate that the ULSD
supply may not be enough to meet diesel demand (EIA-DOE 2001). The ULSD shortage could
lead to sharp short-term price increases. This could spur refiners to maximize ULSD production
by shifting other distillate streams to ULSD.
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The availability of ULSD in 2006 in the US could open the light-duty vehicle market for
diesel cars and trucks capable of meeting the Tier 2 standards, to be phased in between 2004 and
2007" The steep rise in gasoline prices in the past few years has provoked serious discussion
about increased light-duty diesel penetration. Regular grade gasoline prices rose from an
average of$1.13 per gallon in the 1990s to an average of $2.27 per gallon in 2005 (EIA-DOE
2006b). High prices have led automakers, politicians, and regulators alike to think more
seriously about the potential for diesels in the US.
A growth in diesel market share would have a major impact on the refining industry.
Existing US refineries have been designed to maximize gasoline output, so increasing diesel
output would require costly refinery upgrades, which could raise diesel prices. Figure 9-5 shows
that the US refineries are optimized to produce more gasoline rather than middle distillates (gas
oil and diesel fuel). Meanwhile, the Japanese and European refineries produce only 24%
gasoline, and significantly more gas oil/diesel fuel.
Figure 9-5: Refinery Product and Final Consumption Mix in 2003
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This is not the first time that modifying the diesel-gasoline fleet mix has brought
concerns for the refining industry. In the late 1970s, in the midst of the oil crises, speculation
about dramatic diesel growth in the US cast similar doubts about feedstock availability and
prices (Chemical Week 1977). Any significant increase in diesel demand in the US could also
have adverse effects on Europe, which imports excess diesel fuel from the US and exports its
excess gasoline to the US. Europe would have to find other sources of refined, low-sulfur diesel
product. Increased diesel demand in the US would put a strain on ULSD, which may already be
in tight supply following the US implementation of the 2006 sulfur standard (Tippee 2005). On
the upside, refineries capable of refining sour crude would do well because they can take
advantage of the growing price differential between sweet and sour crude.
For example, Valero Energy, the largest North American independent oil refiner,
aggressively acquired refineries divested after major oil mergers in the 1990s as well as other
refineries from smaller companies. It then upgraded those refineries to turn sour crude into very
clean, low-sulfur products. The company recognized the trend towards cleaner fuels, heavier
feedstock, and more expensive sweet crude. According to Philip Verleger, an independent
petroleum economist and former Valero director, "Valero saw early on that the oil was going to
become heavier and tighter regulations meant that products were going to have to be cleaner"
(Morrison 2005). This has turned into a very lucrative strategy for Valero Energy, which has
quadrupled its earnings between 2000 and 2004.
US refineries are actually far better equipped than most Asian and European refineries to
refine sour crudes. Even before the very low sulfur standards for gasoline and diesel were
proposed, US refineries had invested in greater desulfurization capacity - over 80% of the total
domestic refining capacity - to cope with the higher sulfur content in imported crude oil from
Mexico, Venezuela, and the Middle East (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2005). As the world
harmonizes towards lower sulfur fuels and less sweet crude becomes available, US refineries are
better prepared to adapt to these trends. Refineries that can produce diesel with even lower
sulfur levels, like 5 ppm, will be in a strong competitive position, as automobile manufacturers
contend that the most advanced aftertreatment technologies require fuel sulfur levels near zero.
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9.4 Japan
In November 2000, the Japan Central Environment Council issued its Fourth
Recommendation for "Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission Reduction." Along
with its proposed vehicle emission limits, it also stipulated fuel quality measures, one of them
lowering the fuel sulfur limits from 500 ppm to 50 ppm. The Council recognized the importance
of low sulfur diesel for new vehicles to attain the long-term diesel target for 2005. At that time,
the Council considered 50 ppm to be the technical limit, but anticipated further reductions in the
future. It set the end of 2004 as the deadline for getting both diesel and gasoline sulfur levels
down to 50 ppm (Japan Central Environment Council 2000). Unlike the European and US
standard-setting process, there was no observable industry opposition to this proposal, because it
was the product of earlier negotiations between the government and auto industry.
9.4.1 Oil industry cooperation
In March 2000, the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and the
Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ) announced plans to voluntarily introduce vehicles
compliant with the long-term emission targets and 50 ppm sulfur diesel fuel two years ahead of
schedule. Originally, the Japanese government had expected the long-term targets to be met in
2007 and the 50 ppm fuel to be ready in 2005. After significant pressure and negotiations with
the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the auto and oil industries jointly agreed to accelerate the
introduction of cleaner vehicles and fuels. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) took
credit for the accelerated adoption.
TMG began anti-diesel measures in 1999, after heavily criticizing the central government
for not doing enough to regulate diesel vehicle exhaust (Asahi News 2000). TMG persuaded the
PAJ to market low-sulfur fuel early by lobbying the association and then the oil companies
individually (TMG 2003). According to the oil industry, 50 ppm sulfur diesel fuel would cost 20
yen per liter (US$0.70/gallon) more to produce than the 500 ppm product (Jiji Press 2001).
TMG responded by providing oil manufacturers with subsidies of up to 10 yen per liter
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(US$0.35/gallon) for 50 ppm sulfur diesel fuel as part of a two-year subsidy during FY2001-
2003 (TMG 2003). Previous estimates from a Petroleum Council study had estimated a small 2-
yen per liter (US$0.07/gallon) price premium, but this spread the total 200 billion yen (US$1.86
billion) production investment over years of fuel production (Petroleum Council 2000).4 4 The
higher estimates were more indicative of short-term costs. TMG's subsidy was a major driver in
motivating oil companies to invest in desulfurization equipment. By April 2003, the oil
companies were expected to supply 50 ppm diesel to the Tokyo area. Because of the pressure to
move early from the Tokyo government, oil companies agreed to accelerate their introduction of
50 ppm diesel to the rest of Japan.
Under the national agreement, automakers would begin rolling out 2005-compliant diesel
vehicles in 2003 and 2004. Oil companies would have a partial supply of 50 ppm diesel fuel
ready in 2003, followed by a full transition by the end of 2004 (Japan Central Environment
Council 2000). By April 2003, Japanese oil companies introduced 50 ppm sulfur diesel fuel
virtually nationwide, almost 2 years ahead of the government deadline (PAJ 2005).
Seeing the EU's desulfurization trends, Japan anticipated reducing sulfur levels down to
10 ppm as well. In its 2002 Fifth Report on "Future Policy for Motor Vehicle Exhaust Emission
Reduction," it remarked on Sweden and Germany's successful adoption of 10 ppm sulfur fuel
because of favorable tax incentives (Japan Central Environment Council 2002). Seeing that the
EU would have 10 ppm sulfur diesel available by 2005, the Japanese government was not
content to rest at 50 ppm. In addition to the environmental benefits, there was also the issue of
technological competitiveness. If the automakers were to design vehicles around 10 ppm sulfur
diesel fuel in Europe, the Japanese automakers should also benefit from having similar high-
quality in their own country. Diesel cars developed in Europe could also have market potential
in the US; low quality diesel fuel would no longer be a barrier. For example, Toyota's promising
DPNR system, initially developed for the European passenger car market, requires sulfur levels
of 10 ppm or lower. With similarly low levels in Japan, DPNR-equipped vehicles may have the
opportunity to penetrate the Japanese market. The central government called for 10 ppm diesel
fuel by 2007.
In 2004, the Japanese Ministries of Industry, Finance, and Environment announced the
Oil and Energy Conservation Fund, a 5.2 billion yen (US$48 million) cash subsidy to refiners
44 Historic exchange rate from FXTOP.com: In 2000, 100 yen = US$0.928.
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who produced 10ppm sulfur diesel.45 The subsidy would be rewarded on a first-come, first-serve
basis for producers or importers of the fuel (Huizenga, Fabian et al. 2005). This policy no doubt
had an influence on the petroleum industry's decision to voluntarily start selling 10 ppm fuel by
2005, earlier than the 2007 deadline. It announced this voluntary commitment at an international
setting in May 2003 - the Society of Automotive Engineers Spring Fuels and Lubricants Meeting.
They kept their promise and in January 2005, began selling the fuel, with the anticipation of
widespread availability by 2008 (PAJ 2005; Peckham 2003g).
9.4.2 Explanations for cooperation
Unlike the oil industry in Europe and the United States, the Japanese oil industry was
very cooperative with the government and automobile industry's push for lower sulfur fuels.
The automobile industry's agreement to roll out cleaner vehicles two years ahead of the original
2007 deadline hinged on the oil industry's commitment to have 50 ppm sulfur fuel by 2005.
Automakers were comfortable with the accelerated deadline if it meant securing the availability
of 50 ppm sulfur diesel and gasoline fuel. In addition to recognizing the synergy between the
auto and oil industries in reducing vehicle exhaust, the oil industry had several other important
motivations.
By 1998, it was known worldwide that Europe's diesel fuel would reach as low as 10
ppm in 2005. The EU's next installation of emission regulations, Euro IV, was also set to go
into effect in 2005. With Japanese automakers hoping to strengthen their presence in Europe, the
Japanese government was very aware of JAMA's desire for greater harmonization of vehicle and
fuel standards between the two regions. Having comparable regulations would help Japanese
auto manufacturers more easily develop products suitable for both markets.
Another important motivation was the need to maintain diesel vehicle and fuel demand.
The very stringent national emission standards and the Automobile NOx/PM law revised in the
early 2000s dampened diesel vehicle sales. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's anti-diesel
campaign, which had the slogan "Say No to Diesel Vehicles," contributed to a negative
consumer perception of diesels. Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, very passionate about
45 Historic exchange rate from FXTOP.com: in 2004, 100 yen = US$0.925.
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cutting diesel emissions, urged consumers not to ride, buy, or sell diesel passenger cars in the
metropolitan area (Asahi Shimbun 2002) As a result, highway diesel fuel demand began to
decline. The oil industry's support for cleaner fuels coincided with forecasts of further decreases
in highway diesel fuel demand. In its 2004 annual report, the Petroleum Association of Japan
forecast a decline in diesel fuel sales: "Transportation fuel demand for gasoline and jet fuel will
continue to increase but demand for gas oil [same as diesel] will decline mainly owing to the
decrease of the number of diesel cars" (PAJ 2005).
Figure 9-6: Japanese Gasoline Demand Increases as Diesel Demand Declines
Japanese Gasoline and Diesel Demand, 1980-2008
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The availability of cleaner fuels would enable the auto industry to produce cleaner
vehicles, compliant with the new 2005 standards. Low-polluting diesel vehicles would sustain
the diesel fuel market and perhaps reverse the downward trend of diesel fuel demand. The
petroleum industry in Japan, like in Europe and the US, seeks balance in its refined product
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portfolio. If the trends of the early 2000s continue, Japanese refineries would face a gasoline
shortage and a diesel surplus.
Another explanation for the Japanese oil companies' support of cleaner fuels is the use of
fuel quality regulation to block foreign competition. Beginning in 1987, the Japanese petroleum
industry underwent deregulation, which was designed to lower fuel prices and increase
international and domestic competition. The late 1990s were characterized by fierce competition
from imports (PAJ 2005). By limiting fuel sulfur levels to 50 ppm, Japanese companies could
prevent other Asian oil companies from selling higher sulfur gasoline and diesel fuel to Japan.
All Japanese companies would be required to make substantial investments, and outside firms
not dedicated to the Japanese market were unlikely to do the same. The high vehicle and fuel
standards would also prevent competition from rival auto companies. Automobile companies
based in countries with lower vehicle and fuel standards would not be able to meet the stringent
Japanese standards.
Initially, the oil companies did request fiscal assistance from the government in
introducing lower sulfur fuel. However, they made their announcement to introduce 50 ppm
sulfur diesel, and then 10 ppm sulfur diesel, without any expectation of tax incentives or
subsidies. Even though the Tokyo Metropolitan Government provided a 10 yen per liter subsidy
to oil producers for 50 ppm sulfur fuel in fiscal years 2001-2002, no fiscal incentives were
granted by the central government. There had already been criticism by environmental groups
and municipalities that diesel fuel had long benefited from lower taxes than gasoline fuel (TMG
2003). Even the president of one of Japan's leading automakers suggested that consumers
should be responsible for paying more for cleaner fuels and vehicles (Asahi News 2000).
When the industry decided to uniformly adopt ultra-low sulfur diesel, a sluggish
economy depressed oil demand and led to refinery closures and industry consolidation. By the
end of 2002, oil refiner Idemitsu announced the closure of two of its refineries. Companies
began consolidating into four main groups to improve efficiency and capacity utilization
(Financial Times 2002; Kyodo 2002). Since refineries were already in the midst of
reorganization, producing higher-value 50 ppm sulfur diesel (thanks to government subsidies)
may have fit in well with their plans to upgrade refineries for greater efficiency.
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9.4.3 Environmental benefits
In addition to the direct emission reduction benefits from cleaner fuels, the early adoption
of 50 ppm sulfur diesel fuels has facilitated the installation of diesel particulate filters in existing
vehicles, according to the retrofit requirements of the Automobile NOx/PM Law. Without the
low sulfur fuel, fleet and vehicle owners would not be able to successfully retrofit their existing
vehicles with sulfur-sensitive emission control technology. While reduction to 50 ppm sulfur is
sufficient for catalyzed particulate filters, the proper operation of NOx reduction technologies,
such as NOx adsorbers, oxidation catalysts, and lean NOx catalysts, require near-zero fuel sulfur
levels (10 ppm or less).
9.5 Summary
This chapter illustrates the role of first-mover countries in spurring cleaner technology,
which, in this case, is ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel. Sweden foresaw the benefits of lower sulfur
fuels, and used tax differentiation to get consumers and refiners to switch fuels. Sweden's early
action inspired Finland to follow suit, and together they put pressure on the EU to also adopt 50
ppm sulfur fuel, and eventually 10 ppm sulfur fuel. This created a "snowball effect" that led to a
rapid adoption of ultra-low sulfur diesel in industrialized countries. The Swedish and Finnish
experiences were cited by Japanese and American regulators as they considered their approach
towards desulfurization.
The companies that stepped forward ahead of required standards to offer clean fuels were
motivated by tax incentives, the prospect of future tax incentives or subsidies, or a desire to carve
out a place in a small but potentially lucrative market. Greenergy responded quickly to the tax
differentials in Sweden and the UK. It also recognized that some clients, like the UK
supermarkets and their customers, would be willing to pay a premium for a "green" product.
Although BP's readiness to market clean fuels in Europe was not markedly different from its
competitors', its European experience put BP at the forefront in the US regulatory scene, where
BP stood apart from most of the US oil industry in supporting the 15 ppm sulfur standard.
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The opposition of the oil industry to very low fuel sulfur levels was much stronger in the
US than in the EU and Japan. There are several possible explanations for this. The most salient
explanation is the lack of fiscal incentives, compared to the differential taxation in several
European countries or the subsidies offered by Tokyo Metropolitan Government. These
incentives helped to ease the cost of upgrading refineries to meet the new standards. The
relationship between regulators and regulated industries is usually more contentious in the US,
where the political climate is perceived as more conducive to cooperation and negotiation. The
sulfur reduction in the US was much more dramatic, going from 500 ppm to 15 ppm, while the
EU went from 350 ppm to 50 ppm to 10 ppm, and Japan went from 500 ppm to 50 ppm to 10
ppm. The magnitude of the reductions makes the required capital investments in the US much
more costly, an economic threat to older and smaller refineries. Although Japan did not have
national fiscal incentives, the local subsidies in Tokyo were enough to jumpstart the switch to
lower sulfur fuels. Also, the combination of pressure from citizen groups and the powerful
Japanese automobile industry, and the competitive threat of high-sulfur imports made Japanese
oil companies amendable to desulfurization. This type of market share threat was also felt by
BP/ARCO in the US as it faced substantial anti-diesel sentiment. To reverse public perception of
"dirty diesel," it adopted a clean fuels strategy designed to maintain diesel demand.
Demonstration projects and fleet contracts were effective tools in showcasing the
emission benefits of low-sulfur diesel to customers and regulators. They did not carry the risk of
investing in extensive distribution infrastructure because fuel could be transported in a tank truck
from a single refinery. Results from these small projects inspired additional projects and
provided feedback to technology vendors. They were also used as evidence of technical
feasibility by regulators.
The direct emission benefits from lowering sulfur levels occur once the clean fuels are
marketed, but the greater benefits from enabling cleaner vehicle technologies will only be felt
once new, cleaner vehicles are purchased or existing vehicles are retrofitted. Now with fuel
sulfur levels lowered, the attention will be on the vehicle, engine, and emission control industries
to develop technologies that they assured were possible with ultra-low sulfur fuel.
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CHAPTER 10 - Discussion
10.1 Introduction
The past five chapters evaluated regulatory processes in the EU, Japan, and the US,
where some companies chose to act ahead of regulatory requirements. Such behavior constitutes
a deviation from the norm, which is to meet regulations no earlier than the compliance deadline.
Regulatory and market contexts shaped corporate decisions to pursue early compliance or
technology introductions beyond existing regulatory requirements. This chapter reviews the
lessons learned from those cases. While there are significant motivations and potential benefits
from early and first-mover behavior, the disincentives tend to dominate, leading companies to
behave more cautiously. However, in cases where firms did step forward, the environmental
benefits were significant, especially when the technology spread to other companies and
countries. The chapter explains the corporate strategies behind those technological introductions
and ways in which regulatory policy and public pressure encourage early and first-mover
behavior. The chapter ends with recommendations to make regulatory competition more
attractive to firms and beneficial to the public.
10.2 Regulatory context
The regulatory context in which companies operate shapes their technology choices and
response to new or anticipated regulation. Proactive governments, environmentally-minded
citizens, regulatory timing and stringency, and compliance details had significant roles in
technology development and the emergence of technology leaders.
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10.2.1 First-mover countries, states, and municipalities
The regulatory cycles in vehicles, engines, and fuels demonstrated that lead countries
with more stringent or earlier regulations and fiscal incentives encourage the market introduction
of clean technologies ahead of regulatory requirements. While the main emphasis of this
research has been on proactive behavior by companies, their behavior is heavily influenced by
their home government's transport and environmental policies. Sweden's tax differential
between standard diesel and 10 ppm sulfur diesel was responsible for the rapid adoption of
desulfurization by Swedish refiners. Sweden's early leadership in the 1990s led to the creation
of Greenergy, a fuel supplier that sold ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) to the Swedish market, and
then ultimately introduced the same diesel product to the UK market. The environmentally-
proactive Scandinavian countries have been known to adopt "green" policies ahead of the rest of
Europe. Compared to the rest of Europe, the UK was quick to adopt ULSD because the British
government followed Sweden's example in imposing tax differentials. This resulted in large oil
majors like BP and Shell acting as early movers, selling ULSD well ahead of the 2005 Euro 4
deadline.
Even if a company's home market is not a first-mover country, it may find more
responsive governments in its export markets. Germany's UBA has historically been a very
progressive environmentally agency. It recommends very stringent emission standards to the
German Environment Ministry, which then applies pressure at the EU level for tighter standards.
The proactive environmental behavior of the UBA and Germany as a country explains why the
French company PSA chose to focus its filter introduction in Germany rather than its home
market of France. As early as the development phase of PSA's filter systems, UBA was an eager
participant in testing and rallied behind filter tax incentives. Even when other companies began
to introduce filters as an added-cost option in their vehicles, around 80% of German car
customers did pay extra for a car filter if available. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the percentage of
customers in other European countries requesting the option was negligible. Much of this was a
result of the extensive media coverage of the "No Diesel without Filter" campaign in Germany.
The customer response was attributable to country-specific prioritization of environmental
concerns. In numerous interviews, industry representatives described the German public as more
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concerned and aware about environmental issues than people in other EU countries. This
coincides with the assertive regulatory officials at UBA, who often challenge the German
government's reticence towards environmental policies by engaging public and media support.
A country may have first movers in local and state governments that take the lead on
emission reduction policy. Not surprisingly, this often coincides with regions that are most
seriously affected by the health effects of vehicle exhaust. In response to air pollution problems
in Tokyo, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) has frequently passed regulations whose
stringency far surpasses the Japanese Central Government's regulation. For example, the Tokyo
Diesel Retrofit Program and the Automobile NOx/PM law restricted access to Tokyo for in-use
diesel vehicles not retrofitted by a certain deadline. Before then, only new vehicles were subject
to emission standards, but TMG sought a more hostile policy toward older diesels to improve air
quality. Many particulate filter manufacturers were borne from TMG's regulatory requirements
and filter subsidy program.
California, which also suffers from serious air pollution problems, has been a longtime
leader in emissions policy in the US. Because its motor vehicle emission standards predated the
existence of EPA, California is the only state legally allowed to pass light-duty vehicle emission
standards more stringent than EPA's. It has taken advantage of this legal situation to establish its
Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) Program, which has also been adopted by several Northeast states.
As an indication of California's influence on EPA policy, environmental groups and industry
representatives alike will use the state as a forum for policy debate. They recognize that once
California paves the way for a certain environmental regulation, the rest of the country will
eventually follow. Automakers Honda and Toyota use California as their test market for many
new, low-emission models. BP/ARCO chose California as the first state to make its 15 ppm
sulfur diesel fuel widely available at retail stations. The California Air Resources Board
(CARB) has a reputation as a regulatory trailblazer. A recently published National Research
Council report called California "a laboratory for emissions-control innovations." CARB can
change standards more rapidly than EPA, making it more responsive to market and technological
change. The risk of failure is limited to one state, while successes can be spread to the rest of the
country (National Research Council 2006). Its staff members share some of the same tenacity in
pursuing emission reduction goals as its counterparts at Germany's UBA.
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Table 10-1 summarizes how first-mover governments spur companies to develop
emission reduction technologies and encourage the diffusion of the technology and regulation to
other regions. The details of the activities by each first-mover government can be found in the
indicated chapter(s).
Table 10-1: First-mover Governments Influence Technology Development and Other
Regulatory Decisions
Ch Regulation Resulting diesel Technology/product Impact on other
technology/product transferred to: regulation
5 US Tier 2 and California Mercedes E320 with 2009 Japanese standards
LEV II require gasoline and Bluetec urea solution will also require equal
diesel cars to meet the same for 45 states (expected treatment
emission standards Fall 2006)
5 Tax incentives for early Most automakers had Rest of Europe Increased receptivity to
Euro 4 compliance in Euro 4-compliant diesels for US Tier 2
Germany, UK vehicles 2 years early
5,6 Tokyo Automobile Hino's NOx reduction Rest of Japan; Japan's 2005 diesel
NOx/PM Law technology for trucks D-CAT-equipped vehicle emission
Particulate filters Toyota Avensis in standard; US Tier 2;
(various) Europe Possible influence on
Toyota D-CAT for cars Euro 6
8 Japan's 2005 diesel vehicle Isuzu and Hino Motors Isuzu: DMAX joint None observed
emission standard EGR and DPF engine venture with GM in US
technology Hino Motors: Nissan
Diesel
9 Swedish tax differentiation Greenergy's "city UK, Germany, Euro 4 (50 ppm with 10
favoring ULSD (1992) diesel"; all Swedish Switzerland ppm availability) and
refineries within 3 years Euro 5 (10 ppm); US'
15 ppm sulfur diesel
standard; Japan's 50 and
10 ppm sulfur diesel
standard
9 UK tax differentiation Greenergy's ULSD, BP/Arco prepared for US' 15 ppm sulfur
favoring 50-ppm ULSD sold through US distribution of diesel standard; Japan's
(1997) supermarkets ULSD 50 and 10 ppm sulfur
Sainsbury's and Tesco; diesel standard
later BP's ULSD; all
British retailers by 1999
8,9 California requirement that ARCO's ULSD; Rest of the US 2006 US requirement
all urban diesel bus fleets International's Green for 15 ppm sulfur levels
run on ULSD by 2002 Diesel Technology
9 Tokyo offers subsidies to oil 50 ppm sulfur diesel by Rest of Japan Adoption of 10 ppm
companies to sell 50 ppm all Japanese oil sulfur diesel accelerated
sulfur diesel (2001-03) companies to 2005, instead of 2007
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First-mover governments have used fiscal incentives as well as emission standards as
regulatory instruments. Fiscal incentives such as tax differentiation and direct subsidies seem to
elicit more uniform industry responses with technology introductions, while regulatory standards
result in one or two early technology introductions, if at all. Granted, incentives are usually
offered only when industry has the technology available but it costs too much to be competitive
with the existing product.
The first-mover government often represents a more environmentally-minded segment of
a country or region. Once the new regulation and technology adoption have been "proven" in
first-mover market, it diffuses through the rest of the region or to neighboring countries. Sweden
and Germany have served this function for the EU, Tokyo for Japan, and California for the US.
The main challenge for industry is to develop the new technology for the first-mover markets.
Once the technology is available, expanding it to more markets within a region can take
advantage of scale economies. This occurred with early Euro 4 compliance, the Tokyo
Automobile NOx/PM Law, and several regions' ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) introduction.
The most far-reaching consequence of first-mover government activity is its impact on
other regulation. Despite differences in regulatory procedures and timing, there has been a
surprising amount of cross-country influence. Sweden's tax differentiation on ultra-low sulfur
diesel not only influenced Euro 4 and 5 standards, but ultimately ULSD standard-setting in the
US and Japan. Japan, conscious of its vehicle industry's reliance on export markets, has
mirrored several regulatory moves by the US and European governments. Japan has followed
the US on equal treatment of gasoline and diesel cars and Europe's movement toward very low
diesel sulfur levels. Harmonizing regulations helps its companies remain competitive in those
larger markets. Regulatory influence has also worked in the reverse direction, with Japan
influencing other markets. Toyota subsidiary Hino Motors originally designed its DPNR NOx
reduction technology to meet Tokyo's stringent truck standards. Toyota adapted it on its diesel
Avensis car for the European market. Its achievement of low NOx levels relative to other diesel
cars intrigued regulators during Euro 5 consultations, and may affect NOx levels for Euro 6.
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Economic drivers
As noted earlier, first-mover countries and regions are usually those that are more
environmentally minded, though this is not always the case. For example, automakers and
emission control manufacturers claim that the UK is not known for its environmental awareness,
yet it was the first European country outside of Scandinavia to offer tax differentials favoring
ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel. News reports from the UK attribute the tax policy to greater concern
about air quality, while others speculate that the tax differential may have been a concession to
the UK's trucking industry. At the same time that the ultra-low sulfur diesel -pence tax
reduction was announced, the UK Chancellor also increased diesel and gasoline tax by 3-pence
per liter (Brown 1996). The UK's early tax incentive for ULSD was meant to appease critics of
the tax increases. Environmental measures can also be a result of governments' seeking to
improve national competitiveness. They support regulation that offers domestic companies an
advantage over foreign competitors in domestic or international markets. Until the past decade,
foreign companies had major difficulty negotiating with government officials, who favored the
domestic companies. For instance, Japanese companies had long been excluded from
discussions among European automakers, which formed a tight-knit network through trade
associations. Now the lines between domestic and foreign automakers has been blurred by
46international alliances, joint ventures, and insourcing.46 Many of those interviewed noted that
industry lobbyists tend to have more influence on elected officials than regulatory officials, who
are usually career bureaucrats. While regulators may be eager to implement regulations in the
interest of public health, other parts of the government have competing concerns about the
industry's stability and employment. For example, the 2005 Euro 4 fuel standards and 2006
ULSD requirement in the US raised concerns about refinery closures and disadvantages to small
domestic refiners. On the other hand, the Japanese refining industry cooperated with the
Japanese government's push for ULSD because it offered them a competitive advantage over
their nearby Asian rivals, who could no longer export their high-sulfur product without making
the costly desulfurization investments.
46 Insourcing refers to a foreign company making substantial investments in facilities and creating jobs in the home
country. An example is Toyota's building automobile plants in the United States.
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Regulatory policy influenced by national competitiveness may manifest itself as a
national government's support for specific technologies. Germany has been a major advocate of
urea SCR (selective catalytic reduction) technology, primarily because its domestic heavy-duty
vehicle companies have chosen SCR over EGR, the predominant choice of US companies. The
German automobile trade association, VDA, has considerable influence on the German
ministries and the Chancellor. VDA has previously used the threat of job loss as an argument for
or against particular regulatory policies (VDA 2006). The British government has supported a
very stringent PM standard at the EU level, motivated heavily by its home-grown company
Johnson Matthey, an industry leader in catalyzed particulate filter technology. When PSA
introduced its particular filters in Germany, it initially seemed that the German Ministry of the
Environment was uncharacteristically supporting the French company's filters, to the
disadvantage of its own German automakers. However, the German government ultimately
delayed implemented filter tax incentives until its own automakers finally agreed to also offer
filters.
10.2.2 Stringency and timing
While many of the cases presented in the past five chapters highlight the fiscal incentives
used by European countries and the cooperative approach pursued by Japan, the US differs from
the EU and Japan in its frequent use of technology-forcing regulations. The European and
Japanese emission reduction strategy focuses on rapid diffusion of best available technology, i.e.
technology that is leading-edge, but commercially available. The time between new emission
standards in the US is generally longer than in the EU and Japan; this comes from the long,
contentious process accompanying many environmental regulations and the built-in minimum
timing requirements. US legislation requires at least 4 years of lead time and 3 years of stability
in the heavy-duty engine emission standards. Meanwhile, the US reductions compensate for
lower frequency of revision by being more dramatic, amounting to 70-90% emission reductions
as opposed to the 30-50% reductions more common in EU and Japan. The same has been true of
diesel fuel sulfur standards, in which the US will drop from 500 ppm to 15 ppm, while the
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Europeans and Japanese have taken a more incremental path toward near-zero sulfur levels (see
Figure 10-5).
Figures 10-1 to 10-5 show the emission and fuel standards over several regulatory
periods. The different testing cycles and requirements make them difficult to compare directly,
but they do illustrate some important general points about the standards. Although the US and
California standards are technology-forcing, the more gradual standard revision in the EU and
Japan has recently led to relatively comparable standard levels in PM standards and fuel sulfur
levels. The US still has the most stringent NOx emission levels, and its test procedures and
durability requirements are considered by industry experts to be more challenging. However, the
EU and Japan can adapt more quickly to changing technologies, instead of waiting a decade or
longer to lower emission standards. These shorter time frames give technology leaders more
opportunities to influence the level of regulatory stringency. They will be giving their feedback
on regulatory proposals when their technology is near commercialization rather than in the
experimental stage, which is often the case in the US. In forming a technical basis for standard-
setting, regulators tend to place more credence in technologies that have already been field-tested.
While the US or California standards are often known to be the most stringent at the time they
are proposed, the EU and Japan make incremental reductions during the interim period that can
match or surpass the US levels until the next cycle of new US standards.
Within the US, California has been first to adopt the most stringent standards, which has
resulted in a virtual ban on diesel cars in recent years. Its levels have been followed by Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, and Vermont. These five states comprise 24% of the new passenger
car market (US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2005). Limiting sales to a 45-state market
has discouraged any significant diesel car penetration in the US. So far only Volkswagen and
Mercedes have sold small volumes of diesel passenger cars in the US. Even if diesel emission
reduction technology improves after a particular regulatory standard has taken effect for several
years, the next proposed set of standards threatens to shut out diesels again. It may not be worth
the cost and effort for a diesel car manufacturer to introduce a model for the "tail end" of an
existing regulatory period and then be forced to pull it off the market after new regulations take
effect.
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Figure 10-1: Diesel Passenger Car PM Standards
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Figure 10-2: Diesel Passenger Car NOx Standards
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Figure 10-3: Diesel Engine PM Standards
PM Standards for Heavy-duty Diesel Engines
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Figure 10-4: Diesel Engine NOx Standards
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Figure 10-5: Diesel Fuel Sulfur Standards
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A series of increasingly stringent NOx standards in Japan have also posed a barrier to European
diesel manufacturers seeking to expand their overseas markets. Even though high fuel prices
make vehicle fuel efficiency greatly valued, diesels have not been very popular. The perception
of diesels as polluting and the Japanese auto industry's strength in highly efficient, low-emission
gasoline cars have made it politically easier to maintain stringent NOx standards. As shown in
Figure 10-2, Japan has also maintained relatively low NOx levels since the 1980s. Until
recently, it has prioritized NOx reduction over PM reduction.
The timing and stringency of standards also depend on the characteristics of the
technology itself. Thanks to the aftertreatment industry, major improvements in the
effectiveness and cost of particulate filters for trucks enabled dramatic reductions in PM levels in
the 1990s. Greater difficulty reducing NOx emissions has been manifested in more gradual NOx
reductions, as shown in Figure 10-4. Although the US heavy-duty engine standards have
recently changed more frequently than the US diesel car standards, federal legislation guarantees
the heavy-duty vehicle industry minimum lead time and stability. The US Clean Air Act requires
at least 4 years of lead time and 3 years of stable regulatory levels for heavy-duty engine
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emission standards. This gives the industry the security of sufficient R&D and field testing time.
The smaller product volumes in the heavy-duty vehicle industry mean that companies need
longer production runs to recoup their costs. 47 For diesel fuel sulfur levels, it is helpful for
governments to set out a pathway and timetable for reductions. This allows individual refineries
to plan investments in desulphurization equipment efficiently. For example, in some cases it
may make most sense to install new equipment for the complete reduction in one step; in other
refineries intermediate reductions may be achieved by modifying existing desulphurization
equipment as an intermediate step towards a more major restructuring of the refinery or by
closing it.48 By the early 2000s, technology already existed for levels below 10 ppm (Blumberg,
Walsh et al. 2003).
10.2.3 Regulatory details
The details of compliance, such as certification procedures and enforcement, can
influence public and private outcomes as much as the standards themselves. In the EU and Japan,
regulators do not have testing facilities and must rely on the manufacturers to submit
documentation of their product's attainment of performance requirements. While the necessary
data is often generated by reputable third-party testing facilities, the lack of routine regulatory
verification means that the regulators are dependent on the honesty of the regulated firms. The
US EPA and California Air Resource Board (CARB) each have their own testing facilities which
certify new engine and vehicle models. However, even passing government tests and receiving
certification does not necessarily mean the product is performing as the regulation intended.
The use of "defeat devices" to circumvent NOx controls in US and European engines,
described in Chapter 7, is probably the best demonstration of the discrepancy between emission
performance during testing and emission performance during actual driving conditions. In the
US, in-use NOx emissions were 2-3 times higher than the maximum limit, which made the
resulting emissions even worse than levels mandated in older standards. The penalties and
accelerated deadlines of the consent decree between the US engine manufacturers and EPA
47 Interviews with senior experts in the diesel vehicle industry, 2006.
4s Interview with Stewart Kempsell, Hydrocarbon Fuel Strategy Manager, Shell International Ltd., September 28,
2005.
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resulted in a competitive disadvantage to most US manufacturers and consumer skepticism of the
new, compliant engines. In a further twist, consent decree manufacturers who produced
compliant engines on time suffered market share losses because of the structure of the non-
compliance penalties and fuel economy-emission reduction trade-off. Although European
engine manufacturers made use of "defeat device" software as well, there was no legal
mechanism at the time to hold them accountable for doing so. In Japan, the leading particulate
filter supplier, Mitsui, falsified emissions data to qualify for Tokyo's filter subsidy program. Its
filters' removal rate was only 70-80% of the rate required by the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government. Although Mitsui had clearly betrayed the government, TMG's reliance on
manufacturer submissions and its zealousness in accelerating filter adoption may have also
facilitated Mitsui's deception. Discovery of these undesired outcomes have led to reexamination
and revision of certification testing and enforcement procedures.
National governments and companies have sought to agree upon harmonized test cycles
for engines and vehicles, which would make it easier for multinational companies to certify
engines in different markets. The current variety of test cycles makes emission standards
impossible to compare directly. Governments tend to advocate the worldwide adoption of their
preferred cycle, and companies often prefer the test cycle and requirements of their home market,
positions which bolster domestic companies.
Past experience with compliance problems affected some regulators' perception of future
technologies and user responses. US regulators were very hesitant about urea SCR technology
because it required the truck operator to keep the urea tank from going empty. Concerns about
compliance no doubt stemmed from the recent defeat device experience as well as the 1980s
experience of catalyst poisoning from leaded fuel.
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Table 10-2: Comparison of Select Regulatory Compliance Details
Item Europe Japan US
Source of From manufacturers From manufacturers; From manufacturers and
certification data ex: Mitsui's data regulatory agencies' own
falsification to gain testing facilities
government approval for its
filters
Durability 100,000 km for Euro 4 and 80,000 km for 2005 and 193,000 km for Tier 2;
requirements for 160,000 km for Euro 5 2009 Required "full life" is
passenger significantly longer than
vehicles Europe and Japan's
Treatment of More lenient NOx standards Diesel and gasoline vehicles Diesel and gasoline vehicles
gasoline vs. for diesels will be treated the same in treated the same since
diesel passenger 2009 2004*;
vehicles EPA bin averaging may
allow for diesels in the more
lenient bins; CA's LEV
standard is a fixed level so
harder for diesels
Off-cycle heavy- Excessive off-cycle NOx Changed from steady-state Excessive off-cycle NOx
duty emissions emissions from Euro II to transient test cycle emissions from 1988-1998
engines by optimizing for because the effectiveness of engines caused by dual
fuel economy outside of test new emission control mapping (EPA test cycle vs.
points; Changed from technology depends on highway conditions); EPA
steady-state to transient test exhaust temperature changes adopted EU's transient test
cycle as a supplemental test
Impact of testing Low exhaust temperatures Urea refilling every 31,000
and durability over the JE05 test cycles led miles does not meet EPA's
requirements on to poor SCR performance minimum 150,000-mile
urea-SCR until diesel oxidation maintenance interval for
technology catalyst added emission control devices
End-user issues No requirements for sensor Warning lamp on Nissan EPA concerned about user
for urea SCR for system to detect proper urea Diesel's SCR-equipped tampering or negligence
heavy-duty tank refilling until 2009 trucks is a poor incentive for with urea refilling
engines urea refilling
*However, as of March 2006, the EPA was considering the temporary relaxation of the diesel passenger car standard
to encourage fuel efficiency.
Earlier, it was mentioned that US and California standards are generally more difficult to
meet - the stringency of the standards is not the only reason. EPA and CARB have longer
durability requirements, equal standards for diesel and gasoline cars, and closer scrutiny of end-
user problems. They have also been more cautious about operational issues associated with new
technologies that are very different from existing ones. While the EU and Japan have taken a
"try it and fix problems later" approach to urea SCR technology, EPA has proceeded more
cautiously. Existing compliance requirements such as the 150,000-mile maintenance interval
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and avoidance of user misfueling also make the US a less hospitable place for the manufacturers
of SCR-equipped vehicles.
10.3 Market context
The diesel vehicle industry has faced very different market conditions in Europe, Japan,
and the US, which are often shaped by the government's regulatory priorities. At the same time,
the regulations are a reflection of the market conditions. Fuel prices, climate change concerns,
diesel market share, and product mix affect each company's competitiveness.
10.3.1 Fuel prices and CO2 constraints
High fuel prices have driven the pursuit for fuel efficiency, while domestic industry
strengths have determined the technologies used to meet that goal. Regulations may be
designed to accommodate each region's technological solutions. In Europe and Japan, fuel
prices for both diesel and gasoline are approximately twice that of the US. This has motivated
customers' demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. In most European countries, tax
differentials favoring diesel over gasoline and the European automotive industry's strength in
diesel vehicles have made diesel cars the predominant fuel-efficient choice. In Japan, diesel fuel
is slightly cheaper than gasoline, yet because of the Japanese automotive industry's strength in
gasoline vehicles, small gasoline-powered cars have dominated Japan's pathway to fuel
efficiency. Moreover, greater attention to climate change has also led the EU and Japan to adopt
transport policies giving tax advantages to vehicles with lower CO2 emissions, which tend to be
diesels and smaller vehicles. In the US, the relatively low price of fuel and cultural acceptance
of larger cars have popularized gasoline-powered passenger trucks and SUVs. However, recent
increases in fuel prices in the US have prompted the government to seriously weigh the trade-off
between pollutant emissions and fuel efficiency, which may lead to more diesel-friendly policies.
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10.3.2 Diesel market share
With diesels increasingly making up the majority of the European new car market, EU
environmental regulatory officials designed their policies to allow clean diesels to thrive. They
offered incentives for very low diesel fuel sulfur levels and incrementally tightened NOx and PM
standards to levels readily attainable by industry. The same was not true in Japan and the US,
which view low-emission gasoline vehicles as a more environmentally beneficial alternative to
diesels. Because diesels are such a small portion of the light-duty market share, regulators can
be more aggressive with the light-duty standards, even if it means regulating diesels out of the
market. EPA and CARB officials have been accused of doing exactly that because of their very
stringent NOx standards. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government's anti-diesel stance and its
retroactive diesel regulations also send an unwelcome signal to diesel car purchases. The
strongest opponents to these unfriendly diesel policies have been the European automobile
manufacturers, who have less influence in the US and Japan than domestic automakers.
Product mix
Automotive/truck companies with a narrower product line, specifically those with
inherently lower emissions and fuel consumption, have tended to fare better with the advent of
more stringent regulation. This is especially true if different size classes face the same standards.
For example, Japanese and European automakers (not including DaimlerChrysler) have
historically focused on compact to medium-sized passenger cars, which comprise over two-thirds
of their global sales. Meanwhile, almost half of the "Big 3" American automakers' global sales
are in light trucks, SUVs, and vans (Austin, Rosinski et al. 2003). In the last 2 years, fuel prices
have increased significantly and US Tier 2 emission standards have begun to treat light trucks,
SUVs, and vans like passenger vehicles. As a result, American manufacturers face greater
challenges to meeting customer demand for fuel-efficiency and regulatory demand for emission
reduction. In the US, they are shifting their product mix to smaller vehicles like "cross-over"
SUVs and passenger sedans, in which Japanese firms already hold a third of the US passenger
car market (Ward's Automotive Yearbook 2005).
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In Europe and Japan, where fiscal incentives exist for purchasing low-CO2 vehicles,
companies whose product line already consists mostly of fuel-efficient, low-CO2 vehicles stand
to perform well against the competition. "Changing Drivers," the investor report by Sustainable
Asset Management and the World Resources Institute, points out that PSA and VW have lower
risk from CO2 constraints than their competitors because the majority of their sales are already in
low carbon intensity vehicles (Austin, Rosinski et al. 2003)
International Truck and Engine was more supportive of the 2007 US heavy-duty engine
emission standards than the rest of the engine manufacturers and certified a compliant school bus
6 years early. Its narrower range of truck and engine products - mid-range engines, medium
trucks, and school buses - may have made it easier to meet proposed regulations. Other
manufacturers that make a wider range of engines claimed that International's narrow range of
engine types helped them obtain certification early.49 It could concentrate its R&D on a limited
portfolio of engine types, while other major engine manufacturers had to develop emission
control systems for a broad range of engine types, including vocational (off-road) equipment.
Moreover, International catered to the school bus market, which is more sensitive to protecting
children from diesel exhaust.
The regulatory and market context in which the companies develop technologies and
compete shapes their potential for competitive advantage. Their home country or region's tax or
environmental policy, public attitudes, technology choices, and product mix affect their
preparedness for more stringent emission and fuel standards. This study acknowledges that
companies do not start out with the same opportunities, but their regulatory and market context
does not lock them into a specific decision or strategy. Even when a company has a potential
competitive advantage, there are conditions that either motivate or discourage early or first-
mover behavior. Identifying and explaining these motives and disincentives responds directly to
the original research questions:
Under what conditions do competitive regulatory strategies succeed in providing private
benefits tofirst-moverfirms and environmental benefits to the public? What motivates
firms to engage in first-mover behavior?
49 Interview with Rich Kassel, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council, September 8, 2005.
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10.4 Motives for early andfirst-mover behavior
A company generally does not introduce a cleaner, but more costly, product in the
absence of customer or regulatory demand. However, based on several instances of early and
first-mover behavior, economic incentives, market preservation, and technology development
can provide adequate motivation to introduce a technology ahead of regulatory requirements.
10.4.1 Tax incentives encourage early adoption
A company sitting on a technology capable of surpassing existing regulations would be
hesitant to introduce it because of the uncertainty of customer and regulatory demand. Tax
incentives or other types of similar economic instruments (e.g. subsidies, tradable credits) may
tip the balance in favor of introducing the cleaner product early. Virtually all the interviewees in
industry were supportive of tax incentives as an attractive scheme to promote clean technology.
Tax incentives help cover the R&D or investment costs associated with technology development.
Many of those company officials interviewed supported tax incentives that go to customers, not
to the companies. The incentives create certainty in customer demand that is crucial to new
product introduction. They offset the higher retail price associated with cleaner technologies,
which then become more cost-competitive with the older technology. In order to keep tax
incentives revenue-neutral, governments may penalize the most polluting products while
lessening taxes or registration fees on the cleanest products. For example, the Swedish tax
differentials on diesel fuel consisted of raising taxes on standard diesel and lowering taxes on
ultra-low sulfur diesel.
The power of tax incentives as a motivator for early adoption is evidenced by the
different choices made by the same company in an environment with incentives and one without.
For example, BP introduced ultra-low sulfur diesel throughout retail stations in the UK
immediately following the 3-pence tax differential favoring ULSD. However, in the US, where
no ULSD tax incentives exist, BP has been selling the fuel at a 5C/gallon premium to fleets and
to California stations. According to an EPA representative, a few companies, including BP,
came forward as early as 2003, offering to sell 15 ppm sulfur prior to the 2006 deadline if tax
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incentives were made available. EPA only offered them tradable credits for early sales in 2005
to mid-2006. The lack of more substantial incentives resulted in limited ULSD availability,
mostly for municipal bus fleets. The US outcome stands in sharp contrast with the rapid, near
100% adoption of the cleaner fuel in Sweden, UK, and Germany, well ahead of the 2005 Euro 4
deadline.
Tax incentives assume that the next set of regulatory standards have been established, so
companies frequently lobby for tax incentives once the regulations are already finalized.
Occasionally, companies will introduce their cleaner product on a limited basis in hopes that it
will persuade regulators to adopt tax incentives for widespread adoption. This was BP's strategy
in France, but it did not appear to work. Toyota and PSA asserted that they did not actively
pursue incentives before introducing their hybrid cars and particulate filter-equipped cars,
respectively, but they were cooperative with regulators who proposed incentives favoring their
technology.
Tax incentives are meant to be a complement to regulations, not a replacement for
standards. Not all companies in industry favor tax incentives, perhaps because they tend to
distort markets, complicate pricing, and lead to demand spikes. Most oil companies prefer "to
have clear regulation and clear standards for fuel quality, and to follow them, rather than
incentives." 50°
10.4.2 Market preservation and protection from competing technologies
Absent fiscal incentives, adoption of cleaner and more costly technologies ahead of
regulatory requirements seldom occurred in the diesel vehicle industry. While promoting a
"green" image to the public was cited as important to companies, the rare cases of genuine first-
mover behavior were not exclusively motivated by the hopes for favorable publicity or an
altruistic commitment to good citizenship. Instead, the companies were executing a strategy
motivated by concern about market share erosion; they saw their existing market share
threatened if they did not introduce a less polluting product.
50 Interview with Stewart Kempsell, Hydrocarbon Fuel Strategy Manager, Shell International Ltd., September 28,
2005.
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PSA noticed a dip in diesel market share in the mid-1990s because of growing health
concerns about diesel exhaust, especially from the medical community. If manufacturers did not
help "clean up" diesel's image, PSA, with a diesel-heavy product portfolio, stood to be one of
the companies to hurt the most from a diesel backlash. As a result, PSA began to voluntarily
equip its cars with particulate filters even though the upcoming Euro 4 standards did not require
them. ARCO/BP introduced ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel in California because state regulators
seemed to be targeting diesel buses for extinction, steering municipalities towards CNG.
Recognizing that an increase in CNG's popularity would cut into the diesel market share,
ARCO/BP offered a cleaner fuel that would enable diesel retrofit technology. International also
recognized the threat of CNG competition and introduced its Green Diesel Technology school
buses 6 years before the new 2007 standards. Companies recognized the impact of the media
and environmental and citizen groups on regulatory attitudes towards diesels. These outside
pressures reinforced the need to preserve the diesel market for the entire industry, not just for
individual competitive interests. A Toyota representative noted in an interview that a company
foremost wants to remain a car manufacturer and therefore must form a long-term vision of
sustaining the car market.51 Countering environmental and health concerns by continuously
introducing cleaner products fits into this vision.
The actions of these first-movers have long-run spillover benefits to their competitors.
Initially, their competitors may view following in their footsteps as burdensome and unnecessary,
but the adoption and diffusion of the less-polluting technology gives both regulators and
customers additional confidence in the longevity of the technology. For example, any
competitive advantage that PSA had with the filters was narrowed once its rivals marketed
effective filter-equipped cars as well. If its main objective has been to preserve the market for
the entire diesel industry, other companies could free-ride from its first-mover behavior.
Although the whole industry may be criticized for being laggards at first, the first mover takes
the initiative to improve the image of the industry. It is no surprise that the companies to take on
this burden are also some of the largest companies within their market - e.g. BP in fuels, PSA in
diesel cars, International in school buses. In terms of financial benefits, any competitive
advantage to the company may not extend long into the future. The first mover is better prepared
to meet upcoming regulations than its competitors, and it usually receives praise from regulators
5' Interview with Didier Stevens, Manager of Government Affairs, Toyota Motor Europe, August 24, 2005.
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and NGOs. However, once regulations are implemented and everyone must reach the same
standard, others quickly mobilize to market similar technology. In the initial years, the first-
mover companies' lower unit costs and greater learning experience may help it maintain an edge
over the competition until the regulatory and public eye focuses on the next round of regulations.
This sentiment was echoed by representatives at the first-mover companies, who often viewed
these technology introductions as repeated rounds, for which they led in one round, and then
quickly moved on to compete in the next.
A market share threat from foreign competition may also make companies less resistant
to their first-mover government's plans to require cleaner products. This occurred in the
promotion of cleaner diesel fuel in Scandinavia and in Japan. In Sweden and Finland, refineries
were facing potential competition from Russian refiners, who were beginning to reorganize their
industry and sell refined petroleum products in addition to crude oil. It was in the interest of the
Swedish and Finnish refineries to make costly desulfurization investments to stave off future
imports of cheap, higher sulfur Russian diesel fuel. A similar situation occurred in Japan, which
faced tough competition with Asian refineries exporting inexpensive, high-sulfur fuel to Japan.
Japanese refineries may have been more cooperative with their government's requirement of 50
ppm sulfur diesel because they benefited from trade protection.
10.4.3 Technology development to test the market
Another motive besides market share preservation is technology development. A
company may foresee increased stringency in the future and decide to introduce its advanced
technology at small volumes prior to the regulatory deadline. Field experience and feedback
from customers and regulators will help to improve the technology. By the time that the
regulation does require the technology's use, it will be easier for the company to ramp up to high
volumes. This is a major motivation for technology vendors, such as emission control
manufacturers, to engage in demonstration projects to showcase their upcoming products to
regulators and potential customers. Johnson Matthey and Engelhard, two leaders in catalyzed
diesel particulate filter (CDPF) technology, participated in many field tests and fleet retrofits in
the US and Europe, even though there were no regulations requiring CDPFs at the time.
303
Although the availability of retrofit subsidies did partially drive their efforts, they anticipated that
future regulations would require truck and bus OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) to use
their technology. The on-road experiences helped them see how their emission control systems
operated once integrated into the vehicle. In the late 1990s, the SiNOx SCR system
manufacturer Siemens (later Argillon) participated in demonstration projects with US
engine/truck manufacturers, fleet owners, and regulators to increase receptivity to SiNOx. Since
Johnson Matthey, Engelhard, and Siemens/Argillon are suppliers, they could not sell their
products independently at a large scale without regulatory-driven commercial demand. Even
their retrofit equipment sales were subject to the availability of public subsidies.
Engaging in proactive behavior for technology development is not only the purview of
technology vendors. The desire for technology development was behind the introductions of
PSA's particulate filter and Toyota's D-CAT system. In both cases, the automakers offered the
technologies for commercial sale, not just through demonstration projects. The development of
the emission control system in-house allowed the companies to dictate when their new products
would be introduced. Even though PSA attributes its decision to adopt filters to preserve diesel
market share, its approach to the filter introduction suggests that it viewed the technology as an
opportunity to expand its market share, especially in Germany. It started with the Peugeot 607
first, and then each year gradually expanded to more Peugeot and Citroen models. Incremental
filter improvement and filter-equipped vehicle sales occurred in parallel. By 2005, when
industry experts expected most automakers to offer filters as standard in cars, PSA already had a
"running start" on its competitors. Toyota also pursued a similar strategy with its D-CAT
system, though upcoming regulations have not yet required a ramp-up of production beyond the
small number of Avensis and Corolla Verso cars sold. Instead of keeping the technology in-
house until regulations were implemented, PSA and Toyota chose to get their technologies out
on the market early, even if it initially cost more for them to do so.
Small-scale production followed by production ramp-up also occurred with the Toyota
Prius, the gasoline-electric hybrid car. It debuted in Japan in 1997, and sold 30,000 units in its
first 2 years (Automotive News International 1999). Toyota kept Prius sales within Japan until
2000, concerned about how their new car would behave in foreign driving and climate conditions
(Dawson 2005). The small production numbers allowed the Prius to be produced on existing
production lines for the Camry and other mainstream models. In the event that the Prius was
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unsuccessful, Toyota did not have to commit itself to a new production line (Dawson 2005).
When Toyota expanded Prius sales worldwide, with the US as the biggest customer, production
numbers increased significantly. In the first few years of limited production, monthly production
numbers averaged 1,000 units, but once the second-generation Prius model was introduced in
September 2003, monthly production jumped to an average of 5,000 (AutoInfoBank 2005). US
sales of the Prius have grown from 15,556 in 2001, the first full year of sales, to nearly 100,000
in 2005 (Ward's Automotive Yearbook 2005). Toyota has already migrated its hybrid
powertrain to popular existing models like the Highlander, Lexus RX 400, and Camry (Toyota
2005). Although the production ramp-up was driven by customer demand rather than
preparation for more stringent regulation, the Prius introduction shares a similar pattern with the
PSA filter and Toyota D-CAT's gradual diffusion into larger production volumes and more
models.
10.5 Disincentives to early andfirst-mover behavior
Earlier, it was mentioned that companies will typically not pursue any type of first-mover
or early-mover behavior without certainty in regulatory or customer demand. There are strong
disincentives to being first to the market, so technology leaders may choose to wait until after
regulations are implemented. Although the lack of a business case is the strongest disincentive
to proactive environmental behavior, companies with a financial incentive to move forward still
face other deterrents.
10.5.1 Lack of a business case
The most frequent response given by interviewees for the rarity of first-mover behavior is
the lack of a business case. This fits with the earlier proposition about tax or other fiscal
incentives being the best way to persuade companies to act early.
Senior environmental officials in major automobile and truck manufacturers claimed that
they have the technology to introduce more environmental features in vehicles, but customers are
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unwilling to pay extra for them. Even if a company were to introduce extra emission-reducing
technology as an option for more environmentally minded customers, the low volumes would
make the technology too expensive. It only becomes affordable when produced at high volumes
or when other companies adopt the technology. When different suppliers have to compete for
the OEMs' business, the competition drives prices down. An executive at Ford Europe
commented that a company's need to attend to short-term profitability prevents a company from
coming out as an environmental leader and pushing the regulations themselves.5 2
Leading emission control manufacturers like Johnson Matthey and Engelhard use
technology improvements to achieve lower-cost compliance rather than regulation-surpassing
performance. They recognize that this is what their customers (OEMs) want. If one company
were to market expensive, high-end catalysts while another sold cheaper but adequate catalysts,
the latter would win out in the marketplace. Auto and truck makers also take cues from their
customers' buying preferences. According to a senior manager at a major auto company, if his
company were able to introduce diesels in the US because of improved NOx reduction
technology, it would use diesel power to make larger SUVs and trucks rather than to reduce fuel
economy. American customers are perceived as caring more about vehicle size and power than
fuel economy.
Companies in the truck and engine business viewed their customers as even more
sensitive to cost than the average private vehicle owner. According to engine manufacturers,
emissions are among the last priority of heavy-duty truck customers, who care mainly about
performance, reliability, and cost. With the exception of government fleets, school buses, and
economic incentives, there is no customer demand for more emission control than is required by
law.53 As described in Chapter 7, even a 3-5% fuel penalty from required emission control
equipment may motivate a truck buyer to seek a more fuel-efficient engine. If an engine
manufacturer elected to meet more stringent emission standards unilaterally, and raised the
prices of their engines to cover the added cost, customers in general would not be willing to pay
the incremental expense.54
52 Interview with Dr. Wolfgang Schneider, Vice President of Legal, Governmental, and Environmental Affairs, Ford
Europe, August 31, 2004.
53 Interview with Joseph Suchecki, Engine Manufacturers Association, July 14, 2005.
54 Interview with Dr. John Wall, Chief Technical Officer, Cummins, November 11, 2003.
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Government policy protecting small and medium-sized businesses may also minimize or
eliminate any advantage to firms applying a competitive regulatory strategy. If lead firms could
anticipate squeezing firms with lower environmental quality out of the market, they might have a
strong business case to use regulatory stringency for competitive advantage. However,
governments have an interest in preserving even the most poorly-performing firms to avoid job
losses. For example, the US has provisions in its 2006 ultra-low sulfur diesel rule that gives
exemptions and longer compliance deadlines to small refineries, much to the chagrin of the large
refineries. From an environmental standpoint, it may make sense for refineries to be closed or
acquired if they cannot meet the desulphurization requirements. However, from an economic
standpoint, closing a refinery may mean worker unemployment and fuel supply disruption.
10.5.2 Corporate risk aversion
Companies are generally risk-averse, and do not want to make technology promises that
cannot be kept or that promote additional regulation. They are hesitant to make technology
assurances to regulators if there are still uncertainties associated with the technology or market.
Although emission control manufacturers are the most optimistic about emission control
technology, they still do not want to overstate their capabilities. In the interviews, regulators,
industry representatives, and NGO leaders overwhelmingly agreed that companies tend to make
very conservative estimates about costs and technological progress. It is more acceptable to
deliver more than expected than to under-perform. For example, a Toyota representative
distinguished that the company's approach is to work collaboratively with regulators.5 5 Some
companies are wary of provoking more regulation if they demonstrate their ability to go further
than their competitors. A senior manager at a major auto company said that it would not lobby
for tighter standards even if the company did make a major R&D discovery. Pushing for more
regulations would be "self-defeating" and "dangerous," because regulators might push the
standards even further, beyond the lead company's capability. Once regulations are finalized,
companies no longer feel such constraint, and compete aggressively to improve technology and
lower cost.
55 Interview with Dave Baxter, Vice President of Corporate Planning, Toyota Technical Center USA, September 12,
2005.
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Regulators inherently favor more optimistic technology reports, since they are eager to
see environmental improvements. They actively seek out evidence to support their next set of
standards, so a company coming forward with a promising technology would attract their interest.
EPA staff use past certification data to set standards. They seek instances where companies were
certified well below the standard as indications that lowering standards further is possible.
Sometimes being the second-mover company has its advantages. It may already have the
technology or product ready in-house, but allow the first mover to face the problems first. If the
first-mover's technology introduction encounters any problems, the second-mover company can
make improvements in-house and market a "better" product. For example, the first two
generations of PSA's particulate filter required replacement every 80,000 and 150,000 km,
respectively, and did not meet the Euro 4 NOx standard. These weaknesses were exploited by
other car manufacturers, like DaimlerChrysler, who came out with filters three years later, but
could declare their products as maintenance-free and Euro 4-compliant. Fortunately for PSA, its
third-generation filter in 2003 finally met both of these requirements, so the comparison quickly
became a moot point.
Individual companies may have the same level of capability to meet more stringent
standards, but they vary considerably in their attitude towards regulation. While BP and Tosco
were willing to bring US diesel fuel sulfur levels down to 15 ppm, large companies like
ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco joined independent refiners in strongly opposing to the 15 ppm
limit. Those large companies have the size and investment capacity to handle the new standard,
and benefit from squeezing out small, independent refiners from the market. However, their
overall resistance to additional costly regulation may have outweighed any perceived
competitive benefits. Now that 15 ppm is the required sulfur level, ExxonMobil and
ChevronTexaco will still have an advantage over the smaller refiners. They may have foreseen
their competitive benefit irrespective of their regulatory position, weakening the impetus to come
forward earlier.
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10.5.3 Industry pressure
Throughout the regulatory cycles explored in the previous chapters, there were instances
when individual companies or an entire industry, in the case of emission control manufacturers,
would almost certainly benefit from more stringent regulation. Their technology surpassed
regulatory requirements and was cost-effective enough to be introduced in the market.
Nevertheless, those companies chose not to push for greater stringency, or at least do so more
passively than their economic interest would suggest. These would-be first movers face pressure
from other industry sectors and from competitors not to advocate for more stringent regulations.
Emission control manufacturers have always had to walk a fine line between supporting
more stringent regulations to create demand for their products, and not appearing to antagonize
automobile and engine manufacturers by actively supporting more costly regulation. Keeping a
low profile in regulatory activities has become increasingly important, because more OEMs are
working exclusively with one catalyst supplier at the early stages of product development, rather
than selecting a supplier at the end of the development process, or sourcing from various
suppliers for the same engine platform. The emission control industry addresses this dilemma by
using their trade associations to make their arguments with the regulators.5 6 The most well-
known trade associations include US-based MECA (Manufacturers of Emission Control
Association) and Europe-based AECC (Association for Emission Control by Catalyst). The
companies can stand behind a group of companies, without any single company having to take
the initiative and risking a boycott from the OEMs. According to one experienced veteran of the
emission control industry, his company used to get phone calls from auto companies in the 1980s,
asking them to stop promoting regulations, but in recent years, this has been occurring less.
Emission control manufacturers could stand to lose lucrative contracts if they were perceived as
lobbying regulators against the OEM's wishes.
In some cases, emission control manufacturers have tried to make their support of
regulatory activities anonymous, preferring to demonstrate their technologies "behind the
scenes." During the first year of Germany's "No Diesel without Filter" campaign, the NGO
organizers were unable to get any financial support from filter manufacturers. Even though they
56 Interviews with senior experts in the diesel vehicle industry, 2005 and 2006.
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clearly had a financial interest in promoting filter use, they were afraid to anger their potential
clients. Later into the campaign, some filter manufacturers did contribute funds but requested
anonymity. DUH, the German environmental NGO leading the campaign, had broad level
support from the manufacturers but could not publicize the individual donor companies. When
DUH installed a filter on a Mercedes SmartCar, it could not reveal the brand of filter used.
Manufacturers frequently offer prototypes for regulators to conduct testing. In the late
1990s, in preparation for California's LEV II rulemaking, an emission control manufacturer
participated in a light-duty truck test program with the California Air Resources Board. At the
time, light-duty trucks were subject to weaker emission standards than passenger cars. The
testing could demonstrate that light-duty trucks could reach passenger car standards. The
manufacturer did not reveal its participation, fearing that auto companies would boycott its
products. However, the auto companies eventually discovered its involvement, and they were
not pleased.57
A more industry-friendly strategy would be to provide information about R&D activities
and future products to industry and to regulators at the same time, so that they are not accused of
privately feeding data to regulators. Emission control manufacturers have been very
forthcoming about presenting their latest technologies at conferences, publishing in industry
journals like SAE, and participating in pilot projects and subsidy programs - more indirect ways
of advocating for more stringent regulations.
Pressure from within the same industry to oppose stringent regulations was a major
deterrent to first-mover behavior. Typically, a regulated industry resists additional
environmental regulation, so tension arises when one firm or a subset of firms in the industry
adopts a technology or stance that is inconsistent with the industry view. Trade associations and
industry groups aim to reach consensus on regulatory issues, so it is unusual for a member
company to adopt a different position. Most of the company and industry association
representatives interviewed explained the importance of showing a unified front. Unity gives
them greater influence with regulators and elected government officials. In the rare case where
there is a difference in opinion, trade associations will either pick a majority position or stay
silent on the issue altogether. They would expect the companies to not emphasize the difference
to the public or the media, in order to maintain a show of solidarity.
57 Interview with a senior industry expert, August 2005.
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Even among companies that may have had a technological advantage in deviating from
the industry position, their representatives described little dissent in their industry. However,
their actual position and behavior might lead to some conflict within the industry. For instance,
Toyota's product line of more fuel-efficient and lower-emission vehicles suggests that it might
gain an advantage from differentiating itself from its fellow automakers. According to EPA and
CARB regulators, Toyota and Honda are often ahead of the curve in terms of technology and
regulatory compliance, and are very open about sharing their technology development with
technical regulatory staff. Even so, Toyota USA has chosen to downplay its differences from the
rest of industry. A Toyota representative in the US noted that the company has never come
forward to show they oppose what its industry association, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (AAM) is doing.58 Demonstrating technical competence is less aggressive than
actively pursuing more stringent regulations, an action that would give first movers many
enemies in the industry.
The US auto industry might be a more tight-knit, unified group than the US oil industry,
which did have dissenters on the 15 ppm diesel sulfur standard. BP and Tosco's support of the
standard differentiated them from other oil companies.59 Even though BP and Tosco generally
supported the standard in their public comments to EPA, the companies tried to keep a low
profile in the public eye. Representatives from BP with experience in the US and UK said that
within the oil industry, individual companies are always free to retain their individual points of
view. BP did not feel pressured to adopt the same position as its trade associations, and if
differences are too great, BP can withdraw, as it did with the Global Climate Coalition.60
PSA's introduction of diesel particulate filters in its passenger cars angered German
automakers, who prided themselves in reaching Euro 4 standards without any filters. Although
PSA worked with regulators in testing their technology and marketed the standard filter option in
Germany, they were careful not to get involved in the "No Diesel without Filter" campaign or
appear to support more stringent PM standards. According to representatives at both PSA and
the German environmental group DUH, PSA was invited to participate in the filter campaign but
58 Interview with Toyota representative, September 12, 2005.
59 Interview with a senior expert in the diesel vehicle and fuel industry, February 2003.
'O Interviews with Gary Stewart, General Manager, State Government Affairs, BP, August 16, 2005, and Kathryn
Shanks, VP External Relations - Environment, BP, July 25, 2005. BP withdrew from the Global Climate Coalition
in 1997 because the GCC opposed any policies supporting C02 emission reductions, whereas BP supported taking
policy action to address climate change.
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refused, preferring to keep its distance from the NGO alliance's activities. The company did not
want to antagonize the other automakers. It recognized that it could not go alone with filter
technology - others would have to adopt filters in order to make the technology viable and
affordable. Technology introductions happen repeatedly and congenial relationships are
desirable, so "sportsmanlike" conduct is essential. This time, PSA had the lead on filters, though
in the future another company might take the lead on another technology, and then choose to
attack PSA in retaliation for its past behavior.6 '
PSA's filter decision was very unusual. Although different companies take the lead on
various automobile technologies, it was not expected that a company would introduce an
emission control device not required by upcoming legislation. Had PSA been a German
company instead of a French company, it is unlikely that it would have introduced the filters.
According to a senior German environmental official at UBA, one or two German manufacturers
had prepared to introduce filters earlier, but they stopped production because they could not
reach agreement within VDA, the German auto industry association.6 VDA provided a strong
constraint on first-mover behavior from its members. Non-VDA members like Renault, Fiat, and
Toyota began promising to add filters once they saw the customer demand in Germany. When
Ford Europe, a VDA member, chose to license PSA's filter technology for its vehicles, some
German companies tried to pressure Ford to stop offering filters.63 PSA's reputation as a diesel
technology leader and its status as an outsider to the tight-knit German auto industry allowed it to
pursue its own strategy without much deference to the German companies.
Even companies that achieve compliance ahead of schedule face criticism from their
competitors. Caterpillar heavily criticized Cummins and Detroit Diesel's new engines after the
EPA certified them as meeting the October 2002 deadline. When International certified its
school bus engine well ahead of the 2007 deadline, Caterpillar argued that it was much easier for
International to meet the standards because it sells in a much narrower range of engine types.
Many industry observers note that trade associations tend to defer to the least common
denominator when deciding on a regulatory position. While this promotes consensus and
camaraderie, it can discourage the more proactive companies from supporting more
61 Interview with Bruno Costes, Technical and Political Affairs, PSA Peugeot Citroen, September 3, 2004, and
Jurgen Resch, Executive Director, Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (DUH), September 3, 2004.
62 Interview with German UBA representative, October 2004.
63 Interview with Jrgen Resch, Executive Director, Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (DUH), September 3, 2004.
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environmentally protective policies. Granted, every company is free to select its own
technologies and products. However, companies would be more likely to act as first movers and
gamrner success if they can convince their industry peers to follow their example. In countries in
the EU and in Japan, it is unlikely that one or two lone first movers in industry would be able to
steer the government towards policy changes. Whereas the US may base its technology-forcing
regulations on progress by the industry leaders, the EU and Japan seek to ensure that the majority
of industry can meet the regulations.
Pressure from other companies acts as a powerful constraint against self-promotion and
lobbying for more stringent regulation, even if the company has a clear competitive advantage.
Companies prefer to stay out of the limelight, wait for the regulations to be finalized, and then
promote their technology afterwards.
10.5.4 Lack of infrastructure
The lack of supporting infrastructure or complementary technologies can delay or block
the first-mover technology introductions and/or limit their effectiveness. Because of the
interdependence of engines, fuel, and aftertreatment devices in emission control, a "missing link"
can prevent the adoption of a cleaner technology. Many aftertreatment technologies, such as
Toyota's NOx adsorber in its D-CAT system and Johnson Matthey's CRT particulate filter, are
very effective at reducing emissions, but cannot reach their 90% or higher conversion rate
without ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) fuel. The main argument for ULSD is not for its direct
role in reducing PM and sulfate emissions. Rather, it is most valued for its enabling role in the
installation of catalyst and filter equipment on new and in-use vehicles. Although Johnson
Matthey had their CRT filters ready for commercialization in the 1980s, the lack of a ULSD
distribution infrastructure delayed its introduction until the early 1990s in Scandinavia, and the
late 1990s in the rest of Europe and the US.
Urea infrastructure is a constraining factor in the adoption of SCR technology, which has
the support of the majority of European heavy-duty vehicle manufacturers and regulators.
Difficulty ensuring a reliable urea supply threatens to put a freeze on SCR's popularity. In Japan,
Nissan Diesel stood alone in wanting to use SCR, so it had to develop the urea infrastructure on
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its own. Because of the large geographic size and decentralized diesel fuel distribution
infrastructure in the US and Europe, an economically viable urea infrastructure depends on the
majority of manufacturers' committing to SCR.
10.6 Public and private outcomes
Table 10-3 summarizes the major early- and first-mover companies discussed in the
regulatory cycles in Chapters 5-9. It omits the myriad activities of emission control
manufacturers, because it is almost always in their commercial interest to support more stringent
regulation. The list focuses on industries that would normally be opposed to more regulation.
First movers introduced technology that surpassed any existing or known upcoming standards,
while early movers introduced technology ahead of known compliance deadlines. While both
types of behavior resulted in public health and environmental benefits, first movers deal with
greater uncertainty and have greater impact on the development of future regulation and
technology.
The public benefits of proactive behavior often extended beyond the individual actions of
one government or company. Governments engage in their own type of regulatory competition
by trying to pass the most ambitious emission or fuel standards. The successful introduction of a
cleaner product by one firm frequently had the effect of causing a diffusion of the associated
technology (e.g. particulate filters, ultra-low sulfur diesel) throughout the industry.
Private benefits, if observable, came in the form of stronger sales and contracts, either
through technology licensing or supply contracts. In many cases, private benefits to the
companies were not easily measurable or directly attributable to environmental performance.
Instead, the benefits were often intangible: improved relations with environmental groups and
regulators, preparedness for the next round of regulations, or an environmentally-friendly public
image. Public benefits usually consist of emission reductions occurring earlier than required by
the upcoming compliance deadline.
In several cases, products relied on complementary technologies for deployment or full
benefits. Without the necessary urea infrastructure, DaimlerChrysler/Siemens and Nissan Diesel
could not introduce their SCR-equipped trucks. Ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel had two-tiered
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benefits - the immediate but minor pollutant reductions from using the fuel, and the dramatic
reductions made possible by installation of aftertreatment equipment. Toyota D-CAT
technology has been constrained by the availability of ULSD. D-CAT-equipped cars were
initially sold only in the UK and Germany, which have 100% ULSD adoption.
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10.6.1 Comparing across cases
Earlier in this chapter, fiscal incentives, market preservation, and technology
development were discussed as key motives for early and first-mover behavior. Table 10-3
shows a relationship among motive, size of response, and type of behavior. Tax incentives have
been a strong motivator for early movers, such as auto manufacturers' early Euro 4-compliant
vehicles and fuel companies' ultra-low sulfur diesel introductions in Sweden, Finland, UK, and
other parts of Europe. They help to motivate the majority of companies into technology adoption
because of the certain financial benefits and intention to support best available technology. First-
mover behavior is exhibited by a much smaller number of companies because of the greater
uncertainty in the competitive advantages of stepping forward. The first movers in the cases
were most often motivated by the desire to protect market share from a competing technology
(VW's diesel-electric car vs. electric cars, PSA's diesel cars vs. non-diesel cars, and
ARCO/BP/Tosco's diesel fuel vs. CNG). The Toyota first-mover case does stand out from this
group, in that the company has far less at stake with diesel technology because of its strong
portfolio of gasoline and hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles. However, realizing Europe's
preference for diesels, Toyota anticipated the need for further emission reductions and used the
D-CAT technology launch to prepare for a more full-scale introduction when required by future
regulations.
The tendency of first-mover behavior to arise from the desire for market share protection
or regulatory preparedness reveals the important role that interest group and regulatory pressure
has on the pace of technology introduction. Several of the competing technologies to diesels,
like electric-powered and CNG vehicles, rose in popularity because of growing attention to
diesel exhaust's harmful health effects. When environmental and regulatory groups endorsed
switching to competing technologies, companies in the diesel vehicle industry responded by
making their technology cleaner. While these were defensive responses, they altered the
previous anti-diesel mindset of environmental groups and many regulators, which later came to
endorse the clean diesel technologies.
The cases document great variability in the level of success of the corporate strategies.
Significant private financial and reputational benefits and public environmental benefits are good
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success indicators. While there were instances of non-compliant activities discussed in
Chapter 7, there no observed cases of pure rent-seeking, where companies successfully used
regulations for their own competitive advantage, without any significant benefits to the
environment. However, the most successful cases had limited private benefits and significant
public benefits. The greatest public benefits came from behavior that resulted in the widespread
adoption of an environmentally superior technology or performance level. If considered from
the standpoint of health and environmental protection, the big early and first-mover successes are
the PSA filter introduction, several auto manufacturers' early Euro 4 compliance, Greenergy and
BP's clean fuels introduction, and accelerated compliance deadlines by the auto and oil
industries in Japan. Regulatory activity by first-mover governments deserves credit for the last
three cases. The existence or expectation of fiscal incentives gave greater traction to the
technology introductions. Customers saw value in purchasing the new technology, not just
because of environmental benefits, but because tax schemes or subsidies promised to offset the
additional cost. Other products, like International's Green Diesel Technology, Toyota's D-CAT
system, and BP and Tosco's ULSD in the US, sold in very limited quantities. They had clear
emission benefits, but they did not have accompanying government incentives to support
widespread adoption. Many companies began with technology demonstrations or small-scale
sales first. Some remained at this stage, like VW's Ecomatic, but others quickly expanded in
production once regulatory or customer demand came into play.
There were no indications of heavy lobbying by companies for more regulatory
stringency. Instead, the results of technology demonstrations spoke for themselves. Since
regulators base rulemaking on technological progress, many of the technologies influenced the
upcoming level of stringency or boosted regulators' confidence about the feasibility of proposed
standards.
10.6.2 Paired comparisons
Several of the cases share similar characteristics, but result in very different outcomes.
Pairing such cases for comparison is a useful exercise for understanding the reasons behind those
differences.
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PSA 'sfilters and Toyota's D-CAT technology
PSA's particulate filter introduction shares several similarities with Toyota's D-CAT
technology. Both were first movers because they introduced diesel car technologies that
exceeded known existing or upcoming regulations. The companies targeted the European
market, with their introductions occurring before the implementation of the 2005 Euro 4
standards and before the finalization of the Euro 5 standards. They performed technology
demonstrations and field studies, freely disclosed performance data at industry and regulatory
meetings, and received praise from environmental groups and the media. Their actions deviated
from mainstream industry, predominantly drawing criticism from the German auto
manufacturers. PSA is an outsider to the German auto industry just as Toyota is an outsider to
the EU auto industry. However, filter adoption became a Germany-wide, and later, an EU-wide
trend, while sales of D-CAT-equipped Toyota diesels remain small. PSA added its filter as
standard in its models, while Toyota offered the D-CAT system for an extra cost. This still does
not explain the discrepancy because German customers did pay extra for filter-equipped diesels
from other manufacturers who offered filters as an added-cost option. Chapter 6 discusses the
likely reasons for the starkly different outcomes, concluding that PSA benefited from earlier
product introduction timing relative to Euro 5 standard-setting, higher NGO involvement, greater
public attention to PM than NOx, and compatibility with the existing fuel infrastructure.
Toyota's sulfur-sensitive D-CAT system was constrained by the limited availability of ULSD.
PSA'sfilters and International's Green Diesel Technology
PSA and International Truck and Engine were primarily motivated by diesel market share
protection. Both introduced filter technologies ahead of requirements, and were very focused on
PM reduction rather than NOx. They recognized that the growing antagonism towards diesels
came from those worried about the health effects of diesel PM. Both companies have diesels as
their core business - PSA in small diesel passenger cars and International in medium-duty diesel
engines and trucks and buses. Their different outcomes - widespread filter popularity vs.
limited sales of Green Diesel buses - may come from industry-specific differences. Passenger
car filters cost considerably less than heavy-duty engine filters. Passenger car models also have
higher volumes across which to spread the costs. Heavy-duty engines have tougher durability
requirements because of their usage patterns.
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BP in Europe and the US
Another interesting paired comparison takes the same firm and technology - BP's ULSD
- and seeks to explain why the company had such different experiences in Europe and the US.
The availability of government incentives offers the best explanation for the differences. In
Europe, BP frequently followed on the heels of tax incentives as fuel tax differentials made
ULSD competitive with regular diesel. The company quickly introduced ULSD in all its retail
stations in countries with favorable tax incentives. In the US, BP had to pursue an entirely
different strategy because the US had to no tax incentives for introducing ULSD before the 2006
deadline. BP sold ULSD in limited quantities to municipal or school district fleets. It offered
ULSD statewide in California, because state laws require buses run on the fuel. On the upside,
BP had more influence on regulations in US than in EU because it had already successfully
marketed ULSD in Europe.
SCR technology in Europe and Japan
The most recent round of heavy-duty engine emission standards have required engine
manufacturers to decide between SCR and non-SCR strategies. While the US has so far taken a
strictly non-SCR approach, the choices by manufacturers in the EU and Japan have been mixed.
DaimlerChrysler and Nissan Diesel have been the SCR technology leaders in the two regions.
Although they have picked the same technology path, geographical and logistical differences
influence the extent to which each manufacturer had to get buy-in for their technology. It was
crucial to DaimlerChrysler to get other manufacturers to adopt SCR and to persuade European
regulators of its superiority to EGR. Installing the AdBlue urea infrastructure would be
worthwhile only if the vast majority of trucks ran on SCR systems. In contrast, Nissan Diesel
was able to go alone on SCR in Japan because of the country's relatively small size and more
centralized fuel distribution network. With fewer AdBlue refueling points, Nissan Diesel could
manage to single-handedly establish the urea infrastructure for its truck customers.
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10.7 Technology development as an instrumentfor influencing regulation
Companies have used a variety of tools to influence environmental policy. Traditional
tools include lobbying elected officials who may have influence on senior environmental
officials or raising national competitiveness and employment concerns at the time of rulemaking.
Wary of introducing a product for which there is no regulatory or market demand and
concerned about reproach from fellow companies, potential early or first movers have taken on
more indirect ways of promoting their technology or ability to surpass existing regulations,
namely:
* Presenting new technology at industry events, conferences, and other public forums.
* Meeting one-on-one with regulators to confidentially discuss proprietary technology
under development.
* Teaming with public and private partners on technology demonstration projects.
* Selling the product in small volumes or on a limited basis to a niche market.
* Choosing to stay silent or neutral about proposed regulations while the rest of the
industry launches a vocal opposition
These less aggressive ways of showcasing a product or technology are likely to still
influence regulators, who are eager to find evidence of technological progress. Regulators may
then use the technology leader's success for rulemaking or to persuade other companies to follow
suit. Environmental interest groups and other NGOs with a strong focus on diesel issues are also
quick to pick up on the latest technology developments. They often do the more vocal
campaigning in favor of a certain technology or more stringent standards. However, their tactics
are perceived as extreme, such as in the "No Diesel without Filter" campaign. Even though the
campaign organizers praised PSA's filters, PSA intentionally steered clear from its activities.
Instead of engaging in self-promotion and advertising, a company gains more credibility among
the public when its technology is validated by regulators or environmental groups.
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10.8 Recommendations
The findings from the cases developed in this thesis highlight many areas where
corporate strategy, regulatory policy-making, and interest group activity can be improved to
enhance private and public benefits. Based on the lessons learned from the cases, four key
recommendations on fiscal incentives, environmental interest group/NGO involvement,
communication of technological progress, and regulatory timing are discussed below.
Recommendation #1: Governments should use fiscal incentives as a tool to promote the
diffusion of cleaner technologies.
The past chapters have shown that in countries and regulatory cycles where fiscal
incentives exist, customers have more rapidly adopted the new, less polluting technologies. The
incentives spur customer demand, which in turn gives companies the certainty they need to
produce the cleaner products. Tax differentiation favoring the less polluting product ensures that
the incentives are revenue-neutral. Fiscal incentives would be most helpful in promoting early
compliance, rather than first-mover behavior, because it assumes target levels are already
established by regulators. One possibility is to use industry's progress as a "moving target,"
such that products cleaner than the industry average receive a tax reduction and more polluting
products face a higher tax.
This type of scheme is commonly known as a "feebate" program. Feebates have been
increasingly discussed by energy experts as a cost-effective and revenue-neutral means to reduce
vehicle fuel consumption and/or greenhouse gas emissions (Greene, Patterson et al. 2005; Jansen
and Denis 1999; Johnson 2005; Johnson 2006; Michaelis and Davidson 1996). A vehicle
feebate would charge an extra fee on purchases of more polluting vehicles and give a rebate for
purchases of lower-emitting vehicles. A feebate program is based on a vehicle model's
emissions performance relative to an industry average, which would presumably change as
technology improved. Sweden's highly successful feebate-based program for large combustion
plants reduced NOx levels by 50% in 1995 from 1990 levels (Johnson 2006). Although vehicle
feebate proposals have focused primarily on reducing CO2 , a program involving multiple
pollutants or characteristics, such as fuel economy, C0 2, NOx, PM, HC, and other pollutants
might be possible.
323
California attempted to pass a feebate program in 1990 called "DRIVE+" (Demand-based
Reductions in Vehicle Emissions). It reduced sales tax for vehicles with below-average fuel
consumption and vehicle emissions (pollutants and C0 2) and raised sales tax for those with
above-average fuel consumption and emissions. An annual review would adjust the fee/rebate
schedule to maintain revenue neutrality. DRIVE+ included cars and light trucks, avoiding the
loopholes for heavier vehicles found in weight class-based proposals. Although the bill passed
by the legislature, it was vetoed by the governor (Schuster, Schuster et al. 2004).
Feebate programs encourage companies to continue innovating to be "above average."
They are rewarded by greater customer demand. Customers respond to the feebates by
purchasing the cleaner vehicles in higher proportions than they would without the program. This
helps to get around the information asymmetry that regulators face in assessing technologies.
The industry baseline is determined directly by technological progress, not pre-established
standards. There seems to be greater receptivity to feebates in Europe, where many countries
already use tax differentiation for fuels.
Tax incentives have been very popular in Europe, especially Scandinavia, UK,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany. However, it may not be easily transferable to Japan
or the US. The Japanese regulatory environment encourages industry-government cooperation,
where industry promises to meet a certain level of stringency. In return, the government
frequently gives industry-wide subsidies to help alleviate costs in the first few years of a new
regulation. In the US, tax incentives are popular instruments for encouraging cleaner choices,
but penalizing more polluting choices with higher taxes would face political opposition.
Although cigarette taxes are a notable exception, American culture's emphasis on free choice
and individuality generally discourages the use of tax instruments to punish undesirable customer
behavior. Any tax differentiation policy would have to be accompanied by a strong consumer-
supported movement against polluting technologies or creative packaging with more politically
and socially pressing concerns, such as national energy security and fuel efficiency. The 2005
US energy bill did take the latter approach with vehicle fuel economy, but it emphasizes
incentives over penalties. It offers tax incentives for the purchase of fuel-efficient hybrid, clean
diesel, and fuel cell vehicles, but sets no penalties for less efficient vehicles. The "gas guzzler
tax" on highly polluting cars still exists, but it exempts the light trucks and SUVs, far more fuel-
consuming than automobiles. Unfortunately, these types of incentives and taxes only affect car
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sales at the margins. Penalizing more polluting vehicle models through a feebate-type program
would have broader impact, but would also draw strong opposition from major producers of light
trucks and SUVs. This resistance might be overcome through mobilization by producers of
cleaner, more efficient vehicles, regulatory agencies, and environmental groups.
By focusing on shaping customer behavior through economic incentives, regulators can
avoid the problem of manufacturers' producing very clean products, but having no customers to
buy them. Economic incentives may also be used to help phase-out older technologies.
Although it is unlikely that the EU or the US will follow Japan's example of retroactively
regulating the emissions of in-use vehicles, a differential vehicle tax favoring newer and cleaner
vehicles may encourage more vehicle turnover. A penalty on very old vehicles could potentially
hurt low-income individuals. As a solution, state governments could implement programs to
trade in old, polluting vehicles for a voucher to apply to purchasing a new or newer car or a
transit pass.
The countries that have been first to implement tax incentives often improve national
competitiveness as well. Their domestic companies are better equipped to handle regulatory
change when other markets' regulations become more stringent. The tax incentives push their
home companies to invest and innovate in cleaner technologies, which can ultimately be
transferred to other countries.
Recommendation #2: Public groups and NGOs can leverage their knowledge about
technology development to make a strong impact on regulatory and corporate decision-
making about clean technologies.
Anti-diesel movements in the US, Japan, and Europe had a strong impact on the
stringency of government regulations and on corporate decisions. The environmental and public
health NGOs supported their campaigns with scientific evidence from medical studies and
technology assessments from government and private research projects. Despite the variety and
quantity of information available, they are able to pull together the relevant pieces to build a
focused argument for more protective regulation. This does require that NGOs have staff
members or volunteers who are technically and politically savvy and who interact frequently
with government and industry representatives. NGOs also have more freedom to use aggressive
and even sensationalistic tactics not typically practiced by government agencies or companies
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seeking to push for greater emission reduction. NGO activity can foster widespread customer
awareness, which then creates the customer demand for cleaner products that persuades
companies to invest and market less polluting technologies. Crucial to the NGOs' effectiveness
is their ability to leverage concrete evidence of the technical and economic feasibility of their
proposed regulatory changes.
In some early-mover and first-mover cases, companies felt compelled to introduce
cleaner products to counter the prevailing idea that diesels are highly polluting. Fear of losing
market share was a major driver. Even though the companies' actions seemed more reactive
rather than proactive environmental strategies, they still achieved public benefits. The research
findings imply that well-organized and focused public or NGO campaigns can shift public
opinion and alter company strategies.
Recommendation #3: In an environment where openly supporting more stringent
regulations might risk forfeiting customer loyalty or antagonizing the rest of the industry,
companies should make use of technology demonstrations and public-private studies,
which may be more credible and influential than independent claims from manufacturers.
Technology demonstration usually occurs once a company already has a product ready
for commercialization. Conducting testing, demonstration projects, or pilot studies means that
the upfront R&D investment must already have been made. A production-ready product attracts
strong interest from regulators and NGOs alike. By allowing the capabilities of its product to
speak for itself, a company can avoid accusations by its competitors of secretly lobbying
regulators for more stringent regulations or tax incentives. It can also test how its product works
within the entire vehicle-road system, especially if special fueling infrastructure is needed.
Showing off the product as part of a well-coordinated public relations plan can also enhance the
company's image as an environmental leader, winning reputation points with NGOs and the
public. For technology vendors, like catalyst manufacturers, public demonstration projects are
essential. Actual on-road results can more convincingly showcase their products' effectiveness
to OEMs than data generated in-house at a laboratory.
Such projects indirectly influence regulatory decision-making, because regulators
routinely use the results as a basis for future requirements. Programs that involve the regulatory
agency as a partner can strengthen the relationship between the company representatives and the
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regulators. When it is time to sit down one-on-one to discuss technological progress and future
regulations, the parties will have already established trust and good will, hopefully making for
less contentious debate in the standard-setting process.
Recommendation #4: Regulatory agencies and companies should establish both short-term
and long-term performance-based emission targets.
Earlier in this chapter, it was explained that the US implements more dramatic emission
reductions, but with longer time periods between new regulations. For instance, the US Tier 2
standards began in 1994, 10 years after Tier 1 first took effect. The phase-in period (usually 3-5
years) for US light-duty vehicles accommodate the typical 3 to 4-year lifespan of a given
model's production run, allowing manufacturers to stagger the upgrade of production lines (EPA
1999c). Based on interviews with auto and truck company representatives, industry prefers the
certainty that longer-term emission standards bring, rather than shorter-term standards that
change every 3 to 4 years. On the other hand, longer time intervals make it harder for regulators
to predict which technologies will be viable in the future, so it is important for regulators to
monitor industry progress closely. While the longer time intervals allow for more innovative
activity, the new vehicles entering the fleet annually have the same emission levels for several
years. Except for natural fleet turnover and vehicle retrofits, there is no additional emission
reduction from the vehicle fleets.
The relatively short 3- to 4-year lead times for new emission standards in Japan and
Europe are less conducive to technology-forcing. The length of time is inadequate to include
extensive R&D, experimentation, field testing, and mass production. There may be enough time
for only the latter two. Such a short timeline assumes that the product is close to
commercialization when the regulation is established. Japanese and EU regulations are based
on best available technology, usually one that can be accomplished by the majority of companies.
The advantage of this approach is that regulators can incorporate the latest developments in
emission control technology more quickly. Through more adaptable, the shorter timelines
preclude more ambitious emission reductions and seldom incorporate the type of technology-
forcing that can lead to technological breakthroughs.
A hybrid approach would combine the best of both styles. After consulting with industry,
regulatory agencies could set longer-term targets 8-12 years in advance, and then set
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intermediate standards within that time frame, at 3-4 year intervals. For the auto and truck
industry, these intervals would more closely correspond to the length of their production runs, so
that changes in emission requirements coincide with model changes. Industry benefits from
having some regulatory certainty and information to plan their emission reduction R&D well into
the next decade. The public benefits from having incremental improvements to emission levels,
rather than having to wait many years for the next set of requirements to take affect. Also, with
more rounds of regulation to test their latest technology, companies have more opportunities to
gather feedback and improve for the next set of targets.
The hybrid approach still does not get around the problem of regulators misjudging
industry's long-term progress. If the long-term targets are too lenient, the full potential for
emission reduction is not met. If the long-term targets are too strict, industry will be unable to
meet them and the regulators will have to postpone or weaken them, which lowers the credibility
of future targets. A feebate structure, which was discussed earlier in Recommendation #1, might
solve this dilemma by using technology development as a moving target. The intermediate
standards could be structured with feebates, which reward above-average companies with rebates
on cleaner vehicles and penalize below-average companies with fees on more polluting vehicles.
They institutionalize the regulatory competition that otherwise happens sporadically. The
industry average and rebate/fee amounts can be revisited every 3-4 years, and adjusted based on
companies' progress.
While industry will appreciate the certainty of the long-term targets, they may be resistant
to the flexibility of readjusting interim standards or feebate rates every 3-4 years. In particular,
the companies that tend to be technology followers rather than leaders will fear that the faster
progress of technology leaders will tighten standards. Even government regulatory agencies may
not readily accept such a hybrid approach because it requires regulatory staff to more frequently
assess industry progress and set appropriate interim emission levels. However, a compromise
plan might be one that guarantees industry a fixed long-term target for an 8-12 year time horizon
in exchange for interim steps that accelerate interim technology adoption.
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10.9 Conclusions
This chapter has brought together the insights gained from the regulatory cycles in the
past five chapters. It has explained how a company's regulatory and market context affects its
potential for competitive advantage from regulation. Proactive governments have a major
influence over technology development in industry because their fiscal and regulatory policies
spur innovation and technology adoption. Variations in regulatory stringency, timing, and
compliance details shape the competitiveness of firms. The US has had more technology-forcing
standards with longer regulatory cycles, while the EU and Japan have taken on smaller,
incremental changes in shorter time frames. Since lead firms tend to draw attention to their
environmental performance at later stages of product development, shorter, more frequent
regulatory cycles put their technology in a better position to influence policy. Compliance
details often escape the notice of the public and even environmental groups, but regulatory
loopholes can undermine environmental benefits and distort competition. Existing market
conditions are closely entwined with the regulatory environment. Tax policy, whether motivated
by environmental or economic concerns, increases the attractiveness of introducing cleaner
technologies. The technological strengths and the product portfolio of individual firms
determine their preparedness for future regulations.
Even if firms do have the technological capacity to exceed regulatory requirements, there
are external and internal challenges that restrict their willingness to step forward or their ability
to reap benefits from competitive regulatory strategies. This has resulted in a diversity of
responses among firms with similar capacity to meet more stringent regulations. According to
the regulatory cycles studied, companies seldom strategically seek to shape the terms of
competition by supporting more stringent regulation. Instead, corporate behavior is driven by
other motivations that consequentially result in their technology influencing regulatory policy.
The weak form of competitive regulatory strategy prevails, with technology leaders preparing for
more stringent regulations through R&D and product introductions. In cases where companies
did accelerate technology introductions, government-sponsored fiscal incentives have been the
strongest driver. Meanwhile, the desire for market preservation and/or technology development
has often been behind first-mover behavior.
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Companies, even emission control manufacturers, seldom advocate directly for greater
stringency, but their technology demonstrations do catch the attention of regulators and NGOs,
who then go on to pursue tighter standards. Overall, proactive behavior has been a rarity because
of the many obstacles firms face. The lack of a business case is probably the greatest
disincentive. Cautiousness about overstating a product's performance or dissenting from the rest
of industry also discourages firms from stepping forward. As vehicle technologies have become
more dependent on appropriate emission control and fuel systems, the lack of available
complementary technologies or infrastructure poses another serious obstacle. With these
obstacles to implementing competitive regulatory strategies, companies have used more subtle
strategies, such as technology demonstration and small-scale trials or sales. These actions signal
to regulators that the company might be supportive of more stringent standards without the firm
having to express its support explicitly.
From an environmental protection standpoint, it is desirable for the public benefits of
proactive behavior to extend beyond the individual actions of one government or company.
Governments engage in their own version of regulatory competition by trying to pass the most
ambitious emission or fuel standards. Improving public health and responding to public pressure
are key drivers, but regulatory agencies also pride themselves in being world leaders in
regulatory stringency. The successful introduction of a cleaner product by one firm frequently
has the effect of causing diffusion of the product throughout the industry. However, in order for
technology introductions to reach beyond a single company or regional area, government
intervention - in the form of fiscal incentives or new standards - has been crucial to encouraging
widespread diffusion of the technology and its associated benefits.
In the interest of promoting more early- and first-mover behavior by firms, the final
recommendations call for (1) greater use of tax incentives, (2) review and communication of
scientific/medical findings and technological progress by public groups and NGOs (3) use of
technology demonstrations and partnerships with regulators or NGOs to communicate
technology readiness, and (4) adoption of a combination of short-term and long-term emission
targets.
Through a systematic analysis of multiple regulatory cycles for diesel emission and fuel
regulations, this research has identified factors that influence early and first-mover behavior and
that generate private and public benefits. The industries covered in this thesis - the automotive,
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truck, engine, fuel, and aftertreatment industries - shared commonalities in their decision-making
and regulatory responses, but structural and technological differences did affect behavior and
outcomes. This implies that there are limitations to extending the findings to other industries.
The next and final chapter compares the research findings to recent empirical work in other
industries.
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CHAPTER 11 -Future Work
11.1 Introduction
The focus on the diesel vehicle industry led to investigation into the automobile, truck,
engine, fuel, and aftertreatment industries. Despite the wide-ranging differences among those
individual industries, their interdependent technologies and their need to respond to frequently
changing emission and fuel regulations produced many shared and similar experiences. After
studying these industries in the context of diesel emission reduction, the next task is to consider
the applicability of the research findings to other industries and technologies. This chapter
compares the findings from the diesel vehicle industry to those in other industries, and seeks
potentially generalizable conclusions. The contribution to the existing body of research on the
interaction between environmental regulation and technology development is discussed. In
terms of future work, this research study can be easily broadened to study more regulatory cycles
and related technologies, or adapted to other regulated industries.
11.2 Comparingfindings from other industries
Although some of the empirical work discussed in Chapter 2 is still in progress,
preliminary findings show some important areas of commonality. The following section
compares the thesis findings to research in other industries, with special attention to work
completed through the AGS CARE (Competitive Advantage, Regulation, and the Environment)
project. Based on a review of the limited, but valuable, empirical work from the CARE project
and other similar studies, the following have been identified as important factors contributing to
companies' ability to gain competitive advantage from regulatory stringency: size advantages,
country-specific preferences, proactive governments, aligned NGO interests, and regulatory
incentives for innovation. Evidence from this study supports and further refines those results.
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11.2.1 Size advantages
Studies by CARE researchers and others have found that larger firms are more likely to
capture competitive advantage from more stringent regulations, whether or not they actively seek
greater stringency (Bernauer and Caduff 2004; Foster, Hilden et al. 2006; Foster 2001; Oye and
Maxwell 1995; Vogel 1995). Their work has spanned several sectors, including electronic waste,
food safety, pulp and paper, and chemicals. The motor vehicle and oil industries are more highly
concentrated than these industries, and the motor vehicle industry (including automobiles, trucks,
and engines) is more so. There is evidence of size advantages in the oil industry, but not in the
motor vehicle industry. The impact of size was clearly seen in the oil industry's response to very
low fuel sulfur levels, where the smaller refineries lobbied heavily against the new standards.
Some refineries faced acquisition or closure because they could not afford to make the costly
desulfurization investments. Meanwhile, some oil majors, like BP and Shell, were less resistant
to the change. The one exception to this was Greenergy, which began as a small UK fuel
supplier serving a niche market for ULSD. Since Greenergy does not have retail outlets, it also
sells its fuel to BP and Shell, which distributes ULSD through its retail locations. Larger firms
are also more likely to push for upward harmonization of standards, a trend which was discussed
in Chapter 10. Because the motor vehicle industry is so concentrated in the EU, Japan, and US,
it was difficult to determine whether size advantages exist in the industry. Companies with
advanced technology that stood to benefit from more stringent standards - PSA, Toyota Europe,
International, for example - are major players in their respective markets, but were not
necessarily the market share leaders. There were many instances in the motor vehicle industry
where the market share leaders were the most resistant to regulatory change.
The pulp and paper study by Foster, Hilden, et al. observed that the large, more efficient
plants have difficulty adapting to changes in regulatory or customer demand. In the diesel
vehicle industry, it does not appear that company or plant size is a hindrance to flexibility. Even
Toyota and Honda, which came late to the European diesel market in the early 2000s, were still
able to produce competitive models in a few years' time. They even added capacity to their
European plants in response to the diesel demand. In the oil industry, large companies have
responded to shifting customer and regulatory demand through major upgrades, acquiring
smaller refineries, and managing imports and exports.
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11.2.2 Country-specific preferences, lead markets, and proactive governments
Country-specific preferences have manifested themselves in the variety of customer and
regulatory responses. The CARE research and other work have pointed to the more
environmentally minded public in Scandinavia and Germany as an explanation for the countries'
greater success in fostering cleaner technology. This is consistent with the countries which are
most proactive in reducing diesel vehicle emissions in Europe. Sweden and Finland adopted tax
differentiation policies for ULSD well ahead of other European countries. Because of the
organized activism of its environmental groups, Germany was the starting place for the wave of
particulate filter popularity throughout Europe. Despite its French identity, PSA strategically
promoted its filter among groups in Germany. When other manufacturers offered filter-equipped
cars at an extra cost, 80% of German customers paid for filters, in sharp contrast to the relative
lack of interest in France and the UK.
National governments also adopt policies that boost the competitiveness of their domestic
industries. For example, the Danish government's Renewable Energy Feed Tariffs helped
expand its wind turbine production, making Denmark the lead market for wind energy and a lead
exporter to other markets (Beise and Rennings 2005). The German government's interest in
more stringent diesel regulations also encourages its own companies to exercise leadership in
environmental innovation. Beise and Rennings call this the "Porter effect" based on Michael
Porter's theory of regulation-induced innovation.
The automobile and truck industries in Europe, Japan, and the US all carry significant
political clout with their governments. While government agencies do show sensitivity to the
interests of their domestic firms, their desire for environmental protection can outweigh concerns
about domestic competitiveness. European engine manufacturers lobbied EPA regulators to
accommodate urea SCR systems to meet the 2007 heavy-duty engine emission standards.
Initially, EPA had little incentive to make allowances for SCR systems because all the American
engine manufacturers had planned to use non-SCR systems. However, in recent years, EPA has
been more receptive to urea SCR systems, as manufacturers offer more concrete solutions to the
lack of urea infrastructure and potential end-user problems. The German Environment Ministry
wholeheartedly embraced French company PSA's filter technology, much to the chagrin of
German automakers. EPA's consent decree with the US heavy-duty engine manufacturers
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ultimately disadvantaged domestic firms and gave a competitive edge to foreign firms. The
California Air Resources Board frequently praises the low-emissions automotive technologies
from Japanese firms Honda and Toyota. Proactive government agencies like those in Germany,
California, and Tokyo have used the leading technologies of foreign companies to challenge the
progress of their domestic companies.
11.2.3 Alignment with NGO groups
Environmental groups can place pressure on companies to produce cleaner technologies
by drawing attention to the health and environmental risks of existing products. Fearing
additional regulation, companies may voluntarily introduce cleaner technologies to preempt
more criticism and/or regulation. In the food safety case by Bernauer and Caduff, there is
indication that companies push for higher standards to "buy political legitimacy and public good-
will" and increase regulatory certainty (Bernauer and Caduff 2004). This argument coincides
with a key motivation behind the cooperative rulemaking between the Japanese government and
its automobile and truck industry. With growing anti-diesel sentiment and a spate of diesel
exhaust lawsuits in Japan, the automobile and truck manufacturers were eager to show that diesel
vehicles were a clean technology. They agreed to accelerate their initial 2007 standard deadline
to 2005. However, their NOx emission reduction was not as significant as previously expected.
As part of their negotiations with the Japanese government, they weakened their NOx reduction
in exchange for a more stringent PM standard. By being more proactive with the standard-
setting, the Japanese companies were able to build in more flexibility and negotiate a more cost-
effective NOx-PM trade-off. As discussed in Chapter 10, many cases of early and first-mover
behavior were motivated by the desire for market share protection and regulatory preparation.
Companies like PSA, ARCO/BP, and International used their technology to counteract anti-
diesel criticism from the scientific and environmental communities.
A company with a cleaner product may find itself the beneficiary of environmental
groups' work to publicize the merits of cleaner technology. In some cases, companies may even
work in concert with NGOs to promote more stringent regulation. David Vogel calls this a
"Baptist and Bootlegger coalition." Environmental groups (the "Baptists") seek regulation to
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promote environmental protection, while the companies (the "bootleggers") seek regulation to
improve product sales and market share (Vogel 1995). Bernauer and Caduff (2004) discuss the
alignment of NGO and corporate interests occurring in their research. A commonly used
example is the phase-out of ozone-depleting CFCs. CFC producers Dupont and ICI's support of
the phase-out helped ensure the passage of the Montreal Protocol, a great success for the
environmental community, but a boon for the producers' sales of more costly substitutes
(Murphy 2002).
In the diesel vehicle industry, collaboration between companies and NGOs seldom
occurred openly. Lead firms were hesitant to use their advanced technology to push for greater
stringency, but once news of their technology's performance reached NGOs, regulators, and the
greater public, those groups advocated for regulations that would require their technology. The
"No Diesel Without Filter" campaign's praised PSA's particulate filter; US environmental
groups supported ARCO/BP's ultra-low sulfur diesel introduction; and environmentally-oriented
auto clubs and regulators referenced Toyota's D-CAT-equipped Avensis during the Euro 5
consultations. The companies limited accusation of rent-seeking by broadly distributing
information about their new technology, and then leaving it to third-party groups to advocate the
environmental merits on their behalf. Even emission control manufacturers, who have a very
clear interest in more stringent regulation, distanced themselves from direct collaboration with
environmental groups. Otherwise, their clients, the engine and truck manufacturers, would
perceive them as promoting more costly regulation. The "No Diesel without Filter" campaign
ultimately received funding from emission control manufacturers under the conditions that the
company donors would remain anonymous.
11.2.4 Regulatory incentives for innovation
The case studies in this thesis showed the important role of fiscal incentives in spurring
firms to market cleaner technologies. Reduced vehicle registration fees for early Euro 4
compliant cars, German toll discounts for Euro 4 and Euro 5 compliant trucks, and Swedish
ULSD tax differentiation are all examples of regulatory incentives for innovation. Similar
dependence on government intervention was observed in the findings from the other studies.
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Foster, Hilden, et al. emphasized the need for more government R&D funding for process
innovations in the pulp and paper industry. The World Resources Institute "Changing Drivers"
report on automotive industry competitiveness was based on the premise that carbon constraints,
in the form of carbon standards or taxes, would induce firms to invest in lower-carbon
technologies. The previously mentioned Danish Renewable Energy Feed Tariffs, which
subsidized renewable energy producers, was instrumental in promoting wind turbine
technologies in Denmark.
11.2.5 Findings unique to this study
While there are many shared findings between this study and other work, this research
does have some findings that have not received significant attention in other studies. While
much has been written on the role of environmental NGOs in industry responses to regulation,
the role of another type of NGO - the industry trade association - has seldom been addressed.
Instead, it is usually rolled into references to "industry" as a collective unit. This research has
shown that trade associations play a crucial role in regulatory and corporate interactions. First
and foremost, they all provide valuable information to regulators whose technology assessments
form a basis for standard-setting. Some associations, like those for emission control
manufacturers, actively promote new technologies, thereby making the case for more stringent
regulations. Other organizations may work together to oppose or weaken the stringency of
proposed regulations, by collectively citing the high cost of compliance. By doing so, they may
discourage technology leaders from introducing advanced technology ahead of regulations,
especially if this means deviating from the trade association's position. This research has
documented cases where early and first-movers have been subject to intense criticism and "peer
pressure" from competitors or trade associations.
Regulatory compliance issues such as certification and enforcement procedures
occasionally had an unintended impact on environmental benefits and regulated firms. These
details rarely surface to the mainstream media, and often go ignored by the public, even
environmental groups. However, this study shows that they deserve as much attention as the
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standards themselves because of their potential effects on firm-level competitiveness and
regulatory implementation.
Political lobbying was not necessarily the preferred vehicle for communicating readiness
for more stringent regulation. Several cases showed how technology demonstration could be
used as a more subtle and credible mechanism for influencing regulation. Regulators rely
heavily on expert assessments and company-level data to determine the feasibility of proposed
regulations. Regulatory documents and interviews with regulators show that they place
significant weight on results from pilot studies and field tests.
11.3 Future work
This thesis adds evidence from company-level and industry-wide cases to improve
understanding about factors affecting the terms of regulatory competition. The focused study of
the automobile, truck, engine, aftertreatment, and fuel industries in the EU, Japan, and the US
can facilitate additional cross-sector and cross-country comparisons. This next section discusses
future work that can build on this research.
Research can be extended in several different directions. Within the area of diesel
vehicle emission reduction, additional regulatory cycles can be evaluated, since emission and
fuel standards have been promulgated since the 1970s. This research project limited its historical
reach to the 1990s and 2000s because of greater data availability for recent years, but greater
reliance on interviews with senior experts may help to compensate for limited access to
contemporary documentation. The research design could be readily applied to studying
regulation of gasoline emissions in the same three regions. During discussion of diesel
technology, many interviewees also volunteered interesting insights into gasoline vehicle
technology, which confirm the relevance of questions concerning regulatory competition.
Off-road equipment and marine vessels have recently been subject to increasingly
stringent regulations, so the data on outcomes have been sparse. However, in a few years, after
more technology introductions are observed, they will present good opportunities for study.
Regulators and industry representatives have praised the significant government-industry
cooperation on off-road emission standards. A close study could uncover how technological
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competitiveness factors into the more collaborative outcome. The two-tier research methodology
of examining regulatory cycles and then corporate and institutional behavior could be useful for
other regulations that are tightened repeatedly. For example, regulations on combustion plant
emissions have been revised multiple times since their first promulgation. Since they are process
regulations rather than product regulations, they will not have the element of customer demand-
driven or trade-related competition that vehicles have. These differences may reduce incentives
for regulatory competition.
Automobile safety standards offer excellent material for study. Manufacturers already
compete aggressively on safety performance and reputation. According to automobile industry
surveys, customer valuation for safety is far higher than for environment (Kallback 2004). As a
result, customer demand is a stronger force than for emission reduction. Companies with
superior safety features have more traction with transportation regulators, who will want to
mandate installation of the best technologies as standard. It would be socially objectionable for
safety features to be available only to consumers who can afford to pay. Automobile insurers
seeking to reduce their accident liabilities and consumer groups seeking to reduce automobile-
related deaths will also advocate for more stringent safety mandates.
Any focused industry study would require some "immersion" in the regulations and
technologies important to that industry, in order to gain familiarity with the broader regulatory
and market context. Understanding the technical issues, keeping up with trade publications, and
interacting with experts at conferences have all been crucial to this research. The time and
resource-intensive immersion process makes such focused industry studies particularly
challenging. Relevant technical training or background is a valuable prerequisite for pursuing
such studies.
This research relied heavily on publicly available documents as a main data source, with
interviews operating as a secondary tool to supplement documentary findings. People from a
representative sample of firms, agencies, and interest groups were interviewed, but time and
resources did not allow for interviews with all major firms in the industry sectors studied. A
more systematic interview process, with structured questionnaires, could be used to test the
research findings across more firms within the diesel vehicle industry. Such an approach is
being undertaken by members of the CARE group at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology -
Zurich. They are performing research at the firm and innovation field to understand the
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determinants of "green innovation." To build a larger dataset, they are developing
questionnaires for individual firms, focusing on Swiss and German firms in the chemical and
food industries (Bernauer, Engels et al. 2006).
Additional research could compare the effectiveness of political lobbying and technology
demonstration as instruments for influencing policy. The results are likely to vary across
different industries, particularly according to their organizational level and size. The research
also illustrated significant cultural differences in regulatory styles, so further research could
address the transferability of specific policies to other national settings.
11.4 Summary
Findings from this research are generally consistent with empirical findings from other
qualitative studies of environmental innovation and regulatory competition. Size, national
preferences for environmental protection, proactive governments, aligned NGO interests, and
regulatory incentives for innovation have a positive effect on firms' ability to benefit from more
stringent environmental regulation. Additionally, this research addresses the role of industry
trade associations, regulatory compliance details, and technology demonstration in shaping
regulatory competition. Their demonstrated importance in this work should draw greater
attention to considering these areas in further studies.
The research design can be extended to other time periods, industries, and regulations.
While emissions regulations of off-road equipment and marine vehicles have not progressed
enough to provide adequate research material, gasoline vehicle emissions, combustion plant
emissions, and vehicle safety have a rich history of increasingly stringent regulation and
corporate responses. Additional research in these areas can help establish the cross-sector reach
of the findings, and determine their applicability to different types of regulations, such as product
versus process regulations or environmental versus safety concerns.
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